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
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[PARTS I-IV

REFLECTIONS ON VEDIC MYTHOLOGY*

BY

R. N. DANDEKAR

The ninth verse of the ninetieth hymn in the first book of the *Ṛgveda* reads :

*śamī no mitraḥ śamī varuṇaḥ
śamī no bhavaty aryamā /
śamī na indro bṛhaspatiḥ
śamī no viṣṇur urukramaḥ ||*

“Propitious unto us Mitra ; propitious Varuṇa ; propitious unto us may Aryaman be. Propitious unto us Indra ; Bṛhaspati ;¹ propitious unto us Viṣṇu, the widestriider.”

Whether it is deliberately intended or not — in view of the significant recurrence of this verse in various Vedic texts,² I for one should like to believe that it *is* deliberately intended — this verse reflects the three main and consecutive phases of the evolutionary mythology of the *Ṛgveda* — in the first two quarters, the first phase of the definite realization of the cosmic

* Address delivered by the author on the occasion of the re-conferment of the Doctorate on him by the Heidelberg University, on June 10, 1988.

¹ On account of the single occurrence of the word *śamī* in this quarter it is sometimes suggested that *bṛhaspatiḥ* is to be understood as an epithet of Indra. But the general tenor of the context makes it clear that the mention of two separate divinities, Indra and Bṛhaspati, is intended here. Moreover, in no sense can *bṛhaspati* be regarded as a distinctive epithet of Indra (in the way in which *urukrama* can be of Viṣṇu).

² *AV* XIX. 9. 6 ; *VS* 36. 9 ; *Tā* 7. 1. 1 ; *TU* 1. 1. 1 ; 12. 1 ; *Mān* ŚS 6. 1. 5.

(moral) order established by the 'binder' god Varuṇa and his two *alter egos* Mitra and Aryaman; in the third quarter, the phase of the mythologization of history as represented by Indra and of the purposeful concoction of his counterpart Bṛhaspati; and in the fourth quarter, the phase of the hierarchisation of popular religious cults as symbolized by Viṣṇu. It may be presumed — and this presumption gets adequate confirmation from the history of later Hinduism — that independent religious sects grew round these Vedic gods, namely, Varuṇa, Indra, Bṛhaspati, and Viṣṇu. A mutual confrontation among these religious sects was also inevitable — and, indeed, understandable. Therefore, in order to avoid any probable schism within the Vedic religion that might arise out of such confrontation, the Vedic seers introduced into their evolutionary mythology the concept of dual-divinities and thereby sought to establish a kind of rapprochement among these religious sects, based mainly on the principles of complementarity, conciliatory adjustment, and hierarchisation.

Let me begin by stating some of the principal tenets of what I understand by "evolutionary Ṛgvedic mythology": (1) The Ṛgvedic mythology cannot be said to have assumed a finite and finished form at any given moment. It would, therefore, be wrong to study that mythology as if it was a static phenomenon. Ṛgvedic mythology had been, throughout, reacting and responding to the various vicissitudes in the cultural history of the Ṛgvedic age. (2) A particular Vedic god is seen to have been dominant in a particular period, because the personality and character of that god adequately reflected the ethos of that period. (3) Even after a Ṛgvedic god had been conceived, his character did not remain unchanged. His personality, as it were, 'grew' — it often assumed a heterogeneous character on account of the different elements which came to be assimilated into it in conformity with the mythological ideology which had been undergoing constant modification. (4) The relationships among the various Ṛgvedic gods were governed by certain culture-historical compulsions. The concepts of some of the principal dual-divinities, for instance, have originated out of such compulsions.

Before I proceed, let me make it clear that I am not going to examine critically the views of other scholars regarding the topics which I shall be dealing with in the course of my lecture today. I have already done so at great length elsewhere.^{2a} I shall take for granted my own views in this regard and shall endeavour to set them forth in a new frame-work. Further I shall

^{2a} DANDEKAR, *Vedic Mythological Tracts*, Delhi 1979.

be taking into account mainly the original characters of the Vedic gods who form the subject-matter of my discourse and not the subsequent development of their personalities.

While the Proto-Aryans, that is to say the common ancestors of the Vedic Aryans and the Iranian Aryans, had been living together, presumably in the region round about Balkh, their language and religious ideology may be said to have received their initial distinctive characterisation. In that early epoch, the ancient Vedic Aryans are known to have lived in close proximity to — indeed, as a part and parcel of — nature. Like many other peoples, they were struck by the vastness, brilliance, and bounty of nature. But in their case, the mythological concept arising out of this experience, like, for instance, that of the Father Sky and the Mother Earth, seems to have had its growth arrested. For, the ancient Vedic Aryans had become fascinated by another characteristic of the natural phenomena. They realized that nature, though vast, was by no means unplanned and unregulated. It was governed by some definite law. In other words, it was not chaos; it was cosmos. This realization gave rise to the mythological concepts of *Ṛta*, the cosmic law,³ and *Varuṇa*, the administrator of that cosmic law. *Varuṇa* accomplishes the stupendous feat of establishing and sustaining the cosmic order *Ṛta*, because he is *asura*. The word *asura* is made up of the noun *asu* and the possessive termination *ra*, thus yielding the sense 'possessor of *asu*'. At an early stage in the evolution of human thought, man believed that a cosmic, magically potent, fluid permeated through all the aspects of creation and thereby invested them with the capability of being and becoming. In the Vedic parlance, this magical potency came to be called *asu*. *Varuṇa* is preeminently *asura* — the possessor of *asu par excellence*.⁴ The colossal power which *Varuṇa* derives in virtue of his being *asura* is called *māyā*,⁵ which word etymologically means the incomprehensible capacity to plan and organize something which is beyond the intelligence and powers of man. It is, indeed, from this point of view that *Varuṇa* is called *yakṣin*,⁶ the awe-inspiring miracle-working magician.

How does *Varuṇa* manage to control and regulate the working of the universe — both in its phenomenal and human aspects? How does he become *dṛṣṭavṛata*, the sustainer of laws — the *saṁrāj* or the world-sovereign whose ordinances are inexorable even for gods? The etymology of the word

³ Cf. *Ṛv* V. 1. 7; IV. 42. 4; II. 27. 8.

⁴ *Ṛv* I. 24. 14; II. 27. 10; 28. 7; VIII. 42. 1.

⁵ *Ṛv* III. 61. 7; V. 63. 4; V. 85. 6; V. 63. 3, 7.

⁶ *Ṛv* VII. 88. 6.

varuṇa would help us in answering these questions. I derive the word *varuṇa* from the root *vr* which means 'to bind'. *Varuṇa* is basically the 'binder' god who controls and regulates all the happenings in the universe — cosmic as well as human — by binding down their operators. The famous *pāśas* or fetters of *Varuṇa* may be said to serve a double purpose — on the one hand, working in a subtle intangible manner (*setṛbhir arajjubhiḥ*)⁷ they hold down the various entities in the universe in their proper places and thereby ensure their integrated functioning, and, on the other, they are employed by *Varuṇa*, the guardian of the cosmic-ethical order, as instruments of punishment to the perpetrators of *druhi* or *anṛta*.

So far as the Ṛgvedic mythology is concerned, the mythological concepts of *Mitra* and *Aryaman* must be said to represent a sort of an extension of the *Varuṇa*-concept. They are minor and late. In the *Ṛgveda* there is only one whole hymn which is addressed exclusively to *Mitra*.⁸ A critical study of that hymn and a few other references to *Mitra* would make it clear that, in the view of Vedic poets, *Mitra*'s personality had no physical basis whatsoever. I think that the initial words of the *Mitra*-hymn, *mitro janān yātayati bruvāṇaḥ* — "Mitra, through his commands, sets people in their proper places" — express the true character of that god. *Mitra* is *yātayajana*,⁹ and his main function is to control, regulate, and direct the affairs of men. The word *mitra* also, like the word *varuṇa*, is derived from a root which means 'to bind'. The original nominal derivative *mitram* (neuter) means a bond — later, a bond of friendship; and *Mitra* (masculine) is the name given to the god who establishes such bonds among the people and organizes them more particularly in the moral sense. The fact that the concept of *mitra* is connected with the concepts of *dharma* and *ṛta*¹⁰ would confirm that god *Mitra* represents the personification of an ethical-moral abstraction. One, indeed, gets the impression that the Ṛgvedic *Mitra* has been conceived as a sort of *alter ego* of *Varuṇa*. *Mitra* is in relation to the affairs of men what *Varuṇa* is in relation to the cosmic phenomena. The function of *Aryaman*, who too, in a way, shares the basic character of *Varuṇa*, is still more restricted in scope. He regulates the relationships of the Vedic people with 'strangers' — mostly in an amicable manner.

The second important period in the age of the *Ṛgveda* was marked by the migration and victorious onward march of the Vedic Aryans from the

⁷ ṚV VII. 84. 2.

⁸ ṚV III. 59.

⁹ ṚV III. 59. 5; VIII. 102. 12.

¹⁰ ṚV V. 81. 4; VIII. 52. 3; X. 8. 4.

region round about Balkh, where they had lived for a pretty long time, towards Saptasindhu or the land of the seven rivers (roughly covering the north-western portion of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent) and their subsequent colonization in Saptasindhu and beyond. I believe that the religio-mythological ideology of a people is often determined by the way of life and thought of that people. While the ancient Vedic Aryans lived with an overwhelming feeling of awe for the cosmic order, it was but natural that their religion and mythology should have been dominated by the concepts of *Ṛta* and *Varuṇa*. As against this, in the new phase of their cultural life, which I have just indicated, the Vedic Aryans were mainly required to encounter various forms of opposition and obstruction — *vr̥trāṇi* — both natural and human. They, therefore, sought for a new kind of religion — a religion which would be consistent with their new way of life. People on the war-path needed a war-god to inspire and bless them. This is briefly how *Vṛtrahā* Indra came to be 'born' in the *Ṛgvedic* pantheon, and how, soon after he had been born, he became the foremost among the *Ṛgvedic* gods — *yo jāta eva prathamah*.¹¹

Numerous *Ṛgvedic* references would make it clear that originally Indra was not a god, but that he attained god-head through his own achievements. It is noteworthy that the *Ṛgvedic* poets have not emphasized the human traits, in form and character, of any other god to the extent to which they have done of Indra. Descriptions such as that Indra had long arms, a well-shaped chin, golden hair and beard, etc., are indeed so realistic that out of them unmistakably emerges the picture of a blonde Aryan hero. But what perhaps makes the humanness of Indra's personality most self-evident are the glimpses which the Vedic poets have given us into what may be called the human weaknesses of that god. Indra's extreme fondness of Soma, his peculiar interest in women, the replenishment of his virile power through the intervention of *vr̥ṣākapi*, the unusual war-fright which he experienced on one occasion, his skirmishes with his valiant troops Maruts who were normally loyal to him — all such references would imply that the human elements in Indra's personality were really basic and essential and not merely the result of the anthropomorphisation of a natural phenomenon. Verily, Indra was a human hero, who was characterised by some human weaknesses, but who, at the same time, possessed the capacity for superhuman exploits.

The most basic theme of the Indra-mythology is Indra's victory over *Vṛtra*. One of the most exclusive epithets of that god is *vṛtrahā* — conqueror

¹¹ *ṚV* II. 12. 1.

and destroyer of *Vṛtra*. And in this very epithet lies the secret of the elevation of the human hero to godhead. The *Ṛgvedic* references to *Vṛtra* hardly produce the impression of any specific personality. The word *vṛtra* (neuter; usually plural *vṛtrāṇi*) originally implied any form of resistance or opposition. This impersonal concept was sometimes personified in the form of demon *Vṛtra* (masculine) after the historically authentic hero Indra had been transformed into a mythological divinity. Etymologically considered, if *Vṛtra* was resistance incarnate, Indra (connected with the word *nara*) was virility incarnate.

I have, all along, been emphasizing the fact that the original character of Indra was that of a historically authentic human hero. It must not, however, be supposed that all the exploits ascribed to Indra by the Vedic poets were actually accomplished by that particular individual. For, when history is transformed into mythology, an individual is correspondingly transformed into an institution. In other words, after the mythological deification of the historical human hero Indra, all conceivable exploits—historical or otherwise—came to be attributed to him. It is the period of the warlike adventures of the Vedic Aryans and their subsequent conquests and colonization under the victorious leadership of Indra, which is largely reflected in the *Ṛgveda*. This explains why the *Ṛgvedic* mythology is so conspicuously Indra-dominated.

Bṛhaspati-Brahmaṇaspati (I take the two divinities, *Bṛhaspati* and *Brahmaṇaspati*, to be identical) obviously owes his origin to the tendencies which were inevitably engendered by the Indra-dominated mythology. In a sense, therefore, this god may be said to belong conceptually to the second phase of the evolutionary mythology of the *Ṛgveda*. Various views have been put forth regarding the personality and character of *Bṛhaspati-Brahmaṇaspati*. ROTH sees in him the personification of the activity of the holy men with respect to the gods. According to OLDENBERG, *Bṛhaspati* represents the deification of the efficaciousness of the *mantras* or magically potent prayers. MAX MÜLLER, who is generally followed by MACDONELL, identifies him with Agni, while HILLEBRANDT, who, incidentally, on account of his unmistakable bias towards moon-gods, is often referred to as Mond-mytholog, thinks that he is a moon-god. It is also suggested, by ZIMMER, for instance, that *Bṛhaspati* is a deified ancient seer. BERGAIGNE seems to agree with this view, but he rejects the suggestion that *Bṛhaspati* is a pure abstraction. WEBER and HOPKINS regard that god as priestly abstraction of Indra. In recent years, GONDA has understood *Bṛhaspati-Brahmaṇaspati* to be the lord of the power in *brahman*, while Hans-Peter SCHMIDT has drawn attention to the various

aspects of that god's personality — for instance, as epithet of Indra, as priest, as an independent god in general, and, more specifically, as a heroic god.

Br̥haspati is celebrated in eleven entire hymns of the *Ṛgveda*, while in two hymns (IV. 49, VII. 97) he forms a dual-divinity with Indra. Though some kind of distinction appears to have been made between Br̥haspati and Brahmanaspati in Vedic ritual and ancillary Vedic texts,¹² the two words are used almost indiscriminately in the *Ṛgveda*. Etymology also seems to suggest the identity of the two gods.¹³ Incidentally it may be noted that only one name, namely Br̥haspati, is generally retained in later literature. *Ṛgvedic* references to Br̥haspati clearly indicate that he has by no means grown out of naturalistic mythology. Nor is he an outcome of the mythologization of a historical human personality. Again the suggestion that *br̥haspati* was originally an epithet of Indra and was later separated from him and established as an independent god does not seem to be warranted. There is no indication in the *Ṛgveda* of this kind of evolution of his personality — he already appears as a full-fledged independent god in that Veda as is clearly testified by II. 24. 11-13. At the same time, there can hardly be any doubt that he is a later addition to the Vedic pantheon. The facts that Br̥haspati has no Indo-European or IndoIranian cognates, that his name is artificially coined as a compound with *pati* as the latter member, that the hymns relating to him rarely contain any internal repetitions, and that sometimes a suspicion is expressed regarding the genuineness and originality of his personality¹⁴ would seem to confirm such an assumption.

The over-all impression that one might form in the light of what has been said so far would be that Br̥haspati was a deliberate artificial mythological creation, that he was conceived at some later stage in the evolution of the *Ṛgvedic* mythology to serve some specific function. Without discussing the various aspects of the personality and character of Br̥haspati, I shall address myself to only one question: why did Br̥haspati come to be introduced in Vedic mythology?

It has been already pointed out that the changed conditions in the life of the Proto-Indo-Aryans necessitated a transition from the cosmic-ethical phase of the *Ṛgvedic* mythology to the Indra-dominated heroic phase. During

¹² Cf. TS II. 1. 7; 2. 6; 8. 2; *Nirukta* X. 11. 12; *Br̥haddevatū* I. 12. 2; II. 2. 3. *Brahmanaspati* is sometimes employed as a gloss on Br̥haspati (TB III. 11. 4. 2).

¹³ *Brahman* and *br̥h* are derived from the same root *br̥h* which means "strengthen" or "make firm".

¹⁴ Cf. *ṚV* I. 190. 5.

their migration from Balkh to Saptasindhu and their subsequent colonisation in that region, the early Vedic Aryans had to confront many Vṛtras, both natural and human. History came to be mythologised, and as the result of it the victorious warlike leader of the Vedic Aryans was 'born' in the Vedic pantheon as Indra and forthwith became the foremost among the gods — *yo jāta eva prathamo manasvān*.¹⁵ This naturally eventuated in the general glorification of the cult of military prowess. The socio-religious repercussions of the newly evident domineering stance of the cult of militarism against priestcraft — of Kṣatra against Brahman — are seen to have been reflected in several Vedic passages. In *Ṛgveda* X. 109, for instance, there is a reference to *brahmajāyā*, the wife of a priest, having been kidnapped.¹⁶ The same topic is dealt with at greater length in *Atharvaveda* V. 17. That hymn contains a clear threat that the kidnapped wife of a Brahman is fearful and causes great disaster.¹⁷ It is hinted that there will be nothing but sheer misfortune in the kingdom in which a Brahman's wife is kept away from him.¹⁸ *Atharvaveda* V. 18 refers to the robbing of a Brahman of his cow. "Her", it is said, "the gods did not give thee for thee to eat, o king; do not thou, o Rājanya, desire to devour the cow of the Brāhmaṇa, that is not to be eaten".¹⁹ The degraded military potentate becomes addicted to dice, is evil and self-ruined, who eats up the Brahman's cow, for, he only thinks: let me live today; I don't care for the morrow — *adya jīvāni mā śvaḥ*.²⁰ He forgets that the Brahman, like fire, is not to be harmed by one who holds himself dear, for, Soma is Brahman's heir and Indra his protector against imprecations.²¹ We are told that the military rulers, Vaitahavyas, who usurped the Brahman's cow (that is, the Brahman's belongings), perished.²² Elsewhere it is reported that the Sṛñjaya-Vaitahavyas, who prospered excessively, who just did not quite touch up the sky (*nodiva divam asprśan*), having molested the Brahman, Bhṛgu, suffered utter mortification.²³ Those who spat upon a Brahman, we are further told, or who sent their mucus at him — they sit in the midst of a stream of blood, devouring hair.²⁴ A king who thinks himself formidable and who desires to exploit a Brahman — his kingdom is laid waste where a Brahman is scathed.²⁵ The derisive attitude of the Pajras towards Bṛhaspati²⁶ may also be mentioned as being indicative of the growing Brahman-Kṣatra antagonism.

Obviously the need must have been felt, even at an early stage, for

¹⁵ *ṚV* II. 12. 1.

¹⁸ *AV* V. 17. 12-17.

²¹ *AV* V. 18. 6.

²⁴ *AV* V. 19. 3.

¹⁶ *RV* X. 109. 2, 5.

¹⁹ *AV* V. 18. 1.

²² *AV* V. 18. 10.

²⁵ *AV* V. 19. 6.

¹⁷ *AV* V. 17. 6, 7.

²⁰ *AV* V. 18. 2.

²³ *AV* V. 19. 1.

²⁶ *RV* I. 190. 5.

counteracting such militarist arrogance. Passively, the Vedic poet-priests used to insist that, in order to prove efficacious, the military prowess (as symbolized by Indra) had to be supplemented by the magically potent *mantra*. For instance, the credit for the victory of Sudās in the War of the Ten Kings (*Dāśarājña*) is said to have largely belonged to Vasiṣṭha (Sudās' Purohita) who, through his *mantra*-power, had brought about Indra's intervention in Sudās' favour.²⁷ When, in that war, the Tṛtsu-Bharatas had become disrupted and weak, their Purohita, Vasiṣṭha, assumed the leadership and goaded his patrons on to victory.²⁸ Elsewhere it is said : O Indra-Varuṇa, invulnerably you overpowered Bheda by means of your deadly weapons and thus aided Sudās in the Dāśarājña battle; for, you listened to the magically potent prayers of the Bharatas even in the midst of the urgent rival-invocations. In all this, indeed, there clearly became evident the supreme efficacy of the priestcraft of the Tṛtsu-Vasiṣṭhas — *satyā tṛtsūnām abhavat purohitiḥ*.²⁹

The other step in this process of asserting the claim of priestcraft by the side of — or, in some cases, even against — military prowess was more positive. A veritable new god was conceived and came to be introduced in Vedic mythology — namely, Bṛhaspati-Brahmaṇaspati, the lord of *brahman*, of *mantra*-power and priestcraft. Understandably, there was little anthropomorphism in the make-up of this god — the 'function' aspect of this god was definitely more prominent than the 'individuality' aspect. It is emphasised that that king alone would, indeed, prevail over his adversaries who held Bṛhaspati in high esteem and regard.³⁰ Bṛhaspati is the sage of sages (*kaviṇi kavīnām*), the supreme king of prayers (*jyeṣṭharājāṃ brahmaṇām*).³¹ He promotes the yoking of devotion, and without him sacrifice does not succeed.³² As a path-maker he makes good the access to the feast of the gods.³³ He awakens the gods with sacrifice.³⁴ Wise gods themselves attain their share in sacrifice through mighty Bṛhaspati; he is the creator of all magically potent *mantras*. Whoever makes offerings unto him will never be subjected to suffering; but of the Brahman-hater he is a veritable scourge.³⁵ Verily, Bṛhaspati is the most godly of the gods (*devānāṃ devatama*).³⁶

Besides such conventional glorification of Bṛhaspati, attempt seems to have been deliberately made to present that god as being on par with Indra, the victorious warlike hero who had become the foremost among the Vedic

²⁷ ṚV VII. 33. 3.²⁸ ṚV IV. 50. 7-9.²⁹ ṚV II. 23. 6-7.³⁰ ṚV II. 24. 3.³¹ ṚV VII. 33. 6.³² ṚV II. 23. 1.³³ AV XIX. 63. 1.³⁴ ṚV VII. 83. 4.³⁵ ṚV I. 18. 7.³⁶ ṚV II. 23. 4.

gods. Bṛhaspati Āṅgīrasa, the first-born holy one, cleaver of rocks, roars as a bull at the two worlds, slays *vṛtras*, shatters forts, overcomes foes.³⁷ No one can overcome him in great fight or small.³⁸ He is to be invoked in combats,³⁹ and is a priest much praised in conflict.⁴⁰ Bṛhaspati shares with Indra the epithets *vajrin* (wielder of the bolt),⁴¹ *maghavan*,⁴² and *somapā*.⁴³ He is sometimes represented as the companion and ally of Indra,⁴⁴ but, what is far more significant, Bṛhaspati is individually credited with great heroic exploits in the celebrated Vala-myth. The mountain is said to have yielded to Bṛhaspati's splendour when he opened the cowstall. Accompanied by his singing host, he rent Vala with a roar and, shouting, drove out the lowing cows. He won treasures and the great stalls full of cows; the irresistible Bṛhaspati slew his foe with flames.⁴⁵ Bṛhaspati's conquest of Vala was regarded to be so characteristic that it almost became proverbial.⁴⁶

There can hardly be any doubt that such warlike character was tendentiously superimposed on Bṛhaspati. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for counteracting the ascendancy of the Kṣātra-power over the Brahman-power, the Vedic myth-makers went to the other extreme. Indra's role, even in warlike exploits, is sometimes said to have been secondary to that of Bṛhaspati.⁴⁷ Presumably, therefore, in order to avoid a new impending conflict between the Brahman-cult and the Kṣātra-cult, the evolutionary Vedic mythology conceived the dual-divinity *Indrābṛhaspati*, who is celebrated in the two whole hymns, *ṚV* IV. 49 and VII. 97.

It needs to be emphasized that the *Ṛgveda-Samhitā*, as we have it today, does by no means constitute the entire literature which had been produced in the *Ṛgvedic* age. Nor can the *Ṛgveda* claim to reflect the life and thought of all the strata of the *Ṛgvedic* community. For instance, the sects, which had developed round *Varuṇa-Mitra-Aryaman* and *Indra and Bṛhaspati* and which we have briefly surveyed so far, have to be understood as representing mainly the religio-mythological ideology of the classes of the *Ṛgvedic* poets, priests, and warriors. But there must have then existed also some forms of the religion of the masses or the common people. The gods of these 'popular' cults could possibly not be by-passed altogether. In course of time, after the life-conditions of the Vedic Aryans had in general

³⁷ *ṚV* VI. 73. 1-2.

⁴⁰ *ṚV* II. 24. 9.

⁴³ *ṚV* I. 24. 12.

⁴⁴ *ṚV* II. 23. 18; 24. 2; VIII. 85. 15.

⁴⁵ *ṚV* II. 23. 18; IV. 50. 5; VI. 73. 3.

⁴⁶ *AV* IX. 3. 2.

³⁸ *ṚV* I. 40. 8.

⁴¹ *ṚV* I. 40. 8; *AV* XI. 10. 12, 13.

⁴² *ṚV* IV. 50. 10.

³⁹ *ṚV* II. 23. 13.

⁴⁷ *ṚV* X. 108, 6, 11; II. 24. 3.

become more settled and secure, the peculiar pressure of circumstances must have compelled the Vedic poet-priests to grant recognition to these gods, albeit with some reluctance. But while granting such recognition, those poet-priests took care to change the original character of those gods in such a way as to bring those gods, as far as possible, in line with the hieratic religio-mythological ideology. However, fortunately for us, some indications about the original character of those gods have remained unobliterated in the *Rgveda*. A typical example of this phenomenon is the evolutionary mythology relating to Viṣṇu.

For instance, in a few passages of the *Rgveda* Viṣṇu is characterised as *śipiviṣṭa*. It is noteworthy that these passages are — perhaps deliberately — shrouded in obscurity. Apparently the Vedic poets were straining themselves to refer to Viṣṇu's character denoted by the epithet *śipiviṣṭa* in as guarded and vague a manner as possible. Etymologically, the word *śipiviṣṭa* denotes an expanding, active male organ. Presumably, the concept of *śipiviṣṭa* must have been regarded by the sophisticated poet-priests almost as taboo. In the *Nirukta*, Aupamanyava describes Viṣṇu's epithet *śipiviṣṭa* as *kutsitārthīya* — “having a censurable implication”. This would explain why the *Rgvedic* poet-priests mentioned it (when they were at all required to mention it) almost grudgingly. That epithet signifies Viṣṇu's connection with the concepts of virile power, procreation, fecundity, etc. In other words, Viṣṇu must have originally been a god of virility and fertility. In confirmation of this hypothesis, attention may be drawn to the *Vṛṣākapi*-hymn in the *Rgveda*⁴⁸ wherein the *Vṛṣākapi* is said to have invested the exhausted Indra with fresh virile power. The identity of *Vṛṣākapi* with Viṣṇu is proved by considerable literary evidence. Viṣṇu's connection with virility, procreation, and fertility is further confirmed by some other incidental references in Vedic literature and ritual, such as Viṣṇu's association with *Sinīvālī*, the guardian goddess of wombs, his epithets *niṣikṭapā*⁴⁹ and *sumajjāni*,⁵⁰ and the formula, *viṣṇur yonim kalpayatu*, employed in a rite connected with conception.

Anthropological research has shown that many primitive communities have conceived their fertility-gods as having ‘bird’ as their symbol. Some traces of this trend are to be seen in Vedic ritual also. For instance, the divinity which plays a very significant role in the *Mahāvratā* rite, which is obviously a fertility rite, is represented in the form of a bird. Similarly the *Mahadukthya* altar used in that rite has the shape of a bird. The word *viṣṇu* is to be derived from the root *vi* ‘to fly’, to which is suffixed the termina-

⁴⁸ *RV* X. 86.⁴⁹ *RV* VII. 36. 9.⁵⁰ *RV* I. 156. 2.

tion *smu* (as in such words as *jiṣṇu*, *kṣeṣṇu*). Thus, Viṣṇu, the god of virility and fertility, was also conceived as having the form of a bird.

When, however, the Vedic poet-priests were constrained to admit Viṣṇu into their mythology, they shrewdly shifted their emphasis from the concept of the bird as the symbol of a fertility-divinity to that of the bird as the symbol of a solar divinity. As a result of this, Viṣṇu appears in the *Ṛgveda* mainly as the wide-striding sun-god. With a view to further elevating the mythological status of Viṣṇu, the Vedic poets employed their usual strategy, namely, of relating that god, of course, with unmistakable artificiality, to Indra who had duly become the trademark, as it were, of the *Ṛgvedic* mythology.

The conception of dual-divinities in the *Ṛgveda* is certainly of great moment in the early Vedic evolutionary mythology. The relationship among the various Vedic gods was governed by certain religious-cultural compulsions. I believe that the conception of dual-divinities — at least in some major cases — has originated out of such compulsions. It has been already pointed out that, in the first phase of *Ṛgvedic* mythology which had developed in the Proto-Aryan period in the region round about Balkh, great emphasis was put on the belief of the sustenance and regulation of the cosmic phenomena, and incidentally of the affairs of human life, having been brought about through some kind of 'bondage'. There must have also developed, during that period, some kind of simple ritual involving Agni and Soma. But the predominant mythological concept was definitely that of the cosmic law *Ṛta* and the sovereign administrator of that law Asura Varuṇa. As has been pointed out earlier, so far as the Vedic mythology was concerned, the mythological concepts of Mitra and Aryaman represented merely an extension of the Varuṇa-concept — they were obviously minor and late. In course of time, however, Mitra's function must have come to be regarded as being as important as that of Varuṇa, for, the ethical-moral order in human affairs was believed to be as essential as in cosmic phenomena. The two gods representing the two different aspects of the same basic concept of ethical bond, namely, Asura Varuṇa and *yātayajjana* Mitra, were combined to form a single divinity Mitrāvaruṇau. Indeed, so far as the *Ṛgveda* is concerned, the dual-divinity Mitrāvaruṇau has more hymns dedicated to it than to each of the two gods individually. Twenty-three whole hymns and parts of several others celebrate Mitrāvaruṇau, while Varuṇa has twelve hymns addressed to him and Mitra only one. In the case of Mitrāvaruṇau, the concept of dual-divinity served the purpose of religious-mythological complementarity.⁵¹

⁵¹ The dual-divinities Dyāvāpṛthivī and Sūryācandramasau also are suggestive of complementarity, but they are naturalistic rather than mythological.

The concept of *Indrāvaruṇau* is, however, of far greater consequence. The dominant religious cult of the Proto-Aryan period was the *Varuṇa*-cult. The last years of the Proto-Aryan period witnessed the migration of the Proto-Aryans towards Iran on the one hand and towards *Saptasindhu* or the Land of Seven Rivers on the other. The migration towards *Saptasindhu* meant for these people, whom we may now call Vedic Aryans, a drastic change in their way of life and thought, particularly after their fairly long sojourn in the region of *Balkh*. It was now a life of fateful confrontation with *Vṛtras* — human foes and environmental impediments — and of consequent warlike adventures. This new life of conquest and colonization called for a new religion and a new god. The cosmic religion of the world-sovereign Asura *Varuṇa* could no longer adequately meet the exigencies of the new age. The Vedic Aryans naturally craved for a heroic god who could bless and promote their onward march towards *Saptasindhu* and beyond. So was *Vṛtrahā* *Indra* 'born' in the Vedic pantheon. Consequently, there developed in Vedic religion two major sects, presumably rivalling each other, namely, the more ancient sect centering round Asura *Varuṇa* and the newly evolved one centering round *Vṛtrahā* *Indra*. A headlong conflict between these two sects could have adversely affected the solidarity of the Vedic community. The impending schism within the Vedic Aryandom had to be avoided at all costs. This was achieved by the evolutionary Vedic mythology through the conception of the dual-divinity *Indrāvaruṇau*.

There are in the *Ṛgveda* eight whole hymns and parts of two hymns which have *Indrāvaruṇau* as *devatā*. Out of these, the four hymns in the seventh book of the *Ṛgveda*, which, incidentally, form the largest single group of *Indrāvaruṇau* hymns, are particularly significant. *Vasiṣṭha*, the seer of the seventh book, was a devoted protagonist of the *Varuṇa* cult.⁵² But, transcending all thought of bigotry, he assumed a very practical and realistic attitude and deliberately sought to co-ordinate and harmonize the two religious sects. He studiously emphasised in his *Indrāvaruṇau* hymns that the spheres of activity of *Varuṇa* and *Indra*, though separate, were essentially complementary and that an active collaboration, on equal terms, of these two gods would alone ensure the properly integrated and amicable operation of the world-process in its cosmic and socio-political aspects. All thought of antagonism between *Varuṇa* and *Indra* was vigorously discountenanced and an attitude of religious conciliation became quite transparent. This, *Vasiṣṭha* accomplished in various ways. For instance, he identified the specific

⁵² See "A Vedic god and a Vedic sect" in DANDEKAR, *Vedic Mythological Tracts*, pp. 312-350.

spheres of sovereignty of these two gods by characterising Varuṇa as *saṁrāj* or primeval world-sovereign and Indra as *svarāj* or one who won his divine suzerainty through his own prowess.⁵³ In the course of the development of the Vedic religious ideology, Varuṇa, the administrator of cosmic law, also came to be represented specifically as the god who enforced moral order within the human community. In his *Indrāvaruṇau* hymns, Vasiṣṭha has taken special pains to reiterate that Indra, the war-god, sponsored the Vedic Aryans' exploits of conquest and colonization (*pṛtanāsu*), while Varuṇa, the moral governor, blessed their efforts in connection with the establishment of law and order (*kṣemasya prasave*).⁵⁴ Both gods were great (*mahāntau*) in their respective roles; having duly recognised this, all other gods, in the highest heaven, subserved *Indrāvaruṇau* by consigning into them their splendour and their strength.⁵⁵ But Vasiṣṭha's main slogan in his efforts to bring about conciliation between the Varuṇa-cult and the Indra-cult may be said to have been embodied in *ṚV VII. 83. 9 ab* : *vṛtrāṇy anyañ samitheṣu jiglmate vratāny anyo abhi rakṣate sadā* "One of the two gods", proclaims Vasiṣṭha, "vanquishes the enemies in battles, while the other ever sustains the socio-ethical laws". In other words, Indra *conquers* and Varuṇa *rules*.

Similar purpose of religious conciliation is served by the dual-divinity *Indrābṛhaspatī*. The Vedic god *Bṛhaspati*, as pointed out earlier, was conceived to counteract the undue glorification of military prowess which had been engendered by the Indra-dominated mythology. There was, however, the fear, which was perhaps not quite unwarranted, that the conflict between what may be loosely called the Brahman-cult and the Kṣatra-cult might jeopardize the solidarity of the Vedic community. Actually, what needed to be specifically emphasised was that, in order to be successful, military activity had to be necessarily augmented by the magically potent *mantras*. The evolutionary Vedic mythology accomplished this, first by presenting *Bṛhaspati*, a new-comer in the Vedic pantheon, as a companion and ally of Indra in his various exploits⁵⁶ and then by celebrating the dual-divinity *Indrābṛhaspatī* as in the two whole hymns, *ṚV IV. 49* and *VII. 97*.

Besides complementarity (as in the case of *Mitrāvaruṇau*) and conciliatory adjustment (as in the case of *Indrāvaruṇau* and *Indrābṛhaspatī*), the

⁵³ *ṚV VII. 82. 2.*

⁵⁴ *ṚV VII. 82. 4 ab; 5 cd; 6.*

⁵⁵ *ṚV VII. 82. 2 bcd.*

⁵⁶ *ṚV II. 23. 18; 24. 2; VIII. 85. 15.*

third purpose which the conception of the dual-divinities served was religious-mythological elevation or hierarchization. We have seen that the third phase of the evolutionary Vedic mythology was characterised by, among other things, the gradual emergence to prominence of 'popular' and 'indigenous' religious cults. The god, who might be regarded as being particularly representative of this trend, was Viṣṇu. In the Ṛgvedic mythology, Viṣṇu is seen to be steadily developing from his original character as a popular fertility-divinity to an artificially sophisticated solar divinity. In course of time, the Ṛgvedic mythology sought to validate this elevated mythological status of that god. It brought this about by associating Viṣṇu with Indra in howsoever superficial and artificial a manner. Indra had become the very hallmark of the hieratic Ṛgvedic religion, as is amply testified by the conspicuously Indra-dominated Ṛgvedic mythology. He served as a catalyst, as it were, in the process of the hieratic elevation of 'popular' gods. Intrinsically Viṣṇu had nothing in common with Indra — he had hardly anything to do with Indra. But the Vedic mythology-makers made him a subordinate ally or an equal partner or a superior associate of Indra in his heroic deeds⁵⁷ and eventually confirmed his elevated status by combining him with Indra to form the dual-divinity *Indrāviṣṇū*.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Cf. *ṚV* VIII. 12. 27; VII. 99. 4-6; I. 154. 6; 155. 2; II. 22. 1; VIII. 3. 8; 12. 16.

⁵⁸ One whole hymn, namely *ṚV* VI. 69, is dedicated to *Indrāviṣṇū*. This dual-divinity is also referred to in many other passages. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the history of the dual-divinity *Indrāpūṣāṇau* has much in common with that of *Indrāviṣṇū*.

A STATISTICAL STUDY OF RĀMĀYAṆA SUNDARAKĀṆḌA, YUDDHAKĀṆḌA AND UTTARAKĀṆḌA

BY

M. R. YARDI

This study of *Rāmāyaṇa* is a sequel to the study of the *Mahābhārata* undertaken by the author and published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.¹ The study of *Mahābhārata* was made possible as it is written for the most part in the *Anuṣṭubh* metre, which has a flexible pattern as contrasted with the rigid pattern of other metres. The *Rāmāyaṇa* is also written mostly in *Anuṣṭubh* metre, and the method which was followed in the study of *Mahābhārata* can also be applied to the study of *Rāmāyaṇa*. This method has been described in *MGG*, Introduction, pp. i-v. It would be worthwhile to repeat its salient points here.

The *Anuṣṭubh* metre consists of 32 syllables, eight in each *pāda*, and although there are several varieties of this metre, the one in common use has the fifth syllable short, the sixth long and the seventh alternately long and short, in each *pāda* with a few permissible variations. A syllable is long if it contains a long vowel or a short vowel followed by a conjunct consonant. Instead of the *pādas* it is more convenient to take the lines, each consisting of two *pādas* i. e. sixteen syllables each. Then each line will have the fifth, thirteenth and fifteenth syllables short and the sixth, seventh and fourteenth long. The remaining ten syllables can be either short or long. The stylistic variations in the *Anuṣṭubh ślokas* could arise by the author's unconscious use of long or short syllables in these positions which they are free to do.

The statistical study proceeds in two stages. First we select a group of *adhyāyas* relating to a definite event or topic and count the number of lines as well as the number of long syllables in each of the ten positions where they can be either long or short. It is obvious that we have to leave out all *adhyāyas* which consist wholly or mainly of long metre stanzas, which have a rigid metrical form. The prose passages will have to be excluded. I have also left out the few *adhyāyas* which have less than ten *Anuṣṭubh ślokas*. The count of long syllables for each *adhyāya* in a group will give a two-way distribution

¹ *The Mahābhārata : Its Genesis and Growth : A Statistical Study* : B. O. R. I., Poona, 1986 (*MGG* for short).

³ [*Annals BORI*]

of long syllables according to *adhyāyas* and the ten positions. Then we apply a statistical method known as Analysis of Variance. The beauty of this method is that one can separate the total sum of squares according to the sources of variation. I have taken two sources of variation : between the *adhyāyas* and within the *adhyāyas*, although a two-way classification can be further divided into between the *adhyāyas*, between the syllabic counts and error. I have combined the latter two sources, as the groups of *adhyāyas* may differ from each other because of the variation due to syllabic counts and due to error or both.

The Analysis of Variance is strictly applicable to normal distribution, but it is also found to be valid for non-normal distributions, which for large samples approach the normal. Since the syllables can be either short or long in ten positions, the distribution is a multinomial one, which for large samples approaches the normal. The total sum of squares is separated into two parts, (i) due to variation between the *adhyāyas* and (ii) due to variation within the *adhyāyas*. In order to eliminate the effect of the sizes of the *adhyāyas*, we calculate the sum of squares due to regression of the *adhyāya* means on the number of lines and deduct it from the sum of squares due to variation between the *adhyāyas*. The remainder gives the sum of squares due to deviations from the regression, and by dividing it by the appropriate degrees of freedom, we get an estimate of variance between the *adhyāyas* after making allowance for the different sizes of the *adhyāyas*. We also get an estimate of variance due to variation within the *adhyāyas* by dividing the mean squares by the appropriate degrees of freedom.

We have now two estimates of variance, and we have to find out whether they differ only by chance or are significantly different. The quotient F of two estimates of a normal population has a distribution discovered by Fisher (pp. 131–136), who has tabulated it in the form $\log_e \sqrt{F}$. Snedecor named the variance ratio F after Fisher and has given a Table for the distribution of F itself. Snedecor has also given a formula for calculating the values of F . If the calculated value of F is less than its tabulated (formula) value, the group of *adhyāyas* is homogeneous. If it exceeds that value, then the variation between the *adhyāyas* is significantly different, and so the group is not homogeneous in style. The application of this method has been applied later to *adhyāyas* 32–65 of the *Yuddhakāṇḍa* and *adhyāyas* 1–38 of the *Uttarakāṇḍa*.

In order to test whether the variances due to variation of two different groups of *adhyāyas* are due to chance variation or are significantly different, we apply a modified F test given by Snedecor (p. 209). F is calculated as the quotient of the larger variance by the smaller and then the probability is doubled. This follows from the fact that the F so calculated is always greater

than 1, so that only the upper part of the distribution is used. In order to test the homogeneity of the two groups at 5% level the ordinary Table giving the 5% points of distribution of F is not useful. We must have table giving 2.5% points of distribution of F. Such a Table is given by Bawkef and Lieberman in their book *Engineering Statistics*. They have also given a formula for calculating the 2.5 per cent points of F. If the calculated value of F is less than the tabular or formula value, then the two groups do not differ significantly. If, however, this value exceeds the tabular or formula value, the two groups are significantly different.

By applying this method to the groups of *adhyāyas* taken two at a time, it has been possible to establish that there are five different styles in the *Mahābhārata*. If we take all the results in the Epic, these styles along with their variances and degrees of freedom representing them as shown below :

Table A

Style	Variance	Degrees of freedom
A	255.42	3123
α	55.52	5168
B	87.08	6795
C	171.51	1773
β	1071.89	99

The style A has been identified as the style of the original Bhārata of Vaiśampāyana, who has been assigned the date (10th century B. C.). The style α and B belong to Sūta and Sauti, father and son, who lived in the 5th century B. C. Style C is identified as belonging to the author of *Harivaṃśa*, who lived in 2nd century B. C. and style β is identified as that of the author of *Parvasaṅgraha*, who lived just before the Christian era. (See MGG, Chap. IX). It is proposed to apply the same method to determine the original *Rāmāyaṇa* and the additions which came to be made later. Incidentally, it would be interesting to find out whether some of the redactors of *Mahābhārata* also had a hand in the redactions of *Rāmāyaṇa*.

I have taken the Critical Edition of *Rāmāyaṇa* published by the Oriental Institute, Baroda, for the purposes of this study. In order to determine the style of the original *Rāmāyaṇa*, it is necessary to begin the study with the *Yuddhakāṇḍa*, which deals with the war with Rāvaṇa.

If we take the first fifteen *sargas*, the mean square is 12444.5 with variance 92.18 (d. f. 135).

For the *sargas* 16-31, the mean square is 16672.7 with variance 115.78 (d. f. 144).

We come up with a problem in the next two groups, *sargas* 32-46 and 47-65. The former gives the mean square 18416.7 with variance 136.42 (d. f. 135). The second gives the mean square 39661.34 with variance 231.94 (d. f. 171). The former looks close to the C-style of the *Mahābhārata*, and the second can be shown to be identical with the A-style of the *Mahābhārata*, which is identified with the style of Vaiśampāyana. However, it seems absurd that Vaiśampāyana could have made additions to the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the miraculous element introduced in this group is also not in his line. We have, therefore, to examine whether he who added *sargas* 32-46 also added the *sargas* 47-65. For this it is necessary to examine whether the *sargas* 32-65 have a homogeneous style. The analysis of variance is as follows :

Table B
Analysis of Variance
Yuddhakāṇḍa
Sargas 32-65

Variation	Degrees of freedom	Mean square	Variance	F
Between				
Due to regression	1	212515.05		
Deviation from regression	32	1297.15	40.54	.21
Within the <i>sargas</i>	306	58078.04	189.8	
Total	339			

We find that F, the ratio of variance due to deviation from regression to the variance within *sargas*, is .21, $n_1 = 306$, $n_2 = 32$, which is less than its tabulated value 1.63. All these 34 *sargas*, therefore, have a homogeneous style and have the mean square 58078.04 with variance 189.8 (d. f. 306).

For the *sargas* 66-79, we have the mean square as 14002.5 with variance 111.13 (d. f. 126).

The *sargas* 80-99 have the mean square 21319.9 with variance 118.44 (d. f. 180).

For the remaining *sargas* 100-116, the mean square is 17779.3 with variance 116.2 (d. f. 153).

Thus we find that for the 34 *sargas*, 32–65, the variance is 189.80 with d. f. 306. For the remaining 82 *sargas* the mean square, variance and degrees of freedom are as shown below :

Table C
Yuddhakāṇḍa

<i>Sargas</i>	Mean square	D. f.	Variance	F
1	2	3	4	
1–15	12444.5	135	92.28	1.28
16–31	16672.7	144	115.47	1.03
66–79	14002.5	126	111.13	1.07
80–99	21319.9	180	118.44	
100–116	17779.3	153	116.20	1.02
Total for 82 <i>sargas</i>	82218.9	738	111.41	

We compare the variances with the highest variance 118.44 (d. f. 180). We find that all the values of F other than for *sargas* 1–15 are clearly not significant. For the *sargas* 1–15, we get $F > 1 = 1.28$, $n_1 = 180$, $n_2 = 135$, which is less than its formula value 1.38 and so is not significant. All these 82 *sargas* belong to the same group and have a variance 111.41 (d. f. 738).

In the *Sundarakāṇḍa*, the first *sarga* starts with the flight of Hanumat over the sea in his search of Sītā. This *sarga*, consisting of 190 ślokas, gives an extraordinarily high mean square, namely 16728.4 with variance 1858.71 (d. f. 9). The first forty ślokas only describe Hanumat's flight over the sea, which forms an essential part of *Rāmāyaṇa*. The ślokas 41–190 contain anecdotes of the Maināka mountain, of Surasā and demoness Simhikā. It was, therefore, evident that this *sarga* contained some later additions. This *sarga* is therefore divided into two parts (1) Ślokas 1–40 with mean square 1831.6 and (2) ślokas 41–190 with mean square 8271.6. The degrees of freedom 9 were split up into 2 and 7 between the two parts in proportion to their mean squares. But since ślokas 1–40 seem to have formed part of the original *Rāmāyaṇa*, their degrees of freedom were taken as 9. Thus ślokas 1–40 had the mean square 1831.7 with 9 degrees of freedom, and ślokas 41–190 had the mean square 8271.6 with 7 degrees of freedom. We have taken the ślokas 1–40 in *sarga* 1 along with ślokas 22–32 for reasons stated in the next two paragraphs.

We then take up *sargas* 2–21, excluding *sargas* 4 and 6, which contain wholly long metre stanzas. In these *sargas* we find that the mean square is 26539.7 with variance 163.83 (d. f. 162). Since these *sargas* disclose an entirely different style, we exclude *sargas* 13 and 14, which continue the narration of Hanumat's search for Sitā further. If we take the remaining 16 *sargas*, we get the mean square as 24260.4 with variance 168.48 (d. f. 144).

We now take up the *sargas* 22–32 excluding *sargas* 26, 27 and 30, which contain wholly or mainly long metre stanzas. We add to them ślokas 1–40 of the first *sarga* and *sargas* 13 and 14. For these *sargas*, the mean square is 11625.9 with variance 117.43 (d. f. 99). For the next nineteen *sargas* 33–54, excluding *sarga* 39 which contains less than ten ślokas and *sargas* 45, 50 which contain wholly or mainly long metre stanzas, the mean square is 21597.3 with variance 126.3 (d. f. 171).

In the next group of *sargas* 55–66, we find that *sarga* 56 has as many as 140 lines and has mean square 13025.6, with variance 1447.29 (d. f. 9), indicating that there have been later additions. In order to maintain the continuity of narration, we take up only the first seven ślokas, the ślokas 44–53 (omitting the first line of śloka 44), ślokas 73–140 giving in all 173 lines, giving the mean square 5317.6 (d. f. 7), the rest of the *sarga* containing 113 lines giving the mean square 1754.4 (d. f. 2). The degrees of freedom have been divided in proportion to the mean squares. But since the 173 lines belong to the original *Rāmāyaṇa*, we take the degrees of freedom as 9 only. If we take the *sargas* 55–66 with the above qualification, we get the mean square 13004.1, with variance 120.41 (d. f. 108).

We get the mean squares, variances and degrees for the 42 *sargas* of *Sundarakāṇḍa* as shown below :

Table D
Sundarakāṇḍa

<i>Sargas</i>	Mean square	d. f.	variance	F
1 (ślokas 1–40)	11625.9	99	117.43	1.08
13, 14, 22–32, 33–54	21597.3	171	126.3	
55, 173 lines of 56, }				
57–66 }	13004.1	108	120.41	1.05
	46227.3	378	122.29	

If we take for comparison the highest variance, the values of F are as shown in the last column which are clearly not significant. These 42 *sargas* have, therefore, the same style, and their mean square is 46227.3 with variance 122.29 (d. f. 378).

It was also found that the ślokas 41–190 of the first *sarga* had a mean square 8271.6 with variance 1181.66 (d. f. 7). So also 113 lines of *sarga* 56, had the mean square 1754.4 with variance 877.2 (d. f. 2). If we combine these two, we get the mean square 10026, with variance 1114 (d. f. 9).

Turning to the *Uttarakāṇḍa* we find that *sargas* 1–38 deal with the birth of Rāvaṇa and the exploits of Rāvaṇa and his son Indrajit. These *sargas* have a mean square 36395.9 with variance 106.42 (d. f. 342). Since this is a large group of *sargas*, we have to see whether they form a homogeneous group. For these *sargas*, we have the Analysis of Variance as follows :

Table F
Analysis of Variance
Uttarakāṇḍa
Sargas 1–38

Variation	Degrees of freedom	Sum squares	Variance	F
Between <i>sargas</i>				
Due to regression	1	83243.95		
Due to deviations from regression	36	849.84	23.61	.22
Within <i>sargas</i>	342	36397.8	106.42	
Total	379	120491.59		

The ratio of the variance due to deviations from regression to the variance due to variation within *sargas* = .22, $n_1 = 342$, $n_2 = 36$, which is less than its tabulated value 1.58 for these degrees of freedom. All these 38 *sargas*, therefore, have a homogeneous style.

If we now go to the remaining groups of *sargas* in the *Uttarakāṇḍa*, we have their mean squares, variances and degrees of freedom, as follows :

Table G

<i>Sargas</i>	Mean square	d. f.	Variance	Calculated Value of F	n_1	n_2	Formula Value of F
39-51	3493.1	117	29.86	1.43	108	117	1.45
52-63	4620.7	108	42.78				
64-73	2727.6	90	30.31	1.41	108	90	1.49
74-89	4872.3	144	33.84	1.26	108	144	1.42
90-100	2983.8	99	30.14	1.42	108	99	1.48
Total for 62 <i>sargas</i>	18697.5	558	33.51				

If we compare these variances with the highest variance 42.78 (d. f. 108), we get calculated values of $F > 1$ as shown in the last column. The values of F as calculated are seen to be not significant. All these 62 *sargas* have, therefore, a variance of 33.51 with 558 as degrees of freedom.

We are now in a position to summarise the results of the statistical study of the three *kāṇḍas*.

It was found that 42 *sargas* of the *Sundarakāṇḍa* had a mean square 46227.3 with variance 122.29 (d. f. 378). 82 *sargas* of the *Yuddhakāṇḍa* had the mean square 82218.9 with variance 111.41 (d. f. 738). In the *Uttarakāṇḍa* 38 *sargas* had the mean square 36395.9 with variance 106.42 (d. f. 342). If we compare the 42 *sargas* of the *Sundarakāṇḍa* with the 82 *sargas* of *Yuddhakāṇḍa*, we have $F > 1 = 1.098$ with $n_1 = 378$, $n_2 = 738$ which is less than its formula value 1.19. If we compare the 38 *sargas* of the *Uttarakāṇḍa* with the 42 *sargas* of the *Sundarakāṇḍa*, we get $F > 1 = 1.15$, d. f. $n_1 = 378$, $n_2 = 342$, which is less than its formula value 1.23 and so is not significantly different. For these 162 *sargas*, the mean square is 164842.1 with variance 113.06 (d. f. 1458). If we compare this with the nearest B style of the *Mahābhārata* represented by the variance 87.08 (d. f. 6795), we get $F > 1 = 1.3$, $n_1 = 1458$, $n_2 = 6795$ which exceeds its formula value 1.11. We designate this style as the R-style.

Again the *Sundarakāṇḍa sargas* 2-21 have a mean square 24260.4 with variance 168.48 (d. f. 144). For the *sargas* 32-65 of the *Yuddhakāṇḍa* the mean square is 58078.04 with variance 189.8 (d. f. 306). If we compare these two variances, we get $F > 1 = 1.13$ with d. f. $n_1 = 306$, $n_2 = 144$ which is

less than the formula value 1.33 and so they are not significantly different. For these 50 *sargas*, we get the mean square 82338.44 with variance 182.97 (d. f. 450). If we compare this with the nearest C-style of the *Mahābhārata* having the variance 171.51 (d. f. 1773), we get $F > 1 = 1.07$ d. f. $n_1 = 450$, $n_2 = 1773$, which is less than its formula value 1.13 and so these *sargas* have the same style as the C-style of the *Mahābhārata*. These 50 *sargas* exhibit the C-style and have been added by Harivaṁśakāra.

In the *Sundarakāṇḍa*, it came to notice that ślokas 41–190 of the first *sarga* and 113 lines of *sarga* 56 have a mean square 10026 with variance 1114 (d. f. 9). Comparing this with the β style of the *Mahābhārata* represented by variance 1071.89 (d. f. 99), we get $F > 1 = 1.04$, d. f. $n_1 = 9$, $n_2 = 99$, which is clearly non-significant. Thus these ślokas have the same style as the β -style. These ślokas have, therefore, been added by Parvasaṅgrahakāra.

We find another style in the later *sargas* of *Uttarakāṇḍa*. In 62 *sargas* 39–100 of this *kāṇḍa*, we find that the mean square is 18697.5 with variance 33.51 (d. f. 558). If we compare this with its nearest α -style of the *Mahābhārata* represented by variance 55.52 (d. f. 5168) we get $F > 1 = 1.66$, d. f. $n_1 = \infty$, $n_2 = 558$, which exceeds its tabulated value 1.14. This style is, therefore, entirely different from the α -style of the *Mahābhārata*. We designate it as the U-style.

It is thus seen that the following 42 *sargas* of the *Sundarakāṇḍa*, 82 *sargas* of the *Yuddhakāṇḍa* and the first 38 *sargas* of the *Uttarakāṇḍa* belong to the R-style, which is entirely different from any of the styles we met with in the *Mahābhārata*.

Table H

Kāṇḍa	Sargas
<i>Sundarakāṇḍa</i>	1 (ślokas 1–40) 13, 14, 22, 32–66
<i>Yuddhakāṇḍa</i>	1–31 66–116
<i>Uttarakāṇḍa</i>	1–38

As these contain all the principal events of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, this R-style represents the style of Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa*.

We found that 62 *sargas*, 39–100, of the *Uttarakāṇḍa* exhibited the U-style, which is significantly different from the R-style. Thus these *sargas* which depict the *Śambūkavadha* and *Śītātīyāga* have been added later than *Rāmopākhyāna* added by Harivaṁśakāra (200 B.C.) to *Mahābhārata* as it does not mention it. The Critical Editor says that the main purpose of the *Rāmopākhyāna* was simply to illustrate how people fallen in misfortune later became happy. This itself shows that the *Śītātīyāga* and Lakṣmaṇa's death, which must have caused great anguish to Rāma, were not known to Harivaṁśakāra. But there is definite evidence to show that it was regarded as a part of *Rāmāyaṇa* in the days of Kālidāsa (5th century A. D.), who refers to *Śītātīyāga* in cantos 14, 15 of his *Raghuvamśa*. This period could be pushed back to 3rd century A. D., since as shown by V. M. Kulkarni (*J. O. I.* Vol. 9, p. 285), the *Uttarakāṇḍa* was known to Vimalasūri, author of *Paumacariya*, a Jain version of Rāma's life (Cri. Ed. Vol. VII, p. 51).

We also found two styles C and β, which figure in the *Mahābhārata*. The *sargas* 2–21 of the *Sundarakāṇḍa* and *sargas* 32–65 of the *Yuddhakāṇḍa* exhibit the C-style. These *sargas* have brought in the miraculous element in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The *sargas* 2–21 relate how Hanumat assumed a minute form and searched for Sītā in the palaces of Rāvaṇa and others. In *sargas* 32–46 of the *Yuddhakāṇḍa*, Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa are shown as bound by Indrajit magically with *nāgapāśa* and were freed by Garuḍa later. *Sargas* 47–65 relate how Rāma and his warriors fought with Kumbhakarṇa and his sons and killed them. The character of Kumbhakarṇa, who slept for six months without food and water, which is physiologically impossible, has probably been created to juxtapose a loyal brother against Bibhiṣaṇa, who had defected to Rāma's side.

In the *Sundarakāṇḍa* the ślokas 41–190 of the first *sarga* and 113 lines of *sarga* 56 have been added by the Parvasaṅgrahakāra. These ślokas relate how Hanumat during his flight over the sea was requested by the Maināka mountain to rest on his peak, how his path was blocked by Surasa, who was sent by gods to test his prowess and presence of mind and how the demoness Simhikā wanted to devour him and was destroyed by him.

The statistical tables are appended.

References :

- (1) Critical Edition of the *Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa*, published by the Oriental Institute, Baroda.
- (2) *The Mahābhārata : Its Genesis and Growth : A Statistical Study*, by the author, published by B O R I, Poona 1986.
- (3) R. A. Fisher, *Statistical Methods for Research Workers*, 1948, pp. 131-136, 248-255.
- (4) George W. Snedecor, *Statistical Methods*, Ames Iowa (1946), pp. 222-25.
- (5) Albert H. Boukef and Gerald H. Lieberman : *Engineering Statistics*, Englewood Cliffs, N. S. (1959), pp. 562, 563.

Table 1

Count of Long

Sundarakāṇḍa, Yuddhakāṇḍa

<i>Kāṇḍa</i> <i>Sargas</i>	No. of lines	1	2	3	4	8	9	10	11	12
<i>Sundara*</i>										
1, Ślokas										
1-40	82	46	40	66	40	47	39	48	67	31
13,14, 22-32	707	443	438	528	399	522	456	396	593	331
33-54	1297	692	729	985	715	939	797	746	1025	563
55-66	767	418	463	551	415	577	469	425	635	331
42 <i>Sargas</i>	2853									

*1 Excluding *Sargas* 26, 27, 30, 39, 45, 50 which contain wholly or mainly long metre stanzas.

*2 Only 82 lines of *Sarga* 1 and 173 lines of *Sarga* 56 have been included here. The rest have been taken to β style.

(R style)

Syllables in *Rāmāyaṇa*and *Uttarakāṇḍa*

16	Sum	Sum of squares	Sum of products	Mean Square	D. f.	Variance due to variation within <i>Sargas</i>
74	498	26632	40836	1831·6	99	117·43
621	4727	260925	375847	9794·3		
1132	8323	490067	727503	21597·3	171	126·3
669	4953	290122	426889	13004·1	108	120·4
				46227·3	378	122·29

Table 1
Count of Long
Sundarakāṇḍa, Yuddhakāṇḍa

<i>Kāṇḍa</i> <i>Sargas</i>	No. of lines	1	2	3	4	8	9	10	11	12
<i>Yuddha</i>										
1-15	857	489	491	643	460	561	526	512	698	398
16-31	1142	695	669	869	662	809	692	662	970	547
66-79	933	508	541	658	500	665	560	500	792	444
80-99	1410	790	799	1039	779	1020	851	796	1181	657
100-116	1162	644	686	853	701	816	700	663	1002	566
<i>82 Sargas 5504</i>										
<i>Uttara</i>										
1-38	2806	1620	1718	1986	1719	1927	1698	1578	2380	1364
<i>Total 162 8859</i>										
<i>Sargas</i>										

(R-style) (Contd.)

Syllables in *Rāmāyaṇa*and *Uttarakāṇḍa*

16	Sum	Sum of squares	Sum of products	Mean square	D. f.	Variance due to variation within <i>Sargas</i>
727	5505	299201	451495	12444·5	135	92·18
986	7561	438947	637228	16672·7	144	115·78
817	5985	288299	425849	14002·5	126	111·13
1254	9166	475958	698250	21319·9	180	118·44
990	7621	440829	646138	17779·3	153	116·20
				82218·9	738	111·41
2404	18394	1010858	1485995	36395·9	342	106·42
				164842·1	1458	112·69

Table 1
Count of Long
Sundarakāṇḍa, Yuddhakāṇḍa

<i>Kāṇḍa</i> <i>Sargas</i>	No. of lines	1	2	3	4	8	9	10	11	12
<i>Uttara</i>										
39-51	547	324	360	361	301	389	353	317	440	251
52-63	519	298	333	368	311	349	300	309	430	211
64-73	396	217	262	264	218	256	238	237	320	169
74-89	653	372	429	435	395	482	438	406	518	280
90-100	438	248	285	292	249	312	283	255	366	200
62										
<i>adhyāyas</i> 2553										

Table 1
Count of Long
Sundarakāṇḍa, Yuddhakāṇḍa

<i>Kāṇḍa Sargas</i>	No. of lines	1	2	3	4	8	9	10	11	12
<i>Sundara*</i>										
2-21	1278	702	752	885	657	877	753	690	996	525
<i>Yuddha</i>										
32-46	1101	604	655	795	608	783	626	602	940	523
47-65	1786	1040	988	1308	1004	1231	1086	928	1490	858
50 <i>sargas</i>	4165									

Table 1

<i>Sundara</i>										
1, lines 41-190	296	107	124	159	128	145	125	96	172	93
56§	113	65	72	81	58	82	73	64	89	48
	409									

* Excluding *Sargas* 4 and 6 which contain wholly long metre stanzas and 13 and 14 which have been taken along with *Sargas* 22-32.

§ Only 113 lines of *Sarga* 56 are included here. The rest 173 lines are included under R-style.

(C style)

Syllables in *Rāmāyaṇa*
and *Uttarakāṇḍa*

16	Sum	Sum of squares	Sum of products	Mean square	D. f.	Variance due to variation within <i>sargas</i>
1117	7954	473072	718567	24260.4	144	168.48
987	7123	383667	563155	58078.04	306	189.8
1549	11482	906300	1341453			
				82338.44	450	182.98

(β style)

179	1328	184630	393088	8271.6	7	1181.66
92	724	54172	81812	1754.4	2	877.2
				10026	9	1114

TABLE I. Statistical Study of Sanskrit

(C style)

Syllables in Sanskrit

and Literature

Id	Sum	Sum of Squares	Mean	Variance	Standard Deviation
1117	7984	47703	71607	34860	186.48
987	7173	41481	66153	300	173.2
1513	11481	130481	109483	10000	100
			103700	450	187.08

(D style)

1117	1338	104630	100088	82710	116768
987	724	52172	81612	17844	8772
			10000	9	1114

ON THE DATE OF MAṆḌANA MIŚRA AND ŚAṆKARA AND THEIR DOCTRINAL RELATION

By

FERNANDO TOLA

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the current and most accepted opinion that Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara lived around 700 A. D. and to examine the question of their reciprocal doctrinal relation. This opinion about the dates of both authors was expressed by P. Hacker already in 1964, in "Zur Geschichte und Beurteilung des Hinduismus", *OLZ* 59, 1964, column 231. More recently A. W. Thrasher in 1979, in "the dates of Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara", *WZKS*, 23, 1979, pp. 117-139, defends the same thesis with a large exposition of arguments. K. H. Potter in 1981 in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Advaita Vedānta*, following A. W. Thrasher's opinion as expressed in *The Advaita of Maṇḍana Miśra's Brahmasiddhi* (Thesis, Harvard University, 1972), considers (p. 346) that "Maṇḍana Miśra must have lived around A. D. 660-720", and places (p. 116) Śaṅkara "in the late seventh and early eighth centuries".

In the first place we shall expose arguments that give support to this theory. In this exposition we shall follow Thrasher's article, because it is this author who gives in a more complete form these arguments. We shall utilize the erudite introduction of Kuppaswami Sastri to his valuable edition of the *Brahmasiddhi*. This introduction provides us the elements that are needed for the fundamentation of this theory.

Exposition of the argument in favour of the theory of placing Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara around 700 A. D.

I. Maṇḍana Miśra lived around 700 A. D. or some time earlier,¹ since he must be located, on one side, a good number of years *after* Dharma-

¹ Dates for Maṇḍana Miśra proposed by other scholars : Nakamura, *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*, pp. 84-85: 670-720; Kuppaswami Sastri, Introduction to his edition of *Brahmasiddhi*, p. LVIII: 615-695; Gnoli, Introduction to his edition of *Pramāṇavārttika*, p. XIX: slightly older contemporary of Dharmakīrti.

kīrti (c. 600–660),² Kumārila (around 630–640)³ and Prabhākara (Kumārila's contemporary)⁴ and, on the other side, *before* Umbeka who wrote a commentary of Maṇḍana Miśra's *Bhāvanāviveka* and who also composed his *Śloka-vārttikavyākhyā* between the years 700 and 790 A. D.⁵ (pp. 118–119 and 138).

II. There are many themes that are common to Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana Miśra, "e.g. – as Thrasher says, p. 120 – *that the universe and its divisions have only a practical reality, not a final one, but that the practical activity lasts until liberation; that liberation is the manifestation of the soul's form; that something unreal can lead to a real result; that the Upaniṣads deny all difference; that to allow any pariṇāma in Brahman would be to give it parts, and that reality must be free from all change whatever; that the Jīva really is Brahman, but appears to be divided from it by false knowledge and by limiting adjuncts*".

III. It cannot be accepted that Maṇḍana Miśra wrote before Śaṅkara, that Śaṅkara took from Maṇḍana Miśra these common ideas and that Śaṅkara had Maṇḍana Miśra in mind when he was writing the passages which present similitudes with other passages of Maṇḍana Miśra, "since Śaṅkara's intellectual contribution would shrink to the vanishing point" (Thrasher, p. 120).

IV. In the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra a series of passages are found which indicate that he knew Śaṅkara's thought and referred to it to criticise and refute it.⁶

These passages are

(a) *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 32, line 13 – p. 34, line 23. Cf. Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* ad 1, 1, 4, p. 150, lines 1–11 and p. 152, line 8 – p. 153, line 1;

(b) *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 20, lines 11–12 and p. 20, line 7. Cf. *Brahma-*

² Maṇḍana Miśra quotes Dharmakīrti. Cf. Gnoli, ed. *Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*, pp. XIX–XX; Kunjunni Raja, "Maṇḍana and Dharmakīrti".

³ Maṇḍana Miśra quotes Kumārila. Cf. K. Kuppaswami Sastri, ed. *Brahmasiddhi*, Appendix IV, pp. 48 and 50.

⁴ Maṇḍana Miśra quotes Prabhākara. Cf. K. Kuppaswami Sastri, ed. *Brahmasiddhi*, p. LVIII, note 202.

⁵ Cf. L. Schmithausen, *Maṇḍanamīśra's Vibhramavivekaḥ*, p. 216, note 150, and Thrasher, p. 138.

⁶ Cf. Kuppaswami Sastri, edition of the *Brahmasiddhi*, Introduction pp. XLV–L, A. W. Thrasher, pp. 121–129.

sūtrabhāṣya ad 2, 1, 9, p. 446, lines 20–22, ad 3, 2, 21, p. 712, lines 19; ad 4, 1, 3, p. 938, lines 15–16, and commentary of the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* ad 2, 6, p. 74, lines 15–16.

(c) *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 132, line 20 – p. 133, line 3. Cf. *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* ad 3, 3, 32, p. 818, lines 8–9 and ad 4, 1, 15, p. 958, lines 10–12.

V. Śaṅkara was a contemporary of Maṇḍana Miśra, perhaps a little older than Maṇḍana Miśra (Thrasher p. 139 and p. 121). To found this thesis, it is to be noted, on one side, that Maṇḍana Miśra refers to Śaṅkara, criticizing him. See point IV that precedes. On the other side Sureśvara, a direct disciple of Śaṅkara refers to Maṇḍana Miśra.⁷ Therefore Sureśvara was a contemporary of Maṇḍana Miśra, perhaps a little older than he or even a little after him. But the anteriority of Śaṅkara in relation to Maṇḍana Miśra and the posteriority of Sureśvara in relation to Maṇḍana Miśra cannot have been very great, since that circumstance would have hindered Sureśvara being a disciple of Śaṅkara.

— In consequence to all that precedes, “*The most reasonable time to which to assign Śaṅkara's floruit would be 700 or slightly before*” (Thrasher p. 139).

Criticism of the previous arguments

Regarding these arguments the following observations can be made.

To point I. We can admit that Maṇḍana Miśra's epoch falls between the limits fixed, on one side, by Dharmakīrti, Kumāṛila and Prabhākara, i.e. the middle of the VIIth century A. D. and, on the other side, by Umbeka c. 760–790, i.e. the end of the VIIIth century. But from the fact that Maṇḍana Miśra has quoted Dharmakīrti, Kumāṛila and Prabhākara the only conclusion we can deduce is that the work which quotes comes after the works that are quoted. But we have no solid or precise elements which allow us to locate Maṇḍana Miśra nearer to the *terminus post quem* (middle of the VIIth century) or farther from it. To locate him nearer to it we have only the old traditions that express that Maṇḍana Miśra was a disciple or brother-in-law

⁷ For the passages of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* and specially of *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣyavūrtika* of Sureśvara which present references to *Brahmasiddhi*, see Kuppu-swami Sastri, edition of the *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. X–XIII (this list has been collected by Subrahmanya Sastri); N. S. Anantakrishna Sastri, edition of two commentaries of *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 541–560 and Thrasher, pp. 131–137 and note 38.

of Kumārila.⁸ But these traditions are not trustworthy.⁹ To locate Maṇḍana Miśra farther from that *terminus post quem* we have to argue that in the *Bhāvanāviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra we find references to conceptions of the *bhāvanā* which are beyond Kumārila and which refer to a posterior stage of that doctrine's evolution¹⁰ or that "certain features of the *Prābhākara* theory of error as described in the *Vidhi-viveka* do not appear in what we have of *Prābhākara's* works" and that "it is possible that he implies some development within the *Prābhākara* school after *Prābhākara* himself" (Thrasher p. 119), and that these facts require that several years have elapsed between Kumārila and *Prābhākara*, on one side, and Maṇḍana Miśra on the other.¹¹ One can accept all these facts but it is not possible to determine how many years were necessary for that development being accomplished. So we must locate Maṇḍana Miśra in any moment of the period that runs between both *termini* : c. middle of the seventh and c. end of the eighth centuries.

To points II and III. Regarding the themes that are common to Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara, was it Śaṅkara who influenced Maṇḍana Miśra or was it Maṇḍana Miśra who influenced Śaṅkara? This question cannot be answered by saying that Maṇḍana Miśra was influenced by Śaṅkara, that he took from Śaṅkara the ideas that they have in common, adducing as arguments that, if it were not so and it happened that Śaṅkara be the debtor author, "Śaṅkara's "intellectual contribution would shrink to the vanishing point", as Thrasher says, and it would be difficult to explain the great importance that Śaṅkara had in the Indian thought and the great acceptance that he received from his disciples. Of course we cannot locate Maṇḍana Miśra after Śaṅkara and consider him the debtor author only in order to save Śaṅkara's prestige.

And even if we accept that Śaṅkara was inspired by Maṇḍana Miśra, in relation to their common themes and the passages that present similitudes, we can explain the importance and influence acquired by Śaṅkara in India's philosophy by the brilliancy of his style, the clearness of his exposition, the subtlety and richness of his argumentation either defending his own thesis or

⁸ This tradition is recorded in the old biographies of Śaṅkara as Vyāsācala, *Śaṅkara-vijaya*, V. 34; Mādhavācārya, *Śrīśaṅkaravijaya*, VII, 117. Anantānandagiri, *Śrīśaṅkaravijaya*, p. 174, 1. 3, expresses that Maṇḍana Miśra was the husband of a sister of Kumārila. Cf. Thrasher, p. 118, note 7.

⁹ Cf. the severe judgement of Kuppaswami Sastri, Introduction to his edition of *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. LV-LVI, on this kind of works.

¹⁰ See Frauwallner, "Bhāvanā und Viddhi bei Maṇḍanamīśra" I, p. 231 (= *Kleine Schriften*, p. 180.).

¹¹ Cf. Thrasher, pp. 118-119.

refuting those contrary ones. Something similar happens with Nāgārjuna. The principal doctrines that he exposes have their origin in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* and notwithstanding this fact, he has in Buddhist philosophy an importance and an influence equal to those of Śaṅkara in his own domain.

Moreover it could have happened that neither Maṇḍana Miśra inspired himself in Śaṅkara nor Śaṅkara in Maṇḍana Miśra in relation to the doctrinary themes that are common to both. These common themes may have derived from the Indian philosophical tradition previous to them. Non-dualism with all its consequences had been fully developed by the Buddhist *Mādhyamika* and *Vijñānavāda* schools. In Hinduism also, even before Śaṅkara, non-dualistic speculations were not absent, as those of Bhartṛhari, Gauḍapāda and the *prapañcavilayavāda*.¹² Bhartṛprapañca, a *bhedābheda*-*vin* thinker, criticized the *Vedānta* tenets that sustained a radically monist and illusionistic thesis.¹³ It could be that both Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara drew ideas from the works of those schools and thinkers and found in them inspiration for their own philosophical creativity. It could also have happened that the ideas common to Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara were ideas that necessarily had to impose themselves to any thinker who, like both of them, adopted the thesis of the sole existence of *Brahman* and attempted to draw, in a systematic way, all the consequences that can be inferred from that principle.

To point IV. An argument of more weight than the consideration that Śaṅkara's fame could be reduced, if it is accepted that he was influenced by Maṇḍana Miśra, is constituted by a series of passages of both authors which present noteworthy similitudes and which allow to conclude that Maṇḍana Miśra had presented the thought and the work of Śaṅkara. Let us examine those passages that, according to Thrasher, p. 121, indicate clearly that Maṇḍana Miśra depended on Śaṅkara.

(a) *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 32, line 13 – p. 34, line 23 and *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* ad 1, 1, 4, p. 150, lines 1–11 and p. 152, line 8 – p. 153, line 1. In this passage Maṇḍana Miśra expounds, in order to refute it, the thesis that it is not possible to reach *Brahman* through ritual acts (*karman*) and that for that aim only knowledge counts. It is one of the preferred theses of Śaṅkara. Can we say that in this passage Maṇḍana Miśra had in mind Śaṅkara?

¹² On this school see Hiriyanna, "Prapañca-vilaya-vāda. A doctrine of Pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta".

¹³ Cf. Rüping, *Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Vedānta-Philosophie* I. pp. 1–2 and 69–71. On Bhartṛprapañca see Hiriyanna, "Bhartṛprapañca: an old Vedāntin" and "Fragments of Bhartṛprapañca".

Against an affirmative answer some objections can be adduced. Firstly Thrasher, p. 122, observes that the thesis exposed by Maṇḍana Miśra is much more radical than Śaṅkara's position, since this one attributes some usefulness to ritual acts, as it is seen, says Thrasher, for instance, by the commentary of *Brahmasūtra ad* III, 4, 26, p. 898, lines 8-9; III, 4, 27, p. 900, lines 7-8; III, 4, 33, p. 905, lines 2-3. Besides, that the fact that the thesis exposed by Maṇḍana Miśra on the uselessness of ritual acts is also a thesis of Śaṅkara would oblige to think that Maṇḍana Miśra had Śaṅkara in mind *only* if that thesis were *exclusive* of Śaṅkara. But are we sure of that? Nobody before Śaṅkara did affirm that the ritual act is unable to allow reaching the Absolute? At least we find in the *Upaniṣads* passages which refer to the relation between knowledge (*jñāna*) and ritual action (*karman*).¹⁴ And we know that thinkers like Bhartṛprapañca and Brahmadatta dealt with this point.¹⁵

Anyhow the lines 13-23 of *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 32-34, where Maṇḍana Miśra exposes ideas that are of Śaṅkara, present remarkable and evident similitudes with the commentary on the *Brahmasūtra ad* 1, 1, 4, which we have mentioned before. These similitudes refer to the ideas, the order in which they are presented and the words and expressions which express them. These similitudes are clearly seen in their presentation in parallel columns in Thrasher's article, pp. 123-124.

We think that these similitudes establish without doubt that Maṇḍana Miśra had in mind Śaṅkara and not *vice versa*. It is more probable that Maṇḍana Miśra, on exposing a thesis, that he did not accept, in order to refute it, took ideas and expressions from Śaṅkara, who accepted that thesis; less probable is that Śaṅkara, on exposing a thesis, that he did sustain, took ideas and expressions from Maṇḍana Miśra, who did not accept that thesis and who only exposed it in order to criticize it.

The arguments offered by Thrasher, pp. 122-123, discard the possibility that the similitudes between both authors are due to the fact that they followed some work that has been lost.

(b) Other passages adduced as proof of Maṇḍana Miśra being inspired by Śaṅkara are, on one side, *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 20, lines 11-12 and p. 20, line 7 and, on the other side, the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya ad* 2, 1, 9, p. 446 lines 20-22; *ad* 3, 2, 21, p. 712, line 19; *ad* 4, 1, 3, p. 938, lines 15-16 and commentary on *Taittirīya Upaniṣad ad* 2, 6, p. 74, lines 15-16. In all these passa-

¹⁴ Cf. Govindagopal Mukhopadhyaya, *Studies in the Upaniṣads*, pp. 126-132.

¹⁵ Cf. Hiriyanna's articles quoted in note 13.

ges is expressed the idea that *Brahman* is the essence of empirical reality (*prapañca*) but that the empirical reality is not the essence of *Brahman*. This idea was accepted by Śaṅkara. First of all we must observe that there are not strong verbal similitudes between both series of texts as in the previous case. Therefore it is not possible to affirm on the basis of external similitudes that Maṇḍana Miśra was influenced by Śaṅkara or *vice versa*. These texts are presented together by Thrasher on p. 125. Besides that neither it is possible to say that the mentioned idea was exclusive of Śaṅkara and that consequently Maṇḍana Miśra, on expressing it, was referring himself to Śaṅkara. It is an idea that imposes itself on any non-dualist thinker. To found this statement it is enough to observe (as Thrasher does on p. 126 that the text of Śaṅkara (*ad* 3, 2, 21), in which this idea is presented, belongs to the exposition of a thesis that is defended by a *prapañcavilayādin*¹⁶ and that Śaṅkara examines.

So we think that this second series of texts are not a testimony in favour of the thesis that Maṇḍana Miśra depended on Śaṅkara.

(c) Finally we have, on one side, *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 132, line 20–p. 133, line 3 and, on the other side, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya ad* 3, 3, 32, p. 818, lines, 8–9 and *ad* 4, 1, 15, p. 958, lines 10–12; *bhāṣya* of the *Chāndogya ad* 6, 14, 2, p. 381, line 1 and commentary of the *Bhagavadgītā*, *ad* 13, 23, p. 399, lines 6–7. All these passages are extracted from larger texts that have to do with the problem of the destruction of *karman*,¹⁷ Maṇḍana Miśra refers himself, in order to refute it, to the theory that the *karman* which began producing its effects, cannot be destroyed. It is a thesis which Śaṅkara sustains and defends in the texts from which these passages have been extracted. Moreover Śaṅkhapāṇi¹⁸ in his commentary of the *Brahmasiddhi ad locum*, p. 264, lines 12–14, manifests that Maṇḍana Miśra in his quoted passage of pp. 132–133 has in mind Śaṅkara. This testimony of Śaṅkhapāṇi can be considered exact if one takes into account the external similitudes that exist between the passage of

¹⁶ Cf. Hiriyanā's article quoted in note 12.

¹⁷ Śaṅkara refers also to the problem of *karman* also in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya ad* 4.1.19, but without mentioning the comparison of the arrow or the potter's wheel.

¹⁸ It is not possible to establish with precision Śaṅkhapāṇi's date. According to Kuppuswami Sastri, *Brahmasiddhi's* Introduction, pp. LXXV–LXXVI, Śaṅkhapāṇi would have followed the commentary of *Brahmasiddhi* called *Tattvasamīkṣā* composed by Vācaspati Miśra. Thrasher, p. 128, note 33, even thinks that Śaṅkhapāṇi's commentary is a resumé of Vācaspati Miśra's one. Therefore Śaṅkhapāṇi could have been a contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra or could have lived after him, but it is not possible to fix how many years. Anyhow a long chronological distance between Śaṅkhapāṇi and Maṇḍana Miśra would weaken the former's testimony.

Maṇḍana Miśra and the three passages of Śaṅkara. We transcribe these passages in parallel columns in order that these similitudes may be seen.

Brahmasiddhi, pp. 132

*ye tu manyante – pravṛttabhogānām
karmanām pravṛttavegasyeṣor iva
cakrasyeva vā na śakyaḥ pratiban-
dhaḥ, ato bhogena kṣayapratīkṣeti.*

Brahmasūtrabhāṣya ad 3, 3, 32,
p. 818, lines 8–9

*pravṛttaphalasya tu karmāśayasya
mukteṣor iva vegakṣayān nirvṛttiḥ.*

ibidem ad 4, 1, 15, p. 958, lines 10–12.

*na tāvad anāśrityārabdhakāryam
karmāśayam jñānotpattir upapadya-
te āśrite ca tasmin kulālacakravat
pravṛttavegasyāntarāle pratibandhā-
saṃbhavād bhavati vegakṣayapra-
tīpālanam.*

*Commentary of Chāndogya-Upa-
niṣad* ad 6, 14, 2, p. 381, line 1

pravṛttaphalānām karmanām.

Commentary of Bhagavadgītā
ad 13, 23, p. 399, lines 6–7

*anārabdhaphalānām api karmanām
kṣayo na yukta iti. tad asat. katham.
teṣām mukteṣuvat pravṛttaphalatvāt.*

Let us observe in these texts the following similitudes : 1. Thrasher, p. 120, indicates that both Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara use the word *pravṛtta* while in sūtra 4, 1, 15 we find *ārabdha* (precisely *an-ārabdha*). We can add moreover : 2. *pravṛttabhoga* in Maṇḍana Miśra and *pravṛttaphala* in Śaṅkara ; 3. *pravṛttavega* in both ; 4. *na śakyaḥ pratibandhaḥ* in Maṇḍana Miśra and *pratibandhāsambhavāt* in Śaṅkara ; 5. *Kṣayapratīkṣā* in Maṇḍana Miśra and *vegakṣayapratīpālanam* in Śaṅkara ; 6. *pravṛttabhogānām karmanām* in Maṇḍana Miśra and *pravṛttaphalānām karmanām* and *anārabdhaphalānām...* *karmanām* in Śaṅkara.

All these similitudes allow to affirm that Maṇḍana Miśra, on writing this passage had in mind Śaṅkara's passages, specially those of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. We do not think that it is possible to say that Śaṅkara had in mind Maṇḍana Miśra, since it is more probable that Maṇḍana Miśra, in order to expose a doctrine that is rejected by him and accepted by Śaṅkara, took expressions from Śaṅkara, than the contrary procedure.

To point V. We can accept that Maṇḍana Miśra, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara were contemporaries, in the form indicated in point V. Whatever be the date assigned to Maṇḍana Miśra between the two *termini* mentioned before, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara are in a relation of chronological proximity with him.

Conclusion

On the basis of the preceding considerations in relation with Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara's date we think that, in the lack of more solid elements to judge, the most prudent and better founded opinion is the following one :

1. Maṇḍana Miśra is to be located in the more or less one century and a half that lies between, on one side, Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660), Kumārila (c. 630–640 : date of composition of his last work, a work of his old age, the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*) and Prabhākara (contemporary of Kumārila), and, on the other side, Umbeka (c. 760–790 : date of composition of the *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā*) —or in other words : between the middle of the seventh and the end of the eighth centuries. We do not think we possess elements to locate him with more precision.

2. Śaṅkara was a contemporary of Maṇḍana Miśra, perhaps a little older, and Maṇḍana Miśra knew his work, had him in mind and criticized him. Śaṅkara must have lived between the two extreme *termini* accepted for Maṇḍana Miśra.¹⁰ This is all that we can affirm about Śaṅkara's date. This is not much but we think that a founded doubt is better for the advancement of science than an affirmative thesis without support or based only in not very solid grounds.

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¹⁰ T. Vetter, in 1979, (*Studien*, p. 11) expressed the idea that the only thing that can be said about Śaṅkara's date is that he lived between 650 and 800 A. D.

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WHAT DOES 'NOSELESS' MEAN IN THE *ṚGVEDA*?

BY

STEPHAN HILLYER LEVITT

1. The term "noseless", Skt. *anās*, is used to refer to *dāsyus*, enemies, of the Vedic Aryans, in *ṚV* 5. 29. 10.

Such an interpretation of the term was first suggested by Max Müller. See H. H. Wilson 1850-88 : 4 (1857). 276-7n. and Alfred Hillebrandt 1891-1902 : 3.277 (2nd ed., 2.248). Wilson cites Max Müller as suggesting this in *Universal history of man* 1.346. I have been unable to track down this volume in any of the bibliographical sources available to me, however. In his 1858 essay on caste in Max Müller 1867-75 : 2.328, though, Max Müller writes :

At the time when the name of *varṇa* was first used in the sense of caste, there were but two castes, the *Āryas* and the non-*Āryas*, the bright and the dark race. The dark race is sometimes called by the poets of the Veda 'the black skin.' *Rig-veda* I. 130, 8 : 'Indra protected in battle the Aryan worshipper, he subdued the lawless for Manu, he conquered the black skin.' Other names given them by their Aryan conquerors are 'goat-nosed and noseless,' whereas the Aryan gods are frequently praised for their beautiful noses.

There are a number of problematic points here, such as where the expression "goat-nosed" is in the *Ṛgveda*, or such as where we can find in the *Ṛgveda* praise of the beautiful noses of the Aryan gods. One suspects that one must attribute such affirmations to certain racial attitudes of the day.

The interpretation of Skt. *anās* in *ṚV* 5. 29. 10 as "noseless", though, is welltaken and has been discussed too often in the secondary material on the *Ṛgveda* and in scholarly writings on ancient India to be dismissed. As A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith 1912 : 1. 347 and 356 indicate, it is one of the few points which indicate to us that by the usage *dāsyu* in the *Ṛgveda* real people are sometimes meant, probably aboriginal people.

To this suggestion by Max Müller, Heinrich Zimmer 1879 : 430 brings to bear passages by classical Western authors such as Megasthenes regard-

ing the physical characteristics of the people of India. Such passages can also be found in Strabo, Pliny, and Arrian. See F. Bollensen 1887 : 496, A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith 1912 : 347n. and Jean Filliozat 1973 : 48-9 regarding these passages. While Zimmer's prose is noncommittal as to whether "noseless" is indeed the correct interpretation of Skt. *anās*, the drift of his presentation is such to indicate preference for it.

In accord with this, Alfred Ludwig 1876-88 : 2.109 and 5.95 accepts the meaning "noseless" used to apply to *dasyus* in his translation of and commentary on the *Rgveda*. Following this, Alfred Hillebrandt 1891-1902 : 3.277 (2nd ed., 2. 248) writes that in his opinion only this translation of Skt. *anās* is acceptable. And Ralph T. H. Griffith 1889 (New rev. ed. (1973), 249.) in his translation of the *Rgveda* translates Skt. *anās* as "noseless".

A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith 1912 : 1. 347-8, 356-7 point out that this translation of Skt. *anās* is problematic, but appear clearly to prefer it. They point out that the term, interpreted thus, shows that we clearly have real people referred to sometimes by the word *dasyu*, and they write that it "would accord well with the flat-nosed aborigines of the Dravidian type, whose language still persists among the Brahuis, who are found in the north-west." They add that this interpretation receives support from the interpretation of Bloomfield 1896 : 415 of the obscure Vedic term Skt. *rujānās* used of Vṛtra in *RV* 1. 32. 6 as meaning "broken-nosed", if this interpretation is correct.

A. B. Keith 1925 : 1.11 and 2.634 similarly accepts the interpretation of Skt. *anās* as "noseless", but changes his view that the term applies to Dravidians. He here views the term as applying to pre-Dravidians who are still found as jungle tribes :

It has been assumed that Dravidians may be reckoned as the aboriginal population encountered by the Aryan invaders, and, though this cannot strictly be proved, it is extremely probable by the existence of a people of Dravidian speech, the Brāhūis, in Baluchistan, whether we regard them in origin — now they are greatly mixed and un-Dravidian in type — as an advanced guard of a Dravidian movement from India, or as the remnant of an older population, left behind on the Dravidian advance from Western or Central Asia into India. It is, however, possible that the aborigines met by the Aryans included members of the pre-Dravidians who are still found as jungle tribes, and who are by some authorities brought into relation with the Veddahs

of Ceylon and the Sakai and Semang of the Malay Peninsula: *the term 'noseless' applied to their opponents by some Aryan invaders at least is held to accord better with the appearance of pre-Dravidian than with that of Dravidian tribes* (italics mine). The argument is not decisive, but there is no reason to doubt that both pre-Dravidians and Dravidians may have been encountered by the Aryans. Whether Muṇḍā-speaking tribes were among their enemies it is idle to enquire, for we know even less of Muṇḍā movements than of Dravidian; their physical appearance is now very much that of Dravidians, though their language proves to have affinity with the Mon-Khmer languages of Assam and Burma as well as with other forms of Austric speech scattered over the Pacific.

* * *

The Dravidians were mesorrhines as opposed to the pre-Dravidian platyrrhines, the Niṣādas of Vedic texts, the 'noseless' enemies of the *Rigveda*.

The association of the term 'noseless' with Dravidians, once made, though, gained currency, and is still being reacted to by Robert Shafer 1954 : 8-13 and Jean Filliozat 1973 : 48-9.

Robert Shafer 1954 takes exception to the idea that the Aryans came into contact with Dravidians in Northwestern India, dismisses the work of T. Burrow on Dravidian loanforms in Vedic Sanskrit, noting an opinion of W. Kirfel communicated in a letter that many of these words were cultural terms, and seemingly expressing the opinion that they must have come from South India but it is too soon to tell, and comes to the conclusion that it was pre-Dravidians who were the 'noseless' enemies in the *Rgveda*. This population he identifies with the modern-day Bhils. He offers the description of the Rajputans Gazeteer which states that "the typical Bhil is small, dark, broad nosed, and ugly" as fitting well with descriptions of the Vedic *dasyu* and epic and classical Sanskrit descriptions of Niṣādas. He concludes that "the dwarfish, snub-nosed, blackfaced Bhils occupied western India" in the earliest times. In this regard, I might point to S. H. Levitt 1980 which, like T. Burrow's work, points to Dravidian loanforms in early Sanskrit, and which further suggests that a considerable period of contact with Dravidians must have elapsed before composition of the *Rgveda*. I can also point to S. H. Levitt's work on *r* and *l* in Dravidian, which suggests that at least some of the sound changes in Prakrit are due to Indo-Aryan speech

being spoken by originally Dravidian speakers. As regards Robert Shafer's view that the term "noseless" in the *Rgveda* applies to pre-Dravidians, this is in accord with A. B. Keith 1925 : 1. 11 and 2. 634. Robert Shafer, however, further identifies this population with the modern-day Bhils.

Jean Filliozat 1973 takes exception with the idea that Skt. *anās* interpreted as "noseless" refers to flat-nosed aborigines of the Dravidian type, notes that *Rgveda* 10.99.6 also characterizes *dāsas* as having six eyes and three heads, and notes that classical Western descriptions of South Indians are a consternation to anthropologists since the higher one goes in the caste system in Dravidian South India the finer and more projecting is the nose. Indeed, I can add, one need look no further than the photographs of various Dravidians in the 7 volumes of Edgar Thurston 1909 to begin to question entirely the idea of a specifically Dravidian type of nose. As Edward Sapir 1921 : 207ff. points out, race, culture, and language or language grouping do not coincide. It may well be that the original Dravidian invaders into India were mesorrhine, but discussion of this is useless since it was so long before the Aryans arrived in India. There, no doubt, had by that time already been plenty of opportunity for a situation different from but nevertheless comparable to that in the present to already maintain.

2. Against the interpretation of Skt. *anās* as meaning "noseless", we have the interpretation of the form as meaning "faceless". On the one hand, the form is interpreted as *a-nās* "noseless". On the other hand, the form is interpreted as *an-ās* "faceless". This latter is Sāyaṇa's interpretation. Sāyaṇa writes :

*kiṃ ca anāsa āsyarahitān / āsyaśabdena śabdo lakṣyate / aśabdān
mūkān dasyūn asurān vadhenāyudhena vajreṇāmṛṇaḥ
ahiṃsīḥ /*

Moreover, *anās* is separated into "face" and the negative prefix. By speech from the face, speech is indicated. With the *vadha*, the *āyudha*, the *vajra* of the gods you crushed the dumb (speechless) *dasyus* without proper speech.

As A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith 1912 : 1. 347n. point out, this has led to two interpretations.

On the one hand, there is the interpretation of O. Böhtlingk and R. Roth 1855-75 : 1. 189 and H. Grassmann 1873 : 56 who accept the separation of Skt. *anās* as *an-ās* "faceless", but no more, and who appear to understand the term to mean "misfeatured". H. Grassmann 1866-7 : 1. 181 translates

the term as "ugly". Grassmann's 1873 understanding of the term is followed by F. Knauer 1882 : 53.

On the other hand, there is a full-blown acceptance of Sāyaṇa's opinion and the word is understood to stand in place for "speechless". See, for instance, Taranatha Tarkavachaspati 1873-84. H. H. Wilson 1850-88 : 4.276 translates the term as "voiceless", and further notes that it alludes to the inability of the *dāsyus* to speak the language of the Vedic Aryans. F. Bollensen 1887 : 496 similarly understands "faceless" to mean "unable to speak", understands this to indicate that the *dāsyus* can neither understand nor speak the language of the Aryans, and notes that the Aryans call them 'dumb' on the same basis that Germans to his day call their slaves "dumb". K. F. Geldner 1951 (i. e. 1952)-7 : 2.26 and n., with what would seem to be a similar understanding of the term, translates the term in the text as "faceless", and in a footnote notes simply that this means "speechless". And M. Mayrhofer 1956-76 : 3.642 opines that Skt. *anās* probably means "faceless", and refers to Geldner's translation for usage.

Support for this interpretation of Skt. *anās* is seen to be found in the occurrence of the expression *m̐dhrā-vāc*, generally taken to mean "of hostile speech", also applied to *dasyus* in the same verse. This expression is elsewhere applied to Aryans as well. See H. H. Wilson 1850-88 : 4.276-7n., F. Bollensen 1887 : 496, and A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith 1912 : 1.348.

J. Wackernagel and A. Debrunner 1896-1954 : 2 (1930). 249 note that the form is more probably to be construed as *an-ās* "faceless", but offer no explanation or further interpretation. At 2.317 *anās*, interpreted thus, is listed together with parallel forms, just as at 2.249 it was listed with forms of *nās*- "nose".

With regard to the interpretation that "faceless", meaning "speechless", refers to an inability of the *dasyus* to speak the language of the Vedic Aryans, see in this regard *Amarakośa* 1.5.2 which notes :

apabhraṃśo 'paśabdaḥ syācchāstre śabdā tu vācakaḥ |
Apabhraṃśa is language fallen apart (or, bad language).
Śāstra is language, speech.

Śabda is used here to indicate correct Sanskrit as against native vernaculars. Note that *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* 3.2.1.23-4, 3.2.3.15 and *Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa* 7.6 similarly indicate that *asuras* and barbarians alike talk a bad speech. This would seem to contrast with such a term as speechless". On the other hand, though, the *asuras* are described at the same time in *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* 3.2.1.23 as *attavacas*, or "destitute of speech".

3. Recently, in doing work on Indian proverbs, I came across the expression "noseless" in two Bhili proverbs. As has been pointed out, aspects of Vedic culture are sometimes retained in the culture of tribal peoples in India. See, for example, Stella Kramrisch 1975 in which she points out that Santali culture preserves Vedic associations with Skt. *pūtīka* as a mushroom, and in fact preserves the word which otherwise has dropped out of Indo-Aryan vernaculars. Here we have the expression "noseless" used by exactly the population which A. B. Keith 1925 : 1. 11 and 2. 634 and Robert Shafer 1954 : 8-13 hypothesize was the population to whom the term was applied. This supports their identification of this population as the *dāsyus* of Vedic times, and gives credence to the idea that such *dāsyus* were referred to as "noseless" by the Vedic Aryans since a people often adopts usage of a term used of them by others.

The first proverb in question reads :

*nokṭi vorādāḷe hātarā hova viganem**.

E. Hedberg 1924-7 : 864 translates this :

At her wedding the noseless woman has seventeen hundred disqualifications*.

Hedberg explains the proverb thus :

(Note :— Hedberg's article prints "nokto (nokti)" as here, without diacritics or italics.)

The literal meaning of nokto (nokti) is noseless : but a person with an unusually small nose is also called a nokto. It is thus not only the Aryans who speak with contempt of small-nosed people. This proverb has, however, a deeper meaning too. Any person who has once proved himself to be untrustworthy even if he shows signs of a really changed life, the public opinion will none-the-less be against him.

The second proverb reads :

nokṭo beṭo peṭo ne khoṭo poyaso gūḷho.

* Interestingly, an exactly parallel proverb is found current in modern Marathi :
nakṭicyā laṅṅālā satrūṣe vighne

"Seventeen hundred obstacles (vighna-s) confront a snub-nosed girl's marriage."

—Editor

Hedberg 1924-7 : 864 translates this :

Even a nose-less son is the child of the womb ; and the false coin is secured by a knot (in the cloth).

The explanation here is :

Everybody loves what is his own.

While this second proverb is not as revealing as the first regarding the significance of the usage of the expression "noseless", the usage is clearly derogatory, and it would seem on the surface to imply worthlessness and perhaps the concept of falseness.

A related Bhili proverb given by Hedberg refers to the lips :

māṃḍomde heevom̐ kāṭhopa ne thee heevom̐ oṭhopa.

Hedberg 1924-7 : 862 translates this :

For the quality of bread look at the edge of the loaf, and for the quality of a woman look at her lips.

He explains that thicklips are not only considered to be ugly, but also to be a sign of an untruthful, quarrelsome, and unchaste character.

Given both the Vedic term *anās* and the proverbs given above, I think further investigation of the associations among the Bhili population with the nose, the lips, and the face, and further investigation of the meaning of and associations with the term "noseless", would prove profitable. From the material given by E. Hedberg 1924-7 we can gather that the lips are seen to indicate whether a person is truthful or untruthful, sociable or quarrelsome, and the expression "noseless" — which refers both to the absence of a nose and to a particular formation of nose — carries the connotation of untrustworthiness, worthlessness, and falseness. By the understanding given, "noseless" means "untrustworthy", and perhaps also "worthless", or "false". But how does such a concept as "noseless" fit in with Bhili ideas of the cosmos? Might there be other adjectives which also define "noseless", and perhaps define it more clearly? Can we obtain other evidence regarding to whom this term applies? In an attempt to make a start in this direction, I consulted N. Jain 1962, Sh. P. Acharya 1965, and S. B. Kulkarni 1976, but failed to find the term "noseless" in any of these volumes. Clearly, this would be a profitable avenue for field research for someone conversant with Bhili.

4. With a view toward facilitating such an investigation and perhaps helping to provide it with some framework, as well as with the hope of adding some possible elucidation to the usage of the term "noseless" in *RV* 5.29.10 now that we have evidence from Bhili that there may be behind it deeper

meaning than simply reference to a particular formation of nose, I here bring together some material from Sanskrit literature.

Reference to the nose as such occurs twice in the *Ṛgveda*. In one instance, in *ṚV* 10. 63. 1, it is simply in a listing of body parts from which malady is driven away. In the other, however, in *ṚV* 2. 39. 6. it is associated with the *tanū*, here the being of an individual, the individual self, as the protector of this being. *Atharvaveda* 5. 23. 3 again mentions the nose in a charm against worms in children, but simply in a listing of parts of the face in which the worm moves.

In *Aitareyāranyaka* 2. 4 and *Aitareyopaniṣad* 1. 1, the nostrils are associated with breath, and with breath the wind; the mouth is associated with speech, and with speech fire; the eyes are associated with sight, and with sight the Sun; and so forth. In this context, *Atharvaveda* 11. 8 notes that when in the beginning of time the divine craftsman drilled the apertures, the gods took the mortal for their house and entered man. With specific regard to breath, *Atharvaveda* 11. 4, a prayer to breath, notes in stanza 11 that "breath shall place the truth-speaker in the highest world". Also it can be noted, in the *Upaniṣads* breath is frequently identified with *brahman* and *ātman*. See *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 2. 1. 2, 3. 2, 4. 20 and *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3. 3.

We thus have associations of the mouth with speech; and of the nose with breath, and with the *tanū* in the *Ṛgveda* and with the *brahman* and *ātman* in the *Upaniṣads*, with the universal self and with the individual self. In later Sanskrit tradition, the breath is similarly associated with the *jīva*, the soul, which rides on the breath and which an even breath allows to approach the *brāhman* and absolute truth. *Dhyānabindūpaniṣad* 40, in this regard, notes the nose to be the locality of *amṛta*, or immortality, and the resting place of the *brāhman*. In this we no doubt have a continuation of the tradition expressed in *Atharvaveda* 11.4.11 which associates the breath, and thus the nose, with truth and the highest world; and of the tradition expressed in *ṚV* 2. 39. 6 which associates the nose with the *tanū*.

When we turn to Yāska, we find in *Nirukta* 6. 13 that the *nāsatyas* are described as promoters of truth and ever true, and are described as nose-born. While the association of the *nāsatyas* with the nose is in part due to folk etymology, we have here nevertheless another association of the nose with truth, the principle of order in the universe, as we have indirectly in *Atharvaveda* 11. 4. 11. The term *nāsatya* itself is defined by H. Grassmann 1873; 726 as "not deceitful" or "truthful".

In *Nirukta* 6. 17 we find the nose referred to together with the lips.

The passage in question states that Skt. *śīprā* " the lips " in their widest sense refers to either the two jaws or the nose. Here we find reason for perhaps considering together with our consideration of the term " noseless " the third Bhili proverb given above regarding the quality of a person as being indicated by the lips. In the early Indic delineation of body parts there seems to be overlap. This again provides still another association with truth and order in the universe.

I note I have also consulted Middle Indo-Aryan and New Indo-Aryan terms for " nose " to see if other meanings these terms might carry might throw light on the significance of the nose in Indic thought. In one instance, in Bihari, the term applies to the sole of a plough. And in another instance, in Nepali, it refers to the eye of a needle. I must admit, though, to far too little knowledge regarding agriculture or sewing to adequately interpret these usages in the contexts of the material outlined so far. I can suggest, however, that the association of the term with the eye of a needle ought no doubt involve the religious significance in India and elsewhere of an unsewn garment, and of a hand-sewn garment. I can also speculate in the context of the material above that the reason why the hole at the end of a needle is referred to as the nose is that it allows the breath to pass through it, and that just as breath is the essence of life, it allows the thread to pass through it which intimately involves the purpose of the needle.

Widely, these terms are also used for the rope through the nose of an ox or a bullock, which is used for control, and the nosering worn by women in India. The meanings here would seem to be due to the intimate association of the items defined with the nose. The forms which show this are primarily related to Skt. *nasta*, *nastaka*, and so forth, but the meaning can also be seen in forms related to Skt. *nāsā* and *nāsikā* in, for instance, Sinhalese *nāya*. I should add that as P. K. Gode 1938 and 1940 has argued convincingly that the nosering cannot be traced in Indian literature prior to about 1000 A. D. , which suggests that it is probably a foreign importation, we ought not look too far for any significance to the nosering other than ornamentation though its popularity in India may suggest that this usage in India has latched on to native Indian tradition regarding the significance of the nose. Its popularity may reflect the significance in Indic thought of the concept of the individual self and its association with breath.

Roy L. Turner 1962-6 does not list any forms which carry the meaning " noseless ".

We can find the expression " noseless " used elsewhere in Sanskrit literature, though, in *Taittirīyasaṃhitā*, 7. 5. 12 and in the lexicographic and

grammatical traditions. Both the *Amarakoṣa* and Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, of course, have been noted to contain material which is early.

The word used in *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* 7. 5. 12 for "noseless" is Skt. *anāsikā*. Also found here is the expression "faceless". The word used for this is Skt. *amukha*. A. B. Keith 1914 : 629-30 translates :

To the toothed hail !
 To the toothless hail !
 To the breathing hail !
 To that which hath not breath hail !
 To that which hath a face hail !
 To the faceless hail !
 To that which hath a nose hail !
 To the noseless hail !
 To that which hath eyes hail !
 To the eyeless hail !
 To that which hath ears hail !
 To the earless hail !
 To that which hath a head hail !
 To the headless hail !
 To that which hath feet hail !
 To the footless hail !

This passage then continues by matching functions with the various body parts.

To that which breatheth hail !
 To that which breatheth not hail !
 To that which speaketh hail !
 To that which speaketh not hail !
 To that which seeth hail !
 To that which seeth not hail !
 To that which heareth hail !
 To that which heareth not hail !
 To that which hath a mind hail !
 To the mindless hail !
 To that which hath seed hail !
 To the seedless hail !

This appears to be part of an all-inclusive exhortation to both beings of the *Sat* and the *Āsat*, the regions of universal order and universal disorder, the realms of Truth and of the Untrue. And here we seem to have the import of both "noseless" and "faceless". The term refers to beings of the realm of *anṛta* and disorder, "Truth-less" beings.

"Faceless", as Sāyaṇa suggests, is linked to speechlessness. We would expect to have "noseless" here linked to "breathless" on the basis of the material presented up to this point, but on the surface "noseless" here also seems to be linked to "speechless", "breathless" being linked to what would seem to stand in place for the individual self. But on the basis of *Amarakoṣa* 2. 6. 89-90, which will be mentioned below, the teeth can be associated with the lips and thus the mouth, not referred to directly here. On independent basis the mouth can be associated with speech, and speech as we have seen is associated with the face. What we appear to have in this invocation is the first four items in the listing of body parts being matched with the first two functions in reverse order. Thus we have reference to A and B, then a matching with A and B, both matched with the functions being mentioned in the order B and A. "Toothless" and "faceless" both refer to "speechless"; "that which hath not breath" and "noseless" both refer to "breatheth not". This conflation of these important features suggests that perhaps in *RV* 5. 29. 10 in the usage of Skt. *anās* we have purposeful ambiguity regarding whether the term means "noseless" or "faceless", and that we have the possibility here of a *double entendre*.

With regard to the association of Sāyaṇa of "faceless" with "speechless", this clearly is correct, but it is not at all clear that it refers to non-Aryan speech — which association may be suspect already as noticed above. But either Sāyaṇa's statement does not go far enough, or else, without our understanding of "faceless" and "speechless" in the context here as referring to beings of the *Āsat*, we miss the point of his statement.

We must note here that regardless of whether Skt. *anās* means "noseless" or "faceless", on the basis of *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* 7.5.12 we have in this word a characterization of *dasyus* as beings of the *Āsat*, beings of disorder in the universe, beings of the Untrue. In this, the term is comparable with other characterizations of *dasyus* in the *R̥gveda* such as *akarman* "riteless", *adevayu* "indifferent to the gods", *abrahman* "without devotion", *āyajvan* "not sacrificing" and *avratā* "lawless". We might best characterize the import of both "noseless" and "faceless" as "Truthless" or "Untrue".

The words used for the expression "noseless" in *Amarakoṣa* 2. 6. 46 are Skt. *gatanāsika*, literally "having a gone nose" and *vigra*. M. Monier-Williams 1899: 959c suggests that this is a mislection for *vighra*, and provides cross-reference to *jighra*. These terms would have reference to smelling. The *Amarapadavivṛti* of Liṅgayasūrin, to mention just one of the commentaries on the *Amarakoṣa*, suggests the reading here should be *vikhya*

or *vikhur*. What are we to make of this? *Pāṇini* 5. 4. 119 *Vārttika*, though, notes that *gra* is a Vedic substitute for *nāsikā* after the preverb *vi-*, *vigra* meaning “noseless”. We also find *vigra*, along with *vikhra* and *vikhu*, as definitions for *anāsika* “noseless” in Hemacandra’s *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* 3.114. And similarly, the *Śabdakalpadrūma* notes *vigra* to stand for “noseless” in Halāyudha’s vocabulary. It can be noted that I have not found comparable usage in Roy L. Turner 1962–6.

In *Amarakośa* and Hemacandra, the term “noseless” appears listed together with deformities. In *Amarakośa* the term appears to contrast with “flat-nosed” and “sharp-nosed”. More clearly, in Hemacandra the term contrasts with “flat-nosed”, “sharp-nosed”, and *kṣudranāsika*, “small-nosed”. The Sanskrit term *kṣudranāsika* is also mentioned in passing in *Pāṇini* 6. 1. 63 *Vārttika* 2. While it is not clear as to what the *Amarakośa*, for instance, is stating about “noseless”, it can be noted that shortly before mention of this term in the *Amarakośa*, there is a statement that someone with an imperfect limb is a child.

We must also note in this context that shortly after this in the *Amarakośa*, in a listing of body parts, the face, the nose, and the lips are listed together in sequence in 2. 6. 89–90. Here the face, as above in Sāyaṇa and the *Taittirīyasaṃhitā*, is connected with the function of speaking. The nose, instead of being connected with breath or the individual self, is connected here with smelling. See in this regard A. B. Keith 1909 : 227 and n. 7 where Skt. *prāṇa*, normally translated as “breath”, is here translated as “scent”. Later, in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4. 5. 12, it is said that the uniting place of all odors is the nose. And in the late *Garbhopaniṣad* 1, it is related that the nose serves the body in smell. George William Brown 1921 : 84 ff. notes that this recognition of the nose as the organ of smell can be seen to stand beside its connection with the breath from the earliest *Upaniṣads* on. The lips here are noted as no more than covering the teeth. This association has been used above to help connect “toothless” and “speechless” in *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* 7. 5. 12 and though it is different from Yāska’s association with the lips, it appears to be standard.

5. In summation, both Bhili usage and the lexicographic tradition show that the expression “noseless” is indeed a characterization of a particular physical formation of nose. The *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* similarly uses the expression. But in the *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* such usage seems to refer to an absolute absence of a nose, which usage the expression also carries in Bhili. The import of the *Amarakośa* would appear to indicate Sanskrit usage as in Bhili. In all of this, we have support in the Indian tradition for the inter-

pretation of Skt. *anās* in *R̥V* 5. 29. 10 as meaning "noseless", and as perhaps referring to a physical feature of non-Aryan inhabitants of India.

Bhili usage indicates a deeper meaning to the term, though, and just as in Sāyaṇa's association of the term "faceless" with "speechless", a deeper meaning for the term "noseless" can also be seen in Sanskrit literature in associations of the nose with breath and with the individual self and truth. The most comparable purport would be "without breath" or "breathless", and perhaps further significance might be implied with this as well on account of the associations with the individual self and truth. The *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* indicates an even further purport for the term, however, and for "faceless"; specifically, that such terms refer to the *Āsat*, the region of disorder and Untruth in the universe, and to a lack of behavior in accord with the *Sat*, or Truth of the universe. The lexicographic tradition in this regard, while it does appear to be picking up on early tradition, appears to be picking up on other aspects of the tradition.

The *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* suggests that the ambiguity in the expression in *R̥V* 5. 29. 10 is intentional, and that the term can be understood as either "noseless" or "faceless".

Sāyaṇa's comment on the term, understood as "faceless", is clearly correct. But it is not clear that "speechless" is to be understood as reference to non-Aryan speech. It is clear, on the basis of the *Taittirīyasaṃhitā*, that either Sāyaṇa does not go far enough in his elucidation of the term, or else that without our understanding the tradition independently of his commentary we are missing the import of what Sāyaṇa is stating.

By the understanding of the term expressed in this paper, Skt. *anās* in *R̥V* 5. 29. 10 falls in with other characterizations of *dasyus* in the *R̥gveda* and *Atharvaveda* such as *akarmān* "riteless", *adevayu* "indifferent to the gods", *abrahman* "without devotion", *āyajvan* "not sacrificing", *avratā* "lawless", *anyā-vrata* "following strange ordinances", and *deva-pīyā* "reviling the gods". We may perhaps best characterize the import of "noseless" or "faceless" as Truthless or Untrue. While the term interpreted as "noseless" may indeed refer to a particular formation of nose, and while we can make a case that the term refers to pre-Dravidians, its primary import would seem to be a reference to character. It is a reference to *dasyus* being divorced from Truth, and on this account forces of disorder in the universe. Both "noseless" and "faceless" are aspects of the *Āsat*, of the Non-existent, the Truthless.

This dual usage of "noseless" to indicate both a particular physical formation of the nose and a force of disorder in the universe, a being of the

Untrue, fits in with that aspect of Indic thought which interprets the structure of concrete reality as indicating the perceived structure of the universe. The microcosm recapitulates the macrocosm. A very real enemy in the concrete context is an enemy in the mythic cosmic framework. A physically "noseless" enemy is a cosmical "noseless" enemy.

The Bhili understanding of "noseless" as expressed by Enok Hedberg 1924-7 as "untrustworthy" and "false" perhaps is consonant with the understanding of "noseless" in *RV* 5. 29. 10 expressed here. We would need further Bhili explication of the proverbs in question and of the expression "noseless" in Bhili, however, in order to see this for certain.

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SOTERIOLOGY OF PRAKṚTI : THE WORLD AS GURU IN CLASSICAL SĀMĀKHYA

BY

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Introduction

Classical Sāmkhya teaches that the world (Prakṛti) comes into manifestation so that one (Puruṣa) can see it. This is the reason that the world is created at all. There is no manifest world without one's need to see it. In that looking one has a vision of true selfhood.¹ Contrast the teachings of Yoga as witnessed in *The Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali*. The yogins were the masters of esoteric techniques intended to restrain movement of the psyche caused by stimulation of the senses. *Āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra*, etc., the entire eight-limbed path, is a disciplined effort at closing out the intrusive world of sense objects, in order to bring the psyche to stillness.² Patañjali and commentators took the stance that restricted senses were a necessary ground for the wisdom of one's true selfhood as Puruṣa to be grasped. In

¹ Refer to *Sāmkhya-Kārikā* verse 21 quoted below. (Henceforth the text is noted 'SK'.)

I have followed Gerald Larson and Michel Hulin in defining classical Sāmkhya as that school of religious philosophy (*darśana*) systematized in the *Sāmkhya-Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, as well as the commentaries written directly on this text.

Gerald Larson, *Classical Sāmkhya : An Interpretation of its History and Meaning*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass 1965, p. 4. (Larson has most recently used 'Kārikā Sāmkhya'. This is not preferred.)

Michel Hulin, *Sāmkhya Literature*, Wiesbaden. Otto Harrassowitz 1978, p. 128

The five major commentaries of the classical period have been consulted for this study. The following editions were used :

The Sāmkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the Commentary of Gauḍapāda, T. G. Mainkar (ed., trans.), Pune, Oriental Book Agency 1964.

Sāmkhyakārikā [with *Māṭharavṛtti* and *Jayamaṅgalā*], V. P. Sarma and S. Vangīya (eds.), Varanasi. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office 1970.

The Tattvakaumudī, Ganganatha Jha (ed., tras.), Pune, Oriental Book Agency 1934.

Sāmkhyakārikā [with *Yuktidīpikā*], R. S. Tripathi (ed.), Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass 1970.

All citations refer to *devanāgarī* numbered pages. These commentators will be referred to as: Gauḍapāda, Māṭhara, Jayamaṅgalā, Vācaspati, and *Yuktidīpikā*. See also note 20.

² See *Yoga-Sūtras* 1. 2, 1. 12, 2. 54.

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other words, contact with the world of sense objects inhibits spiritual perfection. Because the *Yoga-Sūtras* has been the central text in Western scholarly investigations into spiritual praxis of India, the faulty image has been born that all classical Indian meditation disciplines are world-renouncing traditions. This image has led to a misreading of the texts from schools outside the Yoga lineage. Specifically, this image does not hold true for Sāṃkhya practice. The Sāṃkhyas did not close out the world, they engaged the sense objects, allowing sensual processes to function actively. The *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, as the authoritative text for the classical school, boldly states that the seeker is utterly incapable of realizing spiritual perfection without sensuous contact with the world. Indeed, it is the world, manifest life itself, that is the source of wisdom as to the nature of the true self. It is the world that is the guru for the Sāṃkhya practitioner. My purpose in this study is to analyze the mechanism and motivation of world creation according to classical Sāṃkhya and to gain an understanding of the teaching function of this world, the skilful means of Prakṛti in her manifest form.

Whereas the yogins were the masters of sensory restraint, the Sāṃkhyas were the masters of sensory observation. They perfected the impossibly simple art of sitting and looking. The Sāṃkhya preceptor initiated a student with a straightforward charge: 'Sit down, watch, observe the world around you!'

Courtship of Puruṣa and Prakṛti

When the Sāṃkhya observes his reality ('his' because there were no female seekers in the orthodox culture) he sees an utterly lopsided duality. On the one hand there is Prakṛti, unmanifest as creativity, manifest as the entirety of creation. On the other hand there is Puruṣa, the individual knower of this world.³ The duality of the Sāṃkhya universe is absolute. Both aspects are eternal, and eternally real. There are no gray areas in regard to sort-of-existing, sort-of-not-existing entities such as the *māyā* of

³ See SK 10, 11:

Manifest Prakṛti is finite, non-pervasive, active, manifold, supported, mergent, composite, and dependent. Unmanifest Prakṛti is opposite.

hetumat anityam ayāpi sakriyam anekam āśritaṃ liṅgam /
sāvayavam paratantraṃ vyaktaṃ viparītaṃ avyaktaṃ //

Both manifest and unmanifest Prakṛti are characterized by the three *guṇas*, indistinguishable, objective, general, inconscient, and productive by nature. Puruṣa is the opposite of them, although similar [to unmanifest Prakṛti of verse 10].

triguṇam aviveki viśayaḥ sāmānyam acetanaṃ prasavadharmi /
vyaktaṃ tathā pradhānam tadviparītaṃ tathā ca pumān //

Advaita Vedānta. Sāṃkhya is very clear about its basic metaphysical statement. Puruṣa is the true essence of the human being, the self as consciousness, and Prakṛti is everything else.

But, even though Puruṣa, the conscious self, is utterly contrary to Prakṛti; even though totally other, eternally not the world in any form, he falsely imagines himself as consisting of consciousness *and* creativity. As a result of this basic ignorance, this imagined relationship of Puruṣa and Prakṛti the world comes into manifest form. In the *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* this relationship is called *saṃyoga*, a term often employed in Sanskrit literature to denote the union of lovers or spouses.⁴ Classical Sāṃkhya tells in fact of a love affair between consciousness and creation, that lopsided pair of the universe.

The commentators spend much time telling us what Puruṣa and unmanifest Prakṛti's relationship is not. Māṭhara lists the accepted categories of the *saṃyoga* sort :

Relationship is indeed of many types : produced by the function of one [of the two members] like that of a post with a hawk on it ; or that produced by the coming together of the two [members] as in the case of two fingers : [or relationship] due to the self-nature [of both members] like that of fire and heat ; [or relationship] which has its cause in capacity like water and fish ; or that which is random and accidental like that of two birds [in flight].⁵

Māṭhara then denies that any of these sorts of *saṃyoga* apply to Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The hawk must fly in order to roost on a post; both fingers must move at the knuckle to meet at the tip. Puruṣa and unmanifest Prakṛti are, however, incapable of activity; they are *niṣkriya* according to *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* (verses 10 and 11). Prakṛti cannot run to embrace the waiting Puruṣa, nor vice versa. Neither can they rush into each other's arms. Further, heat is the determining characteristic of fire and fire of heat. The one has no existence without the other. If this were so with our couple, the spiritual perfection of Puruṣa would be denied. He could never be

⁴ See *Manusmṛti* 3. 32.

⁵ Māṭhara, p. 25 (comment on SK 20) :

anekavidho hi saṃyogaḥ. anyatarakarmajo yathā sthānuśyenayoḥ sampātajo dvayor vā saṃyogo yathā dvyaṅgulākāśayoḥ svābhāviko yathā agnyuṣṇayoḥ śaktihetuko yathā matsyodakayoḥ yādṛcchikaḥ suparṇayor vā ākasmikaḥ.

complete and whole unto⁶ himself. Further, whereas a lake gets along just fine without fish, the latter is dependent on the lake for food and air. Water is the medium of its movement and, what is most important, the environment of its birth. Puruṣa and unmanifest Prakṛti are, in contrast independently existent: neither has a cause bearing them forth. Not having a cause, they are not lorded over by anything.⁷ Finally, the relationship of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is not a fluke of the air, like that of the collision of flying birds. happening by accident, for no fathomable reason. Puruṣa and Prakṛti relate eternally and with definite purpose in mind.⁸

Even though no activity is granted to enable Puruṣa and unmanifest Prakṛti to come together, there is nonetheless a spetial quality to their relationship. According to verses 10 and 11 of the *Kārikā*, both Puruṣa and unmanifest Prakṛti are eternally existent. They are also both omnipresent. Because they exist at all times in all places, they are always in one another's presence. Verse 66 points out that, even after wisdom has arisen, when Puruṣa assumes his true identity as other than Prakṛti, still their relationship continues. According to Gauḍapāda, this is because of the all-pervasiveness of Puruṣa and Prakṛti.⁹ Though unmanifest Prakṛti and Puruṣa are non-physical realities

⁶ See *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 120-121 (comment on SK. 20) :

[This *saṃyoga*] is not of the very self-nature [of Puruṣa and Prakṛti] because [this view would lead to] the faulty conclusion that [Puruṣa] is without release. As with fire, because of its self-nature, there is no release from heat, just so there would be the faulty conclusion of no release for the self from its relationship with the *guṇas*, if it were based on self-nature.

(na svābhāvikaḥ anirmokṣaprasaṅgāt. Yathā agneḥ svābhāvikād auṣṇyān mokṣo na bhavati evam ātmanaḥ svābhāvikātvād guṇasaṃyogād anirmokṣaprasaṅgaḥ syāt.)

⁷ See SK 11 in note three.

⁸ See *Māṭhara*, p. 25 (comment on SK 20) :

Here it is said : that relationship born of the action of one member and [of both members] is not the relationship of Puruṣa and Prakṛti because they are without activity and omnipresent. It is also not due to their self-nature. Because both are eternal, this would imply the impossibility of release, due to inseparability. When, by this very manner of thinking, [the relationship] 'having-a-cause-in-purpose' and 'having-a-cause-in-capacity' remain, it asked : 'Now which one is the relationship of Puruṣa and Prakṛti ?' The [*Sāṃkhya*] says : 'having-its-cause-in-purpose'.

(atrocyate anyatarakarmajasasāmyogaś ca saṃyogo naiva pradhānapuruṣayor vibhūtvāṇīkriyatvāt. nāsti svābhāviko 'pi. tayoṛ nityatvān mokṣābhāvaḥ syād aviyoḡatvāt. evam eva viśayahetuke śaktihetukatve ca. atrāha kas tarhi pradhānapuruṣayor saṃyoga iti. atrocyate arthahetukaḥ.)

⁹ SK 66 reads :

The indifferent one says : 'She has been seen by me ;' the other says : 'I have been seen'. Even though proximity still exists for the two, there is no purpose for creation.

(Continued on the next page)

(i.e. Prakṛti is creativity. Puruṣa is consciousness) they are said to relate in physical space. And since they exist simultaneously throughout the triple world, i. e. since they pervade physical space, there is nowhere for them to go in order to sever their relationship.¹⁰

Yuktidīpikā further expands the discussion of what the relationship of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is not. It is not a true union (*yoga*) at all, in that Puruṣa is not liable to any sort of transformation (*avikārya*).¹¹ The thinking here is that if any two entities join, there must occur some modification in both. Unless each is changed, they are in fact still two separate things. There is no real affair if only one partner falls in love. Thus, even though unmanifest Prakṛti is capable of transformation, as happens whenever she shows herself in manifest form, her relationship with Puruṣa is never a union, because Puruṣa never changes.¹² Mainkar also points out that Puruṣa and Prakṛti cannot

(Continued from p. 68)

dr̥ṣṭā maye 'ty upেকṣaka ekaḥ dr̥ṣṭāhaṃ ity uparamaty anyā /
sati saṃyoge ' pi tayoh prayojanaṃ nūsti sargasya //

See Gauḍapāda, p. 162 (comment on SK 66) :

Even though there is a cessation [of need and activity respectively] on the part of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, of this manner [described above], their relationship continues, due to their pervasiveness due to the omnipresence of Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

(evaṃ prakṛtipuruṣayor nivṛttau api vyāpakatvāt saṃyogo asti prakṛtipuruṣayoh sarvagatavāt.)

¹⁰ See *Jayamaṅgalā*, p. 75 (comment on SK 10):

The unmanifest, on the contrary, is omnipresent (' all pervasive ' is the sense '), because she exists simultaneously in the three worlds, that of the gods, etc.

(sarvagatvaṃ viparītaṃ avyaktaṃ vyāpīty arthaḥ devādiṣu lokeṣu sarvadā vartamānatvāt.)

¹¹ See *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 120 (comment SK 20):

[An objector says] because of the union (*yoga*) of energy [Prakṛti] and consciousness [Puruṣa], his very self-nature becomes that of an [active] viewer This is not logical. Why? Just like space, the nature of which is not liable to change, when in mere proximity (i. e. located in the same place) with a cloud, or dust, or smoke, appears to have the nature of something soiled, even though it is itself absolutely pure and no changeability exists. This is also the case with the self [in proximity of Prakṛti].

(cetanāśaktiyogāt tu draṣṭṛtvam aśya svābhāvikam.....iti tad ayuktam. kiṃ kāraṇam. avikāryarūpasya ākāśasya sannidhānamātrān, meghapayorajodhūmaprabhṛtibhir abhinnadeśatvād atyantaśuddhasyāpi malinam iva rūpam upalakṣyate na ca vikāryatvam evam ātmano api syāt.)

¹² See SK 3 :

Original Prakṛti is uncreated. The seven, beginning with *mahat*, are created and creative. But the 16 are created [only]. Puruṣa is neither created nor creative,

mūlaprakṛtir avikṛtir mahadādyāḥ prakṛtivilāsayāḥ sapta /
śoḍaśakas tu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ //

See also note 11.

intermingle in this relationship because Puruṣa is not made up of parts. He is of a single fabric and thus cannot blend with anything else.¹³

Now if it is so that all these expected characteristics of *saṃyoga* are not applicable to Puruṣa and Prakṛti — they do not move toward one another, depend on or define each other, change Puruṣa in any way, or intermingle — what sort of relating do they carry on? *Yuktidīpikā* says that their *saṃyoga* is simply a proximity; Puruṣa and Prakṛti are located in the same place (*sannidhāna*).¹⁴ However, in their nearness Puruṣa loses his head; he mistakenly begins to identify with Prakṛti. He sees her action in himself and his consciousness in her. The commentators give many daily life analogies as to how a mere proximity can result in a seeming union of characteristics. Māṭhara, for example, uses these illustrations:

Just as a pot which is neither hot nor cold [in itself], when touched by cold water becomes cold, and becomes hot when touched by fire.¹⁵

It is told about how some thieves, having robbed a village and seized its wealth, go on to another village, since their purpose is accomplished. A brahmin, versed in Vedic learning, having the same destination in mind, travels the path along with them. They are all arrested by the police who were chasing after them on the path. Even the brahmin is

¹³ See Mainkar's note in Gauḍapāda, p. 63.

'Not made up of parts' translates *niravayavam*.

See SK 10 in note 3.

¹⁴ See note 11.

¹⁵ Māṭhara, p. 25 (comment on SK 20):

tad yathā anuṣṇāsīto ghaṭaḥ śītābhir adbhiḥ saṃsprṣṭaḥ śīto bhavati. agninā saṃyukta uṣṇo bhavati.

Cf. Gauḍapāda, p. 62 (comment on SK 20):

In this [verse] the Puruṣa is the conscious one. The emergent world, *mahat* and the rest, in relationship with the illumination of that Consciousness appears as if conscious. Just as in worldly experience a pot, when touched by cold, becomes cold, and when touched by heat becomes hot.

(iha puruṣaś cetanāvān. tena cetanāvabhūsa saṃyutkaṃ mahadādi liṅgaṃ cetanāvad iva bhavati yathā loke ghaṭaḥ śītasamīyuktaḥ śītaḥ uṣṇasamīyukta uṣṇaḥ ...)

This pot/heat example adds to our understanding of how Puruṣa and Prakṛti are envisioned in their *sannidhāna*. That they 'sit down together' does not mean that they sit next to each other, as on a park bench, rather they intersperse one another; they share the same space. *Yuktidīpikā*'s comment, quoted in note 11, is an especially strong analogy pointing to the interspersion of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Space does not remain physically separate from the smoke or cloud which inhabits it.

arrested, along with those who had committed the offence.

[The police] say : ' You are also a thief ! ' .¹⁶

This long discussion by the commentators on the nature of the relationship of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is an attempt to explain the experience of the every day human being while upholding the most rock-hard doctrine of classical Sāṃkhya : the real duality of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Verses 17 and 18 of the *Kārikā* use empirical evidence and logical inference to prove the existence of a plurality of Puruṣas.¹⁷ Verse 19 then describes Puruṣa's nature : he is inactive, indifferent [*madhyastha*] viewer of Prakṛti, complete and whole unto himself (*kevala*). Verses 19-21 read as follows :

Because Puruṣa is opposite [of Prakṛti] his witnesshood, wholeness, indifference, viewerhood, and inactivity are proved.

By means of their relationship the inconscient one appears as if characterized by consciousness ; likewise the indifferent one appears to be an actor, even though the agent of activity is the *guṇas*.

The relationship of those two, like the blind and the lame, is for the purpose of Puruṣa's seeing [Prakṛti], and for his spiritual completion. Creation comes forth out of that relationship.¹⁸

¹⁶ Māṭhara, p. 25 (comment on SK 20) :

kecit kila caurā grāmam hṛtvā dravyam gṛhītvā grāmāntaram gacchanti kṛtakāryāḥ. taiḥ saha sārthena śrotṛiyo brāhmaṇaḥ panthānam gacchati. tat padānu-sāribhir āraṅkṣibhis te gṛhītaḥ. kṛtāparādhais taiḥ saha so'pi brāhmaṇo gṛhītaḥ tvam api caura iti.

¹⁷ SK 17 and 18 read :

Puruṣa exists because aggregates are for the sake of another, because [the other] is different from the three *guṇas*, etc., because of superintendence, because of the existence of an experiencer, and because there is activity for the sake of spiritual completion.

saṃghātaparāthātāt triguṇādiviparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt /
puruṣo' sti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārtham pravṛttas ca //

The plurality of Puruṣa is proved because of diversity of births, deaths, and sense organs, because of non-simultaneity of activities, and particularly because of the differences in things made up of the *guṇas*.

Jananamaraṇakaraṇānām pratiniyamād ayugapatpravṛttes ca /
puruṣabahutvam siddham traiguṇyaviparyāyāc caiva //

¹⁸ The Sanskrit text of SK 19-21 reads :

tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddham sāksitvam asya puruṣasya /
kavilayaṃ mādhyasthyam draṣṭṛtvam akartṛbhāvaś ca //
tasmāt tatsaṃyogād acetanaṃ cetanāvad iva liṅgam /
guṇakartṛtve ca tathā karteḥ bhavaty udāsīnaḥ //
puruṣasya darśanārtham kaivalyārtham tathā pradhānasya /
paṅgvandhavād ubhayaḥ api saṃyogas tatkrtaḥ sargaḥ //

it is common practice for Sanskrit commentators to create a hypothetical reader of the text at hand. They imagine that this reader gains a certain amount of understanding from a particular verse, but that the verse also raises a new question. This new question is the supposed motivation for the poet's next verse. In this way the commentators provide the transitional flow of thought between each verse, keeping us aware of the continuity of the text. In that the *Kārikā* is, in an important sense, a *sūtra* text, meant to be used as core statements by the master in teaching the disciple, the hypothetical reader in this case may be taken to represent a Sāṃkhya seeker.

Now, when this seeker hears that his very self as consciousness is not at all active — that self is other than the inconscient Prakṛti in the form of body, sense powers, mind, ego, and intellect — this teaching contradicts his experience of self as consciousness *and* agent of activity. Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati, providing transition between verses 19 and 20, express the seeker's dismay :

If in fact Puruṣa is not an active agent, how does one effect the judgment : 'I will practise moral deeds. I will not practise immoral deeds.'

Having decided upon some purpose to be accomplished, the notion arises in one : 'I am conscious, I desire to act. I [will] act.' Thus it is proved by experience that there is a common subject for both consciousness and activity.¹⁹

Verse 20 is a response to this questioning on the part of the seeker. It explains his daily experience with manifest Prakṛti and Puruṣa by pointing to the proximity of Puruṣa (consciousness) with unmanifest Prakṛti (creativity) as the ground for this false identification. It goes back to the cosmic 'beginning' of this whole affair with which the seeker is so familiar. Verse 20 focuses on the fact of Puruṣa's relationship with Prakṛti. It stresses the ultimate otherness of Puruṣa and the seeming nature of their union. However, it is not the simple fact of relationship, not the mere proximity of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, which brings the world into manifest form, providing a stage for the seeker's experience of self as conscious actor. Remember, Puruṣa and Prakṛti are eternally in proximity; even when Puruṣa finds spiritual perfection, this

¹⁹ Gauḍapāda, p. 62 (introduction to SK 20) :

yasmād akartā puruṣas tat katham adhyavasāyaṃ karoti dharmaṃ kariṣyāmy
adharmam na kariṣyāmīti.

Vācaspati, p. 39 (introduction to SK 20) :

kartavyam artham avagamy cetano' haṃ cikīṛṣan karomīti kṛticaitanyayoḥ sāmānā-
dhikarāṇyam anubhavasiddham

proximity continues. The proximity of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is a necessary condition for world creation, but it is not the motivating cause. That cause is present when Puruṣa is in a state of need, lacking something Prakṛti can provide by going into manifestation. What Puruṣa lacks is the understanding of his natural and impassive indifferent witnesshood, his ultimate wholeness, his otherness. Puruṣa is in the state of bondage. Puruṣa needs Prakṛti to manifest in order to regain that lost freedom. In observing the created things of the world Puruṣa finds freedom from false identification with creativity itself. Verse 21 states that Prakṛti brings forth the world from within herself so that Puruṣa may see her, and in that seeing may come to know his independent integrity once again. Thus verse 21 adds the state of need on the part of Puruṣa to the mere proximity relationship presented in verse 20. In doing so it answers the new question of the seeker which verse 20 created : ' I see how it is possible to mistakenly experience the union of consciousness and creation but *why* do I have manifest experience at all ? ' ²⁰

Prakṛti goes forth into manifestation due to a motivating influence which originates outside herself. It is not her self-nature to transform from the state of creativity into created things. *Jayamaṅgalā* comments on this :

[Thus this creation] is brought about by Prakṛti only, the Foremost One. It is not controlled by a supreme god; this is the meaning here. The triple world is made up of the three *guṇas*, and it arises out of Prakṛti by means of the three *guṇas* alone. However, [creation] is not spontaneous ... Why then is there an initiation [of creation] on

²⁰ See Vācaspati, p. 40-41 (introduction and comment on SK 21).

Vācaspati voices and answers the hypothetical reader's question created by verse 20 :

[The experience of being a conscious actor] is due to the relationship of [Puruṣa and Prakṛti]. However, no relationship exists between two distinct things without there being a need of some sort, nor without the condition of one providing service and one receiving benefit. ' This service, which has its motivating cause in need is declared [in this verse].

(tat saṃyogāt ity uktam na ca bhinnayoḥ saṃyogo ' pekṣāṃ vinā na ca ayam upakāryopakāraḥ bhāvaṃ vinā ity apekṣāhetum āha.)

Vācaspati then responds to a further question in commenting on this verse :

' Wait a minute. The relationship of those two may be, but why is there creation of *mahat*, etc. ? ' [This verse states that] creation comes forth from that union. Indeed relationship without the creation of *mahat*, etc., is not sufficient for the experience and spiritual completion [of Puruṣa], thus that very relationship brings forth creation for the sake of his experience and ultimate perfection.

(nanu bhavatu anayoḥ saṃyogo mahadādi sargas tu kuta ity ata āha tatkrtaḥ sargaḥ iti. saṃyogo hi na mahadādi sargam antareṇa bhogāya kaivalyāya ca paryāpta iti saṃyoga eva bhogāpavargārtham sargam karotīty arthaḥ.)

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the part of the Foremost One ... ? There is initiation for the sake of the spiritual release of each and every Puruṣa.²¹

The motivation for manifestation comes from Puruṣa. His need is Prakṛti's motivating influence. The world comes into form only for Puruṣa's sake. 'Puruṣa's sake' translates *puruṣārtha*, a compound which appears again and again in the *Kārikā*.²² After the notion of Puruṣa and Prakṛti's otherness (*puruṣaprakṛtyanyatā*), it expresses the most important doctrine in classical Sāṃkhya. 'Otherness' states the *what* of reality; 'Puruṣa's sake' states the *why*.

Prakṛti goes into action without any self-interest. She seeks only to serve Puruṣa. Māṭhara offers the analogy of a king and his messenger. The king's purpose is to transmit his orders. The messenger also has a purpose: to get the king's orders through to their destination. Prakṛti's purpose is the purpose of another.²³ When this purpose is fulfilled, when Puruṣa finds release through experiencing Prakṛti in manifest form, she ceases her services she no longer displays herself for that particular Puruṣa. Verse 66 tells us that Puruṣa and Prakṛti remain in proximity after Puruṣa's spiritual perfection, but Prakṛti no longer serves him by bringing forth her manifest form because Puruṣa no longer needs her to do so.²⁴ Māṭhara compares the relationship of Prakṛti with the now perfected Puruṣa to that of a long-standing marriage :

²¹ *Jayamaṅgalā*, p. 111 (comment on SK 56) :

prakṛtikṛta iti pradhānakṛtaḥ neśverādikṛta ity arthaḥ. lokatrayaṃ triguṇātmikam bhavati tac ca triguṇāyā eva prakṛter utpadyate. nāpi svābhāvikaḥ kimarthaṃ pradhānasyārabha ekaikasya puruṣasya vimuktyartham ārambhah.

²² *puruṣārtha* appears in SK 31, 42, 63, 69, etc.

²³ Māṭhara, p. 26 (comment on SK 21) :

[Prakṛti says:] 'For that person who has performed discipline, who exists in the state of wisdom, I will bring about spiritual completion.'. Spiritual completion is release. Just as a king who comes together with his man has the notion: 'He will deliver my message.' And the man who comes together with his king has this notion: 'He will give me my function'. Thus, just as their relationship has its cause in the purpose of both the man and the king, so too does this relationship, this joining together, have its cause in the purpose of both Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

(asya tapasvinaḥ puruṣasya jñāne vartamānasya kaivalyaṃ kariṣyāmīti kaivalyaṃ mokṣa ity arthaḥ. yathā rājā puruṣeṇa saṃyujyate praiṣaṇam me kariṣyātīti. puruṣo'pi rājā saṃyujyate vṛttiṃ me dāsyātīti. evaṃ tāvad rājapurusayor arthahetukah saṃbandhaḥ. tathā pradhānapurusayor apy arthahetukah.)

²⁴ See Vācaspati, p. 78 (comment on SK 66) :

The [verse] said this: 'since there is no purpose for creation.' Now, Prakṛti displays herself in creation, by this means exists her purpose. But, when there is no need on the part of Puruṣa for that [creation], there exists no purpose. This is the meaning here.

(tad idam uktaṃ n prajojanaṃ n nāsti sargasya iti. atha prayujyate sarge prakṛtir ānneti prajojanaṃ tad apuruṣārthe nāstīty arthaḥ.)

Thus when, on account of each other, those two purposes of Puruṣa have been accomplished, as described above, even then the proximity of Puruṣa and Prakṛti continues. Now, however, there is no activity [for Prakṛti] to take on, since she has no purpose (*prayojana*). Just as in the case of the marriage of old people there are no babies, since there is lack of sexual impulse (*prayojana*).²⁵

After beginningless cons of siring the cosmos, Puruṣa finds his natural perfection. He no longer calls for Prakṛti's display. They remain together in their duality, but there is no passion. The relationship become barren.

Thus it is that Prakṛti manifests herself for the sake of Puruṣa's spiritual perfection. This manifestation of Prakṛti is a self-transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the fact of creativity into created things. The *Kārikā* describes the world of things in terms of interaction of the *guṇas*, the innate qualities of Prakṛti. Making use of a delightful Sāṃkhya metaphor, manifest life is the dance of Prakṛti, the cosmic thespian, performed for the entertainment of a wide-eyed audience of Puruṣas. The *guṇas* are the various moods of her dance; she can be actively energetic (*rājasika*), darkly heavy (*tāmasika*) or light and airy (*sāttvika*).²⁶ Yet, how does Prakṛti know which of her moods to display ?

²⁵ Māṭhara, p. 59 (comment on SK 66) :

tatas tau kṛtaprayojanau parāspāramarthena santy uktau taylor bhūyaḥ saṃyogo bhavati. tathāpi nārthakṛtyaṃ prayojanābhāvat. yathā vā vṛddhasaṃyogād apatyam na bhavati prayojanābhāvat.

Mainkar (Gauḍapāda, p. 163) supports the interpretation that *prayojana* is being used here as a pun :

Here is another analogy of a couple who in the knowledge of their prior intimacy cease to care for each other. It is true that they live together but there is no impulse to create.

²⁶ See SK 42 and 59 ; 13 and 16 :

The subtle body, produced for Puruṣa's sake appears [on life's stage] like an actor. [It acts] through the causal connection of conditions and conditioned results, and because of its union with the sovereign power of Prakṛti.

puruṣārthahetukam idaṃ nimittanaimittikaprasaṅgena /
prakṛter vibhutvayogān naṭavad vyavatiṣṭhate liṅgam //

As a dancer ceases her dance, having been seen by the audience, so also does Prakṛti turn back, having displayed herself to Puruṣa.

raṅgasya darśayitvā nivartate nartakī yathā nrītyāt /
puruṣasya tathātmānaṃ prakāśya vinivartate prakṛtiḥ //

Sattva is buoyant and illuminating; *rajas* is moving and activating; *tamas* is heavy and covering-up. Their function is for a purpose, like that of a lamp.

sattvam laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam upaṣṭambhakaṃ calaṃ ca rajaḥ /
guru varaṇakam eva tamaḥ pradīpavac cārthato vṛttiḥ //

(Continued on the next page)

Prakṛti must somehow be guided; her dance is in need of choreography. Verse 17 tells us that the choreographer is Puruṣa himself.

Puruṣa provides superintendence (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for Prakṛti in her bringing forth the manifest world. This superintendence is likened, by Gauḍapāda, to that of a charioteer who reins in a frisky team of horses :

Just as in everyday world a chariot, yoked with horses capable of curvetting, trotting, and galloping, travels [in the right direction] when driven by a charioteer, or as the body [functions probably] when directed by the [bound self]; in this same way, the *Śaṣṭitantra* declares : 'The Foremost One goes forth [into creation] superintended by Puruṣa.'²⁷

The *guṇas* of Prakṛti are like these horses in that they are innately and eternally active. And just as the horses, who naturally run and leap about, settle down to work as a team in order to reach a specific destination only when the charioteer is driving, so too the *guṇas* work in a coordinated way for manifestation of specific created things when Puruṣa, in a state of need, is in relationship with them. Prakṛti creates the cosmos out of herself; she is both the material and efficient cause. Via the interaction of her *guṇas* alone, she effects the diversity of the world. She is not given positive dispensation by the active intervention of any supreme god. However, though the capacity for cosmic action and the power to shape the things of the cosmos are innate in her alone, she does need a certain focusing of her movement. Without Puruṣa her activity would be chaotic, potent yet unbridled. Chaos becomes cosmos with the presence of Puruṣa in need.

(Continued from p. 75)

Unmanifest Prakṛti is the cause. She goes forth [into manifest form] by means of the three *guṇas* in combination. The transformation, like that of water, is due to the specific nature residing in the respective *guṇas*.

kāraṇam asty avyaktaṁ pravartate triguṇataḥ samudayāc ca /
pariṇāmataḥ salilavat pratipratiguṇāśrayaviśeṣāt //

²⁷ Gauḍapāda, p. 54 (comment on SK 17 ; text and translation appear in note 17) :
yatheha laṅghanaplavānadhāvanasamarthair aśvair yuktor athaḥ sārathinā adhiṣṭhi-
taḥ pravartate tathā ātmādhiṣṭhanāc charāram iti. tathā coktaṁ ṣaṣṭitantrē puruṣādhi-
ṣṭhitam pradhūnam pravartate.

Curvet is a sort of leap initiated by lifting the front legs, followed by a kick of the hind legs so that all four legs are off the ground.

Śaṣṭitantra is referred to in SK 72 as the extensive text on which the *Kārikā* is based. This text is lost. It is much speculated upon, but very little is known.

See Pulinbihari Chakravarti, *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, Delhi, Oriental Reprint Corporation 1975, pp. 116-127.

See also Hulin, pp. 137ff.

All the commentators have to contend with the obvious question how it is possible for Puruṣa to provide direction to Prakṛti's cosmic action if he is totally other than Prakṛti and incapable of any activity which would serve to bridge their separation. *Yuktidīpikā* is the most complete in answering this question :

One might say : 'There is an impossibility of superintendence because this would lead to the faulty conclusion of agenthood [on the part of Puruṣa].' Now, this notion could be so, if one concludes that the going forth of the *guṇas* under the supervision of Puruṣa leads logically to the agenthood on his part. However, one could still say : 'There can be no such thing as a non-agent with the status of supervisor.' This is also not acceptable to reason. How so ? Because [superintendence] may be ascribed [to Puruṣa] in so far as there exists a need [on the part of Puruṣa]. In order for Puruṣa's need to be fulfilled, to that end, the *guṇas* go forth into configuration by means of causal connections. Thus the *guṇas* are reliant on another, and for that reason it makes sense that there is superintendence and that the superintendent is Puruṣa.²⁸

Puruṣa is called a superintendent only in so far as it is his state of need which impels Prakṛti's manifestation. This need, according to another commentator, is like a magnet which effects the activity of iron objects without any action on its own part.²⁹

Thus Puruṣa choreographs Prakṛti's dance simply by sitting quietly in the audience. Whether she portrays Śiva as the cosmic dancer or earth-

²⁸ *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 107 (comment on SK 17) :

kartṛtvaprasaṅgād adhiṣṭhānānupapattir iti cet syān matam yadi guṇānām puruṣādhi-
ṣṭhitānām pravṛttir abhyupagamyate kartṛtvam asya prāptam. athākartā na tarhiy asti
adhiṣṭhātṛtvam iti. etac cāyuktam. kasmāt. arthe tad upacārāt. yathā puruṣārthaḥ
siddhyati tathā guṇāḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvena vyūhyanta ity atas tat paratantryād eṣām
adhiṣṭhitatvam upapadyate puruṣasya cādhiṣṭhātṛtvam.

²⁹ Māṭhara. p. 7 (comment on SK 2) :

The unmanifest, the Foremost One, is the cause for the arising of manifest form.
'No effect exists without a cause' is the proof. Puruṣa is the knower. Like a magnet
which, by merely existing in the presence of iron, causes its activity, so too is the moti-
vation of the going forth of the quiescent Foremost One. This is the proof.

(avyaktaṁ pradhānam. vyaktotpattirkāraṇam. na hi akāraṇam kāryam ity asya
siddhiḥ. Jñāḥ puruṣaḥ, sannidhisattāmātreṇa cumbaka iva lohasya pravṛttikāraṇam,
ataḥ pradhānasya jaḍasya pravṛttihetur ayam astīti siddhiḥ.)

shaking lover depends on what Puruṣa needs to see. Or, in the language of *Yuktidīpikā*, the need of Puruṣa motivates a 'specificity in the particular constellations' of the *guṇas*. That is, the *guṇas* express themselves in specific arrangements which result in certain physical and subtle bodies, certain life situations, etc., in order to benefit Puruṣa in his search for spiritual wholeness and perfection.³⁰ Therefore, not only does the need of Puruṣa stimulate the world coming into form, it also determines the specific form the world will take.

Prakṛti as Guru

The mechanism by which the need of Puruṣa determines the form of Prakṛti's manifestation is presented in the *Kārikā* in the context of the bound Puruṣa's transmigration throughout the cosmos. Verse 42 gives the central features :

The subtle body which is produced for Puruṣa's sake, appears [on life's stage] like an actor. [It acts] through the causal connection of conditions and conditioned results, and because of its union with the sovereign power (*vibhū-tva*) of Prakṛti.³¹

This subtle body is the transmigratory entity with which Puruṣa is bound as long as any false identification with Prakṛti exists. It travels through the triple world, over and over again taking on the physical body of a god, a human being, or a body in the sub-human realm, either animal or plant. The subtle body is the vehicle of the bound Puruṣa's experience, transporting him to as many life situations as is necessary for Puruṣa to realize his otherness from Prakṛti. The implication here is that transmigration is a very long process. Puruṣa must experience many forms of existence before coming again to the natural state of completion.

Of course Prakṛti, being all created things, also constitutes the subtle body itself. This subtle body is the actor who takes on many roles, playing,

³⁰ *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 107 (comment on SK 17):

Were it the case that the coming forth of the Foremost One was a random event, there could be no specificity in the particular constellations [of the *guṇas*]; this [specificity] is impelled by the need [of Puruṣa]. That [specificity] of things consisting [in the gross elements] like earth, etc., and of [the senses] like ear, etc., is for the sake of coming together [of the bound Puruṣa] with beneficence and avoidance of malevolence during [its transmigration] in the worlds of gods, men, and animals.

(*ihāksmikyām pradhānapravṛttau arthavaśaḥ sanniveśaviśeṣanīyamo na syāt. srotādi pṛthivyādinām devamanuṣātiryakṣu hitayogārthaś cāhitapratīṣedhārthaś ca saḥ.*)

³¹ See Sanskrit text in note 26.

as it were, first a Viṣṇu, then a Rāma, then a Hanumat. Life-as-drama is, again, emphasized here. The characters and their exploits are meant to be watched and experienced by Puruṣa, for indeed, they act only for the Puruṣa's sake.

Further, the subtle body moves about under the structuring mechanics of a reciprocal causative relationship which exists between 'conditions and conditioned results' (*nimitta* and *naimittika*). Conditions are the states (*bhāvas*) of the intellect (*buddhi*) and the conditioned results are the physical bodies and life environments which the subtle body takes on. (Though the *Kārikā* does not use such language, these are the structuring mechanics of what are commonly known as the laws of *karma*.) The intellect is the dominant member of the thirteenfold subtle body, along with five subtle elements, five organs of apprehension, mind and ego (*ahaṁkāra*).³²

The states of the intellect, as described in verses 44 and 45, are measurements taken along four continua : virtue, wisdom, indifference, and power. First, one who leads a life of virtuous behavior is reborn in one of the eight divine realms, whereas a life of vice leads to rebirth as an animal or plant.³³ Thus, the degree of one's virtue determines the direction, either upward or downward, in which one moves within the cosmos from one life to another.

Secondly, wisdom is the immediate knowledge of the otherness of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, the essential state of *buddhi* (intellect) that sets one free. Nonwisdom is false identification of Puruṣa with Prakṛti and, according to its degree, results in one of the three types of bondage ; one can imagine the self

³² See SK 40 :

The subtle body, which is previously arisen, unimpeded, made of *mahat* down through the subtle element, transmigrates without experiencing, being impelled by the states of the *buddhi*.

pūrvotpannam asaktaṁ niyataṁ mahadādisūkṣmaparyantam /
saṁsarati nirupabhogaṁ bhāvair adhivāsitaṁ liṅgam //

³³ SK 44 and 45 read :

By means of virtue there is movement upward ; by means of non-virtue there is movement downward. And spiritual perfection comes by means of wisdom ; bondage results from the opposite [i. e., non-wisdom].

dharṁṇa gamanam ūrdhvaṁ adhaśtād bhavaty adharṁṇa /
jñānena cāpavargo viparyāyād iṣyate bandhaḥ //

From indifference comes dissolution in [unmanifest] Prakṛti ; from passionate attachment comes transmigration. From power comes non-obstruction, and the reverse from its contrary.

vairāgyātpakṛtilayaḥ saṁsāro bhavati rājasād rūgāt /
aiśvaryaḥ avighāto viparyāyāt tadviparyāsaḥ //

to lie in unmanifest Prakṛti, or in one of the created essences (*tattva*) of Prakṛti (intellect, ego, mind, sense powers, body, etc.), or one may be totally ignorant of the self as existing at all. Virtue determines the cosmic realm in which one is reborn, wisdom determines the imagined locus of self within that realm.

The third continuum on which the status of *buddhi* is measured is called indifference (*vairgāya*, literally, 'the state of lacking passion'). One who is extremely indifferent to any aspect of the manifest world will, at the time of death, simply disperse into unmanifest Prakṛti. This dispersal is only possible for those whose condition of bondage, as determined by wisdom status, is at its most rarefied level, i. e., where the self is imagined to lie in the unmanifest. In this way, dispersal into the unmanifest can be seen as an absorption into the falsely identified self.⁸⁴ One who completely lacks indifference is attached passionately to personal happiness in the transmigratory world (*saṃsāra*). This one is characterized by a sort of *saṃsāric* hedonism, going about giving gifts to holy ones and performing sacrifices with a single eye to the rewards of such activities.⁸⁵ The continuum of indifference measures the degree to which one is entangled in the particular life situation in which experience is occurring.

Power (*aiśvarya*) is the fourth continuum of *buddhi*. One who is highly powerful is able to move throughout the presented life situation without any obstacle whatever. Any desire is obtained. Great power is alive in the *buddhi* only if the organs and mind are healthy. One who is lame or constipated or retarded offers up faulty sensory data to the *buddhi*, and thereby enfeebles it. Power is also generated by each successful attainment in the seeker's spiritual discipline. Achieving a proper attitude toward spiritual

⁸⁴ See Vācaspati, p. 59 (comment on SK 45):

As a result of indifference alone, for one who has no realization of the essences and Puruṣa, there comes dissolution in Prakṛti. By the term 'prakṛti' is intended the unmanifest, great one, ego, [subtle] elements, and sense organs. There is dissolution into [one of] those which is focused upon with the view that the self lies therein. But, after a time, one returns again to the manifest world.

(*puruṣatattvānabhiñāsyā vairāgyamātrāt prakṛtilayaḥpraktigrahaṇena prakṛti-mahadahaṃkārabhūtdendriyāṇi gṛhyanti teṣu ātmabuddhayopāśyamāneṣu layaḥ. Kālāntereṇa ca punar āvirbhavati.*)

⁸⁵ See Māṭhara, p. 46 (comment on SK 45):

That one who is attached passionately performs sacrifices and gives donations without any indifference: 'Happiness in this world is for me and due to me [performing good deeds]'. [Happiness] will be mine [in future lives].

(*yo 'yam rājaso rāgo 'vairāgyam yajñam karoti dānam dadāty amunā'muṣmin loka sukhaṃ me bhāvīti.*)

effort produces power. Overcoming the threefold suffering, which originally brings the seeker to the teacher, likewise produces power, and so does comprehending the teacher's instructions. One who is empowered controls the life situation, whereas the feeble are overcome by the obstacles in life.

The four states of *buddhi*, taken together, synthesize to form a vector for the subtle body in its travels through the cosmos. The states determine the physical body and life situation, the experience of which creates new states. The new states then direct the subtle body, again, to the required body and life situation.³⁶ Puruṣa gains experience through these travels. Because he is falsely identified with the essences (intellect, ego, mind, sense powers, body, etc.) the states of *buddhi* (intellect) are imagined to be his own. Thus, 'he' takes on a new body and life situation in exact response to 'his' status on the four continua of measurement : the conditions of the bound Puruṣa bring about the conditioned results.

The causality of conditions and conditioned results is the mechanism by which Prakṛti manipulates the manifest world for the sake of Puruṣa's liberation. Verse 42 ends by saying that it is Prakṛti's sovereign power (*vibhūṭva*) which enlivens the entire cosmic mechanism. Vācaspati comments :

'But whence such might of this [subtle body]?' In response [the verse] says : 'From the union with the sovereign power of Prakṛti.' As the Purāṇa teaches : 'This wonderful transformation of Prakṛti comes from her capacity to take on all forms'.³⁷

The need of bound Puruṣa, expressed in the particular states of 'his' *buddhi*, invokes a response in Prakṛti to take on the wondrous forms of cosmic life. Puruṣa only needs to watch with awe in order to find spiritual completion. Gauḍapāda describes Prakṛti's missionary service :

Through various skilful means (*upāya*) Prakṛti is the helpful servant of Puruṣa, the master who himself returns no

³⁶ See SK 52 :

Not without the states [of *buddhi*] is there a subtle body ; not without the subtle body is there efficacy of the states. Thus creation goes forth in a twofold way, known as 'subtle body' and 'states'.

na vinā bhāvair liṅgaṃ na vinā liṅgena bhāvanirvṛttiḥ /
liṅgākhyo bhāvākhyas tasmād dvidvidhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ //

³⁷ Vācaspati., p. 127 :

kutastyaḥ, punar asyedṛṣo mahimā ity ata āha prakṛter vibhūṭvayogāt iti. tathā ca puruṣaṃ vaiśvarūpyāt pradhānasya pariṇāmo 'yam adbhūta iti.

11 [Annals BORI]

benefits. How so? By means of becoming gods, men, and animals; by means of becoming joy, suffering, and delusion [i. e., life experiences]; by means of becoming the objects [of the senses] like sound, etc. Having displayed these for the self with the notion: 'I am one you are another,' she turns back [from her display].⁸⁸

Prakṛti is a guru who teaches Puruṣa through her skilful means. Each physical body is a tailor-made response to the exact state of the bound Puruṣa. Each life experience intones: 'I am one, you are other!' The Sāṃkhya observes his world with the conviction that every life event is exactly what he needs in order to obtain wisdom and find the true locus of self. The world itself is the guru.

The truly remarkable adroitness in Prakṛti's skilful means is only appreciated when one recalls that Puruṣa is the true self of each individual human being. Puruṣas are unlimited in number, Prakṛti is only one; and she takes on form in response to the need of each and every Puruṣa, for the sake of each and every Puruṣa's spiritual freedom.⁸⁹ This means that it is the states of the entirety of bound Puruṣas which call forth the world. The world is determined in its specificity by the integration of the vectors produced by each falsely identified self. The world is a totally integrated system. Each event is perfectly enmeshed with all others. When, through observation of Prakṛti's many forms, one seeker finds the true locus of self, Prakṛti no longer dances for that particular Puruṣa.⁹⁰ The manifest world does not disappear, rather Prakṛti's complex response to the needs of the Puruṣas will no longer include consideration of that liberated one. The seeker who reassumes his natural condition of otherness has no need of Prakṛti.

⁸⁸ Gauḍapāda, p. 151 (comment on SK 60):

nānāvidhair upāyair prakṛtiḥ puruṣasya upakāriṇī anupakāriṇaḥ pūṃsaḥ. katham. devamānuṣatiryagbhāvena, sukhaduḥkhamohātmakabhāvena, śabdādiviśayabhāvena. evaṃ nānāvidhair upāyair ātmānam prakāśya aham anyā tvam anya iti nivartate.

⁸⁹ SK 56 reads: 'Thus this [creation] is performed by Prakṛti for the sake of release of each and every Puruṣa (*Pratīpuruṣavimokṣārtham*). Māṭhara (p. 54) glosses this compound thus: '*Puruṣam puruṣam prati vimokṣaḥ*'. The compound has distributive sense, i. e., release in regard to one Puruṣa after another.

⁹⁰ See Vācaspati, p. 58 (comment on SK 44):

Prakṛti sets experience in motion only until she effects discriminating wisdom, no longer. Then, when discriminating wisdom comes to be via the accomplishment of her purpose, she turns back from activity with regard to that Puruṣa who has [found a culmination in discriminating wisdom].

(tāvad eva prakṛtir bhogam ārabhate na yāvat vivekakhyātiṃ karoty atha vivekakhyātau syātān kṛtakṛtyatayā vivekakhyātim antam puruṣam prati nivartate).

Without need, Prakṛti has no impelling superintendence; the world will simply adjust to the lack of influence of one needy soul.

Further, because the world is called forth by bound Puruṣas, it has certain basic features upon which all agree. In the human realm people sit in chairs, not in envy. When a truck collides with a body, the body is crushed while the truck is unharmed. These basics are agreed upon as they are conditioned results held in common by all those in need of the human experience. Specific events within the human realm are also called forth by the common need of many people, i. e., many bound Puruṣas jointly determine the manifesting of the world in the form of a certain thing taking place. That collision of truck with body is witnessed by all the people in the area. Each of them literally creates that accident by their individual needs to experience it; it is a personally tailored life situation. Each Puruṣa thereby gains a necessary experience. Thus, even though the world takes form in response to all Puruṣas' needs, and many individuals witness specific life situations in common, one can say: 'This cosmos was made for me only; it is indeed *my* world!' Prakṛti is the dancer whose every kick and twirl, while delighting the Puruṣa in the audience, is also perfectly suited for the enjoyment of the stagehand in the wings.

Finally, the ultimate in Prakṛti's personal tailoring is illustrated in the everyday fact that all witnesses of any occurrence, like our traffic accident for example, see somewhat different versions of the event. All agree that metal collided with flesh, but each has undergone a unique life experience. When the truck hits the body one witness may feel moral indignation, seeing the rights of pedestrians denied, the growth of technology getting out of hand and suppressing human freedom. Another witness, however, may be troubled by the inability of the truck to stop quickly due to the lack of quality in existing brake drum engineering. A third may feel pity for the turmoil and pain caused to the victim and family.

The *Kārikā* explains such an array of life experiences in response to a single life event through a further refinement in the relationship between conditions, i. e., states of *buddhi*, and conditioned results — this time specifically referring to the great elements, five of the essences (*tattva*) of manifest Prakṛti: space, wind, earth, fire, and water. Verse 38 states that these great elements are 'tranquil, turbulent, and perplexing'. Māṭhara illustrates the meaning of these terms:

Among these, space is tranquil, turbulent, and perplexing.
It is tranquil in so much as it is characterized by pleasure
(*sukha*). As is the case when someone has exited from

the inner chamber of the temple to stand in open space ; for that one space would be tranquil because it causes pleasure. That very same [space] can be turbulent because it causes suffering (*duḥkha*) when coming into contact with heat, cold, or wind. For the fugitive traveling on the road alone, seeing open space everywhere, not recognizing the right way to go, for this man that very same [space] would be perplexing ... In the same way, fire is tranquil for one afflicted with cold. It is turbulent for one afflicted by the heat in the hot season. Fire is perplexing in that it causes delusion for a man when it has grown great in the burning of his village.⁴¹

It is sensory contact with the great elements, in the form of their combinations as sensible things of the world, which makes experience come to be. Because each element is tranquil, turbulent, and perplexing, they stimulate responses of pleasure, suffering, and delusion. (These three types of response stand for the entire spectrum of possible experience in the world.) The particular sort of response one undergoes in contacting a thing in the world is determined by the predispositions which one brings to the situation : a lost thief on the run is confused by an unmarked expanse, whereas the devotee welcomes the open air in contrast to the claustrophobic shrineroom filled with incense. These predispositions are the states of the *buddhi* according to one's status on the four continua : how virtuous, how wise, how entangled with the world, how powerful.⁴² Each of the witnesses to the traffic accident

⁴¹ SK 38 reads :

The subtle elements are non-specific. From these five [come] the five great elements. These are known as specific, and are tranquil, turbulent, and perplexing.

tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣaḥ tebhyo bhūtāni pañca pañcabhyaḥ /
etc smṛtā viśeṣāḥ śāntā, ghorāś ca mūḍhāś ca //

Māthara, p. 40 :

tatrākāśaṃ śāntaṃ ghorāṃ mūḍhaṃ ca. śāntam tāvat sukhalakṣaṇaṃ. yathā kaścid garbhagrāhāt, niṣkrāntaḥ avakāśasthitas tasya tad ākāśaṃ sukhahetutvāc chāntaṃ syāt tad eva usṇasītatvādisaṃyogād duḥkhatvād ghorāṃ syāt. pathi gacchataḥ kāndīśikasya kevalaṃ sarvatrākāśaṃ paśyato mārḡādyanabhiñjasyaya puṃsas tad eva mūḍhaṃ syāt ... evam agniḥ śītūrtasya śāntaḥ. grīṣmakūle tāpārtasya ghorāḥ. grāmādidāhe pravṛddho 'gniḥ puṃso mohotpādakatayā mūḍhaḥ.

⁴² See *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 173 (comment on SK 38) :

Among these, [the great elements] are, first of all tranquil, due to the birth of typical features like brightness [of mind], etc., when one is in proximity with them. This is due to one's being yoked with specific personal conditioned impressions (*sva-saṃskāra*, equivalent to *bhāva*). Also, they are turbulent because causative of typical feature like *śeṣa* etc. They are also confusing because causative of concealing, etc.

I have left the term *śeṣa* (remainder) untranslated because it is of unclear meaning in this context. What one needs here is a feature typical of the *guṇa rajas*,

undergoes a different response, depression of anger, etc. For the *buddhi* status each brought to the event reacts with the protean response potentials of the great elements, which constitute the event, resulting in a particular experience being drawn from the event.⁴³ Each Puruṣa, the true witness of life events, receives a new piece of data. These data are exactly what each Puruṣa needs in the search for self.

The causal relationship between conditions and conditioned results is the mechanism of Prakṛti's skilful instruction. It is alive on all levels of life in the cosmos. The world takes form as a synthetic response to the needs of all Puruṣas. The earthly world is the basic environment stimulated by the common *bhāva* status of all the many Puruṣas in need of human experience. Many human beings jointly call forth particular combinations of the great elements, in the form of things and events, because each needs to see the same traffic accident; the *bhāva* status of a single person draws out a unique response. All levels of cosmic experience are for the sake of each Puruṣa : each Puruṣa is satisfied. Indeed, the perfection of need fulfillment is implicit in the world, for it is that very need which motivates and determines the world.

In Summary

The world comes into being in order to be seen. Prakṛti transforms herself into the cosmos because Puruṣa needs to see her in this manifest form. Freedom from bondage to creativity is only possible through observation of created things. According to classical Sāṃkhya, to restrict sensuous contact with the manifest world is to deny the possibility of spiritual perfection. Prakṛti, in manifest form, can therefore be viewed as the guru for whom life itself is the skilful means. All life experiences are implicitly perfect lessons for each individual Puruṣa's disciplined observation. In her display of life events, Prakṛti teaches the Sāṃkhya seeker his otherness from the world and brings him to independent selfhood.

⁴³ The great elements are capable of causing pleasure, suffering, and delusion, when contacted via the sensory and motor organs, only because they are themselves made up of the three *guṇas* which constitute these feelings. All three *guṇas* are present in all elements. Also, according to verse 23, the highest measurements on the four continua are the *sūttvika bhāvas*. Low measurements are *tāmasika* (Neither the *Kūrikā* nor the commentators explain the exact dynamic of *rajas* on these continua.) The image in classical Sāṃkhya seems to be that when a person contacts the objects of the world, the like *bhāva* status of that person attracts like response potential in the great element. *Sūttvika bhāvas* draw out *sūttvika* (i. e., tranquil) responses. *Tāmasika bhāvas* (Continued on the next page)

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(Continued from p. 85)

draw out *tūmasika* (i. e., preplexing) responses. A sunset can only be pleasureable if the pleasure potential resides in it.

Cf. Dasgupta :

The fundamental characteristic of external gross matter is its mass; energy is common to both gross matter and the subtle thought-stuff. But mass is at its lowest minimum in the thought-stuff, whereas the capacity of translucence, or what may be otherwise designated as the intelligence-stuff, is at its highest in thought-stuff. But if the gross matter had none of the characteristics of translucence that thought possesses, it could not have made itself an object of thought; for thought transforms itself into the shape, colour, and other characteristics of the thing which has been made its object. Thought could not have copied the matter, if the matter did not possess some of the essential substances of which the copy was made up.

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PRĀYAŚCITTA (EXPIATION) AND DAṆḌA (PUNISHMENT) : A STUDY

BY

JAYA CHEMBURKAR

*1 Dharmaśāstra literature deals with Ācāra or Rules of Conduct, Vyavahāra or Rules for Judicial Proceedings and Prāyaścitta i. e. Rules of Expiations or Penances. This Śāstra enforces law or a command. It implies obedience with the further implication that disobedience of a command involves punishment for those who are guilty of disobedience.¹

*2 The object of the Dharmaśāstra rules is to secure happiness of the people of all the varṇas in all the stages of their life. According to Dharmaśāstra, happiness can be secured by avoiding evil; avoidance of evil can be accomplished only by conforming to the rules and laws. These laws and rules, if carefully followed, result in general good; their disobedience leads to chaos. All happiness thus depends on dharma.² It is for this reason that the sages requested Manu and Yājñavalkya to expound to them dharma in its entirety. In this context, commenting on the word dharma, Mitākṣarā remarks that dharma is sixfold,³ viz. (1) Varṇadharma, (2) Āśramadharma, (3) Varṇāśramadharma, (4) Guṇadharma, (5) Nimittadharma, (6) Sādhāraṇadharma. Here Varṇadharma is illustrated as "Let a brahmaṇa always abstain from wine". Āśramadharma is the duty related to fire, fuel and begging of alms. Varṇāśramadharma is a duty related to the classes and orders, e. g. "for a brāhmaṇa student the staff is to be of the Palāśa wood" and the like. Guṇadharma means duties of a qualified one, i. e. "of a king possessing the qualification of having been duly anointed according to scripture", the duty is to *protect the subjects* and the like (guṇadharmaḥ śāstriyābhiṣekādiguṇayuktasya rājñāḥ prajāparipālanaḍiḥ).⁴ The Nimittadharma is a special rule such as penances for not doing what is enjoined, or for restoring to what has been prohibited (nimittadharma vihitakaraṇapratīṣiddhasevananimittam prāyaścittam).⁵ Sādhāraṇadharma is a general rule, e. g. abstention from injury and

¹ J. R. Gharpure, *A General Introduction with Special Reference to the Yājñavalkya-smṛti and the Mitākṣarā*, p. 13; pub. by V. J. Gharpure, Bombay, 1944.

² Manu IV. 242.

³ Mitākṣarā on Yāj. I. 1.

⁴ Mitākṣarā on Yāj. I. 1.

⁵ Ibid. I. 1.

the like, e. g. " one should not do injury to any created being ". This rule is common to all including the lowest classes.

*3 It will be observed here that the term *Nimittadharma* is used by the *Mitākṣarā* to denote *Prāyaścitta*, and the term *Guṇadharmā* implies *Danḍa* i. e. punishment.

*4 In this paper views of Manu and Yājñavalkya on *Prāyaścitta* and *Danḍa* are examined.

*5

Prāyaścitta (Expiation)

The Word Prāyaścitta and Its Meaning

In Vedic literature we come across two forms of the word *Prāyaścitta* viz. *prāyaścitti* and *prāyaścitta*. The form *prāyaścitti* frequently occurs in the *Tai. S.* e. g. " asāvādityo na vyarocata tasmai devāḥ *prāyaścittimaicchan* " ⁶ *yadi bhidyeta taireva kapālaiḥ sasrjet saiva tataḥ prāyaścittiḥ*.⁷ Here the word *prāyaścitti* means doing something which would get rid of some accidental happening or a mishap such as breaking of an *ukhā* (a pot or a sauce-pan for boiling or cooking) or the sun's losing its brilliance.⁸ In *Tai. S. V. 3. 12. 1* — viz. *eṣa vai prajāpatiṃ sarvaṃ karoti yo'śvamedhena yajate sarva eva bhavati sarvasya vā eṣā prāyaścittiḥ sarvasya bheṣajam*— the word *prāyaścittiḥ* is used in the sense of an expiation for a sin.⁹ Thus the word *Prāyaścitti* had two shades of meaning.

*6. The word *Prāyaścitta* occurs in the *Kauṣītaki-Brāhmaṇa*.¹⁰ *Śāṅkhāyana Śr. III. 19. 1*, viz. *vidhyaparādhe prāyaścittam*, uses the word *Prāyaścittam*. Similarly *Vaikhāṇasa Śr.*, viz. *vidhyaparādhe prāyaścittam doṣanirghātārtham vidhiyate'nājñāte viśeṣe dhyānam nārāyaṇasya tajjapejyāhomaśca hananārtheti*, uses the word *prāyaścitta*.¹¹ In the above two passages the word *prāyaścitta* is used in the sense of expiation.

*7 While commenting on *Aśv Śr. III. 10. 38*, the commentator *Nārāyaṇa* explains the word *prāyaścitti* as *vihitasyākarāṇe 'nyathā karāṇe ca prāyaścittiḥ kartavyā / prāyo vināśaḥ cittiḥ sandhānam vinaṣṭasandhānam prāyaścittir ityuktam bhavati*, i. e. *prāyaścitti* should be performed for not doing something

⁶ *Tai. S. II. 1. 2. 4; II. 1. 4. 1; III. 1. 3. 2-3; cf. also P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. IV, p. 57, B. O. R. I., Poona, 1953.

⁷ *Tai. S. V. 1. 9. 3; cf. also P. V. Kane, Hist. of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. IV, p. 57.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 57.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 57.

¹⁰ *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa V. 9, VI. 12.*

¹¹ *Cf. also P. V. Kane, Hist. of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. IV, p. 57.

that is enjoined and doing something that is prohibited. *Prāyaḥ* means destruction and *citti* means *Sandhānam* i. e. joining together. Thus *prāyaścitti* means making good what is lost.¹² This indicates that the idea of *prāyaścitta* is very ancient. If Dharma is the upholder of society, Adharma would naturally disintegrate the society and lead to chaos. It is therefore necessary to wipe off Adharma and its influence on the mind through expiation.

*8

Two Types of Prāyaścitta

According to Śābara *prāyaścittas* are of two kinds, viz. (1) those which are meant to make good the defect in sacrifice, arising through neglect, and (2) those undertaken to atone for not doing what is ordained or doing something which is forbidden.¹³ The first type of *prāyaścitta* is *kratvartha* and the second one is *puruṣārtha*. This paper deals with the *prāyaścittas* of the second category only.

*9

Manu and Yājñavalkya on Prāyaścitta

Manu has discussed *prāyaścitta* at length in eleventh chapter of the *Manusmṛti*,¹⁴ whereas Yājñavalkya has dealt with *prāyaścitta* in the last two chapters of the third section of the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*. Both the *smṛti* writers begin the discussion on *prāyaścitta* by explaining when a *prāyaścitta* is to be performed. According to both, when a man does not do what is enjoined by the Śāstra and does what is prohibited, or becomes addicted to sensual objects, he becomes liable to expiatory rites.¹⁵ Both hold that an expiation is to be performed for the sake of purification.¹⁶ Yājñavalkya remarks that when a *prāyaścitta* is performed the sinner's soul and the world are pleased.¹⁷ Mitākṣarā observes that the word *prāyaścitta* is current in regard to a particular act which is conducive to the extinction of sin and the world also inclines favourably to have dealings with him i. e. the sinner.¹⁸ According to Mitākṣarā, a *prāyaścitta* is due to a special cause : *naimittiko'yaṁ prāyaścittādhikāraḥ*.¹⁹ Kullūka describes it as *Naimittakadharmā*.²⁰ Both imply that *prāyaścitta* is to be performed when there is an occasion or a special cause for it.

¹² Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹³ Śābara on *Jai.* XII. 3. 16, 17; Cf. also P. V. Kane, *Hist. of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. IV, p. 58.

¹⁴ *Manu* X. 31.

¹⁵ *Manu* XI. 44; *Yāj.* III. 219.

¹⁶ *Manu* XI. 53a; *Yāj.* III. 220a.

¹⁷ *Yāj.* III. 220.

¹⁸ *Mit.* on *Yāj.* III. 220.

¹⁹ *Mit.* on *Yāj.* III. 220.

²⁰ Kullūka on *Manu* XI. 1, 2.

*10 A sin might be committed intentionally or unintentionally. For both the types of sin expiation is to be performed according to Manu and Yājñavalkya.²¹ Manu holds that a sin committed unintentionally is expiated by reciting the Veda, while that committed intentionally in folly is expiated by various forms of expiatory rites.²² Yājñavalkya also holds the same view.²³ It may be mentioned here that if a sin is committed a *prāyaścitta* must be performed.²⁴ *Prāyaścitta* is not left to the sweet will of the sinner. Both the *smṛti* writers warn that, if a *prāyaścitta* is not performed and the sin is not purified, the sinner will be born with defects.²⁵

*11 Hindu social thinkers have assigned the highest place to dharma among the four *puruṣārthas*. *Dharma* is always highly appreciated and *adharma* is always condemned. Pursuit of dharma is believed to enable a person to attain *mokṣa*. Throughout his life when a man is pursuing the different *puruṣārthas*, he is required to curb his senses and, through their control, the mind; because it is the mind that plays a very important role in his bondage and release from this world. Sin, intentional or unintentional, is likely to affect his mind which then needs expiation for its purification. *Prāyaścitta* is, therefore, necessary for spiritual purpose; it is necessary for social purpose also. The Hindu social thinkers have viewed a man not as an isolated individual only but also as a member of the society in which he lives. As a responsible member of a society they expected him to maintain high moral character and purity of conduct. *Prāyaścitta* was meant to promote purity of conduct i. e. *prāyaścitta* was necessary for the moral health and stability of the society also.

*12 It may be stated here that the threat of being born with different defects is in keeping with the usual device of the theologians. When they do not have any other more effective device to make the people follow their injunctions, they give a threat of sufferings in this birth or a fall in hell after death. The same can be said about the threat of Manu and Yājñavalkya.²⁶

*13 *Authority To Prescribe Prāyaścittas*

In ancient India it was always the responsibility of a king and the *brāhmaṇas* with profound learning to maintain high standard of morality in the society, as indicated by the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*.²⁷ According to the

²¹ Manu XI. 45; Yāj. III. 226.

²² Manu XI. 46.

²³ Yāj. III. 226.

²⁴ Manu XI. 53; Yāj. III. 220.

²⁵ Manu XI. 48-53; Yāj. 206-218.

²⁶ Vide *10 above.

²⁷ Sat. Brā. V. 4. 4. 5.

Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra it was the duty of an ācārya to order a prāyaścitta to those who had committed a sin, to purify themselves. If the sinners did not obey the order of their ācārya, he (ācārya) took them to the king. The king sent them to his purohita proficient in Dharmaśāstra. He ordered them to perform a penance, if they were brāhmaṇas. He could reduce them to forcible means except corporeal punishment and slavery.²⁹ The king, according to this passage, only helped in carrying out a prāyaścitta, he did not prescribe it.²⁹ Dr. Kane observes : "The pariṣad made its rules about prāyaścittas.... The king did not very probably interfere with the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the pariṣad."³⁰ Now coming to the views of Manu and Yājñavalkya on the authority to prescribe a prāyaścitta, it may be stated here that the authority to prescribe a prāyaścitta will always decide what is *dharma* and *adharma* ; and according to Manu a *pariṣad*, i. e. an assembly of learned people having thorough knowledge of the ṚV, YV, SV, can decide *dharma* and *adharma* ;³¹ and such pariṣad only can prescribe a prāyaścitta to a sinner ; if any ignorant person prescribed a *prāyaścitta* for a sinner, he would incur the sins of that particular sinner.³² According to Yājñavalkya, a *pariṣad* should ordain a *prāyaścitta* to a sinner who approaches it and confesses his sin.³³

*14 The reasons for not involving the king in ordaining a prāyaścitta appear to be these. In Ancient India a king used to live in his capital, not easily accessible to the people staying in distant parts of the state ; besides he used to be busy with his multifarious administrative duties. Communication and transport not being very easy and quick, it was not possible to produce the sinners before the king. Even when statutory law was violated and minor crimes were committed, the popular courts used to give justice. Only the major and serious crimes were tried before the king. Neglect of practice of daily rites and rituals, not studying the Veda etc. are looked upon as sins, for which prāyaścitta is prescribed ; but the ancient king would not look into these matters, and he did not prescribe a prāyaścitta. This job was left to the *pariṣad*. Besides, the theologians do not appear to demand the attention of the king in the matter of these sins and prescription of prāyaścittas for them. Taking into consideration the caste-system, superiority and privileges enjoyed by the brāhmaṇas, it can be said that probably these brāhmaṇa

²⁹ Ap. D. S. II. 5. 10. 12-16. Cf. also P. V. Kane, *Hist. of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. IV, p. 70.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 70. ³¹ Ibid., p. 69.

³² Manu XII. 112 ; Cf. also Manu XII. 110, 111.

³³ Ibid. XII. 115. ³⁴ Yāj. III. 300a.

theologians in those days tried to maintain their hold on the society through the prescription of *prāyaścittas*, and hence their emphasis on the thorough knowledge of the three Vedas. Only when *prāyaścitta* was not performed, the king being the final authority was required to punish the sinner.

*15

Different Prāyaścittas

For the attainment of dharma a man has to guard himself against sin and maintain purity of conduct. With this view both Manu and Yājñavalkya mention (a) *mahāpātakas* i. e. grave sins viz. murder of a *brāhmaṇa*, drinking of wine, theft, sexual intercourse with one's guru's wife and association with these sinners,³⁴ (b) sins equivalent to *mahāpātakas*³⁵ and (c) *upapātakas* or minor sins.³⁶ Here Manu and Yājñavalkya indicate that a person committing these sins is liable to a *prāyaścitta*. These lists of sins make a person aware of sins who would then avert them. Some of the *prāyaścittas* are sacrifices,³⁷ a ceremonial bath (*avabhṛthasnāna*),³⁸ recitation of Veda,³⁹ giving of gifts,⁴⁰ recitation of *Gāyatrī*⁴¹ etc. There are horrible *prāyaścittas* which actually result in death, e. g. for killing of a *brāhmaṇa*, Manu prescribes that a sinner should make himself the target of archers at his will (*icchayātmanaḥ*), or throw himself headlong in fire thrice with his face downward.⁴² Similarly for committing the sin of drinking wine a sinner, according to Manu, has to drink red hot wine.⁴³ Manu remarks that when the body is burnt he is freed from sin. Similarly a thief who has stolen gold should go to the king with a pestle and confess his sin and tell the king to punish him. The king then should take that pestle from him and hit him once with it; if he is killed he is purified.⁴⁴ It may be pointed out here that Manu does not forget to mention that this *prāyaścitta* resulting in death is not meant for a *brāhmaṇa*; according to him a *brāhmaṇa* (who has stolen gold) is purified by penance (*brāhmaṇastapasaiva vā*).⁴⁵ A *brāhmaṇa* is exempted from this severe penance obviously because a *brāhmaṇa* is not to be killed according to Manu (*na jātu brāhmaṇam hanyāt sarvapāpeṣvapi sthitam*).⁴⁶ For committing adultery with one's preceptor's wife a sinner has

³⁴ Manu XI. 54; Yāj. III. 227, also Manu IX. 235.

³⁵ Manu XI. 55-58; Yāj. III. 228-231.

³⁶ Manu XI. 59-66; Yāj. III. 234-242.

³⁷ Manu XI. 74; Yāj. III. 244.

³⁸ Yāj. III. 244.

³⁹ Manu XI. 75; Yāj. III. 249.

⁴⁰ Manu XI. 76; Yāj. III. 50 (42), Manu XI. 73.

⁴¹ Manu XI. 225.

⁴² Manu XI. 73.

⁴³ Manu XI. 90; Yāj. III. 253.

⁴⁴ Manu XI. 100; Yāj. III. 257.

⁴⁵ Manu XI. 100.

⁴⁶ Manu XIII. 380. Also Cf. Manu VIII. 124 and Kullūka on it.

to embrace a heated iron image of a woman,⁴⁷ or himself cut off his generative organ and his testicles, and having taken them in the cavity of his palms joined, he may walk straight towards the region of Nirṛti, until he falls down (dead).⁴⁸

*16 After having prescribed *prāyaścittas* for the first four grave sinners, viz. a murderer of a *brāhmaṇa*, wine drinker, a thief and one who commits adultery with his guru's wife, *Manu* and *Yājñavalkya* prescribe *prāyaścitta* for the fifth grave sinner viz. one who associates oneself with the above four sinners. Such a sinner has to perform the same *prāyaścitta* which is prescribed for the other four.⁴⁹

*17 Here it will be observed that *prāyaścittas* ending in death are prescribed for grave sins (*mahāpātakas*). According to *Manu* the sinner himself performs these *prāyaścittas* : *icchayātmanaḥ* and *svayam vā*.⁵⁰ *Yājñavalkya* is silent on this point. It appears that these *prāyaścittas* for *mahāpātakas* were expected to result eventually in the death of the sinner as indicated by *Kullūka* and *Mitākṣarā*.⁵¹ *Manu* is precise on this point ; he categorically states— *vadhena śudhyati steno*⁵² or *mṛtyunā sa viśudhyati*⁵³ or *nairṛtim diśamāti* the *ānipāṭād ajihmagāḥ*.⁵⁴ *Yājñavalkya* also holds the same view; he remarks—*Mṛtakalpaḥ prahārāto jīvanapi viśudhyati*,⁵⁵ *surāpo'nyatamam pītvā maraṇāc chuddhim ṛcchati*⁵⁶ or *hato mukto'pi vā śuciḥ*.⁵⁷ *Prāyaścittas* ending in death are probably meant to imply that not only the sinner is to be purged of his sin but the society also needs to be purged of such sinners.

*18 The above mentioned *prāyaścittas* may appear to be very cruel, but it has to be said that they reflect the regard of the ancient Hindu society for values in life and high ideals.

*19 Simple *prāyaścittas* for minor sins are—confession of the sin, repentance, austerity, study of the *Veda* etc.⁵⁸ Confession and repentance would make one aware of sin. After confessing one's sins before the relatives etc. one

⁴⁷ *Manu* XI. 103; *Yāj.* III. 259a.

⁴⁸ *Manu* XI. 104; *Yāj.* III. 259b.

⁴⁹ *Manu* XI. 181; *Yāj.* III. 261a.

⁵⁰ *Manu* XI. 73, 104.

⁵¹ (a) *Yāvanmṛto mṛtakalpo vā viśudhyet*, *Kullūka* on *Manu* XI. 73.

(b) *mukhe taya sā nirdagdho mṛtaḥ śuddhim avāpnuyāt*, *Kullūka* on *Manu* XI. 90.

(c) ... *mṛtyunā sa viśuddho bhavati*, *Kullūka* on *Manu* XI. 103.

⁵² *Manu* XI. 100.

⁵³ *Manu* XI. 103; cf. also *Manu* XI. 146.

⁵⁴ *Manu* XI. 104; cf. *Yāj.* III. 248.

⁵⁵ *Yāj.* III. 248.

⁵⁶ *Yāj.* III. 253.

⁵⁷ *Yāj.* III. 257; cf. also *Yāj.* III. 259.

⁵⁸ *Manu* XI. 227, 228, 230.

would feel ashamed to commit them again. Keith remarks, "wickedness is made less by being declared."⁵⁹

*20

*Action Against A Grave Sinner (Mahāpātakīn)
Not Performing A Prāyaścitta*

For ancient Indians character was a precious possession of man; immoral unchaste conduct was not tolerated by the society. Serious note was taken by the society of such lapses. Funeral rite was performed during the life-time of the sinner (mahāpātakīn), and relations were cut off with him. This is indicated by the injunctions of Manu and Yājñavalkya. Both prescribe such a rite whereby when one has become an outcaste, his sapinḍas and relations have to offer him water outside the village, on an inauspicious day, in the evening, in the presence of his relatives, priests, and elders.⁶⁰ A female slave shall overturn a jar full of water with her feet, as in the case of the dead i. e. facing the south and they along with relations shall observe impurity for a day and night.⁶¹ According to Kullūka and Medhātithi, the significance of this rite is that when one has become an outcaste and is unwilling to perform the prescribed expiation, they shall treat him as dead and offer to him the water-jar. We learn from Śaṅkha quoted by Mitākṣarā that this rite of expiation should be observed only when, although being urged by the kindred, he does not perform the expiation. In his case in the presence of the Guru, the relatives and the king, after having pronounced his sins and explained to him, and after having asked him again and again to resume his course of conduct and even then if he is not restored to a proper line of thought, then a pot should be hurled to him.⁶² Medhātithi remarks that the mention of the female slave indicates that the sapinḍas should not do it themselves (dāśīgrahaṇāt svayam karmam niṣedhati).⁶³

*21 After this rite all conversation with him, sitting with him, his sharing in property, as also all ordinary intercourse with him will cease.⁶⁴

*22 According to Manu and Yājñavalkya, similar rite should be performed for an outcaste woman also, but she should be given food, clothing and abode near the house.⁶⁵

*23 But if the expiation is performed, the sapinḍas and relatives of the sinner shall bathe with him in a sacred reservoir of water and shall throw into the

⁵⁹ A. B. Keith, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads*, p. 266, Pub. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1970.

⁶⁰ Manu XI. 182.

⁶² Cf. Mit. on Yāj. III. 294.

⁶⁴ Manu XI. 184.

⁶¹ Manu XI. 183; Yāj. III. 294.

⁶³ Cf. Medhātithi on Manu XI. 183.

⁶⁵ Manu XI. 188; Yāj. III. 296.

water a fresh jar filled with water.⁶⁶ Having thrown that jar into the water he shall enter his own house and carry on as before all his family functions.⁶⁷

*24 The funeral rite described above⁶⁸ is to be performed only in the case of a mahāpātakīn. The performance of this rite indicates that the society had control on the behaviour and conduct of the individual; and it acted as a guardian of moral standard. Right to control the sinners was given to the society by Manu : *jñātisambandhibhis tvete tyaktavyāḥ kṛtalakṣaṇāḥ | nirdayaḥ nirnamaskārās tān manor anuśāsanam ||*⁶⁹

*25

Considerate Attitude

Manu and Yājñavalkya are not prepared to tolerate a mahāpātaka, but when a mahāpātakīn performs a prāyaścitta they show consideration to him. Both of them state that one should not despise those sinners who have performed the necessary expiation.⁷⁰ But this consideration they do not show to certain sinners such as murderers of children, ungrateful men, murderers of refugee and women; one should not associate oneself with them even though they may have been duly purified, says Manu.⁷¹ In the prescription of prāyaścittas also both Manu and Yājñavalkya are considerate inasmuch as both take into account the place, time, age, strength, nature of sin etc.⁷²

*26 The above discussion on the prāyaścittas would create an impression of lofty ideals in the society. In fact the Dharmaśāstras have held lofty ideals, glorified virtue and condemned sin. But the prāyaścittas especially the horrible prāyaścittas for mahāpātakas raise a question, viz. "Were these prāyaścittas really enforced or they were merely described by the Dharmaśāstras?" Nothing can be said with certainty about their practice. We do not come across their mention in classical literature just as we do not come across the *literal practice* of Vānaprasthāśrama and Sanyāsāśrama, and though they have been described in the Dharmaśāstras people may have practised them only in spirit.

*27 Regarding surāpāna which has been considered a grave sin by Manu and Yājñavalkya, we have contrary evidence. There are references to wine-shops and wine-drinking in the epics and classical literature. According to Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya, manufacture of wine, its shops and drinking etc. were controlled by the government by appointing a special officer called *surādhyakṣa*.⁷³ Kauṭilya was an administrator; for him manufacture of

⁶⁶ Manu XI. 186.

⁶⁸ Vide *20 above.

⁷⁰ Manu XI. 189; Yāj. III. 295.

⁷² Manu XI. 209, Yāj. III. 293.

⁶⁷ Yāj. III. 295.

⁶⁹ Manu IX. 239.

⁷¹ Manu XI. 190.

⁷³ Cf. Kauṭilyārthaśāstra II. 25.

wine, wine-shops were sources of revenue. Therefore, he would at the most regularise the use of wine and would not condemn and prohibit it totally, whereas the Smṛti writers were theologians bent upon protecting and promoting Dharma. The ghastly nature of these prāyaścittas would make one feel that they were not enforced in actual practice. They were perhaps described simply to indicate the hideous nature of those sins. At the most the society would boycott such sinners. Or another explanation can be that our Smṛtis preserve the relics of several prehistoric customs and practices. Manu and Yājñavalkya might have known these ghastly practices of uncivilized tribes and hence they have recorded them here.

***28** *Manu And Yājñavalkya on Daṇḍa (Punishment)*

Let us now examine the purpose and enforcement of daṇḍa (punishment) as described by Manu and Yājñavalkya.

Purpose of Daṇḍa

***29** We have seen above⁷⁴ that Dharma is sixfold of which Guṇadharmā is the duty of a king to protect the subjects. Practice of Guṇadharmā, therefore, implies daṇḍa. Being the guardian and protector of his people, it is the duty of the king to maintain peace and order in his state by punishing the criminals. If the purpose of prāyaścitta is purification, the purpose of daṇḍa is to punish the criminal physically or in some other form and inspire fear in his mind and also in the minds of other people to prevent them from committing crimes.⁷⁵ Manu remarks that because of daṇḍa people can enjoy the fruits of their actions; besides they do not swerve from dharma.⁷⁶ Daṇḍa protects all and is conducive to the maintenance of dharma; therefore Manu and Yājñavalkya glorify it by identifying it with Dharma (a) daṇḍam dharmam vidur budhāḥ⁷⁷ and (b) dharmo hi daṇḍarūpeṇa brahmaṇā nirmitaḥ purā.⁷⁸ Daṇḍa was looked upon as a sort of expiation which purged the criminal of sinful acts and reformed his character. Manu states that after being punished by the king, men who have committed sins, become pure and like virtuous men go to heaven.⁷⁹ Kullūka remarks that, like prāyaścitta, daṇḍa is also instrumental to the destruction of sin.⁸⁰

***30** Prāyaścitta and daṇḍa were thus the guardians of morality and law. Prāyaścitta would maintain purity of conduct and daṇḍa would maintain peace and order.

⁷⁴ Vide *2 above.

⁷⁶ Manu VII. 15; cf. also P. V. Kane, *Hist. of Dharmasāstra*, Vol. III, pp. 388-390.

⁷⁷ Manu VII. 18.

⁷⁹ Manu VIII. 318.

⁷⁵ Cf. Mitākṣarā on Yāj. III. 257.

⁷⁸ Yāj. I. 354b.

⁸⁰ Kullūka on Manu VIII. 318,

*31

Imposition of Daṇḍa

In ancient India the king was the head of the judiciary and he imposed punishments, assisted by his officers. In addition to the royal court there used to be popular court or tribunals called *kula* i. e. an assembly of relatives, *śreṇi* i. e. guild, and *pūga* i. e. assembly of men of one place belonging to different castes and following different occupations. The popular courts settled minor disputes. But serious crimes were tried in the royal court and heavy fine and corporal punishments were given by the king. Like the *pariṣad* in charge of *prāyaścitta* the king was supposed to be well versed in dharma. It was his duty to inflict punishment according to dharma,⁸¹ after taking into consideration the nature of crime, place and time of the crime, the age of the criminal, learning and monetary position;⁸² i. e. punishments differed according to the nature and circumstances under which the crime was committed.⁸³

*32

Four Methods of Punishment

Both Manu and Yājñavalkya speak of four methods of punishment viz. by gentle admonition, by severe reproof, by fine, by death punishment.⁸⁴ These punishments were to be inflicted separately or together according to the nature of crime.⁸⁵

33* If a *mahāpātakīn* did not perform a *prāyaścitta*, the king had to punish him by branding him in various ways on the forehead;⁸⁶ but if he performed a *prāyaścitta*, he was not to be branded, but a heavy fine was to be imposed on him, according to Manu.⁸⁷ This will indicate that for certain sins mere *prāyaścitta* was not enough. Even after undergoing a *prāyaścitta* a *mahāpātakīn* had to pay a fine. This would again indicate the difference between *daṇḍa* and *prāyaścitta*. Their purpose is not the same. The purpose of *daṇḍa* is to curb control and evil tendencies whereas *prāyaścitta* purifies by destroying the sin.⁸⁸

34*

*Prāyaścitta Ending in Death
And Death Punishment*

It may be pointed out here that in case of some crimes *daṇḍa* resulted in the death of the criminal, whereas in case of some sinners a *prāyaścitta*

⁸¹ Manu VIII. 123, 127, 128. Cf. also VII. 19; Yāj. I. 357.

⁸² Manu VII. 16; Yāj. I. 368.

⁸³ Cf. P. V. Kane, *Hist. of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. III, p. 392.

⁸⁴ Manu VIII. 129; Yāj. I. 367a. Cf. also P. V. Kane, *Hist. of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. III, p. 391.

⁸⁵ Manu VIII. 130; Yāj. I. 367b.

⁸⁶ Manu IX. 236, 237.

⁸⁷ Manu IX. 240.

⁸⁸ Cf. Mit. on Yāj. III. 257.

would also result in their death as observed above.⁸⁹ But there is difference between the two deaths. When death punishment was given the criminal was actually put to death and killed by hanging or by impaling him at the order of a king. The words used in this connection are √ vadh (to kill) and √ han (to kill).⁹⁰ But in case of a *prāyaścitta* resulting in death, the sinner was required to perform a certain act at his will which would consequently result in the death of the sinner⁹¹, i. e. the sinner himself was responsible for his death. In case of a thief who has stolen gold, the *prāyaścitta* consists in the king's hitting him once with a pestle, and here the words are "*sakṛddhanyat*" and "*vadhena śudhyati stene*". Though the words "*hanyāt*" and "*vadhena*" are used in the context of a *prāyaścitta*, this *prāyaścitta* may not necessarily result in death. Besides death does not appear to have been intended in this verse. This is clear from the word "*sakṛt*"; by hitting once the person may not die; i. e. though the words "*hanyāt*" and "*vadhena*" are used here, the king is not required to put him to death or kill him as he would do while inflicting *daṇḍa*. But if the sinner dies he will be purified or even if he survives he will be purified; *mukto vā maraṇāj jīvaṇn api viśudhyed iti yāvati*.⁹² This indicates that *prāyaścitta* for a grave sinner may or may not result in his death but death punishment i. e. *mṛtyu-daṇḍa* was aimed at definite death of the criminal.

*35

Conclusion

The behaviour of an individual has effect on the society in which he lives. Therefore for the moral and cultural well-being of a society it is very essential to control the behaviour of the individual to prevent him from committing sins. When a person commits a sin, he does harm to others but he himself is also mentally upset. *Prāyaścitta* was believed to restore his inner balance. A *prāyaścitta* was thus believed to have psychological effect on him. Besides the theologians often harped upon the theory of *karman*. This theory depends on purity of conduct and purity of action. Even if there was slight deviation from *dharma* on the part of an individual, it would detract from his happiness in the next birth or cause hindrance to his spiritual progress. Of the four goals of life, it is the practice of *dharma* that leads to *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. Therefore, *dharma* is to be guarded by all means.⁹³ *Dharma* is moral law as well as statutory law. When moral law was violated the *pariṣad* prescribed a *prāyaścitta*; and when statutory law was violated the king punished the criminals. Examination of the different crimes for which a

⁸⁹ Vide *17 above.

⁹¹ Vide above *15 and *16.

⁹² Cf. Mit. on Yāj. III. 257.

⁹³ Cf. Manu VIII. 306, 310, 321, 351, 380.

⁹⁴ Manu VIII. 15.

king has to impose punishments and the sins for which a pariṣad has to prescribe prāyaścittas corroborates this view that daṇḍa was prescribed for violating statutory law and prāyaścitta was prescribed for violation of moral law.

***36** Importance given to prāyaścitta must also be due to the religious conditions which prevailed in the days of Manu and Yājñavalkya. The teachings of Jainism and Buddhism mostly constituted an ethical code of conduct, whereby they stressed virtuous, pious and truthful conduct. They also insisted on prāyaścitta for purification of sin. Secondly, in this age Vedic religion took the form of Purāṇic Hinduism which had two principal sets viz. Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism or Bhāgavatadharmā. Bhāgavatadharmā incorporated good elements of Buddhism and insisted on virtuous conduct and self-control through the practice of *yamas* and *niyamas*. Under these conditions the Smṛti writers had to take cognizance of all these trends, and guard moral, ethical standard. Hindu ethics is social ethics and culminates in the philosophy of the Absolute.⁹¹

⁹¹ Sushilkumar Maitra, *The Ethics of the Hindus*, p. 1, Calcutta University Press, Calcutta, 1925.

ELLIPSIS IN MODERN LINGUISTICS AND PĀṆINI

By

MADHAV M. DESHPANDE

I. Introduction

1. 1. In the recent literature on Pāṇini, attention has been drawn to the notion of ellipsis as it is used in his grammar. How does he deal with ellipsis? Does he explicitly formulate rules to predict ellipsis or does he take it for granted as a natural phenomenon? Does he use ellipsis to account for some other phenomena in Sanskrit? Some of these questions have been raised and discussed in the last few years.¹ However, there are more fundamental issues which need to be answered in order to remove the confusion regarding the notion of ellipsis in general, and its application in Pāṇini's grammar in particular. Since the question of ellipsis in Pāṇini's grammar has been raised in the context of comparing this ancient grammar with modern linguistics, it would be useful to look at the broad spectrum of conceptions regarding ellipsis in modern linguistics.

1. 2. There is no agreement on what exactly the term "ellipsis" refers to. The general feeling is that the word "ellipsis" refers to some sort of "incompleteness" of surface-structure or expression. If there is more meaning comprehended than what is presumably directly conveyed by the components of an expression, then one feels like invoking the notion of ellipsis. Is this an occasional phenomenon, or is it in the nature of language to be an incomplete expression of the intended meaning? Hans Aarsleff attributes to Bréal a belief that "it is in the nature of language to express ideas only incompletely" (Aarsleff 1982 : 388). If such is the nature of language, then the scope of ellipsis would be far wider. Below, we will consider a spectrum of views regarding the notion of ellipsis in Western linguistics. This survey is not intended to be exhaustive, but only to illustrate the diversity of approaches to ellipsis. With this background, we can then move on to the Indian tradition.

2. Ellipsis in Structural Linguistics :

2. 1. In Harris (1951 : 334ff.), we find a notion of zero segments and voided elements. Such zero segments can obviously be found in phonology and

¹ Kiparsky (1982) ; Deshpande (1981), (1985), (1987).

morphology. One can include among these zero segments (= zero allomorphs), affixes after the verb *cut* and the noun *sheep* in the constructions *I have cut* and *The sheep are being shorn*. Harris concedes that "this procedure is never unavoidable" (1951 : 334), and yet it is "convenient" and "useful" and that it has a certain "descriptive effect". In contrast with these zero allophones, allomorphs and morphemes, Harris sets up the category of *voided elements*, i. e. ellipsis (1951 : 337). Harris (1957 : 313) uses the structuralist terminology in describing elliptical sentences as "actually not empty but ... occupied by zero morphemes". This allowed one to say that an elliptical sentence or clause was not dependent upon the existence of certain words in the neighboring clauses, but was complete in itself with zero variants of those words. Interestingly, Harris (1965 : 388ff.) moves away from simply talking in terms of the distribution of zero or voided elements, and uses the process terminology of zeroing, dropping and reconstructing the absent elements and redundancy removal. An important point comes across from Harris's discussion, namely that the setting up of zero or voided elements is not absolutely necessary, but that it adds simplicity and convenience to one's descriptions. Referring to the setting up of zero morphemes, Saporta (1964 : 230) concludes : "Zero then is a device which has the effect of combining syntactically similar sub-classes which are formally different, thus facilitating statements of greater generality. The fact is, however, that no matter how many conditions we may make justifying the use of zero, we shall not have answered what is perhaps the crucial question, namely, what conditions compel the use of zero?" Commenting on these statements, Robins (Saporta 1964 : 130-31) says : "The search for universally valid conditions, either on the one hand precluding the positing of zero elements in linguistic analysis at any level or on the other hand compelling it, is likely to prove a vain one. It would be difficult to imagine any set of linguistic phenomena which could in no way be analyzed formally without recourse to zero, though, of course, there are many sets of which the most satisfactory analysis does make use of zero elements at some point. The positing of zero elements is one of the means available to the linguist to smooth out in his analysis the awkward corners of languages in the interests of general symmetry or congruence of linguistic statement." Robins' comments, though they are made in the context of morphology, are also applicable to ellipsis-based explanations in general. Robins (1964 : 232ff.) says that "the patterns common to large numbers of the sentences of a language may be called its favourite sentence types." The "elliptical" or "incomplete" sentences on the other hand is a non-favourite type of a sentence and can be explained in terms of a favorite sentence type. Such a distinction again brings home the point that the notion of ellipsis may indeed

have to do more with a theorist's urge to find symmetry in language, than with the objective facts of a given language. It says at least as much about the linguist, as it says about the language.

3. Generative Approaches to Ellipsis :

3.1. Generally, the notion of ellipsis has received ambivalent attention in various phases of Chomskyan linguistics. Is it part of performance or competence? Can it be accounted for on sentence-internal grounds, or must we invoke sentence-external grounds? If these must be sentence-external grounds, such as discourse-constraints, can they be and should they be incorporated within a generative grammar? If they cannot be, then what alternative approaches to language-analysis do we have? Such and similar issues also come up while dealing with Pāṇini and his successors, and we may start with more familiar grounds.

3.2. In the traditional generative approach, certain basic structures were derived by Phrase Structure rules, while others were derived by transformational rules. We shall review certain discussions in the transformational literature to seek the methodology and the rationale for dealing with the issue of ellipsis. Consider the following sentences :

E 1. Ellsberg was arrested by the FBI and *Jane Fonda was too*.

E 2. I can't see you tomorrow, but *Sam may*.

Akmajian and Heny (1975 : 249) discuss these examples at length. Each of these examples, according to them, consists of a complete sentence, and an elliptical sentence, i. e. *Fonda was too* and *Sam may*. Akmajian and Heny (1975 : 249-250) say :

The meaning of each of the elliptical sentences is dependent on the meaning of the sentence that precedes it. Thus, *Fonda was too* is taken to mean that Fonda was arrested by the FBI too ; *Sam may* is taken to mean that Sam may see you tomorrow. In each case, we have reconstructed the meaning of the incomplete sentence on the basis of the meaning of the preceding sentence.

However, transformational grammarians were not merely interpreting sentences. They were interested in generating them by using their grammar. Linguistic data and a grammarian's perception of it interact in different ways. How to derive the so-called elliptical sentences? Akmajian and Heny (1975 : 250) :

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First of all, we have no way of generating elliptical sentences such as those cited. Our PS rule for sentences, i. e., $S \rightarrow NP \text{ Aux VP}$, always generates structures that are "complete", and there is no way we can generate a "partial" structure such as *Fonda was*. Second, we have seen that the elliptical sentences following *and* in [examples like E1 above] bear a spacial relationship to sentences preceding *and*: the meaning we assign to the elliptical clauses seems to coincide with part of the meaning of the main clauses preceding *and*. Thus, however we may choose to generate elliptical clauses, we must ensure that our theory reflects the fact that they are dependent on the preceding sentences, at least for their meaning.

3.3. The above discussion points to how linguistic facts lead to extensions of linguistic theory based on certain *expectations*, e. g., the expectation that the linguistic theory must account for the dependence of elliptical sentences cited above upon the preceding sentences. The labels "complete" and "incomplete" are already indicative of some *a priori* judgment about the sentences. At some point, a theory which has been developed prior to the consideration of certain linguistic data is forced upon those data. While admitting that "whether the pairs of sentences like *John was fired* and *John was fired by someone* are really synonymous is not clear", Akmajian and Heny (1975 : 248) argue in favor of deriving *John was fired* from *John was fired by someone*. Consider their dilemmas : (1975 : 248)

There is actually no independent evidence for deriving *John was fired* from *John was fired by someone* rather than from an infinite number of different sources such as *John was fired by Bill*, ... *by Joe*, ... *by the woman in the red hat*, and so on.

But if the transformation of Agent Deletion is to be subject to the condition that deleted elements must be recoverable and the condition that rules must not change meaning, then this seems to be the most natural way of stating the transformation. Since there is evidence that there must be a transformational source for agentless passives, and since the condition on recoverability requires that we not delete any element unless it can be recovered from the derivation, we postulate that the deleted NP is one of a specific, limited set of particular elements : *someone* or *something*.

It is interesting to note that here, even when there is "no independent evidence", it is the prior acceptance of certain conditions as part of the grammatical theory, which lead the authors to "postulate". This brings out the interesting dimension of negotiation between the data and the theory.

3. 4. Consider, for instance, one-word utterances like "door", or "slab", the first one used by a parent addressed to a child, and the second used by a builder addressed to his assistant. They are both communicative in their respective contexts. Max Black (1969 : 22) says that these are "telegraphic simplifications of adult sentences". Does this suggest that the user says to himself first the "adult sentence" before shortening it? Ian Robinson (1975 : 38-39) says that such a suggestion would be "unfortunate" and "not enlightening". Turning to the transformational treatment of such one-word utterances, Robinson (1975 : 39) says :

All TG grammar can do with these one-word or one-sound utterances is to relate them to the kernels it *can* deal with, by large numbers of 'deletion transformations'. But does this mean that, according to TG grammar, the longer unspoken sentences are somehow more real, or only that TG grammar cannot handle these cases without extreme clumsiness?

Are the so-called "incomplete" utterances incomplete because they fail to communicate their total expected semantic load, or are they incomplete because our linguistic theories are built primarily to take care of "complete" utterances? In calling certain utterances "incomplete", we are already loading the dice, and then it is no wonder that we try to account for these "incomplete" sentences in relation to what we intuitively accept as "complete" sentences. Referring to this dilemma, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1963 : 10) rightly points out that "the sentence is 'elliptical', not because it leaves out something that we think when we utter it, but because it is shortened - in comparison with a particular paradigm of our grammar."

3. 5. Further modifications of the classical transformational approach were suggested in Jackendoff (1972). The classical transformational approach would derive all anaphors from underlying full representations by a deletion or a substitution rule. These underlying forms then receive their interpretations by rules of semantic interpretation operating off of deep structures. On the other hand, the strict interpretive approach developed in Jackendoff (1972) treats anaphoric expressions as underlyingly present and meaningless dummies which are assigned semantic interpretations by special rules at some

superficial level in syntactic derivations. The quest for the "missing nodes" is very much alive. Consider the following sentence :

E 3. Stanley smokes more pot than tobacco.

Jackendoff (1972 : 181) says that this sentence "has a missing subject and verb after *than*." He further says (1972 : 181) : "One general mechanism that will *not* work is to simply have the syntax generate only the nodes that appear in the surface, and to have the semantic rules conjure up the missing nodes". Thus, for Jackendoff, what is missing cannot be made up simply by providing the missing meaning, but there must be syntactic nodes in the surface to which this meaning can be attached. Jackendoff, instead of having the full representation of the classical generative grammar, proposes the notion of an "empty node", which can undergo transformations like any other node, but this empty node is "either deleted or else interpreted by convention as phonologically null", which results in a "legal" surface-structure. Such a surface-structure is syntactically and semantically well-formed, and yet can contain the phonological non-representation of certain nodes. This approach, while certainly different from the classical generative approach, is still very close to it.

4. Treatment of Context in Generative Grammar :

4.1. A great deal of information understood from a sentence in context is dependent upon our appreciation of that context. The so-called elliptical sentences need not be dependent upon just the prior linguistic context, but the larger situational context may play a role in our understanding of such sentences. The context adds a great deal more to a sentence than what is available from the literal meaning of the sentence itself. This refers to a different kind of gap between what an expression means out of context and what it means within a context. Consider for example the notion of entailment. Gordon and Lakoff (1971 : 63) say :

In everyday speech, we very often use one sentence to convey the meaning of another. For example, if the Duke of Bordello says to his butler, "It's cold in here", he may be giving an order to close the window. This does not mean that the meaning of "It's cold in here" is the same as the meaning of "Close the window". It only means that under certain circumstances, saying one thing may entail the communication of another.

While a distinction between the "literal meaning" of an utterance and its contextual meaning, including such entailments, is important indeed,

the TG school basically tried to deal with de-contextualized sentences, and hence only with their so-called "literal meaning." Chomsky (1966 : 29) was clear on this point :

In a particular situation, the hearer may use information that goes well beyond grammar to determine which of the potential interpretations was intended (or whether, perhaps something was intended that goes beyond the explicit semantic content of the utterance that was used). Absolutely nothing of any significance is known about this use of extra-grammatical information in interpretation of sentences beyond the fact that it exists and is an important characteristic of performance.

Chomsky relegated context to performance, while grammatical theory was supposed to deal with only competence. How effectively can one explain the actual linguistic behavior of human beings through a theory of competence alone, which by its very nature is de-contextualized, and perhaps represents the lowest common denominator for all speaker-hearers in all situations? How do we then account for the fact that certain utterances are grammatical under certain circumstances, and ungrammatical under other circumstances? While still arguing that grammar is a grammar of competence, Lakoff (1971) concludes that grammaticality must be decided relative to assumptions about situational context and thought processes. In Lakoff (1972 : 551) we see a further step :

There are cases where material which is understood but does not appear overtly in the sentence, and which can only be determined from context, must appear in underlying grammatical structure and must be deleted by a rule of grammar.

Of course, as the contexts vary, what may be "understood" varies, and there is no clear indication in Lakoff (1972) as to how to formally incorporate this contextual information into rules of grammar which is ostensibly a grammar of competence. W. R. O'Donnell (1974) presents an insightful analysis of the dilemmas faced by the early generative grammarians. It seems that while the context-related information may be best handled in "explanatory" grammars, it is almost awkward if not impossible to deal with it within a generative or a derivational framework.

5. Non-Derivational Approaches To Ellipsis :

5.1. The work of Rommetveit in psycholinguistics stresses the role of the intersubjectively shared world-knowledge in the production as well as com-

prehension of speech-events. Speaker's assumptions about what the hearer knows at a given point in time lead him to produce different utterances in different contexts, all of which may have the same referential or propositional value. Rommetveit (1974: 30) offers four utterances, referring to the same event, but differing in the intersubjectively shared world-knowledge :

E4. "Magnificent !"

E5. "That was magnificent !"

E6. "That tackling performed by the slim, funny-looking quarterback was magnificent."

E7. "The maneuver that caused such a roar of acclamation towards the end of the game was magnificent !"

Let us assume the following contexts. Utterance (E4) was uttered by the speaker to his friend while both were watching a game. Utterance (E5) was used by the same speaker to the same listener a little later, when the listener could easily recover the referent of "that". Utterance (E6) came from the same speaker to the same listener after a day or so, when "that" particular tackling had to be clearly distinguished from other tacklings by other players. Utterance (E7) came from the same speaker addressed to a person who perhaps was not at the game, but read about it in the newspaper. In each case, the temporarily shared social world is different and hence the appropriateness of each utterance depends upon the specific architecture of intersubjectivity relating to a given case of utterance. Thus, the information shared by the speaker and the hearer and the overt expression of linguistic communication are in complementary relation to each other. If the shared information is greater, then smaller is the need for the overt linguistic expression. On the other hand, if the shared information is smaller, then one needs fuller overt linguistic expressions to make up for this lack of shared information. This way, an elliptical sentence may in fact indicate greater mutual understanding between the speaker and the listener. Thus, reversing the traditional linguistic approach to ellipsis, Rommetveit (1974: 30) says :

Ellipsis appears to be the prototype of verbal communication under ideal conditions of complete complementarity in an intersubjectively established, temporarily shared social world. Full sentences – and even sequences of sentences – may be required in order to make something known, however, under conditions of deficient complementarity and less than perfect synchronization of intentions and thoughts.

In this approach, ellipsis seems to gain some positive value. It is not some "incomplete" entity, but an indication of greater mutually shared world-knowledge. It is an indication that the speaker knows that the listener knows something and that it is salient enough that it need not be overtly expressed again.

5.2. Similar positive response to the notion of ellipsis is seen in modern theories of Text Linguistics. For instance, Robert de Beaugrande (1980 : 133) includes ellipsis among one of the devices to achieve textual efficiency. These different devices are "options for compacting surface expression without damaging the connectivity of underlying knowledge" (Beaugrande 1980 : 132). Ellipsis is defined as "the omission of surface expressions whose conceptual content is nonetheless carried forward and expanded or modified by means of noticeably incomplete expressions" (Ibid., p. 133). Beaugrande (1980 : 155ff.) notices that "Language theories with clearly drawn boundaries of grammatical or logical well-formedness necessarily proliferate the treatment of utterances as elliptical, according to the explicitness of the well-formed idealizations." Beaugrande cites psycholinguistic research which seems to suggest that the elliptical sentences, rather than the completed sentences are easier to perceive. He provides the following examples :

E8 Fred runs faster than the girl.

E9 Fred runs faster than the girl runs.

Walter Kintsch (1977 : 312) reports that the sentence (E8) is easier to perceive than (E9). A generative derivation involving completion-then-deletion assumes the opposite. Beaugrande (1980 : 156) suggests that a model using conceptual-relational networks, on the other hand, agrees with these psycholinguistic conclusions, and that the sentence (E9) requires "testing to see if a second node is needed in addition to an earlier one, as opposed to direct reutilization of one node in (E8)."

5.3. Thus, the context-oriented theories in psycholinguistics and text-linguistics can better "explain" the phenomenon of ellipsis in particular manifestations, but cannot offer any predictive conditions for its occurrence. However, such theories can and do offer an understanding of probabilities. Theories like the generative grammar did not and could not take care of this wider context, and at the same time, the notion of ellipsis proliferated out of control. In relation to the entire discussion of ellipsis in the western schools of linguistics, we must keep in mind an important warning of John Lyons (1968 : 174) :

This category (= elliptical sentences) has come in for a lot of criticism from linguists, who have pointed out (correctly, but irrelevantly) that when such utterances occur in a particular context, they are perfectly comprehensible, and from this point of view can hardly be called 'incomplete'. One must distinguish between contextual completeness and grammatical completeness. ... Traditional grammarians often failed to distinguish between grammatical and contextual completeness.

6. Principal Points Concerning Ellipsis :

- 1) The notion of ellipsis generally indicates some feeling of incompleteness of the structure.
- 2) Depending upon how and in what context a sentence is considered.
- 3) Grammatical incompleteness must be distinguished from contextual incompleteness. Grammatical incompleteness is generally determined in comparison with prototypical complete sentence types, while contextual incompleteness may include a different set of considerations.
- 4) Grammatical incompleteness can be judged only within the context of a particular theory of grammar. Depending upon how a particular grammar defines completeness of a sentence, the extent of incompleteness will vary. Ellipsis represents a theoretical device with which a grammatical description may achieve a degree of generality, and without which this degree of generality may be diminished. The cost of achieving a generalization may be paid in terms of completion-and-then-deletion processes, or one may have to pay the cost of having to set up different types of sentences, and dispense with generalizations. Thus, ellipsis is not necessarily a feature of language per se, but is a result of theoretical deliberation and rationalization in terms of some implicit or explicit theory of grammar.
- 5) One can think of ellipsis from the point of view of a theory of encoding or from a point of view of a theory of decoding. A theory of encoding may start with assumptions about the meaning to be communicated and how that meaning gets encoded into certain surface-structures. From this point of view, if one is dealing with the so-called elliptical sentences, then one has a choice of either arguing that there are meanings which for some reason or another do not find a direct expression in the surface, or that the meanings to be encoded by an elliptical sentence are somehow elliptical themselves, and hence there is no real mismatch between the meaning and the expression. One can look at the elliptical sentences from the point of

view of decoding. Here the degree of incompleteness of a surface-structure may reflect the difficulty or the lack of it experienced in the process of decoding such sentences. In either approach, any judgment about the exact extent of ellipsis in a given case depends upon prior expectations, theoretical or otherwise. While the surface structures of the so-called elliptical sentences are directly accessible to observation, the meaning they are supposed to communicate can only be indirectly reconstructed. Even in a theory of encoding, the starting point of the meaning to be communicated in practice remains only a theoretical starting point. We cannot reach this starting point without first reconstructing it.

6) In a somewhat narrower approach to ellipsis, one could consider ellipsis in terms of derivational dependence of items. If the derivation of an item X is dependent upon an item Y, then the existence of X in the surface-structure warrants the assumption of the prior existence of Y somewhere in the derivational sequence. While such an assumption is expected to bring a higher degree of generalization and descriptive ease, it carries with it no necessary claims to psycholinguistic validity.

7. Indian Approaches to Ellipsis :

7.1. In Indian theories about language, we find a notion that often there is greater meaning to an utterance in a given context than what is directly expressed by its manifest constituents. In such conditions, how does one deal with these utterances ? There is a doctrine that ideally there should be a perfect match between the meaning (*artha*) and the words (*śabda*), i. e. that there should not be more words used to express the same meaning which has been expressed by one word (*uktārthānām aprayogaḥ*) and there should ideally be a different meaning for every different word (*arthabhede śabdabhedaḥ / śabdabhede arthabhedaḥ*). Out of such considerations, in traditions dealing with interpretation of ritual texts, poetry etc., many different conceptions arose to account for this seeming gap between the manifest utterance and the intended or comprehended meaning. Here is a brief listing of these different conceptions :^a

- a. Different significative powers of a word : *abhidhā* "primary meaning", *lakṣaṇā* "secondary or extended meaning", *vyāñjanā* "suggested meaning" and *tātparya* "intended meaning" or the listener's assumptions about what the speaker intends.

^a For details of the traditional theories of meaning and ellipsis, see : Kunjunni Raja 1958 and 1963.

- b. Directly conveyed *vs.* implied, inferred, suggested meanings, *śābda* "meaning directly derived from words" *vs.* *ārtha* "secondary meaning inferred from the literal meaning".
- c. Aids to contextual interpretation :
 "Meanings of words are determined on the basis of the rest of the sentence, textual context, literal meaning, propriety, the temporal and spatial context etc. and not on the basis of the phonological shape of the word alone." *Vākyapadīya*, II. 316.³
- d. *Arthādhyāhāra* "assumption of missing meanings" *vs.* *Padādhyāhāra* "assumption of missing words". These two theories are debated especially in *Mīmāṃsā* (= Ritual Exegesis) texts. Of the two schools of *Mīmāṃsā*, the *Bhāṭṭa* school holds that one must supply the missing words (*padādhyāhāra*) which in turn provide the missing meaning. The *Prābhākara* school, on the other hand, holds that one assume directly the missing meanings (*arthādhyāhāra*) and that one need not invoke the missing words.
- e. *Arthāpatti* "implication". Most schools of Indian philosophy admit a process of implication or entailment. This is a context-sensitive interpretation of a sentence. If someone says, "Devadatta is fat, but does not eat during the day", the implication is that he must be eating at night. Without such an assumption, the sentence becomes unjustifiable.
- f. *Lakṣaṇā* "secondary or extended meaning". A sentence such as *gaṅgāyāṇi ghoṣaḥ* literally says : "the cowherd-colony is on the Ganges". The listener knows that no colonies can be situated directly on the stream of the river, and hence interprets the sentence to mean : "the cowherd-colony is on the bank of the Ganges". This type of extension of the literal meaning is prompted by various reasons such as the difficulty of justifying the literal meaning (*mukhyārthānupapatti*), the syntactic linkages (*anvayānupapatti*) or the intention of the speaker (*tātparyānupapatti*).

These approaches mentioned above assume that often there is more meaning intended by the speaker and understood by the listener than what is literally represented by an utterance. Not all these cases can be subsumed under ellipsis, but ellipsis is one of the related issues. These are then inter-

³ *vākyūṭ prakaraṇād arthād aucityād deśa-kūlataḥ |*
śabdārthāḥ pravibhajyante na rūpād eva kevalāt || Vākyapadīya, II. 316.

pretive or decoding approaches to issues like ellipsis. These systems are not concerned about grammatical derivation of an utterance, but about making sense of an utterance in its appropriate context. In the systems of Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, and Sanskrit Poetics, these issues are discussed in the context of interpreting ritual or poetic texts or in the context of logic, but not in the context of grammatical derivation. Below we shall see that the Sanskrit grammarians are aware of these issues, but that they invoke ellipsis only in the restricted context of grammatical derivation.

8. Indian Grammarians on Ellipsis :

8.1. Kātyāyana and Patañjali

8.1.1. In the works of Kātyāyana and Patañjali, the early commentators on Pāṇini's grammar, there is a general recognition that occasionally people use truncated expressions, and that certain meanings are communicated even in the absence of words denoting those meanings. In Deshpande (1985), there is a detailed discussion of these issues, and I shall only mention the relevant points here. Patañjali says : "one finds people using portions of sentences for sentences and portions of words for words".⁴ For instance, people use the expression *datta* for *devadatta* and *bhāmā* for *satyabhāmā*, and they use just the verb *praviśa* "Enter !" for *praviśa grham* "Enter the house." How is this reduction accomplished? At least for the reduced words, Patañjali says that this may involve deletion (*lopa*) of the first member in the expressions *devadatta* and *satyabhāmā*.⁵ This implies that the grammarians considered certain constructions to be complete and certain others to be incomplete in relation to these. The incomplete constructions were considered to be portions of the complete constructions, or reduced versions of the complete constructions. This is obviously a complete-and-then-delete process of dealing with ellipsis. In other places, Patañjali says that in many cases the sense of restriction is understood even in the absence of the word *eva* "only", and that meanings are communicated often by means other than words, such as the winking of the eye.⁶ Patañjali has both derivational and interpretational approaches to ellipsis, because he is both a grammarian and a textual interpreter. These two approaches must be theoretically distinguished.

⁴ *dṛśyante hi vūkyaṣu vūkyaikadeśān prayujjānūh padeṣu ca padaikadeśān. Mahūbhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 111.

⁵ *athavā pūrvapadalopo'tra draṣṭavyaḥ | ... tad-yathā | devadatto dattāḥ satyabhāmā bhāmeti |, Mahūbhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 6.

⁶ *siddhe vidhīr ārabhyamūṇo'ntareṇāpy evakūram niyamārtho bhaviṣyati |, Mahūbhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 418.
vinūpi śabdaprayogaḥ bahavo 'rthūḥ gamyante 'akṣinikocaiḥ pāṇivihārāḥ ca |, Mahūbhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 363.

8.1.2. Kātyāyana in his *Vārttikas* on Pāṇini's rules brings the notion of ellipsis into a fuller play. Deshpande (1985) shows in detail how Kātyāyana makes extensive use of the device of *padalopa* "word-deletion." There is a distinction between prescribed word-deletion and non-prescribed natural ellipsis. This distinction has serious consequences within the Pāṇinian system. A rule-prescribed deletion becomes a case of zero substitution, where the zero substitute may be treated like any other substitute. However, relying upon the non-occurrence of an item in the surface of a sentence through natural non-prescribed ellipsis does not commit one to treating it as a case of substitution. We shall consider two cases to illustrate this difference. Kātyāyana makes a general assumption that every sentence must have a finite verb and that if there is no overt finite verb in the sentence, then he proposes (*Vārttika* 11 on P. 2. 3. 1) : *astir bhavantīparaḥ prathamapurūṣo 'prayujyamāno 'py asti*, " A third person form of the verb *as* " to be " in the present tense (i. e. *asti*), even though it may not have been used (in the surface of a sentence), still exists (in that sentence)." Though not used in the surface, it still exists. Thus, there is some distinction made between the two modes of existence, i. e. usage and latent existence. We are not explicitly told that in these sentences, the verb form *asti* is deleted or replaced by a zero. Thus, this case is strictly speaking not subject to rules of substitution. On the other hand, there are cases where Kātyāyana explicitly prescribes deletion of words in a derivation, and fears that such deletions may be potentially liable to be considered as zero-substitutions. For instance, Kātyāyana proposes to derive a compound such as *dadhi-saktavaḥ* " yogurt-barley " from a sequence such as *dadhi-upasikta-saktavaḥ* " barley sprinkled with yogurt " through the deletion of the word *upasikta* (cf. Deshpande 1985 : 54ff.). Here, if one assumes that the word *upasikta* is replaced by a zero, this zero could acquire all the properties of the word it replaced through the procedure of *sthānivadbhāva* " substitute acting like the substituendum ". In this case, if the zero substitute acquired the phonological properties of the word *upasikta*, then the word *dadhi* would change to *dadhy* before this zero, as it would before the word *upasikta*. In this way, we could get the wrong form *dadhy-saktavaḥ*, instead of the correct form *dadhi-saktavaḥ*. Kātyāyana is aware of such potential problems with cases of prescribed deletion (Deshpande 1985 : 54ff.). On the other hand, he shows no awareness that a case of natural ellipsis may pose similar problems. For instance, we can pose a similar problem in a sentence like *iyaṃ nadī* " This (is) a river. ". For Kātyāyana, as explained above, all such nominal sentences must contain at least the verb *asti* " is ", even though it may not appear in the usage. If this non-appearance of *asti* is treated as a case of formal deletion or zero-substitution, then one could conceivably pose the following problem. Supposing the original

sentence to be *iyam nadī asti*, let us assume that the word *asti* is replaced by zero. In this case, this zero substitute may potentially acquire the properties of the substituendum. If that happens, the final *ī* of *nadī* may change to *y* before this zero, as it would before the original word *asti*. This may lead to a wrong construction : **iyam nady*. There is no evidence that Kātyāyana imagined such a difficulty with the ellipsis of *asti*, while there is evidence that he did imagine such a difficulty with the deletion of *upasikta* in *dadhi-upasikta-saktavaḥ*. The difference between these two cases is that while one is treated as a case of natural ellipsis, the other is treated as formal deletion. Thus, in Kātyāyana's *Vārttikas*, a distinction is made between natural ellipsis, which is not treated like zero-substitution, and prescribed word-deletion, which is treated like zero-substitution. This distinction is important, because it seems that some such distinction probably goes back to Pāṇini's own grammar.

8.2. Pāṇinian Conception And Application Of Ellipsis :

8.2.1. In Pāṇini's grammar, there is a general recognition that there is no perfect one-to-one matching between constituents of a construction and the constituents of its meaning. While ideally such matching may be hoped for, it is not achieved in many cases. There are two kinds of violations of the ideal matching. The first violation comes about when there is an expression component to which no meaning is found to correspond. For instance, Pāṇini says that the prepositions *adhi* and *pari*, when they are without any meaning, are given the designation *karma-pravacanīya* [cf. P. 1. 4. 94 (*adhi-pari anarthakau*)]. In this particular case, the usage with or without *adhi* conveys the same meaning, and hence no meaning corresponds to *adhi*. A different kind of example is provided by P. 2. 1. 33 (*kṛtyair adhikārtha-vacane*). This rule says that a gerundive form is compounded with another word in the instrumental case in order to express some additional/extended meaning. For instance, the example *kāka-peyā nadī* "crow-drinkable river" conveys the meaning that the river is so full that crows can drink its water sitting on its banks.⁷ It is important to note here that Pāṇini is not giving us rules of textual or contextual interpretation. His concern is primarily with the derivational process. Both the absence of meaning as well as the presence of extended meaning are invoked in the context of derivation. It is not the case that the compound *kāka-peyā* in certain contexts implies or suggests some extended meaning. Pāṇini is stating that the compound can be used only if there is this extended meaning, and that it is not found in the literal

⁷ For the exegetical history of this example, see : Deshpande 1974.

meaning of "a crow-drinkable river". Thus, the extended meaning becomes relevant for the very existence of the word. If this were only an occasional implicational meaning, we would not find Pāṇini stating it in his rules. Thus, relevance to the derivational process is the basis for inclusion of conditions in Pāṇini's rules. As we shall see, this is also relevant in the case of ellipsis.

8.2.2. We shall briefly consider the following rules of Pāṇini :

P. 1. 4. 105 (*yuṣmady upapade samānādhikaraṇe sthāniny api madhyamaḥ*) : "A verb root takes a second person affix if it co-occurs with the coreferential pronoun *yuṣmad*, even if it is *sthānin* (= deleted, replaced, substituted, zeroed ?)."

P. 2. 3. 14 (*kriyārthopapadasya ca karmaṇi sthāninaḥ*) : "Dative can be used even for the object / patient of an infinitive which is *sthānin* (= deleted, replaced, substituted, zeroed ?)."

I have placed a question mark in my bracketed translation of the word *sthānin* in these two rules, because there is a considerable degree of ambiguity concerning its meaning. As an example of the first rule, consider the sentence : *gacchasi* " (You) go ". Pāṇini says that the affix *-si* is predicated on the assumption that the verb co-occurs with the pronoun *tvam* "you", even if this pronoun may not actually be there in the surface. As an example of the second rule, consider the sentence : *phalebhyo yāti* " (He) goes for fruit ". Pāṇini states that the dative *phalebhyaḥ* represents the object / patient of a non-occurring infinitive like *ānetum* "to bring". In this case, if the infinitive were to occur in the surface, we cannot get the dative, but if the infinitive does not occur in the surface, then we can have the dative. It is obvious that these are examples of some sort of ellipsis, but what is not clear is how exactly they are to be handled in terms of the technical processes. The term *sthānin* in these rules holds the key to this problem. Normally, in Pāṇini's rules, the term *sthānin* refers to an item which is replaced, while the term *ādeśa* refers to the replacement or the substitute [cf. P. 1. 1. 56 (*sthānivad ādeśo 'nal-vidhau*)]. Thus, if there is a rule which says "substitute *y* for *x*", then *x* is the *sthānin* and *y* is the *ādeśa*. Even deletion or *lopa*, which Pāṇini defines as non-visibility (*adarśana*, P. 1. 1. 60), is considered to be a zero substitute, and the item which is zeroed becomes the *sthānin*. If we have a specific rule like "substitute *y* for *x*", then it is obvious that *x* is the *sthānin*. However, in the case of the two rules above, Pāṇini does use the word *sthānin* to refer to the pronoun *tvam* and the infinitive form *ānetum*, and yet there is no rule in his grammar which prescribes deletion or zero-replacement for these items. This brings us to a distinction in his grammar that is quite crucial, i. e. prescribed deletion or zero-replacement

versus natural non-prescribed non-occurrence of an item. Pāṇini's use of the same descriptive term *sthānin* to refer to the deleted and non-occurring items does imply a commonality of perception at some abstract level, and yet in one case it is prescribed deletion, while in the other case it is natural non-occurrence. This distinction is similar to the distinction we explored in the statements of Kātyāyana. However, there is no question that Pāṇini's terminology is somewhat confusing. Kātyāyana differentiates between *lopa* "deletion, zero-replacement" versus *aprayoga* "non-usage", and does not attempt to subsume both under a common term such as *sthānin*. Pāṇini's terminology somewhat blurs this distinction, and may simply be a reflection of not having arrived at certain theoretical clarifications. One could possibly differentiate the two meanings of *sthānin* as "the item which was in that place" versus "the item which could have been in that place". While such a distinction may absolve Pāṇini, it is not evident from his wording itself.

8.2.3. In any case, we can compare Pāṇini's procedure with the procedures of *arthādhyāhāra* "assumption of meaning" and *padādhyāhāra* "assumption of lost words" found in Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Sanskrit Poetics. For the derivation of the second person verb form, Pāṇini does assume the existence of something at an abstract derivational level. He does not just assume the meaning of the second-person pronoun, but the word itself (cf. *upapada* "co-occurring word"). This is necessary because only with the pronoun *yuṣmad* can we get second person verb forms. If, for instance, we use the honorific pronoun *bhavat* "Your Honor", compare German *Sie*, then we cannot use a second person verb. Therefore, it was necessary for Pāṇini to think in terms of co-occurrence of the word *yuṣmad*. Thus, he seems to be, at least in these few instances, closer to the view of *padādhyāhāra* "assumption of lost words" than to *arthādhyāhāra* "assumption of meaning". However, while the systems of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Sanskrit Poetics invoke conceptions like *padādhyāhāra* in the context of textual interpretation, Pāṇini seems to invoke it strictly in the context of derivation. This difference is important as it points out the very function of Pāṇini's grammar. Pāṇini's grammar is not a theory like text linguistics, psycholinguistics or exegesis, but a theory of deriving de-contextualized Sanskrit sentence structures. To the extent non-occurring words and non-literal meanings are relevant for the derivation of words and sentences in this de-contextualized grammar, Pāṇini invokes them in his rules. Within the abstract realm of derivational considerations, the derivational processes involve dependencies. If the derivation of X is dependent upon Y, then that Y must be there, even though unseen, so that the existence of X can be accounted for. Therefore, I do not agree with Kiparsky's (1982: 37) view of ellipsis in Pāṇini stated

as : " words may be freely omitted in sentences if they are evident from the meaning or context ". We may have to rephrase the Pāṇinian notion of ellipsis as :

" If the derivation of an item X is dependent upon there being an item Y, then the existence of the item Y may be presumed in the derivational process, even if Y may not actually appear in the final utterance."

This is almost like an extension of zero affixes etc. to the level of words. The main difference is that in the case of zero morphemes their exact location in the structure to be derived and the exact form of the word to be replaced is fully known through the derivational history, and the substitution process is formally specified. In the case of ellipsis or natural non-occurrence of words, we cannot locate exactly where in the sentence this word would have occurred, or even its exact shape. Therefore, while it is easy to say that *gacchasi* is derived under the condition of its co-occurrence with *tvam*, Pāṇini is not making any claims as to whether the pre-ellipsis sentence was *tvam gacchasi* or *gacchasi tvam*. Hence, one cannot argue that there is a morphological zero before or after *gacchasi*, and yet Pāṇini assumes that *tvam* must be there in the derivational history of this sentence. This is what distinguishes a normal zero substitution or deletion from ellipsis in Pāṇini.

8.2.4. Similarly, I also disagree with Johannes Bronkhorst's notion of ellipsis in Pāṇini (Bronkhorst 1987 : 297) :

But why should Pāṇini think that deletion of words " does not have to be mentioned in the grammar itself," and why should he here resort to what ' is evident from meaning or context ', when he never does anything like it anywhere else? As long as we assume that the aim of Pāṇini's grammar is to describe the Sanskrit language, i. e., the ' surface forms ' of the language, the omission of one or more rules for the deletion of words leaves his grammar needlessly incomplete, and it seems incorrect to justify this by saying that Pāṇini was baffled by the task.

The problem disappears once we stop mistaking Pāṇini for a modern linguist and take him on his own terms. His grammar, as I have argued elsewhere (1981), does not primarily attempt to describe the surface forms of the Sanskrit language ; it rather shows how these surface forms manifest the real elements underlying them, the grammar-

tical elements which directly express the meanings to be expressed. Here it does not matter if someone drops parts of the surface forms. The main thing has been shown, viz., that the all-important grammatical elements are manifested in the surface-forms, whatever further happens to those surface forms.

Bronkhorst is right in saying that Pāṇini was not dealing with surface forms of the Sanskrit language, if by that he means 'specific linguistic instances in specific contexts'. But Pāṇini was certainly dealing with the surface-forms in the sense of patterns of grammatical utterances, generalized from his observation of the *prayoga* of the Sanskrit language. He uses ellipsis not so much to account for any missing contextual meaning, but to account for derivational dependencies. But it is a fact that he assumes a kind of natural non-occurrence (or informal zero substitution as implied by the word *sthānin*) without prescribing a rule for such non-occurrence or deletion. The question is not whether he assumes such deletion or non-occurrence, but why is it that he does not go into a formal accounting of such deletion or non-occurrence. This is an important question. Pāṇini is not concerned so much about words in a sentence which someone may drop. He is concerned about words which one does not drop. If the derivation of words which one does not drop is somehow conditioned by their co-occurrence with other words in the sentence, and if those other words are not there in the sentence, then he is forced to resort to the device of ellipsis. He does not give formal rules for such possible non-occurrences of words, most likely because he had not arrived at a formal understanding of this phenomenon. It is obvious that he was aware of the phenomenon of the contextual loss of words in Sanskrit, and he even uses this feature of Sanskrit to produce a very condensed text of his rules. However, he does not give formal rules for the dropping of words. Such formal attempts were not made until later times when Indian philosophers developed the notion of *padādhyāhāra* "assumption of missing words". Even these theories were not very formal. Only in modern linguistics do we see any attempts of rule formation in this regard for phenomena such as gapping. Thus, the reason Pāṇini does not deal with this "natural ellipsis" in formal terms is simply that he has not arrived at a formal understanding of this phenomenon. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali seem to share the same basic theoretical perspective on ellipsis. They seem to agree that it is not rule-governed and yet must be resorted to in cases where the derivation of an item depends upon its co-occurrence with another item which may or may not appear in the surface structure. A certain terminological evolution is definitely seen in the works of Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Pāṇini's

term *sthānin* creates a great deal of confusion, because it blurs the formal distinction between zero substitution and natural non-occurrence. On the other hand, Kātyāyana uses a separate term *aprayoga* " non-usage " to distinguish ellipsis from *lopa* " deletion. " Therefore, it is historically fair and justifiable to assume that Pāṇini had not fully reached a firm theoretical conclusion regarding these issues. Whether he was baffled by this task, we will never know. However, from a comparison of Pāṇini with modern linguistics, it is obvious that though he lived in the ancient East, he had some of the same theoretical dilemmas as his colleagues in the modern West.

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VEDA*

By

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'Veda' in the Veda

The terms 'Ṛgveda', 'Yajurveda' and 'Sāmaveda' do not occur in the oldest parts of Vedic literature. They occur nowhere in the *Samhitās*,¹ nor in the earliest parts of the *Brāhmaṇas*. This can be seen as follows.

The Aitareya *Brāhmaṇa* can be divided into an earlier and a later part on the basis of the fact "that in the first twenty-four *Adhyāyas* (i-v.25) the only tense of narration is the imperfect, and that perfects are extremely rare in any narrative sense. On the contrary, from v. 26 to the end the proportion of perfects grows steadily ..." (Keith. 1920: 34). From this and other² evidence Keith concludes that "the last sixteen *Adhyāyas* can be safely ascribed to a later period than the first twenty-four" (id.). The terms 'Ṛgveda', 'Yajurveda' and 'Sāmaveda' occur in only one section of the Aitareya *Brāhmaṇa*, viz., 5. 32 (25. 7), i. e., in the younger part of the *Brāhmaṇa*.

Also the Śatapatha *Brāhmaṇa* is known to consist of parts that derive from different times. Books 11-14 are younger than the books preceding them, and indeed our three Vedas are mentioned by name only there, viz. at 11.5.8. 3-6; 12. 3. 4. 9; 14. 4. 3. 12. [= BAU 1. 5. 5]; 14. 5. 4. 10 [= BAU 2. 4. 10]; 14. 6. 10. 6 [= BAU 4. 1. 2] and 14. 7. 3. 11 [= BAU 4. 5. 11].

The *Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa* and *Ṣaḍviṃśa Brāhmaṇa* of the *Sāmaveda* belong together, as their names indicate, and the latter is, not surprisingly, younger than the former (Eelsingh, 1908: xxx f.). *Ṛgveda*, *Yajurveda* and *Sāmaveda* are mentioned by name in the *Ṣaḍviṃśa Brāhmaṇa* (1. 5. 8; 4. 1. 2), not in the *Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa*.

* I thank Dr. Harry Falk for critical comments. After this paper had been written I found that similar conclusions regarding the meaning of *veda* have been reached by Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka in the introduction to his edition, translation and explanation of the *Śābarabhāṣya* (Mīmāṃsaka, 1987: 80-81).

1 'Ṛgveda' occurs in the *Khilas* of the *Ṛgveda*, at 4. 2. 6.

2 See Keith, 1920: 28-36.

The above three Vedas are also mentioned by name in a number of other relatively young Vedic texts. We find them, e. g., included in the following enumeration of literary compositions in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (2. 4. 10, 4. 1. 2, 4. 5. 11, [= ŚB 14. 5. 4. 10, 14. 6. 10. 6, 14. 7. 3. 11]) and Maitrāyaṇi Upaniṣad (6. 32): *ṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo 'tharvāṅgīrasa itihāsaḥ purāṇam vidyā upaniṣadaḥ ślokāḥ sūtrāṇy anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni*, GB 1. 1. 17–21 enumerates our three Vedas also with the Atharvaveda, *itihāsapurāṇa, vākovākya, gāthā, nārāśamisi, upaniṣad* and *anuśāsana*.

It seems that the youngest Vedic texts use the terms 'Ṛgveda', 'Yajurveda' and 'Sāmaveda' — which are used in the singular, as in the above quotations — more or less in the same way as we use them, i. e., to denote what is nowadays also known by the names 'Ṛgveda-Samhitā', 'Yajurveda-Samhitā' and 'Sāmaveda-Samhitā'.³ And even if this is not the case, it seems clear that these terms refer to bodies of literature that include the Samhitās. ChU. 3. 1–3 contains a simile which seems to support the interpretation that the Ṛgveda is a collection of Ṛces, and similarly for the other two Vedas. The Ṛces are here compared to bees, the Ṛgveda to a flower: similarly for the Yajuses and the Sāmans vis-a-vis the Yajurveda and Sāmaveda respectively. The Ṛgveda clearly appears at the place where all the Ṛces meet, and therefore seems to be their collection; so for the Yajurveda and Sāmaveda. (ChU 3.4 relates in a similar manner the atharvāṅgīrasas and itihāsapurāṇa, as if there were no Atharvaveda. The significance of this peculiarity is discussed elsewhere.⁴ And GB 1. 1. 29 mentions the four Vedas (i. e., our three plus the Atharvaveda) and gives their beginnings as we know them.⁵

It is clear that the word 'Veda', alone or in compounds, cannot be expected to give rise to difficulties in the younger Vedic texts. But how is the word used in the older texts, especially in those which do not know, or use, the terms 'Ṛgveda', 'Yajurveda' and 'Sāmaveda'?

These texts do indeed use the word 'Veda', be it not very frequently. A number of the occurrences of this word in the old texts support the view that 'Veda' is here more or less synonymous with *mantra*, and does not designate collections of mantras and the like.

³ Note that these expressions are totally unknown to the Vedic texts.

⁴ See Bronkhorst, forthcoming: section 4. 4.

⁵ They are the same as those quoted in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya (ed. Kielhorn I, p. 11, lines 4–5), but the order is different. It is particularly remarkable that Patañjali puts AV (P) *śaṁ no devīr abhiṣṭave* first, while GB puts it last.

AB 1.22 (4.5) has *ṛṇmayo yajurmayah sāmamayo vedamayo brahmayo 'mṛtamayah sanibhūya devatā apyeti ya evaṃ veda yaś caivam vidvān etena yajñakratumā yajate* 'Having come into existence as composed of the Ṛc, the Yajus, and the Sāman, and of the Veda, and of the *brahman*, and of the immortal, he attains to the deities who knows thus and who knowing thus sacrifices with this sacrificial rite' (tr. Keith, modified). There is no reason to translate *brahman* in the passage as 'holy power', as Keith does. It rather has the meaning 'sacred utterance', and thus is partially synonymous with the four terms preceding it. 'Veda' here can in this way be interpreted as one more name for the sacred utterances also known as Ṛc, Yajus, Sāman and Brahman. This same conclusion can be upheld if we understand *vedamayo* as an explanation of the three preceding terms and translate: " ... i. e., as composed of the Veda". The proximity of *brahmayo* would still favour the interpretation 'sacred utterance'.

Also AV 15.3.6-8 brings 'Veda' in connection with 'Brahman' while describing a settle (*āsandī*): "The verses (*ṛc*) [were its] forward cords (*tantu*), the sacrificial formulas (*yajus*) the cross ones. The Veda the cushion (*āstarāṇa*), the *brahman* the pillow (*upabarhaṇa*). The chant (*sāman*) the seat, the *udgītha* the support (?)." (*ṛcaḥ prāñcas tantavo yajūṃṣi tiryāñcaḥ / veda āstarāṇam brahmopabarhaṇam / sāmāsāda udgīthopāśravaḥ* | tr. Whitney). The two phrases *brahmaṇā kṣatram vyapibat* and *vedena rūpe vyapibat* in one and the same section (MS 3.11.6, VSM 19.75 & 78, VSK 21.5.2 & 5, KS 38.1. slightly different at TB 2.6.2.2-3) show again the close relationship between Veda and Brahman.

TS 7.5.11.2 (= KS 45.2), similarly, lists 'the Vedas' in an enumeration of sacred and less sacred utterances ... : *ṛgbhyaḥ svāhā yajurbhyaḥ svāhā 'ngirobhyaḥ svāhā vedebhyaḥ svāhā gāthābhyaḥ svāhā nārāśaṃsībhyḥ svāhā raibhibhyaḥ svāhā sarvasmai svāhā*. It is hard to believe that the Vedas here referred to are the Ṛgveda, Yajurveda and Sāmaveda, since these are never mentioned in the oldest literature; nor does the context seem to allow of the mention of collections at this place.

ŚB 5.5.5.5 appears to identify 'Veda' with Ṛc, Yajus and Sāman : *tasmād apy etarhy evam evaitair vedair yajñam tanvate yajurbhir evāgre 'thargbhir atha sāmabhir* 'Therefore they spread the sacrifice even to this day in the same way with those Vedas, first with the Yajus-formulas; then with the Ṛc-verses, and then with the Sāman-hymns' (tr. Eggeling). AV 7.57.1 may make the same identification : *ṛcam sāmā yad aprākṣam havir oja yajur balam / eṣa mā tasmān mā himsīd vedaḥ pṛṣṭaḥ śacīpate* | 'When I have asked verse (*ṛc* [and] chant (*sāman*) [respectively] for oblation [and]

force, [and] sacrificial formula (*yajus*) for strength, let not therefore this Veda, asked, injure me, O lord of might' (tr. Whitney).

TB 3. 10. 11. 3-4 tells the story of Bharadvāja who spent three lifetimes (Sāyaṇa explains: three hundred years) studying the Veda. Indra offers him a fourth lifetime and asks what Bharadvāja wants to do with it. When Bharadvāja makes known his intention to continue his Vedic studies, Indra shows him three mountains, takes a handful from each, and says:

These, indeed, are the Vedas. Infinite indeed are the Vedas. This (i. e., the three handfuls) is what you have studied in these three lifetimes. The rest you have not studied at all yet.⁶

It is hard to see how the Samhitās as we know them can be said to be 'infinite', even if we add the Brāhmaṇas to them. Countless numbers of Brahmins have managed to learn one, sometimes more than one, Veda by heart, so it looks odd that Bharadvāja had not yet mastered even a single 'mountain' after three lifetimes. The three 'mountains' must rather be considered to consist of non-collected, or only partially collected Ṛces, Yajuses and Sāmans. The meaning of "infinite indeed are the Vedas" seems to mean: the number of Ṛces, Yajuses and Sāmans, i. e. of sacred utterances, is infinite.

The interpretation 'sacred utterance' for 'Veda' in the earlier texts, rather than 'collection of sacred utterances', also fits the occurrence of this word in RV 8. 19. 5 (= KS 39. 15) *yaḥ samidhā ya āhuti yo vedena dadāṣa marto agnaya* 'the mortal who has served Agni with firewood, oblations and 'sacred utterances'.

If indeed 'Veda' did not have its later sense yet in the earlier Vedic texts, it is not impossible that the same is true of the earliest occurrences of 'R̥gveda', 'Yajurveda' and 'Sāmaveda'. In a large number of cases the context does not allow us to determine the exact significance of these terms. Yet at least one context is suggestive.

A number of passages deal with the creation of the three Vedas.⁷ Common to most versions is that the R̥gveda is born from Agni, the Yajur-

⁶ TB 3. 10. 11. 4: *vedā vā ete / anantā vai vedāḥ / etad vā etais tribhīr āyurbhīr anvavocathūḥ / atha ta itarad ananūktam eva /*

⁷ AB 5. 32 (25. 7), ŚB 11. 5. 8. 3 f., ŚaḍB 4. 1. 2, JB 1. 357, GB 1. 1. 6.

⁸ ŚaḍB 4. 1. 2 has the R̥gveda born from the earth, the Yajurveda from the intermediate space (*antarikṣa*), the Sāmaveda from heaven,

veda from Vāyu, the Sāmaveda from Āditya. These three Vedas, in their turn, give rise to *bhūh*, *bhuvaḥ* and *svaḥ* respectively.⁹

From this point onward some of the texts start using the terms 'Ṛc' and 'Ṛgveda', 'Yajus' and 'Yajurveda', 'Sāman' and 'Sāmaveda' rather indiscriminately. AB 5. 33 (25. 8) has *tad āhur mahāvadāḥ, yad ṛcaiva hautram kriyate yajuṣādhvaryavam sāmmodgītham vyārabdhā trayī vidyā bhavaty atha kena brahmatvam kriyata iti trayyā vidyayeti brūyāt* "Important sages say 'Since the Hotṛ's office is performed with the Ṛc, the Adhvaryu's with the Yajus, the Udgātṛ's with the Sāman, the threefold knowledge is taken up; how then is the Brahman's office performed?' 'With the threefold knowledge', he should say." (tr. Keith). JB 1. 358 asks the same question in the form *tad āhur yad ṛcā hotṛtvam kriyate yajuṣādhvaryavam sāmmodgītho 'tha kena brahmatvam kriyata iti | anayā trayyā vidyayeti ha brūyāt |*" But ŚB 11. 5. 8. 4 conveys the same information in the words *ṛgvedenaiva hotram akurvata yajurvedenādhvaryavam sāmavedenodgītham yad eva trayyai vidyāyai śukram tena brahmatvam athoccakrāma*. JB 1. 358, moreover, seems to use the expression *trayo vedaḥ* 'threefold Veda' interchangeably with *trayī vidyā* 'threefold knowledge'. In view of the fact that *trayī vidyā* primarily refers to the knowledge of Ṛc, Yajus and Sāman, rather than to the three Vedas named after them, these two passages suggest that they, too, used 'Veda' for 'sacred utterance', rather than for the collections known to us by that name.

How many Vedas ?

There is a tradition of five (rather than three or four) Vedas which is attested both in Vedic and non-Vedic texts. The Buddhist canon preserves it in a form which does not mention the Atharvaveda, and may therefore be oldest in origin. There is the oft-recurring phrase in Pali :

... *tiṇṇaṃ vedānaṃ pāragū sanighaṇḍukeṭubhānaṃ
sākṅharappabhedānaṃ itihāsapañcamānaṃ padaḥ veyyā-
karaṇaṃ ...*¹⁰

The same phrase occurs in Sanskrit with minor variations :

... *trayāṇāṃ vedānāṃ pāragaḥ sanighaṇṭakakṣabhānāṃ
sākṣaraprabhedānāṃ itihāsapañcamānāṃ padaḥ vyā-
karaṇaḥ ...*¹¹

⁹ ŚaḍB 4. 1. 2 is again the exception. The story takes here an altogether different turn.
¹⁰ DN I. 88, 114, 120, 138; MN II. 133, 141, [146,] 147, 165, 168, 210; AN I. 163, 166;
III. 223; Sn p. 105.

¹¹ Av II, 19.

... trayāṇāṃ vedānāṃ pūrāgo sākṣaraprabhedānām itihāsa-
pañcamānāṃ sanighaṇṭakaiṭabhānām¹²

... trayāṇāṃ vedānāṃ pūrāgo sanirghaṇṭhakaiṭabhānām
itihāsapañcamānām akṣarapadavyākaraṇe analpako ...¹³

... trayāṇāṃ vedānāṃ pūrāgo akṣaraprabhedānām itihāsa-
pañcamānāṃ sanighaṇṭakaiṭabhānām anupadakavyākaraṇa-
kuśalo ...¹⁴

An echo of this phrase is found in Avadāna 33 of the Divyāvadāna :

... vedān samanūsmarati sma sāṅgopāṅgān sarahasyān
sanighaṇṭakaiṭabhān sākṣaraprabhedān itihāsapañcamān...¹⁵

It seems clear that all these phrases agree in enumerating five Vedas. The reason to think so is that *itihāsapañcamānām* (or its equivalent in Pali) is a Bahuvrīhi compound qualifying *vedānām*, and should therefore be translated : 'with *itihāsa* as fifth [Veda.]'. We shall see that this interpretation fits other evidence which will be discussed presently.

The different phrases show some variation regarding the precise contents of Vedas number four and five. They all consider *itihāsa* ' legend - part (sometimes the whole) of the fifth Veda. Most of them agree that the fourth Veda encompasses *akṣara* / *akkhara* ' phonology (PED) ' and *pra-* / *pabheda* ' etymology (PED), exegesis (Rhys Davids, 1899 : 109) ', or perhaps rather *akṣaraprabheda* / *akkharappabheda* ' philologische Technik (Franke, 1913 : 87) ' ; one however does not include them in any Veda. The items *nighaṇṭa* / *nirghaṇṭa* / *nighaṇṭu* / *nighaṇḍu* ' lexicology / etymology (BHSD), synonymische Wortverzeichnisse (Franke, id.), explanation (PED), indices (Rhys Davids, id.), vocabularies (Horner, 1957 : 317) ' and *kaiṭa-* / *keṭubha* ' ritual science (BHSD), Hilfsbücher (Franke, id.), ritual (PED) ' are usually part of the fourth Veda, in two cases of the fifth.

Some passages of the Madhyamāgama preserved in Chinese mention five Vedas, but specify the contents of the fifth one in an altogether different way :

[He] has crossed the four classical texts, with the correct literature of profound intelligence on causes and conditions as fifth.¹⁶

¹² Mv I. 231. 17-18.

¹³ Mv II. 77. 9-10; Mv II. 89. 16-17 has *kuśalo* for *analpako*.

¹⁴ Mv III. 450. 6-7

¹⁵ Divy 619. 21-23.

¹⁶ T. 26 (vol. 1) p. 663c line 8, p. 680b lines 28-29, p. 685a lines 11-12.

Here the Atharvaveda seems, implicitly, to have made its way into the list which may indicate its relative lateness.

The five Vedas are again, this time explicitly, referred to in an otherwise obscure verse of the Saṃyutta Nikāya (I. 29) :

pañcaveda (v. l. *-vedā*) *satam samam* /
tapassī brāhmaṇācarami (v. l. *carami*) //

(Note that the prose portions of the Pali canon refer always to five Vedas ; only in verse the three Vedas are referred to a few times,¹⁷ and this may be an abbreviation dictated by the demands of metre.)

The five Vedas are enumerated, finally, in the Dīpavaṃsa (V. 62) : ...
iruvedam yajurvedam sāmavedam pi nighaṇḍum itihāsaṃ ca pañcamam.

In the Veda itself we find the five Vedas enumerated at ChU 7.1.2, 7.1.4, 7.2.1 and 7.7.1. ChU 7.1.4 reads : *ṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmaveda ātharvaṇaś caturtha itihāsapurāṇaḥ pañcamo vedānām vedaḥ pitryo rāṣir daivo nidhir vākovākyaṃ ekāyanam devavidyā brahmadevidyā bhūtavidyā kṣatравидyā nakṣatравидyā sarpadevajanaavidyā*. Most of the terms of this list are unknown (see Horsch, 1966 : 33). Here it is clear that *caturtha* ' the fourth ' refers to a Veda, viz., the Atharvaveda : the same must therefore be true of ' the fifth '. (We may follow Horsch, and thus indirectly W. Rau, in taking *itihāsapurāṇaḥ pañcamo vedānām vedaḥ* together, translating ' *itihāsa* and *purāṇa*, which constitute the fifth Veda among the Vedas '. This does not however affect our main argument.) [Śāṅkara's comments on ChU 7.1.2 are intriguing (Cf. Horsch, 1966 : 36). *Vedānām vedaṃ* is taken as a new item after the fifth Veda, meaning *vyākaraṇa*, because by means of *vyākaraṇa* the Ṛgveda etc. are known in their division into *pada* etc. (*vyākaraṇena hi padādivibhāgaśo ṛgvedādayo jñāyante*). The result is so close to the enumerations in Avadānaśataka and Mahāvastu presented above that it seems likely that Śāṅkara was influenced from Buddhist side].

The Buddhist enumerations of five Vedas have no place for the Atharvaveda. The Jaina canonical scriptures contain an enumeration which seems clearly derived from the one used by the Buddhists, with the Atharvaveda. Unlike the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, it does not simply drop the ' original ' fourth Veda, but moves it to the sixth place. *Itihāsa* keeps its traditional fifth place. The result is an enumeration of six Vedas :¹⁸

¹⁷ Thag 1171 ; SN IV. 118 ; J VI. 214.

¹⁸ Viy 2. 1. 12 ; 9. 33. 2 ; Aupapātika Sūtra (ed. Leumann) section 77 ; and elsewhere, see Charpentier, 1914 : 28.

*riuvveda - jajuvveda-sā maveda-athavvaṇaveda - itihāsapañca-
māṇam nighaṁṣachaṭṭhāṇam caūṇham vedāṇam saṁgovam-
gāṇam sarahassāṇam sārāe vārāe pārāe ...*

A very clear enumeration of five Vedas is provided by the Arthaśāstra (i. 3. 1-2): *sāmargyajurvedās trayas trayī | atharvavedetihāsavedau ca vedāḥ |*.

It is not without interest, yet hardly surprising, to see how the Mahābhārata, once it was written down sometime before the 5th century A. D.,¹⁹ appropriated to itself the title of 'fifth Veda'.²⁰ This however focuses attention on the fact that before that time the 'fifth Veda' was no collected whole. The same is true of the 'fourth Veda' in most of the Buddhist enumerations. Could it be that the first three Vedas were no collected wholes either at the time when tradition of five Vedas came into existence? (We may have to make an exception for the Ṛgveda, whose Padapāṭha is old (Bronkhorst, 1982) and may be referred to by the Pali *padaka* in the phrase studied above: this word is derived by Pāṇini's rule 4.2.61 in the sense 'who studies or knows the Pada- (-pāṭha)'). The fact that the tradition of five Vedas soon passed out of existence might then be attributed to the circumstance that no more than three, or four, Vedas came to constitute tangible collections. Already the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and the Maitrāyaṇi Upaniṣad (cited above) enumerate partly the same items as ChU 7 without mentioning the five Vedas. The Milindapañha in its later portions, similarly, gives a clearly related enumeration without mentioning them (178. 15-17): *Irubbedam Yajubbedam Sāmavedam Athabbaṇavedam lakkaṇam itihāsam purāṇam nighaṇḍu keṭubham akkharappabhedam padam veyyākaraṇam ...*

* * *

The above evidence suggests that the meaning of the word 'Veda' underwent a development. Before the 'Samhitās' had come into existence, it did not, indeed could not, designate these. 'Veda' appears to have been used in that period, and perhaps for some time afterwards, as an approximate synonym of *mantra* and *brahman* 'sacred utterance'. It was apparently used much like *vidyā* in *trayī vidyā*, which kept this sense when 'Veda' came to designate the Vedic collections including or consisting of the 'Samhitās'. Before the word 'Veda' obtained its final meaning, however, it may have been used in a far looser sense to refer to the 'five Vedas', at least some of which never were collections in the proper sense of the term.

¹⁹ The evidence discussed by Bühler and Kirste (1892) shows that the Mahābhārata existed in something like its present form in the 5th cent. A. D.

²⁰ See Fitzgerald, 1985. Later authors like Madhva accept the Mahābhārata as fifth Veda but apply the term to other works as well, like the Pañcarātra; see Glasenapp, 1923: 5, 7. See further Rocher, 1986: 16 f. (Purāṇas), Keith, 1924: 12-13, Kuiper, 1979: 118-119 n. 42, 121 f. (Nāṭyaśāstra).

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Abbreviations

(All Pali texts PTS edition)

AB	Aitareya Brāhmaṇa
AN	Āṅguttara Nikāya
Av	Avadānaśataka
AV	Atharvaveda (Śaunakiya)
AV (P)	Atharvaveda (Paippalāda)
BAU	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
BHSD	Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary by F. Edgerton
ChU	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
CPD	Critical Pali Dictionary
Divy	Divyāvadāna
DN	Dīgha Nikāya
GB	Gopatha Brāhmaṇa
J	Jātaka
JB	Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa
KS	Kāṭhaka Samhitā
MN	Majjhima Nikāya

BRONKHORST : *Veda*

MS	Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā
Mv	Mahāvastu
PED	Pali-English Dictionary (PTS)
PTS	Pali Text Society
RV	Ṛgveda
ṢaḍB	Ṣaḍviṁśa Brāhmaṇa
ŚB	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa
Sn	Suttanipāta
SN	Saṁyutta Nikāya
T.	Taishō edition of the Tripiṭaka in Chinese
TB	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa
Thag	Theragāthā
TS	Taittirīya Saṁhitā
Viy	Viyāhapannatti (Jaina-Āgama-Series 4)
VSK	Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā (Kāṇva)
VSM	Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā (Mādhyandina)

THE ÁSVINS: AN INCARNATION OF THE UNIVERSAL TWINSHIP MOTIF

By

UMA CHAKRAVARTY

Worship of twin gods is a universal phenomenon in mythology. In the Semitic, pre-historic, Indo-European, African and American mythologies twin gods have been worshipped. J. Rendel Harris says: "But this belief is not limited to Aryan civilization; it occurs in Semitic also, and can be traced in the earlier chapters of Genesis, and down to the building of Solomon's temple, as well as in Phenicia and Mesopotamia."¹ Gilgamesh and Enkidu (Eaboni), the two brothers-in-arms of the Assyrian mythology, represent this twinship motif. The Assyrian mythology belongs to an epoch much earlier to that of the Indo-European mythology. We read in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*: "In Asia Minor and Palestine the cult of the Twins appears from a very ancient date. Esau and Jacob and other twins found in the Hebrew Scriptures are personages whose pristine form and attributes it is no longer possible to recover from the attrition of time and the erasive energies successfully wielded by the generations of pious editors".² Hermann Güntert displays prints of three stone slabs found in Germany and Sweden. One of them, belonging to the pre-historic age from Tarun in Bohuslan, demonstrates in stone-carving the twin gods (*Dioskuren-darstellung*), while the other stone plate in the shape of a razor, belonging to the early bronze-age from Kivik near Cimbrushnum on the east coast of Schonen, represents the solar twins sitting on a boat.³ He also observes: "Was vedische Dichter schildern, führen aus wiederum prähistorische Kunstwerke anschaulich vor."⁴ According to Donald Ward, "Divine Twins are by no means limited to the Indo-European tradition; they are found through the world."⁵ He also gives the names of a few dual deities from different traditions. Here we mention a few of them from traditions other than the

¹ J. Rendel Harris, *The Cult of the Divine Twins*, Cambridge, 1906, p. 154.

² *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. by James Hastings. Edinburg, T & T Clark, 1960 edn., Vol. XII, p. 498.

³ Güntert Hermann, *Der arische Weltkönig und Heiland*, Haale (Saale), Verlag Von Max, Niemeyer, 1923, p. 272.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

⁵ Donald Ward, *The Divine Twins*, University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968, p. 2.

Indo-European : Alcis, Halfdan the black and Halfdan the white, Ferrutius and Ferrutio, Sintran and Baltram, Huz and Buz.⁶ Harris also speaks about the "Children of Tilo" belonging to the African tradition.⁷ Ugo Bianchi speaks about the dual divinities from the ideologies of non-literate culture along with twin gods from different traditions. Among them are Tanus and Yolokantamulu, the twin gods among the non-literate Karibbean population of American Indians.⁸ Much later the twin Christian saints mentioned in the calendars of saints took the place of divine twins. Harris suggests the names of a few pairs of such saints from the French and Italian calendars.

A few names from the French calendar :⁹

Acius & Acelous
Cantius & Cantianus & Cantianella¹⁰
Donatianus & Crispinian
Ferreolus & Ferretius
Protasius & Gervasius
Vitalis & Agricola

A few names from the calendar of Italian saints :

Picumnus & Pilumnus
Mutunus & Tutunus
Sisinnius & Martyrius
Sisinnius & Sisinnidorus¹¹

A similar pair of Spanish twin saints are : St. Damian and St. Cosmos.

It is true that the divine twinship motif is a universal phenomenon of mythology ; yet the characteristics of the Indo-European tradition are more specifically defined. It is observed by Donald Ward : "... there was an exclusive Indo-European tradition of Divine Twins."¹² The Greek Dioscuri (Castor and Pollux) represents very closely this archetype. "Children who are deliverers of men on earth and swift-going ships when stormy gales rage over the ruthless sea."¹³ This description of Hesiod readily brings to the mind the succouring Vedic twins, the Aśvins, and their rescuing Bhujyu from the midocean. Of similar type is also the story of Roman Castor and Pollux.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

⁸ See *The Encyclopaedia of Religion*, Vol. 15, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987, pp. 99-107.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 63-66.

¹⁰ This triad brings to the mind the Greek triad, Castor, Pollux and Helen, the Indian Aśvins and Sūryā, and the Baltic Dieva Deli, Dieva Sunelei and their female associates, Saules Meita and Saules Dukterys.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 80-95.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

¹³ Hesiod, *Homeric Hymns*, To the Dioscuri, XVII.

The pattern, two gods and a maiden,¹⁴ is observed probably only in the Indo-European tradition. The association of Dioscuri with Helen, their sister who was abducted by Theseus and later rescued by her brothers, bears close resemblance with the Baltic myth of Dieva Deli and Dieva Sunelei and their sisters and beloved Saules Meita and Saules Dukterys who were abducted by Menes, the moon, but later rescued. Similar is the story of the Aśvins and the sun-maiden Sūryā. The Iranian twins Haurvatat and Ameretat¹⁵ along with the goddess Aramaiti also forms a similar triad.

The Vedic Aśvins inherit most of the characteristics of the twinship motif. The Ṛgvedic seers eulogise them as succourers, doctors and the deities of the early morning in the main. One comes across more than hundred names of their proteges.¹⁶

Whether the Aśvins rode any horses cannot be, for sure, known from the Vedic text. But, right from their very names we can see that they are variously connected with horses. Aurnavābha says, 'They are called Aśvins on account of their having horses.'¹⁷ Śaraṇyu and Vivasvat assuming the forms of horses gave birth to the Aśvins.¹⁸ The Aśvins learnt the honey-lore (*madhuvidyā*), the sole possessors of this knowledge from Dadhyañc after fixing a horse's head on him.¹⁹ The ṚV does not tell us whether they rode horses, though their epithets are found to be *svaśvau* (VII. 68. 1; 69. 3), 'possessors of skilled horses' and *aśvāmaghā* (VII. 71.1) 'whose treasure is horse'. Many a time the Aśvins are invoked to come to the sacrificial ground on their chariot drawn by horses.²⁰ In some verses, however, they are invoked

¹⁴ I have discussed this topic in my article, "The heavenly twins and a maiden," published in the *Proceedings of the Fifth World Sanskrit Conference*, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 78-82.

¹⁵ Cf. C. Bartholomae, *Altiranischer Wörterbuch*, Strassburg, 1905, p. 1791. *Haurvatat, haurvat : Ganzheit, Vollkommenheit... in Dualverbindung mit ameretat, y 51.7; 45.10; 44.18; 47.1 ; "Gib mir ... Unsterblichkeit und Wohlfahrt durch den heiligen Geist, ... Kraft und Bestand"*.

¹⁶ I have discussed in details on the succouring nature of the divine doctors Aśvins in my article, "The divine doctors Aśvins and the Soma-drink," read in the Vishva-bharati session of the AIOC and awaiting publication in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, Bengal. Therefore, I avoid discussion on this point here.

¹⁷ *The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta* ed. & tr. by Lakshman Sarup. Motilal Banarsidass 1967 Second print, p. 184. *aśvairāśvināvityaurṇavābhaḥ* / XII.1. p. 106.

¹⁸ See *Bṛhaddevatā* III. 18-23.

¹⁹ See *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* III. 126.

²⁰ See ṚV I. 118.4, 5; 120. 10; VII. 68. 1, 69. 1, 72. 1,

to come on their strong horses as fleet as the wind and mind,²¹ and swift like falcon (VIII. 5.7). No mention of chariot has been made in these verses. Of course three times donkey has been described as drawing the Aśvins' chariot²² but there is no denying the fact that the Aśvins' horses are more prominent and are more frequently mentioned than donkeys. The association of horses with the dual divinity is an Indo-European phenomenon. Donald Ward says : "In the *RV* the very name of the divine pair expressed their relationship : Aśvinā 'owners of horses.'. Similarly the Gk Dioskouri were called leukópōloi 'having white horses' (Pindar, Pyth 1.66)"²³ Incidentally, the Aśvins gave Pedu their most favourite protégé, a white horse.²⁴ The Roman Castor and Pollux also had white horses.²⁵ The horses of the Baltic twins were also seen outside the Sun Maiden's door or on the hill-side feeding on oats. The twin brothers and legendary leaders of the first Anglo-Saxon settlers in Britain in A. D. 450 were Hengest (Hengist) and Horsa.²⁶ the meaning of both these words being horse.

The Aśvins' association with horses speaks of their solar character. Yāska the theoretician of the 6th century B. C. says : "*aśvinau yad vyaśmuvāte sarvam*" (Nir. XII. 1), "The Aśvins are so called because they two pervade everything."²⁷ That some scholars derive the word *aśva* from *aś* 'to spread' has relevance in this context.²⁸ The epithets *sūryāvasū* (*RV* VII. 68. 3) 'living with Sūryā', according to Sāyaṇa, and *divo napātā* (*RV* I. 184. 1; IV. 44. 2) 'children of heaven' also indicate the solar identity of the Aśvins.

The Aśvins' association with the boat also hints at their solar identity. They are invoked to come to the prayer in a boat (I. 46. 7). They protected

²¹ *RV* I. 181. 2

ū vām aśvūsaḥ śucayaḥ payasṭhā
vātaramhaso divyāso atyūḥ |
manojuvo vṛṣaṇo vītaṇṣṭhā
cha svarajo aśvinū vahantu ||

²² See *RV* I. 34. 9, 116. 2; VIII. 85. 7.

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

²⁴ See *RV* I. 116. 6, 117. 9, 119. 10; X. 39. 10.

²⁵ Cf. Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, tr. Mary M. James, Penguin Book, 1975, p. 189. "But now the twin brothers Castor and Pollux not yet raised to be stars in the heavens rode up together, a striking pair on their horses."

²⁶ See *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Ready Reference and Index, Vol. IV, 15th edn. 1973, p. 1019.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 184.

²⁸ N. G. Chapekar, "Nāsatiya", *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. 45, 1964, pp. 29-37. "More plausible is Aśva, is derived from aś to spread. The rays of the luminous bodies spread instantly over the whole universe." Hermann Guntert, however, thinks that the Aśvins were originally horses of Sūrya's chariot and later promoted to solar deities. See *Op. cit.*, p. 269.

Bhujyu from mid-ocean in a hundred-oared boat (RV I. 116.5). In one of the stoneplates displayed by H. Güntert, as already referred to, the twin gods are depicted as sitting on a boat and are described by the author as “*Dioskuren im Sonnenboot*.”²⁹ And, he comments on the Aśvins, “*Ihre Lichtnatur ist besonders deutlich*.”³⁰ Félix Nève comments on the solar identity of the Aśvins: “The Aśvins would have been glorified rightly in the primitive hierarchy of the gods of light.”³⁰ Regarding the solar identity of the twin deities of South America and southwestern regions of North America, Ugo Bianchi says, “Another important feature of American Indian mythologies of twins is that in South America and in Southwestern regions of North America twins are conceived as solar deities.”³¹ The solar identity of twin gods is not a characteristic of the Indo-European tradition only; it occurs in other traditions also.

Apparently two different aspects of the Aśvins are revealed in the Vedic verses. On the one hand they are succourers, an aspect in which we may categorize them as doctors, fertility gods etc., and on the other hand they are the deities of early morning, the associates of Uṣas, the dawn. The Ṛgvedic singer states that Uṣas follows the all-pervading Aśvins who desire the oblations prepared at night.³² RV VII. 71. 1 narrates that the dark night is passing away from her sister ‘Dawn’, making path for the bright sun, and at this hour the singers pray to the twin gods: may they scare away the enemies day and night.³³ RV III. 58. 1 tells us that the time of the Aśvins is prior to the time of Uṣas:

uṣasaḥ stomo aśvināvajigaḥ |

Probably such descriptions inspired Yāska to fix the time of the Aśvins as follows: “Their time is after midnight which, in consequence, is an impediment to the appearance of light. The part in the dark is atmosphere, and the part in the light is sun.”³⁴ The Aśvins are addressed as *prātaryāvānā* (II.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 272.

^{30a} *Op. cit.*, p. 253.

³⁰ Félix Nève, *An Essay on the Myth of the Ṛbhus*, tr./G. V. Davane, Ajanta Publication Limited, Delhi, 1985, p. 250.

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 102.

³² RV. I. 46. 14. *Yuvoruṣā anu śriyaṃ pariṣmanorupācarat |*
ṛtā vanatho aktubhiḥ ||

³³ VII. 71. 1. *apa svasuruṣaso nagjihite*
ṛnakti kṛṣṇīraruṣāya pañthūm |
aśvāmaghā gomaghā vām hūvema
divā naktam śarumasmadyuyotam ||

also cf. RV VIII, 9. 17, 18.

³⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 184. Nir. XII. 1: *tayoḥ kālā ṛdhvamardharātṛtṛt prakāśibhāvasya*
anuvīṣṭambham | anutamō bhūgo hi madhyamaḥ | jyotirbhūga ādityaḥ |

39. 2) 'going early in the morning', *śubhrayāvānā* (III. 58. 1) 'having a white path', *rudravartanī* (I. 3.3; VIII. 22. 1; X. 39.11), *hiraṇyavartanī* (I. 92.18; V. 75.2-3; VIII. 8.1) 'golden-pathed'. Such epithets clearly show their time. Next to *nāsatyā* the most frequently used epithet of the Aśvins is *dasrā*. Sāyaṇa has interpreted this word sometimes as *śatrūṇāmupakṣapayitārau*, and at others as *darśanīyau*. Both the interpretations reveal the Aśvins as the deities of early morning. The epithet *nṛtu* (VI. 63.5, Sāyaṇa : *nartantau*) also gives an image of the first spread of morning glow. As the Aśvins are the deities of early morning so most of the hymns dedicated to them are applied in the Prātaranuvāka.

The succouring nature of the Aśvins became the cause for their becoming solar deities and consequently the deities of early morning. The sun, the healer of diseases, takes one across sin and blame.⁵⁵ The horses of the sun traverse heaven and earth in one day.⁵⁶ So it is quite natural for the Aśvins, being solar deities, to take their devotees beyond the multifarious problems of life. That the Aśvins were worshipped as fertility gods⁵⁷ also speaks of their solar character. V. C. Srivastava observes, "... the physical basis of Aśvins was simply solar in his dual aspects of fertility and light."⁵⁸

Dual deities have been worshipped by peoples irrespective of their belonging to historic or pre-historic, literate or non-literate cultures. Some scholars believe that they were originally historical persons and later deified. Harris speaks on this point : "The anthropologists have been slowly finding out for us that Heavenly Twins can be taken out of the zodiac altogether, that they belong to a time when Chaldean astronomy was not yet dreamt of, and to a period of human development which can only be called historical at all by a very liberal use of the term, and their varied activities and philanthropies are a mirror in which we can read the evolution of human life of many aeons of progress."⁵⁹ Donald Ward says, "One notices that the divine twins are traditionally very human... Such evidence has led Leo Sternberg to the assumption that twin cults, wherever they occur, is the result of deifica-

⁵⁵ RV. I. 115. 6 *adyā devā uditā sūryasya*
niraṃhasaḥ pīṣṭū niravadyāt |
tanno mitro varuṇo māmahanātām
aditih sindhuḥ pṛthivī uta dyauh ||

⁵⁶ Cf. RV I. 115. 3.

⁵⁷ Cf. RV I. 112. 9, 12, 16; 116. 10, 13, 22; 117. 13, 20, 24; 118. 6, 8; 119. 6; VI. 62, 7; VIII. 68. 8; X. 39. 4; 40. 8; 184. 3.

⁵⁸ V. C. Srivastava, "The Aśvins in the Rigveda," *Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society*, XXX (I-IV), 1964-5, p. 62.

⁵⁹ *Op. cit.*, Introduction, p. 2.

tion of a pair of human beings."⁴⁰ K. P. Jog is also disinclined to accept that the Aśvins are the representatives of natural phenomena, though he has not given any distinct opinion on their identity. He opines, "The connection of the Aśvins with any distinct natural phenomena that can serve as the basis of the Aśvin-concept is the least obvious."⁴¹ The Aśvins as depicted in most of the Ṛgvedic hymns are very much human. Of all the gods they are the closest to their worshippers. Because of failing to maintain the olympian attitude they had been temporarily deprived of the Soma libation by the Vedic Pantheon. But, such a friendly attitude is just true to the form of the dual divinity.

Belief in the divine twins is a universal phenomenon of mythology. Their counterparts in different mythologies have been worshipped by peoples all over the world since very early days of human history. The solar character of them is almost universal. The characteristics of this archetype belonging to the Indo-European tradition is more specifically defined. To mention a few : their association with horse and boat, their magical healing power and solar identity, and their also being warriors, saviours at sea and associated with a solar maiden.

It has been observed in life that when two friendly, benevolent and determined persons exert themselves for the good of their fellow men they render immense service to the society. The fellow creatures on their part in gratitude eulogise them, and, gradually in course of time, quite imperceptibly they are deified. Gratitude for philanthropy lies at the root of this euphemization.⁴² This apotheosis took place at different times among different peoples according to the social needs. The Aśvins are just one example of this archetype. Later in Hindu myth they returned as Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa, Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, Nara and Nārāyaṇa, and much later we get a glimpse of this twin motif in the Bengali folklore in the story of Buddha and Bhutum.⁴³ Sukumari Bhattacharji speaks on this point, "Gods reappear again and again in changed garbs to suit the altered needs of the time."⁴⁴ In conclusion we would like to say that the Aśvins are one appearance of the many incarnations of the universal twinship motif.

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁴¹ K. P. Jog, "Aśvins in the Ṛgveda and their traces in the later Indian literature," *Journal of the Bombay University*, September 1964, p. 48.

⁴² In this connection we would like to remember the *Karmadevas* who have been defined in the *Ś. B.* (14. 7. 1. 35) as, *ye karmaṇā devatvam abhisampadyante*. 'who have earned divinity through action.' Also see *T. Ā.* 8. 8. 3 and *T. Up.* 2. 8. 3.

⁴³ Dakshinaranjan Mitra Majumdar, *Thakurmar jhuli*, 2nd edn. pp. 29-58.

⁴⁴ Sukumari Bhattacharji, *The Indian Theogony*, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1975 (1st pt. Cambridge, 1970), p. 248.

A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CRITIQUE OF THE *ARTHAŚĀSTRA* OF KAUṬILYA

BY

SURESH CHANDRA MISHRA

Situating precisely the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya (hereafter *KA*) on the vast convass of Indian history has been a conundrum for the historians of this century. By and large, the views of different scholars on the age, authenticity and authorship problems of the *KA* have been influenced by patriotic and national sentiments for quite some time. This paper seeks to pinpoint the various trends in the historiography of the *KA* problems ever since its discovery for the first time till India won freedom. In the process an examination of the writings of about thirty scholars from different camps — Indian, British and German — has been attempted. It would appear from this study that these camps were further subdivided into two groups. While the one group supported and upheld the traditional view on the *KA* problems, another was diametrically opposed to it. Nevertheless it is remarkable to note that in the initial stages of its discovery, the *KA* was looked upon as the product of the Mauryan age by all the three groups of historians. But this phase lasted till 1919 when the authenticity of the *KA* began to be questioned first by an Indian and then by the German School of historians. It is gratifying to note that, inspite of their great abhorrence and scant regard for the Indians, none of the English historians questioned its age, authenticity and authorship. Notwithstanding this, the text has been stated variously either to be pre-Pāṇinian or post-Daṇḍin, or falling anywhere between these two extreme limits. Thus it has been variously placed between 700 B.C. and A.D. 700.

I

The Arthaśāstra-Nationalist Nexus

The discovery of the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya in 1905 and its publication in the *Indian Antiquary* by R. Shama Sastry in 1909, was hailed in all quarters, as it came as a great boon to the nationalist historians,¹ who strongly resented the use of many old cherished English Clichés about Indian history. The nationalists henceforward prided on their 'golden past', which experi-

¹ R. S. Sharma and D. N. Jha, "The Economic History of India up to A. D. 1200: Trends and Prospects", *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Leiden, 1974. XVII, p. 54.

mented in advanced political and economic activities. The English historians, however, were not convinced.² They saw in Indian history an uninterrupted chain of absolutist rule from the ancient down to the Moslem and British periods, in which any monarch was able to rule free from the trammels of law, and in such a way could exercise severe justice.³ To them Kauṭilya was nothing but an early theoretician of absolutist monarchical power.⁴ They looked upon the *KA* as 'The Bible of imperialism'.⁵ The great interest of Indian historians in ancient Indian politics since the discovery of the *KA* is partly explicable as a reaction against the teachings of British "imperialist" historiography, which provided a historical justification for the maintenance of the British Raj.⁶

That the 'political expedience' and the temper of the hour led the nationalist historians to look for their respective aspirations in the *KA*, is very well brought out by R. S. Sharma and J. H. Voigt in modern times and by many others anterior to these two.⁷ Thus obsessed with the ideas of G. P. Gooch, Ranke and Treitsche, K. V. Rangaswami rightly foresaw the national sentiments controlling the work of research. "Ours is not the only country in which national aspirations and historical work have been so closely associated with historical themes, and studied as the means to specific ends. The history of historical writing during the last hundred years in Europe and in America should make us anticipate that as in the west so in India the further growth of a scientific spirit and the widening of the area of historical studies and interests will bring in their chain, a state of affairs in which the nationalist feeling will quicken and historical method control the work of research."⁸ Conscious of

² Johannes H. Voigt, "Nationalist Interpretations of *Arthaśāstra*" in Indian Historical writings St. Anthony's papers 18, S. N. Mukherji, (ed.) *South Asian Affairs*, ii, Oxford, 1966, p. 46.

³ V. A. Smith, *Indian Constitutional Reform*, pp. 19ff.

⁴ Voigt, op. cit., p. 55.

⁵ B. K. Sarkar, "Democratic Ideals and Republican Institutions in India", *American Political Science Review*, Baltimore, 1918, p. 585.

⁶ Voigt, op. cit., p. 63.

⁷ R. S. Sharma, *Aspects of Political Ideas and Institutions in ancient India*, (second edition) Delhi, 1968. First chapter; Voigt, op. cit., K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, *Considerations on some Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity*, Madras, 1935, pp. 6-7. The works like *Corporate Life in Ancient India*, *A History of Hindu Political Theories*, *The Mauryan polity*, and many others contest the persistent notions of the imperialists. The debate on concepts such as 'Oriental despotism', 'Stagnation of Indian Society' etc. continues to this date. The myth of such concepts as above is ably falsified by R. S. Sharma, Romila Thapar and Irfan Habib in their researches.

⁸ K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, *Considerations on some Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity*, pp. 6-7.

the possible historical pitfalls, he cautioned the audience : "The fortunes of German historical schools should provide both an inspiration and a warning to our historical student."⁹ We find that a zealous research activity on the *KA* by the Indianists continued unabated upto 1930 on nationalist lines.¹⁰ Though it continued even thereafter, this activity was not so substantial. It seems that the studies relating to the age, authenticity and authorship of the *KA* have been influenced by political and intellectual climate. This will be evident if we examine these aspects authorwise in terms of time, place and situations.

The historiography of the *KA* dates back to the handing over of the two manuscripts to the Mysore Government oriental library by a Pandit of the Tanjore district in the Tamil Nadu state and the immediate publication in the *Indian Antiquary* in 1905 of a paper by R. Shama Sastry. In his paper entitled "Cāṇakya's Land and Revenue Policy" he found in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa Sthavira Pallīcarita* of Hemacandra and *Nandīśūtra*, fairly reliable data for assuming that Chāṇakya lived as minister of Chandragupta in the fourth century B. C.¹¹ To prove the genuineness of the *KA* as the production of Chāṇakya he referred to the *Daśakumāracarita* of Daṇḍin, the *Nītisāra* of Kāmandaka and some works such as *Nandīśūtra*, *Pañcatantra* and the *Nītiyākyāmrta* of Somadeva.¹² The text of the *KA* was edited and published for the first time by Shama Sastry in 1909. In 1915, R. Shama Sastry in the preface to the translated text discussed the genuineness and antiquity of the text. He said that Kauṭilya lived and wrote his famous work, the *KA*, between 321 and 300 B. C. In support of his claim, he referred to the state of social milieu as portrayed in the *KA*, some religious observances and style and vocabulary of the *KA*. By the time the third edition of his translation came out, there had been a lot of debate on the authenticity of the text. Therefore, Shama Sastry reasserted his previous stand that the *KA* is a work of the Mauryan period and particularly as Tradition says, of the time of Chandragupta Maurya.

The age and authenticity of the *KA* were hardly questioned even by the imperialist historians in the initial stages of its discovery. Thus in 1908 V. A. Smith's view about these problems seems to support Shama Sastry's proposition. According to Smith the substance of the precepts and regulations, has an extremely archaic aspect, and the polity described is mainly that of the

⁹ *ibid.* foot-note 5, p. 7.

¹⁰ R. S. Sharma and D. N. Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹¹ R. Shama Sastry, "Cāṇakya's Land and Revenue Policy", *Indian Antiquary*, Bombay, 1905, XXXI, p. 5.

¹² *ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

Mauryan age.¹³ In 1914 Smith revised his opinion and took it to be a pre-Mauryan treatise, an authoritative account of political and social conditions in the Gangetic plains in the age of Alexander the Great around 325 B.C.¹⁴ However, he thought that the existing text probably contained minor interpolations of a later date, but the bulk of the book certainly dated from the Mauryan period.¹⁵ In Smith's *Oxford History of India* published in 1919, the pre-Maurya character or atmosphere of the *Arthaśāstra* was maintained.¹⁶

German School

The *KA* was a centre of attraction for many German scholars. Among these scholars the prominent ones were A. Hillebrandt, Julius Jolly, Hermann Jacobi and Aufrecht who studied the *KA* from the above angles. On the basis of comparison of the Munich manuscript of the *KA*, with the collection of quotations and fragments Hillebrandt held that it cannot be assumed that Kauṭilya himself is the sole author of the text in question. It only originated in his school which quotes often the opinions of other teachers and contradicts them (after the manner of *Sūtra* works) expresses the view of Kauṭilya himself, at times expressing the latter in the form of direct maxims.¹⁷ Though he did not attempt the dating of the *KA*, his belief in the plurality of the *KA* authorship and its being a product of Kauṭilya's school remained unshaken. Thus in 1923 Hillebrandt who translated the *Arthaśāstra* by "*Lehre vom Nutzen*" (Principles of Profit)¹⁸ reiterated his stand.

In a rejoinder to Hillebrandt's objection¹⁹ to the unitary authorship of the *KA*, Hermann Jacobi maintained that it was the work of Kauṭilya, the "famous minister of Chandragupta". In 1911 Jacobi stated, "Through the discovery and publication of the Kauṭīliya, the book of polity by Kauṭilya, the chronologically certified basis for cultural and literary historical investigation is further pushed back to the juncture of the fourth and the third century B. C. The date of the composition of this work becomes wellnigh certain through the personality of its author, Kauṭilya, also known as Viṣṇugupta and Cāṇakya".²⁰ Again in 1912 Jacobi reiterated his position.²¹

¹³ V. A. Smith, *The Early History of India* (second edition), Oxford, 1908, p. 134.

¹⁴ *ibid.* (third edition), New Delhi, 1970, p. 137.

¹⁵ *ibid.* (appendix), p. 153.

¹⁶ V. A. Smith, *Oxford History of India* (first edition) Oxford, 1923, pp. 76-93.

¹⁷ A. Hillebrandt, *Das Kauṭīliya śūtra und Verwandtes*, Breslau, 1908, p. 10.

¹⁸ A. Hillebrandt, *Altindische Politik*, Jena, 1923, p. 3. ¹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁰ H. Jacobi, "Kultur, sprach und Literaturhistorisches aus dem Kauṭīliya", *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Berlin, 1911, p. 954.

²¹ H. Jacobi, "Über die Echtheit des Kauṭīliya", *Sitzung Berichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Berlin, 1912, p. 849. English translation by V. S. Sukthankar available in *Indian Antiquary*, XLVII.

He held that the text had not undergone any considerable addition, but thought in terms of possible curtailment.²²

Julius Jolly, a specialist in juridical studies maintained a sustained interest in the study of the *KA*. His writings on the subject may be divided into two phases. Till 1912 he had no doubts about the authenticity and antiquity of the text. In 1914–1915 his collection of parallel passages from the *KA* and *Dharmaśāstra* was being published.²³ In one of these papers he referred to the following passages of chapter VIII of the *Daśakumāracarita* which purport to say that this science (of politics) was recently (*idānīm*) abridged by ācārya Viṣṇugupta into 6000 verses for the use of the Mauryas (*iyam idānīm ācārya viṣṇuguptena Mauryārthe śaḍbhiḥ śloka-sahasraiḥ saṅkṣiptā*) It is on the ground of the word *idānīm* that Jolly considered the *KA* to be not much older than the *Daśakumāracarita* (seventh century A. D.) He was soon challenged in the same Journal by Jacobi in his article : “Ist das *Daśakumāracarita* gleichzeitig mit dem Kauṭīliya *Arthaśāstra* ?”²⁴ (‘Is the *Daśakumāracarita* of the same age as the *Arthaśāstra* ?’) The question of dating dealing with technological, chemical and medicinal chapters of the *KA* was published by Jolly in 1916 in *Nachrichten von der Gessellschaft der Wissenschaften zur Göttingen*.

The second phase in Jolly’s writings on the *KA* problem began in 1921 with the publication of an article, entitled “*Eine neue Indische Rechtsquelle*”, in a journal of comparative jurisprudence.²⁵ In this article he held that the *KA* might be traced to the fifth or fourth century after Christ, and believed that the work had perhaps as little to do with the half-historical Chāṇakya as the sayings of Solomon with the famous king Solomon.²⁶ His stand on the problem became clearer with his publication of the text of *KA* in 1923 from Lahore. In the introduction to volume-I of his book he took the *KA* to be an ‘ancient imperial Gazetteer of India.’²⁷ He pulled down the date of

²² H. Jacobi, “On the Authenticity of the Kauṭīliya”, *Indian Antiquary*, XLVII, p. 195.

²³ J. Jolly, “Kollektaneen zum Kauṭīliya *Arthaśāstra*”, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Leipzig, 1914, LXVIII, pp. 345-59 and LXIX, pp. 369-78.

²⁴ H. Jacobi, “Ist das *Daśakumāracarita* gleichzeitig mit dem Kauṭīliya *Arthaśāstra* ?” *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Leipzig, 1914, LXVIII, pp. 603-5.

²⁵ J. Jolly, “*Eine neue Indische Rechtsquelle*”, *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft*, 1921. XXXVII p.

²⁶ Quoted by B. K. Sarkar, *The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology*, Allahabad, 1921, 1, p. 276.

²⁷ J. Jolly and R. Schmidt, *Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya*, Lahore, 1923, 1, pp. 1f.

Kāmandakīya Nītisāra and *Pañcatantra* to about the 6th and 4th centuries A. D. respectively,²⁸ credited Kauṭilya with familiarity of the whole body of the *Dharmaśāstra* literature including the most metrical *smṛti* fragments,²⁹ placed Kātyāyana in the 4th century A. D., and Kauṭilya in the third century. According to him "The minister Rākṣasa in the *Mudrārākṣasa* is probably a myth, why should not Kauṭilya be mythical as well?"³⁰ He held that alchemy, metallurgy and *Suruṅgā* were used later than the 3rd century A. D. and therefore dated the composition of the *KA* in the 3rd century A. D.³¹

On the authorship problem he remarked : "The whole work considering its before mentioned unity of plan and structure, is likely to have been composed by a single person, probably a pandit belonging to a school of polity and law who to render a dry subject interesting introduced debates in which the *Pūrvapakṣa* is put in the mouth of eminent sages or of deities whose names he got from the *Mahābhārata* or from tradition, while the *uttarapakṣa* or *siddhānta* is reserved for Kauṭilya."³² The ascription of the work to K(auṭilya) or Cāṇakya was entirely due to the myths current regarding the fabulous minister who was looked upon as the master and creator of the art of polity and as the author of all the floating wisdom on the subject of *Nīti*. We ought to be content to possess in the *Arthaśāstra* a remnant of an early age, though the hope has been disappointed of its turning out a production of the 4th century B. C."³³

That the discussion on the dating, authorship and the authenticity of the *KA* was influenced considerably by the nationalist movement was fully realised by Jolly. In an article published in 1925, he sought to challenge the Swarajist historians for their unshakable belief in the authenticity and high antiquity of the *KA*. According to him : "One cannot fail to see a connection of these *nur Scheinbar rein wissenschaftlichen Tendenzen* (only apparently pure scientific tendencies) with the modern movements for freedom and autonomy. It lies in the interest of Swarajists to be able to refer to similar tendencies in the old literature of their father land. That is why most of the authors reviewed here do not wish to renounce the belief in the authenticity and early origin of the *Arthaśāstra*, although the evidence for it is inadequate. However much one may sympathise with the freedom movements of these Indian researchers, their historical viewpoints and conclusions are to be accepted with caution (*vorsicht*) and cannot entirely exonerate the authors

²⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

²⁹ *ibid.*, p. 34.

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 44.

²⁹ *ibid.*, p. 17.

³¹ *ibid.*, pp. 34-43.

³³ *ibid.*, p. 47.

named here from the reproach (*vorwurf*) that they have not kept politics and history separate from each other."³⁴

Calcutta School

The triumvirate consisting of N. N. Law, Radha Kumud Mookerji and Benoy Kumar Sarkar from the 'Calcutta School' has left an indelible impression as the proponents of traditional Indian view about the *KA* problem. Their stand got further support from yet another nationalist stalwart, K. P. Jayaswal. According to Law, the *KA* throws a flood of light on the material, social and political condition of the ancient Hindus during the third and fourth centuries before the Christian era. It is a record of the age of Chandra Gupta.³⁵

In the introduction to Law's *Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity*, Mookerji summed up the arguments in support of the traditional and widely current view that the *KA* was the work of Chāṇakya, the minister of Chandra-gupta and therefore belonged to the 4th century B. C. He held that the work was the production of an individual author and not of a school.³⁶ As a reaction to a lecture delivered at Calcutta University by M. Winternitz on 17th Sept. 1923, in which he held a view contrary to the Indian tradition on the *KA*, N. N. Law defended the Indian tradition on the problem. The entire paper of Winternitz was subjected to a detailed scrutiny.³⁷

Like many of his predecessors, Benoy Kumar Sarkar did not question the traditional view on the *KA* till 1918. But afterwards he turned a little sceptic about its Mauryanism. He believed it to be a work on the philosophy of Kauṭilya. He wrote, "In so far as the *Arthaśāstra* is the work of a scholar, theorist, philosopher, *Gelehrter* or *Pandit* its statement cannot be depended upon automatically as descriptions of things as they were in Maurya times. On the other hand we should not be justified in calling it un-Maurya or post-Maurya simply because certain things known to be Maurya from sources are not found to be in this book."³⁸

K. P. Jayaswal was in the forefront among the interpreters of the *KA* on the nationalist lines, whose writings from 1912 onwards later formed the

³⁴ J. Jolly, "Über die alte Politische literatur Indiens und ihre Bearbeiter" (on the Ancient Political Literature of India and its Researchers), *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Recht wissenschaft* XII cited by B. K. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 280.

³⁵ N. N. Law, *Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity*, Indian reprint, Delhi, 1975, p. 1.

³⁶ *ibid.* (Introductory Essay), p. X.

³⁷ N. N. Law, "The Kauṭīliya *Arthaśāstra*," *Calcutta Review*, XIII, pp. 228-38.

³⁸ B. K. Sarkar, *Positive Background of Hindu Sociology*, 1, p. 248.

part of his *Hindu Polity* (1924). His *magnum opus* had become too sacred to the Indian nationalist to be aptly called 'the Bible of the Indian Nationalists' by a modern Indian historian.³⁹ Appendix-C of his work examined the arguments advanced by Jolly in his introduction to the Lahore edition of the *Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra* point by point and defended the Indian tradition of the date and the authorship of the *KA*.

Imperialists

As stated earlier even the imperialist school of historians had not questioned the nationalist view on the *KA*. In 1915 writing an introductory note to Shama Sastry's English translation, John Faithful Fleet assigned the text a date between 321 and 296 B. C. and held Kauṭīliya to be the author of the text. He opined that though the existing text is perhaps not absolutely word for word that which was written by Kauṭīliya still we have essentially a work that he did compose in the period stated above.

Another historian of this school is F. W. Thomas, whose views on the problem could be traced back to the introduction of his edition of *Bṛhaspati-sūtra*, where he held that in the fifth and fourth centuries B. C. the subject of royal policy was a recognised topic. He became more precise when he placed the date of *KA* within or near the Mauryan period.⁴⁰

An Indian civil servant, F. J. Monahan took the *KA* as the basis for Mauryan institutions.⁴¹ He visualised that a number of vassal kingdoms comprised the empire and therefore the polity contemplated in this treatise is evidently that of a small state.⁴²

Following Hillebrandt, Jolly and Winternitz, A. B. Keith also questioned the traditional view of the *KA* question. In 1916 he held it to be a creation of a school and assigned it a date of the first century B. C. In a paper one of the suggestions given by him regarding the solution to the problem was that Kauṭīliya was an energetic student of the *KA*, who carried his theoretic knowledge into practice and in the evening of his days enriched the theory by knowledge based on his political experience, and that the *KA* is based on his teaching, though not by his own hand.⁴³ Regarding its date of composition

³⁹ R. S. Sharma, *Aspects of Political Ideas and Institutions in Ancient India*, Delhi, 1968, p. 5.

⁴⁰ E. J. Rapson (ed.) *Cambridge History of India*, Delhi, 1955, 1, pp. 467-74.

⁴¹ F. J. Monahan, *The Early History of Bengal*, Humphrey Milford, 1925, pp. 30-1.

⁴² *ibid.*, p. 136.

⁴³ A. B. Keith, "Authenticity of the Kauṭīliya", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, London, 1926, p. 133.

he said, "It is, however, perfectly possible that the *Arthaśāstra* is an early work and that it may be assigned to the 1st century B. C., while its matter very probably is older by a good deal than that."⁴⁴ We notice a drastic change in his view by 1928. He held that it might have been written about 300 A. D. by a court official somewhere in South India.⁴⁵ In a comparative study on Megasthenes's *Indica* and the *KA*, he favoured a late date for the text despite some similarities between the two.⁴⁶

While the triangular tug-of-war was going on amongst the nationalists, imperialists and the German school of historians, the *KA* problems were put to rigorous screening by K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar in Sir Subramanya Aiyar lecture delivered in 1914.⁴⁷ He thought that Kauṭilya's work was composed during a period in which Pāṇini's work was either unknown or had not attained celebrity and influence. The *KA* is therefore pre-Pāṇinian, i. e. prior to 350 B. C.⁴⁸ Defending the traditional view on the age, authenticity and homogeneity of the text Rangaswami Aiyangar asserted Kauṭilya to be pandit before he turned administrator. He thought it idle to deny that an exceptionally able and versatile man, who had proved by his own achievements how a scholar could be a successful statesman, can, if need be, turn into an author, and compose a treatise in which he seeks to expound old views in the light of his own experience.⁴⁹ By citing numerous royal authors he justified Kauṭilya's case. In his opinion the text was homogeneous. The six kinds of evidence used by him in determining the age of the *KA* are (i) religious, (ii) political, (iii) historical, (iv) literary, (v) philological, and (vi) astronomical.

In the eyes of Rangaswami Aiyangar mere moral or intellectual degeneracy cannot satisfactorily explain decadence or disappearance of the *Arthaśāstra* copies. Among other reasons he saw its use only by a very select esoteric section of the community hastening its speedy extinction rather than survival.⁵⁰ It should have roused public curiosity to infringe and royal vigilance to protect the mastery of the teaching and opinions. The possibility of the imposition of some kind of royal taboo on the text cannot be ruled out altogether : "In the ages of belief in the supernatural, parts of

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, p. 137.

⁴⁵ A. B. Keith, *A History of Sanskrit Literature* (reprint) Oxford, 1956, p. 461.

⁴⁶ A. B. Keith, "The age of the *Arthaśāstra*", D. R. Bhandarkar (ed.), *B. C. Law Vol.* Calcutta, 1945, 1, pp. 477-95.

⁴⁷ The lectures are now available in his book, *Considerations on some Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity*, Madras, 1935.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p. 140.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p. 158.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, p. 21.

the *Arthaśāstra*, like book XIV, XIII. 3, IV. 2 etc. which deal with secret means, magic, spell and incantations should have been regarded by kings as dangerous literature which should not pass into the hands of enemies and disaffected subjects. Kauṭilya's inductive treatment of such topics as the overthrow of princes etc. should have made kings eager to prevent the popularisation of the *Arthaśāstra*. The tremendous prestige of Kauṭilya's name would also have cast a glamour on his treatise and generated even a fear of it."⁵¹

II

Indian Tradition questioned by Indian

It was for the first time in the history of the *KA* study that any Indian argued against the Indian tradition. In his presidential address to the first All-India Oriental Conference held at Poona in 1919, R. G. Bhandarkar favoured for Kauṭilya a date between the first and the second century A. D. According to him the date of the *KA* depended on the date of the *Kāmasūtra*, whose author Vātsyāyana was the earliest to notice the *KA*.⁵²

M. Winternitz discussed this problem in detail. From the very outset he was against the Indian tradition. He⁵³ did not consider the *KA* to be the creation of an individual and of course not of the minister of Chandragupta. Besides, it was not much older than the *Tantrākhyāyikā* which was deemed to belong to the fourth century after Christ.

In 1923, in his Readership lecture at Calcutta University he extolled the value of the *KA*, although he did not consider it older than the seventh century A. D. when it was quoted by Daṇḍin.⁵⁴ His lecture in its treatment of the problems seems to be immensely influenced by the findings of his pupil Otto Stein against the synchronism of the *Indica* and the *KA*. He considered the chapters on minerals in the text to be a strong proof of the later origin of the *KA*.⁵⁵ He came across strong discrepancy between the strict Brahmanical religiosity of the author and the unscrupulousness with which the same author recommends all kinds of clandestine tricks in which religious rites and religiosity of the people are abused for political purposes.⁵⁶ He was not prepared to believe that we have in the *KA* really the work of the minister of the Maurya Chandragupta of the fourth century B. C. before us.⁵⁷

⁵¹ *ibid.*, foot-note, 34, p. 20.

⁵² *Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference*, Poona, 1920, pp. 24-5.

⁵³ M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der Indischen Literatur*, Leipzig, 1921, iii, p. 523.

⁵⁴ M. Winternitz, "Kauṭīliya *Arthaśāstra*," *Calcutta Review*, 1924, p. 14.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p. 20.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p. 25.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p. 27.

In spite of his serious scepticism about the reliability of the Hellenist ambassador Megasthenes, Otto Stein undertook the scrutiny of the Mauryanism of the *KA* by the touch-stone of the *Indica*. His view about the *KA* problem as expressed in his book, seems to be in somewhat equivocal tune : "On the strength of an intensive comparison between the *Indica* of Megasthenes and the *Arthaśāstra*, it is not possible to discover an agreement as some investigators have stressed. The synchronism of the two sources becomes, therefore, improbable and the authorship of Chandragupta's minister for the *Arthaśāstra* doubtful."⁵⁸

After R. G. Bhandarkar, another Indian scholar to voice against the Mauryanism of the *KA* and its composition by Kauṭilya was Kalidas Nag. In his book, he found it impossible to accept the view originally held by Shama Sastry and later on supported by Jacobi that the *KA* was written entirely by Chandragupta's minister around 325 B. C.⁵⁹ In the section dealing with diplomacy, Nag discovered that the diplomacy is not that of a centralised empire but rather that of a divided feudality in which each chief is in constant conflict with his equals for a hegemony in its turn crumbles down by causing a new series of wars. This normal politics he ascribed to an age of political atomism which is just the opposite of the politics of a large empire. The diplomacy of Kauṭilya may be anterior or posterior to that of the Mauryas but does not contain any unerring traces of centralised imperialism of Chandragupta. He lamented that Indian Scholars are hypnotised by the name of Chāṇakya-Kauṭilya and found fault in the ascription of the fourth century B. C. as the age of the *KA* by N. N. Law whose *Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity* (1914) largely deals with Book-II. Nag considered this section to be a later interpolation.⁶⁰ The *KA* is not a homogeneous work belonging in its entirety to a single epoch and even if we accept the view that a great portion of the treatise was the work of Kauṭilya himself, it is equally probable that it was recast on several succeeding occasions. He cited instances in support of his theory that the *KA* is not a product of a single powerful brain but rather an encyclopaedia of Hindu political science to which more than one expert has contributed.⁶¹ Nag discussed why the *KA* is the only document on the subject and why it remained utterly unknown until Shama Sastry all of a sudden discovered it in a private library. He

⁵⁸ Otto Stein, *Megasthenes und Kauṭilya*, Vienna, 1922, p. 302.

⁵⁹ Kalidas Nag, "Les Théories Diplomatiques, de l'Inde Ancienne et l'*Arthaśāstra*", Paris, 1923. English translation by V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar available in *The Journal of Indian History*, Trivandrum, VI, p. 30.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p. 31.

⁶¹ *ibid.*, pp. 30-35.

hinted at the solution of Aśoka's Hindu Science of *artha* and *rājanīti* – by introducing *Dharma* as the keynote of all human activity and, as the moral element in *dharma* gained ground, it was permitted to sink into obscurity. He found some kind of protest against the Kauṭilyan mind from emperor Aśoka the grandson of Chandragupta.⁶³ "History", said Nag, "will decide whether India lost or gained by making the choice but the fact is that it rejected mainly the path chalked out by Kauṭalya-Chāṇakya to enter into that of Dharmakośa."⁶⁴ Explaining the circumstances in which interpolations could have crept in, he said that in a land like India the climate necessitates the frequent copying of manuscripts and it is well known that those transcriptions are the occasions not only of alterations in the text, but of considerable additions sometimes.

Contrary to Nag, U. N. Ghosal in the same year pleaded a date towards the end of the fourth century before Christ for the composition of the treatise.⁶⁵ He was in complete agreement with D. R. Bhandarkar in placing the beginning of the *KA* tradition not later than 650. B. C.⁶⁶ He accepted the same age of the *KA* in the treatment of the Mauryan fiscal system in another important work.⁶⁶

A big rebuff to the challenge to the Indian tradition by the triumvirate i. e. Keith, Jolly and Winternitz among others came from Ganapati Sastri, who edited the *KA* in three volumes with his own commentary called *Śrīmūla* between 1924–25 A. D. He justified the conventional view of the fourth century B. C. as the age of the *KA* and held Kauṭalya to be posterior to Yājñavalkya. He found Kauṭalya revealing his high regard for and acquaintance with the *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* by adopting it *ad verbum* and *ad sensum* as well as by explaining and supplementing it when the latter treats of *Sāhasaṇḍa* in the second *adhyāya*.⁶⁷ The other evidence cited by him in support of his claim is that of *Bālakṛīḍā*, a commentary on *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* by Viśvarūpācārya alias Sureśvarācārya, a pupil of the great Śaṅkarācārya. This commentator must have taken the *Arthaśāstra* of Bṛhaspati and Viśālākṣa to be *ārṣa* works known to Yājñavalkya and therefore, quoted from them to supplement Yājñavalkya's statement but not from Kauṭilya who was

⁶³ *ibid.*

⁶³ *ibid.*

⁶⁴ U. N. Ghoshal, *A History of Hindu Political Theories*, Oxford, 1923, p. 21.

⁶⁵ *ibid.* p. 72.

⁶⁶ U. N. Ghoshal, *Contributions to the History of the Hindu revenue system*, Calcutta, 1929.

⁶⁷ T. Ganapati Sastri, *The Arthaśāstra of Kauṭalya*, Trivandrum, 1925, 1, (Introduction) p. 7.

posterior to Yājñavalkya. On the basis of his reference in the *gargādigaṇa* under *Sūtra* 'gargādibhyo yañ' of Pāṇini. Yājñavalkya was considered to be known and, therefore, anterior to Pāṇini.⁶⁹

Another pioneering work on the problem was that of D. R. Bhandarkar. In his Manindra Chandra Nandy lecture delivered at the Benaras Hindu University in 1925, he controverted the then most prevalent views against the Indian tradition. He found enormous similarity of style between the *Dharma Sūtra* and the *Arthasāstra* and therefore believed the latter to belong to a period between the seventh and the second century B. C. His upshot was that the work must have been composed by Kauṭilya, the Prime-Minister of the Mauryan emperor Chandragupta.⁶¹ About the first and the last chapters of the text he said the Kauṭīliya had definitely undergone some modification or amplification shortly before Kāmandaka (A. D. 500) when the process of embellishment was taking place. It is in this process that a few strange or late things may have crept into it. He remarked that if at all there are interpolations, they are very few and very far between, so that the original text of the Kauṭīliya which is the present book minus its first and last chapters and which is in the old *Dharmasūtra* style seems to have remained intact.⁷⁰ Bhandarkar justified the homogeneity of the text (minus first and the last chapters) by showing the evolution of chapters on the basis of (1) preservation of what has been acquired, (2) the acquisition of new territory, (3) augmentation of what has been preserved, (4) distribution among the deserved of what has been so augmented, making the chapters fit in so well indeed under the scheme.⁷¹

Similarly, in utter disregard of his compatriots Hillebrandt, Jolly, Keith, Winternitz and Otto Stein, John Meyer fell in line with Hermann Jacobi in defending the Indian tradition on the KA. His two books published consecutively in 1926⁷² and 1927⁷³ threw a flood of light on his approach to these problems. His German translation of our text devotes thirty-six pages to vindicate the Indian tradition. He attempted to show that

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, iii, p. 5.

⁶⁹ D. R. Bhandarkar, *Some Aspects of Ancient Hindu Polity* (second edition), Varanasi, 1963, pp. 49-50.

⁷⁰ *ibid.* pp. 55-6.

⁷¹ *ibid.* pp. 12-6.

⁷² J. Meyer, *Das Altindische Buch vom Welt und Staatsleben* (The Ancient Indian Book of Worldly and Political life), 1926.

⁷³ J. Meyer, *Über ihr verhältniss zu einander und zu Kauṭilya* (On the nature of Ancient Indian Law book and their Relations with one another and with Kauṭilya), 1927.

Kauṭilya of the Chandragupta Maurya fame, the ambitious and diplomatic Brahmin minister, the revolutionary philosopher and scholar, is the one single-author-compiler and reformer of the political science as embodied in the *Arthaśāstra* associated with his name. The tradition remains unshaken, in spite of modern attempts to assail it and appears even to be supported by very high probability.⁷⁴ He controverted the view of Hillebrandt that the portions marked *iti Kauṭilyaḥ* constitute the statements of Kauṭilya himself, but collected together by some of his followers who are accountable for the compilation of the whole book. Meyer stated that *iti Kauṭilyaḥ* may be written by Kauṭilya himself just as *iti Baudhāyanaḥ* by Baudhāyana in the *Baudhāyana Sūtra*. One does not have to make any distinction between the different portions of the work as regards authorship. With the exception of Book-II of our text which may be derived from or rather based on various sources, but is by no means independent of author's personal equation, the entire work appears to be the product of one fount, the creation of single man, and that man is no other than the person who is self-conscious enough to be ashamed of describing himself in his own book in the third person as *iti Kauṭilyaḥ*.⁷⁵

Militant nationalism took its full circle in the writings of N. C. Bandopadhyaya (1927) who dedicated his book "To the sacred memory of the heroes that have won immortality in their battles for Hindu social and political regeneration, whose glories will awaken further generations to their sense of duty, whose spirit will dispel fear and bring hope for the future and will guide all in the path of justice, humanity and progress."⁷⁶ Despite his all claims in the preface to have remained unaffected in toto by national and patriotic sentiments in the writing of this book, his chauvinistic subjectivity floats on the surface at times. This is discernible in his discussion on the nature of kingship, where he cited *mātsyanyāya* (law of fishes). Here he seems anxious to say : by no stretch of imagination can this passage be taken to prove Kauṭilya's belief in kingship as a divine institution. He spoke of election and of royal share as being paid in lieu of the king's protection.⁷⁷ These arguments were used as an armour to thwart the English justification of continuance of their rule over India. His description of the KA representing the current of thought of the fourth century B. C. might possibly have grown

⁷⁴ B. K. Sarkar, "German Translation of Kauṭalyan *Arthaśāstra*," *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1928, IV, p. 375.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 375-6.

⁷⁶ N. C. Bandyopadhyaya, *Development of Hindu Polity and Political Theories* (reprint), Delhi, 1980.

⁷⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 80-2.

under the shadow of the above-said sentiments. Bandopadhyaya, however, did not exclude the impossibility of later additions or interpolations.⁷⁸

The year 1923 is remarkable in the history of the *KA* study. It is in this year that S. K. Aiyangar and V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar on the one hand, and E. H. Johnston and Pran Nath on the other took diametrically opposite stands on the *Arthaśāstra* riddle. Aiyangar held it to be a work of Kauṭilya, the minister, who assisted in the establishment of and in laying down the lines of administration for the Mauryan empire.⁷⁹ In one of his books Dikshitar utilised the *KA* for Mauryan administration.⁸⁰ In 1932 he brought out yet another book relating to Mauryan polity, in which he ascribed the *KA* to the Chancellor of Chandragupta Maurya and believed that the polity behind the Aśokan edicts is the Kauṭīliyan polity.⁸¹ The types of evidences examined by him were geographical, literary, religious and astronomical. K. V. Rangaswami's method and themes loom large in the examination.⁸²

III

E. H. Johnston's interpretations bring the *KA* between Aśvaghoṣa of the 2nd century A. D. and Āryaśūra of the 4th century A. D. In his view the lower limit of its composition can hardly be later than A. D. 250.⁸³ According to him Aśvaghoṣa belonged to the second century A. D. and Āryaśūra to the 4th century.⁸¹ While the former does not refer to the *KA* even in places where it would have strengthened his arguments, the latter deliberately parades his knowledge of it.⁸⁵ Regarding the venue of *KA*'s composition or the abode of the author Johnston thought the description fitted well in context with South Bihar and also a good deal of Central India. Book II does not quote from other works and reads much more like the notes of an official with all round experience than summaries from other works. It appears to be based on practical knowledge and the same practical vein runs through the handling of legal and other quotations in the three following books to show in which part of India the author obtained his experience so

⁷⁸ *ibid.*, p. 76.

⁷⁹ V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, *Hindu Administrative Institutions*, Madras, 1929, (Introduction), p. XIII.

⁸⁰ *ibid.*

⁸¹ V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, *The Mauryan Polity*, Madras, 1932, Preface.

⁸² *ibid.*, p. 17.

⁸³ E. H. Johnston, "Two Studies in the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya," *Journal of The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain And Ireland*, 1929, pp. 86-8.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 77-81.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, p. 81.

far as agriculture goes. The account fitted admirably with conditions in South Bihar not so well with North Bihar, and not at all with Bengal or North-Western India. The description would probably also cover a good deal of Central India.⁸⁶

The views of Pran Nath, a proponent of late date of the *KA*, are known from his doctoral thesis approved from the University of London in 1929 and a study brought out two years later in the *Indian Antiquary*. In his thesis the general view taken was that *KA* was compiled during the Gupta period.⁸⁷ The text of the *KA* has been used considerably by him but Pran Nath did not discuss its age except in the introduction, where he assigns it an early date, perhaps not later than the times of the early Gupta Sovereigns.⁸⁸ In 1931 Pran Nath brought the date further down between 481 and 510 A. D.⁸⁹ On the basis of references to some forest-tribes, navigation and some geographical units in the *KA* he held the author to belong to a place near the coast.⁹⁰ The original text was in verse and not in prose, he opined.⁹¹

In 1930, P. V. Kane held that the age of the *KA* could be settled approximately. In his opinion it could not be ascribed to a period later than the 2nd century A. D.⁹² Although in his discussion he was inclined to attest the Mauryanism of the text and its author.⁹³

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⁸⁶ *ibid.*, p. 101.

⁸⁷ Pran Nath, *Study in the Economic Condition of Ancient India*, London, 1929, p. 103.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, p. 8.

⁸⁹ Pran Nath, "The Date of the Compilation of Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*", *Indian Antiquary*, 1931, LX, pp. 109-12, 121-23.

⁹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 110.

⁹¹ *ibid.*, p. 174.

⁹² P. V. Kane, *The History of Dharmaśāstra*, Poona, 1962, 1, pp. 208-9.

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His third study shows that Breloer also was influenced by the contemporary political events in Germany. More than half a dozen of Indo-German equations appear to have been at work in the scheme of Breloer's researches. Jacobi equated Kauṭilya with Bismark, his pupil equated Kauṭilya with Adolph Hitler.¹⁰² The Aryanism and race cult of Hitler's socio-political philosophy influenced the ideology of Breloer. He began his work with a salutation to Kauṭilya as an Aryan and as a kinsman of the heroes of *Nibelungenlied* (an epic).¹⁰³

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⁹⁹ B. Breloer, *Finanzver Verwaltung und Wirtschafts Führung*. Leipzig, 1934, p. 11.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*

¹⁰² B. K. Sarkar, "Kauṭilya Economic Planning and Climatology—Examination of Breloer's *Kauṭilya Studies*", *Indian Historical Quarterly*, ii, p. 334.

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¹⁰⁴ A. N. Bose, "The Date of the *Arthaśāstra*", D. R. Bhandarkar (ed.), *Indian Culture*, Calcutta, 1937, IV, p. 435.

far as agriculture goes. The account fitted admirably with conditons in South Bihar not so well with North Bihar, and not at all with Bengal or North-Western India. The description would probably also cover a good deal of Central India.⁸⁶

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1st century A. D., the beginning of the Sino-Indian intercourse not prior to the 1st century B. C., mention of Ceylon by the *Periplus* in the 1st century A. D., emergence of *śreṇī* bankers and imposition of *praṇaya* (tax) in the Nasik and Junagarh inscriptions — all put together relegate the *KA* to the 1st century A. D.¹⁰⁵ Bose considered the *KA* to be the composition of a single author but it should not mean that all he wrote was his own. It comprised writings of his predecessors.¹⁰⁶ The political philosophy of the present text fits not so well with Maurya imperialism as with an age of turmoil when local principalities were dissolving in internecine war.¹⁰⁷ Bose found an explanation of the social and political institutions of widely separated ages reflected in the floating doctrines incorporated systematically in the book, in a *de facto* author who hailed from a later age, remained obscure and was forgotten. It was he, who borrowed from earlier savants among whom Kauṭilya was one and may be the chief.¹⁰⁸

The old acute interest in the study of the *Arthaśāstra* with reference to these problems gradually started waning in India and abroad after 1940 or so. The nationalist scholars lost interest after the quit India movement and the attainment of freedom. The only significant study worth the name during this period was the *Kauṭilya Studies* (1945) by Stein Konow. He favoured the Indian tradition by assigning Kauṭilya's work to the minister of the Mauryan Chandragupta. He thought that a good deal of the *Arthaśāstra* neologisms was borrowed by the *dharmaśāstra*¹⁰⁹, but he did not exclude the possibility of later interpolations in the text.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 436-42.

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ S. Konow, *Kauṭilya Studies*, Oslo, 1945, p. 65.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*, p. 443.

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 443-4.

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 6.

DOCTRINES OF KARMA, OF MOKṢA, OF NIṢKĀMA KARMA AND THE IDEAL OF BODHISATTVA

BY

Y. KRISHAN

Indian philosophy and religions, in the exposition of the doctrine of *karma*, exhibit two conflicting trends : role of *karma* in shaping an individual's destiny and in the achievement of the goal of liberation or *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*.

Karma, on the one hand, is deemed to be a causative force which is at the root of diversity in the forms of life in this universe ; it is *karma* which is the motive force behind the phenomena of transmigration and rebirth. It is also the fruition of *karmas* which brings about inequality and produces happiness and suffering ; the quality of *karmas* is responsible for the degradation and elevation in the scale of sentient creation from man to vermin and plant life, and the pain and pleasure they experience. It is thus open to an individual to overcome suffering and improve his position in the scale of sentient beings in a future birth by doing good *karmas*. Thus the doctrine of *karma* provided an answer to the problem of inequality and suffering as between different species and within the same species and thus laid the foundation of ethical discipline.

Mokṣa or *nirvāṇa*, on the other hand, is release from the process of death and rebirth. It aims at bringing the life process to an end. Thus *mokṣa* necessarily implies the termination of all *kārmic* activity, which, in turn, is unavoidable and inescapable when a being is embodied in the human frame.

Niṣkāma-karma, desireless action or motiveless activity, is a species of *karma* which permits a person to act without being bound to the moral consequence of that act. *Sakāma-karma* is the source of worldly existence ; *niṣkāma-karma* is the source of freedom from the same.

Thus, *karmas*, however noble, cannot terminate the operation of the chain of birth, death and rebirth or provide escape from pain or suffering inherent in existence. The *karmas* provide the motive power or fuel which keeps the chain or cycle in operation. Thus *karmas* can only determine the nature of rebirth in the cycle of existence, and the quality of life therein that is within the closed circuit of birth and death and rebirth.

Pari passu, all the objects in the universe, sentient and non-sentient, are also subject to the law of continuous change; they are in a state of perpetual flux, of origination and decay. In the biological sphere, it involves the process of birth, ageing and death. There is, therefore, certain suffering inherent in the life process itself, irrespective of the quality of the *karmas*. A person may have done the most excellent *karmas*, yet he, as a biological entity or unit, cannot escape the pain or unhappiness, which is inherent in and inseparable from coming into existence, growing old and eventual death of that biological unit. Pain has thus both a subjective and an objective existence: subjective pain is ego-born having its origin in the mind and its properties: greed, anger, infatuation, passion; objective pain is essentially a physiological and biological phenomena caused by the absence or denial of nutrition, protection and procreation. Even subjective suffering is rooted in man's constitution. Certain dispositions, behavioural tendencies, *vr̥ttis*, are an inbuilt feature of man's emotional or psychological personality (*prakṛti*), such as love (*kāma*), hate (*dveṣa*), attachment (*rāga*) and desire (*tr̥ṣṇā*): these are collectively called *tamoguṇa*, baser tendencies in human psyche and the *guṇas* determine the dominant characteristics *pravṛttis*, of a man. Men's actions are conditioned by them: *prakṛtiṃ yānti bhūtāni* (BG III. 33). Thus the baser tendencies can generate, by themselves, unhappiness and suffering even if no physical action is undertaken leading to conflict. It is, however, possible to eliminate, circumscribe or reduce this suffering by suppressing baser tendencies through *sādhanā*, through the discipline of *yoga* and by adopting an enlightened philosophy of life that all the material objects and their enjoyers, that is human beings, are transient. So attachment, jealousy, greed etc. are meaningless. Inability to grasp this basic fact of life is *avidyā*, ignorance, nescience. Hence suffering can be eliminated from future life by doing good *karmas*, and also from the present life by destroying *avidyā*, by achieving *jñāna*, enlightenment.

While subjective pain can be controlled and suppressed through mind control, *niṣkāma-bhāva*, shedding desire and eliminating frustration; but objective pain cannot be suppressed beyond a certain limit without the termination of the life process itself. Thus suffering may be *karma-janita*, born of *karmas* accumulated in previous lives, *tr̥ṣṇā-janita*, born of desire, and constitutional.

The doctrine of *karma* provides no answer to the constitutional suffering inherent in the cycle of existence; nay it only perpetuates the "curse of existence". Sureśvarācārya (8th cent. A. D.) in his introduction to the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* i. 1 sums up the problem very succinctly and with great

clarity : pain originates solely through origination of body, that is, embodiment (*duḥkhasya deha-upādāna-ekahetu*); embodiment is brought about by merit and demerit accumulated in the past (*dehasya pūrva-upacita-dharma-adharma-mūlātva*); merit and demerit, in turn, arise from the performance of ordained (good) and forbidden (bad) deeds (*vihiṭa* and *pratiṣiddha karmas*); the deeds themselves arise from desire and aversion (*rāga* and *dveṣa*).¹

This riddle of the incompatibility of *karma* and *mokṣa* arises because the cycle of existence and its characteristics belong to the cosmic law, *ṛta*, which means " the course of things " and which regulates the functioning of the universe both moral and non-moral, and embraces the physical (including biological) and metaphysical fields ; *karma* is only a special derivative of *ṛta* limited to the moral world. While *ṛta* including the law of *karma* is *anādi* (beginningless) and *ananta* (endless), *karmas*, in themselves, like other forces or objects of the universe, have a limited duration of life. The consequences which good (as well as evil) *karmas* produce severally are not endless ; they are *anitya*.

Indians found an answer to the constitutional suffering in bringing the life process itself to an end, in breaking the circuit of birth, death and rebirth. In short they sought to make *ṛta* inoperative. This, they believed, could be achieved by annihilating *karma*, viz. (a) by exhausting the fuel of previous *karmas*, and (b) by preventing fresh accumulation of *karmas* and thus preventing the renewal of the life force potential through suppression (*nirodha*) of desires which are at the root of *kārmic* activity and which keep the life cycle *ṛta* in operation. In other words, *ṛta* and *karma* are inseparably linked ; within the frame-work of *ṛta* *karma* causes inequalities, suffering and happiness in sentient beings ; it also determines the evolutionary process.

Chāndogya Up (*Chānd Up*) V. 10. 7 emphasises that good conduct (*ramaṇīyācaraṇa*) leads to birth in a good womb (*ramaṇīyām yonim*) and that the results of virtuous deeds (*puṇya*) also are exhausted or perish (*kṣīyate*) *Chānd Up* VIII. 1. 6. So the *Chānd Up* VIII. 12. 1 emphasises that there is no freedom from pleasure and pain for one who is embodied (*na vai śarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayorapahastih*).

¹ Śaṅkhaṇi : the commentator of *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra (8th cent. A. D.) refuted the theory of pain as unsatisfied desire and happiness as satisfaction or annulment of desire (*viśaya-prāptim vinā kṛma eva duḥkham atah tannivṛttir eva sukham bhaviṣyati*) and holds that positive experiences of happiness are possible even when one has not desired them. Quoted from S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Indian Edition, Delhi 1975, Vol. II, p. 91.

The *Kaṭha Up* I. i. 26 emphasises that all life is indeed short or ephemeral (*api sarvaṃ jīvitamalpameva*), and Naciketā discounts the value of pleasurable things of life, wealth, power, women, all that can bring mental and physical satisfaction. *Kaṭha Up* I. ii. 5 therefore, teaches that the pursuit of pleasurable things is ignorance (*avidyā*) which makes foolish people go round and round (*pariyanti mūḍhāḥ*). Only those who have discriminating intellect (*viññānavān*) and have controlled or subdued their mind (*samaṇaskaḥ*) attain the highest state and are not born again (*bhūyaḥ na jāyate*, *Kaṭha Up* I. iii. 8; otherwise *karmas*, by themselves, lead to birth in another womb or existence (*yonimanye prapadyante śarīratvāya dehinaḥ*, *Kaṭha* II. ii. 7).

Muṇḍaka Up III. 2. 2 emphasises *kāmān yaḥ kāmāyate manyamānaḥ sa kāmabhirjāyate tatra tatra* : He who covets desirable things, while concentrating on them, is born among them, that is, attains them along with those desires. *Praśna Up* III. 3 teaches that rebirth is the product of mental desires : *manokṛtena āyāti asmin śarīre*.

The *Maitrī Up* I. 3. 4 describes human body as foul smelling and ephemeral, a conglomeration of bone, skin, muscle, marrow, flesh, semen, blood, mucus, tears, rheum, faeces, urine, wind, bile and phlegm, and the whole world as perishing or decaying like gnats, mosquitoes, grass and trees. It emphasises that in this sort of cycle of existence (*saṃsāra*), what is the good of enjoyment of desires (*asmin śarīre kiṃ kāmopabhogaḥ*). In the cycle of existence, a person is like a frog in a waterless well. *Maitrī Up* IV. 2 likens the results of good as also of evil deeds (*sad-asad-phalamayaḥ*) to fetters (*pāśaiḥ*).

The Upaniṣads, therefore, discount the utility of religious activity. *Praśna Up* I. 9 says that those who perform *iṣṭāpūrta*, Vedic sacrifices and charitable works, come back to this world, that is, are reborn. The same *Up*. V 3. 5 and 7 proclaims that the recitation of the *vedas*, *tapas* (austerities), *brahmacarya* (continence and self-control), *śraddhā* (faith) can only bring worldly greatness and heavens.

More importantly the means of escape from the perpetual cycle of birth, death and rebirth, *bhavasāgara*, is cultivating detachment (*tyāga*), desirelessness (*akāmaḥ*). So the *Bṛhad Up* IV. 4. 7 says that a mortal becomes immortal when all the desires have totally left him (*sarve pramucyante kāmāḥ*). *Kaṭha Up* II. iii. 14 says that a man becomes immortal (*maryo amṛto bhavati*) when he discards all desires (*yadā sarve pramucyante kāmāḥ*)... *Muṇḍaka Up* III. 2. 1 says : *akāmaḥ* a desireless person transcends the human seed, that is, overcomes rebirth and transmigration. *Muṇḍaka* III. 2.5-6 proclaims that a person who is free from attachment (*vitaraṅgaḥ*) attains immortality (*amṛta*)

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and is delivered (*parimucyanti*). The *Maitrī Up* VI. 30 teaches freedom from desires (*niṣkāmatvam*), freedom from desire liberates a person and desire makes a man bound.

The *Bhagavadgītā* (BG) 500 to 200 B. C. and the *Mahābhārata* (Mbh) (500 B. C. to 400 A. D.) expound the same teaching about the means of attaining *mokṣa*, *nirvāṇa* or liberation.

The BG VI. 15 describes a *yogin* as one who has subdued his mind (*niyatamānasaḥ*) and thereby attains the peace of supreme *nirvāṇa* (*śāntim nirvāṇaparamām*). BG VI. 18 describes a person as *yogayukta*, that is a *yogin* who has got his mind completely under control (*vinīyatam cittam*) and is devoid of attachment to all desires, good or evil (*niḥspṛhaḥ sarvakāmebhyo*). BG VI. 24 explains that this can be achieved by abandoning all attachments born of desires (*saṁkalpaprabhavān kāmānistyaktvā*) and subduing all the senses (*manasaivendriyagrāmaṇi viniyamya*). This state of *jñāna* (knowledge) leads to destruction of *karmas* (*jñānāgniḥ sarvakarmāṇi bhasmasāt kurute*, BG IV. 37) and such a person is no longer bound by *karmas* (*na karmāṇi nibadhmanti*, BG IV. 41).

The *Mahābhārata*² XII. 21. 3 likens an enlightened being to a tortoise; he withdraws all his desires as a tortoise withdraws its limbs :

yadā saṁharate kāmān kūrmo'ṅgānīva sarvaśaḥ /

According to Sāṁkhya-yoga, the life process or birth and death, is perpetuated by *karmāśayas* (corpus of *karma* potencies); the *karmāśayas* are produced from *kāma* (desire), greed, attachment and anger which are rooted in the *kleśas* (afflictions) from which all empirical beings suffer, these *kleśas* being ego, *rāga* (attachment), *abhiniveśa* (will to live), etc. Salvation (*apavarga*) or liberation (*mokṣa*) is attainable only through *vairāgya* (detachment) strengthened by faith and practice. *Vairāgya* is an essential prerequisite for the attainment of *prajñā* (true knowledge) and cultivation of *nirbīja samādhi* (suppression of mental states of empirical consciousness and experience). The *Yogasūtra* (700 B. C. to 300 A. D.) IV. 6 and 7 explains that a *yogin's karma* is neither white nor black; it leaves no latent deposits and hence this kind of *karma* does not fructify. The *Yoga-sūtra* IV. 30 and II. 3 emphasise that the latent deposits of *karmas* (*karmāśayas*), good or bad, are destroyed with their roots on the attainment of *dharma-megha samādhi* (*Yoga-sūtra* IV. 29), the existential roots being the five hindrances : *avidyā*

² *Parva* XII is a later addition to the *Mahābhārata*.

(nescience), *ahamkāra* (sense of selfhood), *kāma* (passion), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *abhiniveśa* (will to live).

Akṣapāda Gotama in his *Nyāya-sūtras* 4. 2. 38-42 (2nd cent. A. D.) emphasises that meditation (*śamādhi*) is obstructed by external objects of senses and also by the constitutional and natural needs viz. hunger (*kṣudhā*), etc. (i.e. thirst, sex and the like). That is why the *Nyāya-sūtras* advise that meditation has to be practised in isolated places such as a forest or a cave. The *sūtras* 43-46 explain that the attainment of *apavarga*, release or emancipation, by practising *yama-niyama* and spiritual injunctions, necessarily means absence (*abhāva*) of a body; therefore, after the attainment of salvation there is no embodiment in various forms of existence. So *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* I. 1. 2 (4th cent. A. D.) avers *pravṛtṭyapāye janmāpaiti*: with suppression of worldly activity, birth ceases. Praśastapāda³ (5th cent. A. D.) in his *bhāṣya* on *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* explains that with the elimination of ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*), detachment (*vairāgya*) is produced which in turn causes the absence of attachment and dislike (*rāga-dveṣa-abhāva*) and hence *dharma* and *adharma* are not produced (*dharmādharmaḥ prapannānupattāu*). Udayana in *Kiraṇāvalī* 9. 6 (a 10th century commentary on Praśastapāda's *bhāṣya*) says that nescience (false knowledge, *mithyājñāna*) is the root cause of the world (*saṁsāra-mūla-kāraṇam*). When false knowledge is removed through *tattvajñāna* (true knowledge of elements of the universe), *rāga* (passion), motivating force of all actions, is removed.

Śaṁkara (8th cent. A. D.) brings out the conflict between *karma* and *mokṣa* with great clarity. In his *Bhāṣya* on the *Taittirīya Up* I. 1 Śaṁkara says that emancipation is not to be attained through *karmas* (*karmabhyā eva mokṣa iti na*). In his commentary on I. xi. 4 he says that anything that is produced by *karma* is impermanent, that knowledge and *karma* in their combination cannot produce emancipation, *karma* leads to creation, improvement (purification), transformation or acquisition and this is opposed to liberation, that there is opposition between knowledge and *karma*, and their combination is impossible (*virodho vidyā-karmaṇoḥ samuccayānupapatti*). Śaṁkara emphasises: *karmas* cannot be the cause of liberation (*karmaṇo mukteraheturvam*: *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*: 7). Śaṁkara in his *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya* I. 1. 4 defines liberation (*mokṣa*) as bodiless entity (*aśarīratvam*), free from *dharma* and *adharma* (good and evil actions) and from threefold time (*kālatrayam*); *saṁsāra* (empirical existence) is defined (*ibid.* II. 3. 29)

³ *Praśastapādabhāṣya* with Commentary *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdharaḥṭṭa (ed. & tr. into Hindi) by Durgadhara Jha, Varanasi, 1963.

as *kartr̥tvabhoktr̥tvādi-lakṣaṇaṁ saṁsāritvaṁ* : doing and enjoying etc. are the qualities of the world. So in *ibid.* IV. 1.13 Śaṁkara proclaims that, if the *karmas* which have been operating since eternity do not disappear (*karmanāṁ kṣayaābhāve*), *mokṣa* or liberation cannot be achieved. So *karma* is defined as based on false knowledge (*nithyājñānāvaśṭambham*, *ibid.* IV. 1. 19) and the source of embodiment. In *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* 10, Śaṁkara teaches : “for attaining freedom from the bondage of existence, one has to renounce all works” : *sanyasya sarvakarmāṇi bhavabandhvimuktaye*. In *Ātmabodha* 3 Śaṁkara proclaims : action cannot destroy ignorance (*na avidyāṁ vinivartayet*) ; verily knowledge destroys ignorance (*vidyā avidyāṁ nihanti eva*). Śaṁkara’s disciple Sureśvarācārya makes the conflict between *karma* and *mokṣa* clear beyond all doubt. In *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*⁴ I. 7, he says *avidyā saṁsṛter bījaṁ tannāśo muktirātmanaḥ* : nescience is the seed of *saṁsāra* (world) ; its annihilation leads to emancipation of self. Again (*ibid.* i. 24) he reiterates : *ajñānahānamātravānmukteḥ karma na sādhanam* : Elimination of nescience is release but action cannot be the means thereof (see also *ibid.* i. 53, 54) ; he further adds that action and knowledge cannot be joined together (i. 66 *nāsti sāṅgatyāṁ jñāna-karmaṇoḥ* and 68 *dussādhyo jñāna-karmasamuccayaḥ*).

The *Garuḍapurāṇa* (II. 16. 46-47) calls the world as the root of misery (*duḥkhamūlam*) and that he who is in it is afflicted with misery (*sa yasyāsti sa duḥkhitāḥ*) : he who abandons it becomes happy (*tasya tyāgaḥ kṛto yena sa sukhī*). So it advocates the immediate abandonment of the world (*saṁsāraṁ varjayet kṣaṇāt*) which is the abode of all misery (*sarvaduḥkḥānām ālaya*) and the source of all sins (*āśrayaṁ sarvapāpānām*).

The *Brahmavaivarta-purāṇa* 3. 8. 61 avers that one’s desire is the basis of *karma* and *karma* leads to pleasure and pain (*svakāmāt kurute karma karmaṇo bhoga eva ca*), and that *bhoga* is good and evil (*śubhāśubhau*) and is the cause of happiness and suffering (*hetuḥ sukhaduḥkḥayoḥ*). The *Brahmavaivartap.* 3. 8. 63, therefore, emphasises that saints destroy *karmas* from their very roots (*karma nirmūlayantyeva santo*). The *Brahmavaivartap.* 3. 24. 33 states that human beings cannot escape or be saved so long as the *karmas* subsist (*jīvināṁ niṣkṛtirnāsti sthite kamaṇi*) and the saints try to destroy *karmas* (*kurvanti santatāṁ karmaṇaḥ kṣayam*).

Rāmānuja (11th-12th cent. A. D.) in his *Śrībhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtras* makes the same points on these matters. *Śrībhāṣya* I. 1. 1. (para 17)

⁴ The title is very expressive. It means the attainment of inactivity.

says : *karma* constituted of merit and demerit is opposed to *jñāna* : *jñānavi-rodhi ca karma puṇyapāparūpam* (*ibid.* I. 1. 1, para 58). Ignorance is the form of *karma* (*karma-rūpa ajñāna*, *ibid.* 1. 1. 4, para 101), salvation cannot be attained through *dharma* (*na dharmasādhyo mokṣaḥ*, *ibid.* 1. 1. 4, para 99) : cessation of worldly existence itself, indeed, is salvation (*prapañca-nivṛttireva hi mokṣaḥ*); in *ibid.* 4. 4. 3 and 4. 4. 22 (paras 536 and 553) Rāmānuja calls *avidayā* as *karman*; *ibid.* 4. 4. 11, *karma* is the cause of varied embodiments. He, therefore, asserts (*ibid.* 1. 1. 1, paras 9, 10, 11) that suppression of the evil of desire for special reward for works (*phalaviśeṣa-karma-mṛdita-kaśāya*) leads to production of knowledge, that renunciation of enjoyment of the fruits of *karmas* (*phalopabhoga-virāgaḥ*) is one of the essential pre-requisites for dispelling ignorance (belief in plurality).

Vedāntadeśika (13th cent. A. D.) in his *Rahasyatrayasāra*⁵ Ch. 29 says "..... Sin denotes also acts of merit (*puṇya*) which lead to enjoyment in *saṁsāra* (which includes *svarga*, heaven) for they too are, to the aspirant of *mukti*, productive of undesirable fruit." It has been said : "this *svarga* and other such places are..... like hell when compared with the abode of the Supreme Being." Thus to the aspirant of *mukti*, therefore, that which leads to *svarga* is, in no way, different from that which leads to hell. That is why the aspirant of *mukti* is enjoined to give up those means which lead to *dharma*, *artha* (wealth) and *kāma* (pleasure) in the same way as he is enjoined to give up sinful acts. Indeed, the Śrutis and Smṛtis declare that good deeds and evil deeds are both to be avoided by the aspirant of *mukti*, for it is stated : "Giving up *puṇya* and *pāpa* are both of the nature of *karma* and are hard to give up etc." In short, the word *pāpa* (sin) denotes both *puṇya* and *pāpa* which are the cause of bondage.

Vidyāraṇya (known before his renunciation as Sāyaṇa) in the 14th century A. D. in his *Jīvanmuktiviveka*⁶ gives a summation of the teaching in Brahmanical texts of true knowledge that leads to liberation in this very life. He also maintains that rituals and acts of charity (*iṣṭāpūrta*) done with motive (*kāma*) produce impure (*malina*) corpus of *karmas* having potential for rebirth (*punarjanma-karmāśaya*) and desire etc. (*kāmādi*), the source of which lies in attachment etc. (*rāgādi*) and is the cause of rebirth (*punarjanma-hetu*). In fact he calls impure *vāsanās* as causing rebirth (*punarjanma*⁷).

⁵ M. Rajagopala Ayyangar (tr.), Kumbhakonam, 1956, pp. 530-31.

⁶ *Jīvanmuktiviveka* ed. & tr. by S. Subrahmanya Sastri and T. R. Srinivasa Ayyangar, Madras (Year of publication not stated). Text pp. 66 and 69.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Śuddha Vāsanā*, pure gnosis leads to discarding of rebirth.

In Buddhism also *karma*, good or bad, is the causative force. The *Majjhimanikāya* i. 508-512 (3rd-2nd cent. B. C.) explains it with great force and clarity : " Because of grasping, there is becoming because of becoming, birth, because of birth there was ageing and dying, grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair.....Thus there came to be the originating of this entire mass of ill By the stopping of grasping there is stopping of becoming; by the stopping of becoming there is the stopping of birth; by the stopping of birth there is stopping of ageing and dying; by the stopping of ageing and dying, grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair can be stopped. Thus there comes to be the stopping of this entire mass of ill."

The *Samyuttanikāya* (*Saṃ*) i. 65 (3rd-2nd cent. B. C.) emphasises that craving is the cause of a man coming into existence. So *Saṃ* i. 39 says that *nirvāṇa* is getting rid of craving; *Saṃ* ii. 112 : " stopping of becoming is *nirvāṇa* "; *Saṃ* v. 181-182 emphasises " by getting rid of desire the deathless comes to be released. "

The *Suttanipāṭa* 654 (3rd-end cent. B. C.) explains with the help of an analogy that the role of *karma* is keeping an individual in the cycle of existence.

Kammanā vattatī loko kammanā vattatī pajā |
Kammanibandhanā sattā rathassāṇīva yayato ||

The world revolves by deeds, the mankind revolves by deeds. As a pin holds fast the rolling chariot's wheel, so beings are in bondage held by deeds. The *Suttanipāṭa* 1094 explains that *nirvāṇa* is the destruction of oldage and death. The *Milindapañha*⁸ 268 emphasises that all the things of the world, except two viz. *nirvāṇa* and *ākāśa*, are produced by *karma* and (*ibid.* 32) that craving *sakileśa* is the cause of rebirth (*paṭisandhi*). Nāgārjuna in his *Suḥrillekha* (letter to King Gautamīputra) 103 observes : " birth is unfortunate among gods, men, denizens of hell, hungry ghosts and animals (as these are either states of retribution or of suffering inherent in death and transmigration). Realise that birth is a receptacle of many ills." Buddhaghōṣa in *Visuddhimagga* VIII. 9 emphasised that all freedom from illness (*ārogya*) ends in sickness, all youthfulness in oldage, life in death (*sabbam jīvitam maraṇapariyosānam*) all worldly existence (*sabbo yeva loka-sannivāso*) originates from birth (*jātiyā anugato*), is afflicted by oldage (*jarayā anusaṭo*), overcome by disease (*vyādhinā abhibhūto*) and destroyed

⁸ This belongs to Chapter IV of the *Milindapañha* which is a late addition. Cf. Winternitz : *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1933.

by death (*maraṇena abbhāhato*). In the concept of *bhūmis* (stages of spiritual progress) in the Mahāyāna, a *bodhisattva*, on attaining the sixth *bhūmi*, becomes free from desire, *aparāṇhitavimokṣamukha*.

The teaching of Jainism is identical. *Karma* in Jainism, has the property of *adhogurutva*, downward gravity, of pulling down and hence evil. *Nāyādharmakathā*⁹ (4th-2nd cent. B. C.) compares *karman* to mud. The *jīva* is like a gourd. When it is coated with mud, it sinks to the bottom of water (hell). When the mud is removed (*karma-nirjarā*) the gourd floats up (attains liberation). Again *karman* adheres to the *jīva* as dust to a body besmeared with oil. The analogies comparing *karma* particles to dust and mud indicate the low view of *karma*.

In addition to the material character of *karmas*, Jainism also recognises that *rāga* (attachment, covetousness, passion) makes operative the *karma-bandha* or bondage of *karmas*.

Āsrava, inflow of *kārmic* matter, is thus the cause of birth; *Kammam ca jātimaraṇassa mūlam*: *karma* is the root of birth and death: *Uttarādhyaṇa-Sūtra* 32. 7. Again, the souls bound by *karmas* go round and round in the cycle of existence (*Uttarādhyaṇa* 32. 3).

Kundakunda (1st cent. A. D.) in the *Pañcāstikāya* 130 avers that a *jīva* goes round and round in the cycle of existence (*saṃsāra-cakra*) due to *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (hatred). In the *Samayasāra* he admits that the destruction of *karmas* is possible only in the case of those *yatis* (Jaina monks) who adopt the absolute point of view (*ibid.* 156) and that it is the *karmas* which drag the soul into the cycle of births and deaths, *saṃsāra* (*ibid.* 160). Again the *Samayasāra* 257 puts it: *yo mriyate yaśca duḥkhito jāyate karmodayena sa sarvaḥ*: one dies or one becomes miserable, all this happens due to the operation of *karmas*. The same text 263, 264 makes it clear that both evil and good actions constitute bondage. The *Samayasāra* 4. 2. 146 explains it graphically:

*sauvarṇikamapi nigalanī badhnāti kālāyasamī ca yathā puruṣam /
badhnātyevamī jīvamī śubhamāśubhamī vā kṛtamī karma //*

(A shackle made of gold is as good as one made of iron for the purpose of chaining a man. Similarly the *karmas*, whether good or bad, equally bind a person).

⁹ *Nāyādharmakathā*, also called *Jñānādharma-kathā*, Chap. VI, Bombay, 1919. Quoted by S. B. Deo: *History of Jaina Monachism*, Poona, 1965, p. 212, fn. 375.

According to *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (x. 3), *kṛtsna-karmakṣayo mokṣaḥ* : the annihilation of all *karmas* is *mokṣa* liberation. Amṛtacandra (10th cent. A. D.) in *Tattvārthasāra* 8. 7 explains that just as a seed cannot sprout after being burnt, similarly, on the destruction of the seed of *karma* (*karma-bīja*), there can be no springing up of life (*bhavāṅkura*).

Pūjyapāda (5th-7th cent. A. D.) in *Sarvārthasiddhi* 2. 25 says : *sarva-śarīraprarohanabījabhūtaṁ karmāṇaṁ śarīraṁ karma iti ucyate* : the root cause of origination of all bodies is said to be *karman* body. Gaṇadhara-vāda 1639 (6th cent. A. D.) says that body and *karma* are related to each other as cause and effect, as the seed and sprout are related. In fact the *Ādipurāṇa* (9th cent. A. D.) IV. 37 equates *karma* *inter-alia*, with creator (*sraṣṭā*). So *karma* is held to be the source of all suffering.

The inflow of *kārmic* matter, that is *āsrava*, is stopped by *saṁvara* coupled with the destruction or exhaustion of past *karmas*, *kṣayopasaṁa*. This leads to freedom from bondage of *karmas* (*akarmatā*). *Samvara* is the cause of liberation : *Śāḍdarśanasamuccaya* 15. 23.

To stop the inflow of *karmas*, *vītarāgatva* (freedom from attachment, desirelessness, a Jaina variant of *niṣkāmakarmatva*) is commended to be cultivated. A Jaina ascetic achieves *vītarāgatva* in the 11th and 12th spiritual stages (*guṇasthānas*) by suppression of *moha* (attachment) and by expulsion (*samudghāta*) of *karmas*. A *kevalin*¹⁰ is one who has freed himself from "beclouding", "disturbing" and "hindering" *karmas*. *Tattvārthasūtra* 6. 5 of Umāsvāti (135-219 A.D.) classified *karmas* as *sāmparāyika*, possessed of *kaṣāya* or passion (causing bondage) and *īryapatha* devoid of passion. The *sāmparāyika* *karmas* attract *karmas* like moist surfaces catching dust. So the *Samayasāra* (210-211) emphasises that an enlightened being (*jñānī*) does not desire to do merit (*na icchati dharmam*) nor demerit (*adharma*), as such works are a form of binding *karma*, a bondage.

This leads to turning away from the world (*Uttarādhyayana* 29, 32) renunciation of activity, as by ceasing to act a person acquires no new *karma* (*Uttarādhyayana* 29-32). Kundakunda in *Samayasāra* 335 teaches that a *jīva* must become *akāraya* (*akāraka*) non-doer. Vādi Devasūri (1200 A. D.) in the *Pramāṇanayatatvalokālamkāra* 57 says *kṛtsnakarma-kaṣāya-svarūpa-siddhi* emancipation consists in the annihilation of all *karmas*.

¹⁰ W. Schubring : *The Religion of the Jains*, tr. into English by A. C. Sen and T. C. Burke, Calcutta, 1966, p. 32.

It appears that *karma* came to embrace both *karma* and *ṛta*, the law of moral causation and retribution and the law of cosmic operation, of flux, of growth and decay. *Tṛṣṇā*, (thirst), *kāma*, (desire), *rāga* (attachment) are inherent features of sentient creation; and so is the activity of infinite forms of creation. In fact activity or motion is an essential feature of life as such. In consequence it follows that if the operation of *ṛta* is interrupted, individual *karmas* cannot fructify; in fact the individual stock of *karmas* gets automatically liquidated and the otherwise unending creative process is terminated.

In this context the thesis of all the Indian schools of religions and philosophy, except the Cārvākas, was that *karma*, whether good or bad, is the source of bondage, of rebirth as it keeps the *ṛta* going and is the impediment to liberation, *mokṣa*, *nirvāṇa*. To adapt an analogy from the realm of jurisprudence, *karma* acts as a clog on the aspiration for and the progress towards redemption. Such a doctrine could only lead to a philosophy of *akarmavāda* or *akriyavāda* (inaction) and thereby pose a threat to the very functioning of society. In fact this doctrine lay at the basis of people seeking release or emancipation by withdrawing from the world, by repudiating all purposeful secular activity, economic and political, and by promoting renunciation of the world and stopping worldly activities. This found expression in the order of monks, *sādhus*, *yatis* and *bhikṣus*. *Bṛhad Up* 3. 5. 1 and 4. 4. 22 say that those who know the *Brahman*, the supreme self, give up the desire for sins, for wealth and for the world and take to the life of a wandering mendicant (*bhikṣācaryam*). The *Mahābhārata* (XII. 233. 7) says that a being is bound (*badhyate*) by his actions and is released (*pramucyate*) by knowledge. So the sages do not do actions (*karma na kurvanti*). So in the *Kāśibhāradvāja-sutta* of the *Suttanipāta* 1. 4 and *Samyuttanikāya* VII. 2 the Buddha urges people to engage themselves in spiritual activity than in farming involving ploughing and sowing. The story of Anuruddha's retirement from the world in the *Dhammapada*¹¹ *Aṭṭhakathā* XXV. 12b is far more revealing. Anuruddha had to choose between the profession of farming and that of a monk ... after Anuruddha had heard his brother enunciate the endless round of duties connected with the life of a householder, he said, 'I have no use for the householder's life' and became a monk. Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* 6. 1. 154 refers to the community of indolent monks, *maskarins* whom he defines thus : *mā kṛta karmāṇi mā kṛta karmāṇi śāntir vaḥ śreyasī ityāha ato maskarī parivrājakaḥ* : do not do any act, perform no actions,

¹¹ E. W. Burlingame : *Buddhist Legends*, London, 1969, Pt. II, pp. 268-69.

inactivity or inaction is conducive to supreme welfare. *Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* VI-b. 37. 1 (3rd century to 12th century A. D.) defines *yoga* as the cessation (*viyogaṃ*) of the *icchāviṣavikāra*, the illness and emotional disturbance produced by the poison of desire, and often compares the man who has subdued his *citta* (mind) as *pāṣāṇavat* (like a stone) or *kāṣṭhavat* (like wood). Vidyāraṇya in his *Jīvanmuktiviveka*¹² describes a liberated mendicant who has destroyed his *vāsanās* as possessing six characteristics : tongueless (*ajihvaḥ*), impotent (*ṣaṇḍhakaḥ*), lame and blind (*paṅgurandho*), deaf (*badhira*) and simple or innocent (*mugdha*).

The danger from the philosophy of *akarmavāda* was met first partially by the philosophy of *niṣkāma-karma* and more fully by the ideal of *bodhisattva*.

The *Īśa Up* I advises cultivation of detachment (*tyakta*) and elimination of covetousness (*mā gṛdhaḥ*) and *Īśa Up* 2 proclaims that works performed in this manner (without attachment and without covetousness) for a hundred years do not stick (*lipyate*) or bind a person. The *Bhagavadgītā* faced the challenge of *akarmavāda* most vigorously. It itself recognises (II. 49) that *karma* (obviously born of desire) is inferior to wisdom (*buddhi-yoga*); but it declares unequivocally that *karma* is superior to not doing any *karma* (*karma jyāyo hyakarmaṇaḥ*, B. G. III. 8). BG IV. 14 teaches that in the absence of *spṛhā* (covetousness, longing, intense desire for the results of actions, *karmaphala*), the *karmas* do not attach or stick (*limpanti*) to the doer and, therefore, he is not bound by *karmas* (*karmabhir na sa badhyate*). BG IV. 19 speaks of *kāmasanikalpa-varjitāḥ*, doing of *karmas* without desire or longing and passion, and without *sanikalpa*, will, volition, resolution, determination, to perform any ritual observance. BG¹³ IV. 20 says that a person engaged in doing *karmas* (*karmaṇyabhipravṛtta*), does no works or actions (*na kiñcit karoti*) if he has renounced not the works but attachment to the results or fruits of actions (*karmaphalāsaṅgaṃ tyaktvā*). BG IV. 41 says that those *karmas* are not binding (*na karmāṇi nibadhnanti*) which are *yogasannyastakarmas*, *karmas* renounced through *yoga*.

BG V. 10 says that the *yogī* does actions after renouncing attachment (to their results) *karmāṇi saṅgaṃ tyaktvā karoti*. The BG V. 11 says that the *yogīs* perform acts renouncing attachment (*yoginaḥ karma kurvanti saṅgaṃ tyaktvā*). BG V. 12 makes the position clear beyond doubt : it

¹² *Ibid*, text p. 46.

¹³ See also BG V. 7-9 where it is explained that *Karmayogī* while engaged in worldly and bodily activities does not do anything (*naiva kiñcit karoti*).

speaks of *karmaphalam tyktvā*, renunciation not of action but of the fruits of action as the means to supreme peace; on the other hand, the person who is attached to the fruits of action (*karmakāreṇa phale sakto*) is bound by them. That is why BG¹ V. 13 speaks of renunciation of all *karmas* by mind (*sarvakarmāṇi manasā sannyasyāste*) that is, performing actions without attachment. So BG. VI. 1 speaks of doing actions without depending upon the results of those actions (*anāśritaḥ karmaphalam kāryam karma karoti*). BG XVIII. 2 distinguishes between renunciation (*sannyāsa*) of *kāmya karma* (motivated *karmas*) and renouncing the fruits of action (*karma-phala-tyāga*). BG. III. 8 emphasises that without *karma* one cannot maintain one's body. BG. XVIII. 11 proclaims that embodied beings cannot give up actions (*karmas*) but can renounce the fruits (*karma-phala-tyāga*). In fact BG III. 26 and 29 appeal to enlightened persons not to create intellectual doubt about the utility of *karmas*. In short the *Īśa Upaniṣad* and the *Bhagavadgītā* teach not the renunciation of *karma* but the renunciation of *karma-phala*, results of actions. The doctrine of *niṣkāma karma*, unattached selfless activity, permits integration of *jñānayoga* and *karmayoga*, BG III. 20-25 emphasise the need for actions (*karmas*) by a *karmayogī* in the interest of *lokasaṁgraha*, preservation of society, so that it does not disintegrate due to the common man becoming apathetic, slothful, inactive and his withdrawing from the world by imitating the philosophy of renouncing *karmas*. It is in this sense that the *Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* (I. 17-8) emphasises the complementary role of *karma* (action) and *jñāna* (knowledge); as a bird flies with two wings, so can a man attain the highest station (*paramam padam*) only through knowledge and work; each by itself cannot lead to *mokṣa*. Rāmānuja in *Śrībhāṣya* 1. 1. 1 (para 9) recognised that *karman* performed without desire for fruit can promote desire for knowledge (*vividi-ṣotpatti*). In short, *niṣkarmavāda* was an answer to *akarmavāda*: it enabled a reconciliation between *jñāna* (enlightenment) and *karma*, between *nivṛtti* (aversion to worldly activity) and *pravṛtti* (predilection for worldly activity), between *karma* and the ideal of *mokṣa*.

But the BG's philosophy of *niṣkāma-karma* suffered from two limitations: (a) *Niṣkāma-karma* may be sterile so far as the doer is concerned inasmuch as its *phala* or moral merit does not bind the doer. But the *karma* as such is not abortive. It must produce its moral fruits or results in due course of time: detached action is not fruitless or resultless action; a fruitless *niṣkāma-karma* will render it meaningless. But the BG leaves it unexplain-

¹⁴ See also BG VI. 4 *Saṁkalpa-sannyāsa*: renunciation of desires.

ed as to who experiences the results of such *karma* or what happens to the *karma* potential generated by the detached performance of an act.

(b) Secondly and more importantly, the doctrine of *niṣkāma-karma*, however profound, is not practicable. Certain activities are primary, being essential for the preservation and perpetuation of the species : food gathering for sustenance, leading to activities of attack and self-defence, procreation or sexual activity (*maithuna-karma*). Further secondary activities, social, economic and political, are essential for orderly and creative human existence. In all such activities, the motivating factor is the likely fruit or result of a particular action or activity. If a person is indifferent to the results of his actions, as taught by the *Bhagavadgītā*, the mainspring or motivating force for the secondary activities will be absent or considerably weakened. The teaching that one should forget about the fruits of action after it has been done may be good philosophy but poor praxis.

Thus *R̥g-Veda* X. 129. 4 and *Atharva-Veda* IX. 19, XIX. 52 recognise *kāma* (desire) as the foremost source of creation. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.22.1 recognises that the prospect of obtaining happiness leads one to activity. *Manu* 11. 2-4 states that *kāma* (desire) is the basis of all activity.¹⁵ In short *kāma* (desire) is inherently inseparable from its *phala* (fruit).

The Buddhists had also realised the dangers of *akarmavāda* implicit in their teaching of *tr̥ṣṇā-nirodha* and this lay at the root of the development of the concept of *bodhisattva*. The *bodhisattva* was the Buddhist expression of *niṣkāmakarma*. The Buddhists came to realise that the *śrāvakayāna* and *pratyekabuddhayāna* were selfish paths as the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* were concerned only with self-realisation and self-emancipation. They practised *svārtha-karma*, *karmas* concerned with self-emancipation. As the *Dammapada* 166.1 emphasises : *Atta-dattham paratthena bahunāpi na hāpaye* : one should not harm or neglect one's own interest for the sake of the good, however great, of another. Theirs was a negative ideal which advocated escape from the world and posed a danger to social stability. Of this Gautama Buddha was himself a shining example. The Buddha in the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* says "full of hindrances is householder's life, a path of the dust of passion How difficult is it for the man who dwells at home, to

¹⁵ Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 1. 1 recognises that *kāma* is the cause of *karma*. Kumārilabhaṭṭa in *Ślokavūrttika* 1. 12 emphasises that even a foolish person will not perform an action without purpose. For detailed exposition see Y. Krishan : "Karma in Bhagavadgītā," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Madras, March 1986, pp. 67-70.

live the higher life in all its fullness, in all its purity, in all its bright perfection.....". In the *Saṃyuttanikāya*¹⁶ II. XV. I. 3 the Buddha teaches that the cycle of existence, birth and death, involves association with what is not wanted and separation from what we desire; hence the flood of tears we shed crying and weeping is greater than the water of the four seas." This situation repels one from all things in the world, causes loss of interest therein and makes one seek his deliverance therefrom. The dangers that this attitude of mind poses to socially and economically purposeful activity and the evolution of a dynamic and creative society and polity are graphically portrayed by Aśvaghoṣa in *Buddha-carita*¹⁷ IX. 49, when he says: If a king delights in quietude (*śama*) his kingdom collapses; if his mind turns to his kingdom, his quietude is ruined. For quietude and severity (*taikṣṇyam*) are incompatible like the union of water which is cold with fire which is hot."

The Buddhists appear to have realised the dangers of the teaching of *trṣṇā-nirodha* *per se* and also the inadequacy of the doctrine of *niṣkāma-karma*. The former threatened the very functioning of the society. The latter, while getting round *karma* as the cause of the cycle of births and deaths at the philosophical level, was unable to provide adequate motivation for purposeful activity. It is this situation which led to the evolution of the ideal of *bodhisattva*.

The Buddhists sought to replace the ideal of *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* pursuing *svārtha-karma* to achieve emancipation by the ideal of *bodhisattva* who adopts the philosophy of *parārtha-karma*¹⁸ and thus engages himself in endless and intense selfless activity for the benefit of humanity: *bahujana-hitāya bahujana-sukhāya sarveṣāṃ mukti-hitāya, sarvasattvānāṃ hita-sukhāya*: for the good, happiness and liberation of all people and beings: (the *Mahāvagga Vinayapiṭaka* i. 11-1; *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* II. 36-37 etc.); *svārtho yasya parārthaḥ*¹⁹ the good of others is his 'selfish' motive. This gave a positive content to the philosophy of suppression of desire as fundamental to *nirvāṇa* and saved it from degenerating into purely selfish goal of emancipation to be achieved by escape from worldly activity. This made the *bodhisattva* a *karma-yogī*.

¹⁶ Mrs. Rhys Davids & F. H. Woodward (tr.); *The Book of Kindred Sayings (Saṃyuttanikāya)*, P. T. S., London, 1922, Vol. II.

¹⁷ E. H. Johnston's translation: *Acts of the Buddha*, Delhi, 1972 (reprint).

¹⁸ Aśvaghoṣa in *Saundarananda* 18. 57 calls it *parakūrya*.

¹⁹ To quote Bhartṛhari: *Nīṭisataka* 71, *ete satpuruṣāḥ parārthagataḥ svārthān parityajya ye*: those are noble men who give up their selfish ends and promote the good of others.

The story in the *Mārkaṇḍeya-purāṇa* 15. 61 of the visit to hell by king Vipāścīt testifies to the impact of the ideal of *bodhisattva* on Hinduism : when king Vipāścīt found that his mere presence in hell brought relief to its suffering denizens, he refused to leave hell and go to heaven (*na dhyāsyāmi*) so long as these people suffer (*yāvadete suduḥkhitāḥ*).

In the *Samayasāra* 332, Kundakunda recognises that *karma* (born of desire) makes a being *aṇṇāṇī* (ignorant) and *karma* (devoid of desire) enlightens (*ñāṇī*) him ; *karma* makes him asleep and awakens him. So in Jainism too, the ideal of selfless service finds echo in the concept of *parārtharasika* (lover of doing good to others) as expounded by Haribhadra Sūri (8th cent. A. D.) in his *Yogabindu* 272. Such persons possess *samyagdṛṣṭi*, true spiritual insight. They are *sayogakevalī* of the 13th *guṇasthāna*. Haribhadra, therefore, equates *tīrthaṅkaras* with *bodhisattvas*.

Jainism, however, did not stimulate strongly the ideal of altruistic selfless activity because of its peculiar doctrine that *karma* is a kind of subtle matter which could be got rid of by *tapas*, austerities : *karma* is *mala*, impurity to be purged (*nirjarā*). This made it possible to achieve the shedding of *karmas* by a more feasible praxis of *tapas*, austerities, than by the strongly abstract and largely impracticable doctrine of *niṣkāma-karma*.

The *bhakti-mārga* or the path of devotion, provided an alternative answer to the problem posed by the philosophy of *jñāna-mārga* in the pre-*niṣkāma-karma* phase eschewing all activity and renouncing evil life to attain liberation. The path of devotion taught not abandonment of actions but their surrender (*sanyasya*) to the Lord, not renunciation but taking refuge (*śaraṇa*) in God and His grace (*prasāda*) and thereby one attains the supreme state or *mokṣa* (*BG XVIII. 56, 57, 66*). It did not mean stoppage of activity but performing actions on His behalf. It meant dedication of *karmas* as distinct from renunciation of actions or of their results. Evidently it was comparatively more practical than the philosophy of *niṣkāma-karma*. But it virtually negated the law of *karma*. Because of this conflict between *karma* and *bhakti*, the cult could not win widespread philosophical acceptance and became the source and strength for ritualistic practices.

It would be evident from the foregoing that the doctrine of gnosis, *jñāna-mārga*, developed because the doctrine of *karma* fell short to provide an inadequate answer to the problem of suffering : *karma* was, in itself, considered evil ; so the *jñāna-mārga* in its first phase taught renunciation including abandonment of *karma* or activity. It was only in the later phase that the

dangerous implications of the teaching of renunciation of *karma* were realised by the *Bhagavadgītā* and Buddhism. A *jñānī* or gnostic may cultivate renunciation, not of action but of the *karma-phala*, the results of that action. The logical and creative implications of the doctrine of *niṣkāma-karma* were realised by the Buddhists. From the negative ethic of renunciation of an *arhat*, they developed the positive ethic of detached altruistic activity of the *bodhisattva*.

From the sociological point of view, the ethical doctrine of *karma*, rooted in the desire for better life, was the means of preserving society against ruthless and unrestrained selfishness and uninhibited hedonism of man. The doctrine of *niṣkāma-karma* was intended to save society from the disintegrating impact of the philosophy of *jñāna*, gnosis, leading to renunciation of life and the ideal of terminating the life process itself. The ideal of *bodhisattva* provided a rationale for intense selfless *karma* for the benefit of 'fellow' beings. Consistent with the doctrine of *tr̥ṣṇā-nirodha*, it repudiated *karma* for personal benefit; it infused *niṣkāma-karma* with the impulse to work for universal benefit.

THE LAṆKĀ WAR AND ITS WEAPONS

BY

BIBEK DEBROY & DIPAVALI DEBROY

I

A large amount of research work has been devoted to the dating of the events described in the *Vālmiki-Rāmāyaṇa* and the dating of its composition: establishing the precise location of Rāvaṇa's Laṅkā, discussing the historicity or allegorical nature of the epic, and analysing the traits of the protagonists involved. We need not catalogue the results of such research here. Suffice to say that, in comparison, not enough attention seems to have been paid to the weapons used in the Laṅkā War.¹ The intention of the present paper is to discuss the weapons used in the Laṅkā War, as depicted in the *Vālmiki-Rāmāyaṇa*.² By weapons, we mean the word *astra* in its more general usage. That is, the term *astra* encompasses weapons that are of clearly mundane character. The word *astra* is not equated, as has sometimes been the case, with "magical weapons".³ Correspondingly, the word *divyāstra* is used in its commonly understood sense of a divine, celestial or suprahuman missile, fantastic and wonderful in nature.

The broad scheme of the paper is as follows. Section II gives an overview of the main skirmishes in the Laṅkā War. Section III discusses the usual run of the mill *astras*, while Section IV is devoted to weapons that are exceptional or *divya* in nature.

II

Rāma's skirmishes with the *rākṣasas* really begin in the *Arāṇyakāṇḍa*, although the *Bālakāṇḍa* does contain the incidents of Tāṭakā, Mārīca and Subāhu.⁴ The *Arāṇyakāṇḍa* has the Virādha episode, which does not

¹ See however, V. R. R. Dikshitar, *War in Ancient India* and H. D. Sankalia, *Rāmāyaṇa, Myth or Reality*, for very general and broad-based discussions. Also see, P. C. Dharma, *The Rāmāyaṇa Polity*, 1941.


² References are to the critical edition, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1960-67. There are no references to the *Uttarakāṇḍa*. Although this *kāṇḍa* does mention *astras*, they have nothing to do with the Laṅkā War. There is also the question of the clearly later date of composition of this *kāṇḍa*. See, A. A. Macdonell, *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, and M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*.

³ Sankalia, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61, and Dharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

⁴ I. 25. 1-22 and I. 29. 10-23.

belong to the genre of skirmishes with the residents of Laṅkā.⁵ The first proper skirmish between Rāma and the *rākṣasa* denizens of Laṅkā, or their relations, is Rāma's vanquishing of Khara and Dūṣaṇa.⁶ Next comes Rāvaṇa's abduction of Sītā and there is a description of the weapons used by Rāvaṇa in his bout with Jaṭāyu.⁷ Nothing further can be gleaned about weapons till the *Sundarakāṇḍa*. Hanūmān's trip to Laṅkā is followed by his killing Jambumālin in a bout and Rāvaṇa's son Akṣa in another bout.⁸ Indrajit then captures Hanūmān in the course of a third bout.⁹

These events form the backdrop against which the main pageant of the Laṅkā War unfurls in the *Yuddhakāṇḍa*. A description is given of the battle stations of the main *rākṣasa* warriors or defenders and those of the major warriors in Rāma's army.¹⁰ A schematic diagram of this is given in Figure 1.



⁵ III. 2. various ślokas and III. 3. various ślokas.

⁶ III. 21. various ślokas to III. 29. various ślokas.

⁷ III. 49. various ślokas.

⁸ V. 42. various ślokas and V. 45 various ślokas.

⁹ V. 46. various ślokar.

¹⁰ VI. 27. 16-22 and VI. 28. 24-36. Vulgate editions sometimes include a preliminary wrestling match between Rāvaṇa and Sugrīva which is clearly interpolatory in nature.

It is seen from this that Rāvaṇa took upon himself the defence of the northern or most important gate and that the attack from the north was led by Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, Suṣeṇa and Jāmbavān; Prabhasta defended the eastern gate and faced Nīla; Mainda and Dvīvida; Mahāvīryya, Mahāpārśva and Mahodara defended the southern gate and faced a combined strength of Aṅgada, Mahadvala, Ṛṣabha, Gavākṣa, Gaja and Gavaya; Indrajit was entrusted with the task of defending the western gate and he faced Hanūmān, Pramāthi and Praghasa. Virūpākṣa marshalled the forces in the centre of Laṅkā, while Sugrīva led the assault from the north-east.

The schema of Figure 1 does not quite agree with an alternative layout which is described subsequently.¹¹ This is depicted in Figure 2. While the




Figure 2

¹¹ VI. 32. 17-24. The contingent in the lower left-hand corner of Figure 2 were to circum-ambulate and join the battle wherever deemed necessary. Actually, it is not quite clear who attacked from the north-east and who from the north-west. All that is clear is that Dhūmra and Gavākṣa were to either side of Rāma.

battle stations of the defenders are unaltered in the two figures, those of the attackers have changed considerably and the two schemes are obviously inconsistent. True, Figure 1 represents the position prior to any attack taking place and Figure 2 that in the course of the first round of attack. The attackers might simply have switched positions for convenience in attacking. This argument is however not terribly convincing. There are also two Gavākṣas in Figure 2 and it is unlikely, though not impossible, that there were two valiant warriors of the same name in the invasionary force. Figure 1 is in fact more consistent with later descriptions of the battle.

For convenience, let us designate various rounds of attack by Roman numerals. Let us consider what happens in round I, the round that Figure 2 purports to depict. There were numerous duels, Nikumbha*-Nīla, Tapana*-Gaja, Praghāsa*-Sugrīva, Virūpākṣa*-Lakṣmaṇa, Vajramuṣṭi*-Mainda, Aśaniprabha*-Dvividā, Vidyumnālin*-Suśeṇa, Indrajit-Aṅgada, Prajaṅgha*-Sampāti, Śatrughna-Vibhiṣaṇa, Jambumālin-Hanūmān, and finally, Agniketu*, Rāsmiketū*, Suptaghna*, Yajñakopa*, all together with Rāma.¹² The inconsistencies are obvious. In the first place, the casualties on the *rākṣasa* side are too good to be true. In the second place, Jambumālin had already been killed, although there might have been more than one *rākṣasa* of the same name. Thirdly, why should Virūpākṣa, who was entrusted with the reserve forces in the centre of Laṅkā, get embroiled in round I? In fact, we will discover later that Virūpākṣa, far from being killed in round I, survived till a much later bout. Continuing in the same vein and referring back to Figure 2, there is no reason why Gaja, who was also in some sort of a reserve contingent, should get involved in round I.

Subsequent *śloka*s describe a duel between Indrajit-Aṅgada (unlikely in view of Figure 1) and bouts between Yajñāśatru, Mahāpārśva, Mahodara, Vajradanīṣṭra, Śuka, Sāraṇa and Rāma (also unlikely in view of both Figures 1 and 2)¹³ They also describe bouts between Indrajit and Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, in the course of which the latter are knocked unconscious by Indrajit's noose of snakes or snake-like arrows and have to be rescued by Garuḍa.¹⁴ These skirmishes also seem unlikely in view of the layouts of the figures given above and may have been later interpolations.

¹² VI. 33. 6-46. Throughout, the antagonists of a duel are hyphenated, with the *rākṣasa* name coming first. The *rākṣasa* Praghāsa is not to be confused with the non-*rākṣasa* Praghāsa. [An asterisk connotes that the participant was slain in the course of the duel.]

¹³ VI. 34. 19-20 and VI. 34.27-28.

¹⁴ VI. 34. 29-30 to VI. 40. 64.

The first real, as opposed to imaginary, attack (let us call this round II) must have been Dhūmrākṣa's attack. This is clearly described as having been launched by the *rākṣasas* from the western gate.¹⁵ The eventual duel was Dhūmrākṣa*-Hanūmān and this is precisely the sort of duel that Figure 1 would lead one to expect. The next wave of attack, round III, was presumably a western one (although there are no clear indications) since it was launched by Akampana and ran plumb into Hanūmān. The Akampana*-Hanūmān duel did not last very long.¹⁶ It is interesting to note that the initial *rākṣasa* attacks were launched towards the west (and the south). Obviously a breakout should not have been attempted in the north, where the strength of the invading army was concentrated. Stung by the reverses of rounds II and III, Rāvaṇa makes a curious statement. Lamenting over the failure of these attacks, he states that the only leaders left who are capable of leading the *rākṣasa* hordes are Rāvaṇa himself, Prahasta, Indrajit and Nikumbha.¹⁷ Kumbhakarṇa and Atikāya are not included in the list. Nor is there any mention of Virūpākṣa, Mahāvīryya, Mahāpārśva and Mahodara, all important leaders according to the scheme of Figure 1. The only *rākṣasa* warriors who had been slain so far were Dhūmrākṣa and Akampana, in what were very minor attacks compared to what was to come. Consequently, such despondence on Rāvaṇa's part seems illogical.

The next round of attack, round IV, launched by the *rākṣasa* warriors via the eastern gate was a much more powerful one.¹⁸ This was led by the general Prahasta, aided by Narāntaka, Samunnata, Mahānāda and Kumbhahanū. There were a number of swift duels, Narāntaka*-Dvivida, Samunnata*-Durmukha, Kumbhahanū*-Tāra, Mahānāda*-Jāmbavān, Prahasta*-Nīla.¹⁹ Jāmbavān fighting at the eastern gate is odd (vide Figure 1), but he may of course have moved off from the northern gate to help counter the offensive launched by the *rākṣasas*. After the death of the main defenders of the eastern gate, the *rākṣasas* launched another major offensive, round V, along the north and the east. Rāvaṇa entered the fray, accompanied by Akampana (who had apparently already been killed by Hanūmān in round III), Indrajit, Atikāya, Mahodara, Piśāca, Triśirā, Kumbha, Nikumbha and Narāntaka (who had apparently already been killed by Dvivida in round IV).²⁰ The other names were probably added as embellishments, since

¹⁵ VI. 41. 29.

¹⁶ Prior to this, some vulgate editions mention an attack launched through the southern gate by Vajradakṣṭra and a Vajradakṣṭra*-Aṅgada duel.

¹⁷ VI. 45. 6.

¹⁸ VI. 45. 29-30.

¹⁹ VI. 46. 15-16, 44-46.

²⁰ VI. 47. 15-24.

Akampana and Narāntaka had already been killed and there is no reason why Indrajit and Mahodara should figure in an attack launched towards the north and the east (vide Figure 1). The topographic layout described makes some of the duels depicted plausible, such as Rāvaṇa-Sugrīva, Rāvaṇa-Suśeṇa, Rāvaṇa-Nīla, Rāvaṇa-Lakṣmaṇa and Rāvaṇa-Rāma.¹ In the course of these bouts, Rāvaṇa more than holds his own against Lakṣmaṇa, using an *āgneya astra*, arrows received from Brahmā and a *śakti* received from Brahmā in the process, but is beaten back by Rāma. Figure 1 suggests that some of the other duels described, such as Rāvaṇa-Gavākṣa, Rāvaṇa-Gavaya, Rāvaṇa-Ṛṣabha and Rāvaṇa-Hanūmān must have been exaggerations.²²

Having failed in his purpose, Rāvaṇa decided to wake up Kumbhakarṇa. The direction from which Kumbhakarṇa launched his attack, round VI, is never very clear, although the main bouts, such as Kumbhakarṇa-Hanūmān, Kumbhakarṇa-Sugrīva and Kumbhakarṇa*-Rāma would suggest that it was towards the north-west.²³ But Kumbhakarṇa is also described as having fought with Ṛṣabha, Śarabha, Mainda, Dhūmra, Nīla, Kumuda, Suśeṇa, Gavākṣa, Rambha, Tāra, Dvidida and Panasa.²⁴

A somewhat chaotic attack, round VII, was next launched by the *rākṣasas*. The main warriors involved were Triśirā, Atikāya, Devāntaka, Narāntaka (who had already been killed by Dvidida in round IV), Mahodara and Mahāpārśva.²⁵ Nikumbha is not mentioned and Mahāvīrya must have stayed on to defend the southern gate. The attack spread out in all the four directions as the duels Narāntaka*-Aṅgada, Devāntaka*-Hanūmān, Mahodara*-Nīla, Triśirā*-Hanūmān, Mahāpārśva*-Ṛṣabha and Atikāya*-Lakṣmaṇa demonstrate.²⁶ Atikāya had initially attacked from the east and after having fought with Kumuda, Dvidida, Mainda, Nīla and Śarabha, took on Lakṣmaṇa in the north. He acquitted himself quite creditably in his encounter with Lakṣmaṇa, using a *sūryyāstra*, a *tvāṣṭra aiśika astra* and a *yāmya astra* in the process.²⁷ With Prahasta, Mahāpārśva and Mahodara slain, Laṅkā's defences must have been considerably weakened, particularly towards the east and the south. There followed a haphazard attack (round VIII) by Indrajit in the course of which he triumphed over Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa with the use of a *brahmāstra*.²⁸ This strikes one as implausible.

²¹ VI. 47. 35, 38, 65-67, 71, 78-101, 124. ²² VI. 47. 40, 58, 113.

²³ VI. 55. various ślokas.

²⁵ VI. 57. 16-22, 28, 30.

²⁴ VI. 54. 29.

²⁶ The following ślokas *et sequens* VI. 57. 85, VI. 58. 11, VI. 58. 26, VI. 58. 35, VI. 58. 43 and VI. 59. 86.

²⁷ VI. 59. 86-90,

²⁸ VI. 60. 33-43.

At a time when the defences were crumbling, it is inconceivable that Indrajit should launch a counter-attack, particularly against Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa. That the defences had crumbled is clearly seen from the successful attempt of the invading army to set Laṅkā on fire.²⁹ This must have been the true firing of Laṅkā's walls, Hanūmān's solo effort must have been a later interpolation.

With the walls fired, the *rākṣasas* had no option but to come out into the open and fight. They were led by Kumbha and Nikumbha.³⁰ They scattered in all directions, but primarily southwards and eastwards. Kumbha proved to be a valiant warrior and Rāma had to send Jāmbavān, Suśeṇa and Vegadarśi to the rescue.³¹ Hanūmān and Sugrīva must also have hastened southwards, as the duels Kumbha*-Sugrīva and Nikumbha*-Hanūmān. A subsequent Makarākṣa*-Rāma bout was remarkably swift. This constitutes round IX of the skirmish.

The sole warriors of repute left alive on the *rākṣasa* side were now Rāvaṇa himself, Indrajit, Virūpākṣa and Mahāvīrya. Indrajit stayed invincible (round X) with the use of *māyā* and fought with Lakṣmaṇa using *divya* weapons.³² But the encounter Indrajit*-Lakṣmaṇa left only Rāvaṇa, Virūpākṣa and Mahāvīrya to hold the fort. Rāvaṇa himself went out to do battle now (round XI) with Mahodara (who had already apparently been killed by Nila in round VII), Mahāpārśva (who had already apparently been killed by Rṣabha in round VII) and Virūpākṣa in tow. One never learns what became of Mahāvīrya or who accounted for him. Virūpākṣa*-Sugrīva, Mahodara*-Sugrīva and Mahāpārśva*-Aṅgada duels followed. Rāvaṇa used a number of *divya* weapons.³³ These proved to be of no avail and the Rāvaṇa*-Rāma encounter terminated the war for Laṅkā.

III

Such then is the broad outline of the war for Laṅkā. What weapons were used in these skirmishes? The weapons were, by and large, perfectly ordinary. The sole exceptions were some rather special weapons used by Rāvaṇa, Atikāya, Indrajit, Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa.³⁴ There are various ways in which *astras* can be categorised. There is the obvious *amukta*, *yantramukta*, *hastanukta* and *muktāmukta* classification.³⁵ Instead of getting involved in this taxonomy, we simply enumerate the *astras*.

²⁹ VI. 62. 1-23.

³⁰ VI. 62. 37.

³¹ VI. 63. 22-26.

³² VI. 67. 14, VI. 78. 14-20.

³³ VI. 87. 7, 38, VI. 88. 2-8, VI. 90. 14-16 etc.

³⁴ VI. 7. 9-10, VI. 47. 78-83, 98-101, VI. 59. 86-90, VI. 60. 41-43, VI. 67. 14-40, VI. 78. 14-20, VI. 87. 7, 38, VI. 88. 2-8 etc.

³⁵ See, K. P. Bahadur, *A History of Indian Civilisation*, Vol. I, and D. Debroy "Weapons of the Kuruksetra War", *ABORI*, Vol. 65, 1984.

There were natural weapons like the use of brute physical strength, blows with fists and feet, bouts of wrestling and the hurling of stones and trees. Trees and stones feature in Khara and Dūṣaṇa's fight with Rāma (*sālātālaśilāyudhāḥ*).³⁶ In the actual Laṅkā War as well, *rākṣasas* used trees to fight with. Kumbhakarṇa in particular, spurned the use of more usual weapons and used trees and the peaks of mountains.³⁷ He also indulged in a wrestling match with Sugrīva.³⁸ Narāntaka used his fists, as did Kumbha.³⁹ The *vānaras* used trees, hills and chunks of stone.⁴⁰ On occasion, a *rākṣasa* and a *vānara* used their teeth on each other.⁴¹ Ploughs are also mentioned as having been used in the fighting.

The most common artificial weapon was the bow and arrow. The various synonyms for an arrow, often signifying different types of arrows include : *añjalika*, *ardhacandra*, *ardhanārāca*, *bhalla*, *candravaktra*, *dhūmaketumukha*, *grahavaktra*, *gṛdhramukha*, *īhānṛgamukha*, *iṣu*, *kākamukha*, *kaṅkamukha*, *karṇī*, *kharamukha*, *kṣura*, *kṣurapra*, *kukkuṭavaktra*, *makarānana*, *nakṣatravaktra*, *nālīka*, *pañcāsya*, *prasannāgra*, *śalya*, *śilī*, *mukha*, *siṃhamukha*, *śṛgālavādāna*, *sūryamukha*, *śvānamukha*, *śyenamukha*, *śara*, *siṃhadanīṣṭra*, *sāyaka*, *ulkāmukha*, *varāhamukha*, *vatsadanta*, *vipāṣa*, *vāṇa*, *vyādītāsya*, *vyāghramukha*, *vikarṇī*. The trouble with stating categorically that these were all different types of arrows is that it is not always clear whether a term is being used in a literal or metaphorical sense. Such for instance would be the problem with an arrow that is referred to as *vyādītāsya*.⁴² There are also terms that refer clearly to the flight paths of arrows and need not connote separate types of arrows : *adhogati*, *āsuga* and *mārgaṇa*. Similarly, other terms refer to the tassels or decorations on the arrows and need not connote different types of arrows : *kaṅkapatrin*, *rukmapuṅkha*.⁴³

The inclusion of *nālīka* in the catalogue of arrows might seem surpri-

³⁶ III. 24. 27.

³⁸ VI. 55. 48, 114.

⁴⁰ VI. 46. 5, 31, 41-45.

³⁷ Also see, VI. 53. 32.

³⁹ VI. 57. 85 and VI. 63. 46-47.

⁴¹ VI. 46. 38.

⁴² This is the problem with Dharma's taxonomy, where *agnidīptamukha*, *lelihāna*, and *vidyujjihvopama* are included in the catalogue of types of arrows. Dharma also identifies *nārūca* as an arrow made out of iron. This is of course not clear from the internal evidence of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, although *Amarakoṣa* (2. 8. 87) does give this definition. Dharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-85.

⁴³ Dharma however includes these in the catalogue of different types of arrows. In connection with flight paths, arrows are also described as being *ajihmaga* or having straight paths (III. 49. 9), but this does not indicate that *ajihmaga* was a type of arrow. All it presumably implies is that arrows which had curved paths were not unknown. Dharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-85.

sing.⁴⁴ It is however in several instances mentioned in association with arrows. The following *śloka* clearly identifies *nālīka* as being of the same category as *nārāca* and *vikarṇī*.⁴⁵

tato nālīkanārācaistīkṣṇāgraiśca vikarṇibhiḥ |
ājaghāna raṇe rāmaṁ totirairiva mahādvipam ||

Iron was used in making arrows.⁴⁶ Gold and jewels were used in decorating both bows and arrows.⁴⁷ Arrows had tassels or trails of gold as well as of feathers.⁴⁸ Arrows were shot in groups or droves, one after the other.⁴⁹ And arrows were usually countered with arrows.⁵⁰

While the age was thus clearly one of archery, weapons like spears were also used in the war. This class consisted of *śūla*, *parigha*, *śakti*, *tomara*, *prāsa*, *daṇḍa* and *triśūla*.⁵¹ These were *muktāmukta* weapons and special mention must be made in this category of Dūṣaṇa's *parigha*, Rāvaṇa's *śakti* and Kumbhakarṇa's *śūla*. Dūṣaṇa's *parigha* was similar to a mountain peak and was encircled with gold. It was encrusted with iron spikes.⁵² Rāvaṇa used his *śakti* on Lakṣmaṇa in round V, a *śakti* that he had received from Brahmā (*svayambhudattāṁ śaktiṃ brāhmyā*). The *śakti* had a boomerang-type property, in that after having knocked Lakṣmaṇa unconscious, it returned to Rāvaṇa's chariot.⁵³ Rāvaṇa used *śaktis* yet again in round XI, first a *śakti* on Bibhīṣaṇa that Lakṣmaṇa split up into pieces with his arrows, secondly another *śakti* that knocked Lakṣmaṇa unconscious. This second *śakti* had eight bells hanging from it and had been built by Maya with the use of *māyā* (*mayena māyāvihitā mamoghāṁ śatrughātiniṁ*).⁵⁴ It seems more

⁴⁴ Following Dr. Gustav Oppert, the tradition of looking upon *nālīka*, *kṣepaṇī* and *śataghñī* as firearms (guns or cannons) has not died down. See: *Sukranītisūtra*; *Vāsiṣṭha Dhanurveda*; Dikshitar, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-106 and Bhattacharya Śāstrī Saptatīrtha, *Mahābhārater Samāj* (in Bengali), p. 504. Alternatively, *nālīka* has also been indentified with a blow gun, T. B. Mukherjee, *Inter-State Relations in Ancient India*. Dikshitar, *op. cit.*, p. 104 and J. C. Roy, *Dhanurveda* (in Bengali), pp. 24, 32-33 take *nālīka* to have been an arrow or a spear with a hollow stem.

⁴⁵ III. 27. 10

⁴⁶ V. 44. 20. The word used is *āyasa* and one can argue about whether *āyasa* should be taken to mean copper, bronze or iron. See A. K. Majumdar, *Economic Background of the Epic Society*, 1977, pp. 165-166. In the epic period, the word probably did signify iron.

⁴⁷ III. 24. 21, III. 27. 20, III. 49. 11, V. 45. 14.

⁴⁸ III. 27. 20, V. 45. 14.

⁴⁹ VI. 34. 20.

⁵⁰ VI. 34. 20.

⁵¹ It is not clear why Dharma, *op. cit.*, p. 83, lists *paṭṭīśa* in this class. *Paṭṭīśa* would seem to have been an *amukta* weapon like a sword.

⁵² III. 25. 4-5.

⁵³ VI. 47. 113.

⁵⁴ VI. 88. 19-31.

likely that Rāvaṇa used a *śakti* to knock Lakṣmaṇa unconscious only once and that of the two incidents in rounds V and XI, one must have been a later interpolation. Although the *Rāmāyaṇa* does not explicitly identify the *śakti* of round V with that, of round XI, it may well have been assumed that Rāvaṇa possessed only one such splendid *śakti*. To explain how a *śakti* used in round V could have been used yet again in round XI, a boomerang-type property might have been ascribed to it. Just as Rāvaṇa's *śakti* seems to have been a cut above the usual kind of *śakti*, Kumbhakarṇa's *śūla* seems to have been a cut above the usual kind of *śūla*.⁵⁵

Another important class of *muktāmukta* weapons comprised weapons like the mace. This class consisted of *mudgara*, *gadā*, *muśala*, *vajra* and *aśani*. That these weapons were made out of iron is indicated: Kumbhakarṇa's *mudgara* is described as *kālāyasaṁ* and the use of this word indicates that *āyasa* should be taken to mean iron rather than copper or bronze.⁵⁶ Khara's *gadā* is described with some eloquence and these passages indicate that the mace class of weapons were heavy and could even be incandescent.⁵⁷ It might be mentioned that *Rāmāyaṇa* sources do not really enable one to identify *vajra* or *aśani* as a mace or a club. But other arguments can be advanced for such an identification of *vajra*.⁵⁸ It then follows that *aśani* must also have been a mace or a club.

Amongst *anukta* weapons the most important were swords (double-edged and single-edged) and scimitars and shields (*carman*). These were huge and sturdy, sharp and bright.⁵⁹ In this list may be included *nistrimśa*, *paṭṭiśa*, *paraśvadhā*, *khaḍga*, *khaṅgiṇa*, *asi*, *ṛṣṭi* and *paraśu*. *Kūṭa* also belongs to this class, although it was more like a dagger.⁶⁰ There is a mention of an iron *paraśvadhā*, oiled, presumably to prevent rusting.⁶¹ Shields were made of *ṛṣabha* skins and were decorated with bells.⁶²

There were some other weapons that were used which are not all that easy to classify. These include *cakra*, *pāśa*, *kṣepaṇī*, *bhindipāla*, *bhuṣuṇḍi*, *śataghñī*, *yaṣṭi* and *aṅkuśa*. Not enough material is available about these weapons to unequivocally determine their character. *Cakra* must have been

⁵⁵ VI. 55. 8-14.

⁵⁶ VI. 55. 104.

⁵⁷ III. 28. 25-27. Khara's *gadā* was also made clearly of iron.

⁵⁸ See, for example, the arguments advanced in A. Dahlquist, *Megasthenes and Indian Religion*, 1962, Motilal Banarsidass reprint, 1977, particularly pp. 126-128 and 152-157. Dharma, *op. cit.*, p. 83, also accepts this identification.

⁵⁹ V. 44. 33.

⁶⁰ Dharma, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁶¹ VI. 86. 18-19.

⁶² VI. 84. 21.

something like a discus. *Pāśa* was probably a lasso, *yaṣṭi* was simply a stick and *anikuśa* was primarily meant for elephants but doubled up as a weapon. We have mentioned earlier that *nālīka*, *kṣepaṇī* and *śataghñī* have been looked upon as firearms. This has also been the case with *bhindipāla* and *bhuṣuṇḍī*.⁶³ The text of the *Rāmāyaṇa* does not contain any evidence to favour such an interpretation. There is, for instance, no mention of smoke, fire or explosive sounds in connection with any of these weapons. Their presentation is without the pomp and grandeur that should have accompanied mentions of firearms in what was obviously an age of archery. It is more plausible to take *śataghñī* to have been a huge piece of stone covered with iron spikes.⁶⁴ *Bhindipāla* may well have been a sling which could hurl stones.⁶⁵ *Kṣepaṇī* cannot be identified except in so far as it was something that was thrown, although Dharma does identify it as a boomerang.⁶⁶ *Bhuṣuṇḍī* cannot be unambiguously identified either. But the above mundane identifications are more consistent with the relatively backward state of technology in the manufacture of arms and weapons as manifest in the indications of spears, arrows, swords and maces. An age beyond the iron age does not seem to be indicated. There is nothing splendid or miraculous about these weapons. Bows, arrows and spears were used in skirmishes held at a distance and swords in close hand-to-hand fighting. When weapons were not at hand, fists and feet were used freely, sticks and trees were used to carry on the fight and wrestling also took place when the need arose.

IV

As mentioned earlier, the sole exceptions to the above broad picture are some rather special weapons used by Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, Rāvaṇa, Atikāya and Indrajit. These were the *divyāstras*. *Divyāstras* were usually given distinctive names after distinct *devas* or gods, for example, *viṣṇucakra*, *brahmāstra*, *aindrāstra*, *āgneyāstra*, *sūryyāstra*, *raudrāstra* and *yāmya astra*. There were also *gāndharva astras*, *rākṣasa astras* and *āsura astras*.⁶⁷ These latter were associated, as their names suggest, with *gandharvas*, *rākṣasas* and *asuras* rather than *devas*. Several missiles are mentioned to have had individual proper names.⁶⁸

⁶³ See footnote (44). For a rejection of this view in the context of the *Mahābhārata* see, D. Debroy, *op. cit.*

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⁶⁸ I. 26. 5-26.

Unlike arrows, which were available in plenty and were shot in groups or droves, *divyāstras* were used one at a time.⁶⁹ A single *gāndharva*, *rākṣasa* or *āsura* missile could however engender a multiplicity of arrows or other weapons. Rāvaṇa's *āsura* missile shot forth a multiplicity of arrows.⁷⁰ Rāvaṇa used a weapon made by Maya that shot forth shining spears, maces and nooses.⁷¹ Rāma's *raudra*, *pāvaka* and *gārutmata* missiles gave rise to a multiplicity of arrows.⁷² Rāvaṇa's *saura* weapon issued out large and shining *cakras*.⁷³ *Divya* missiles could perform actions other than what usual arrows could. Indrajit's *brahmāstra* tied up Hanumān.⁷⁴ Indrajit's *nāga-maya* arrows bound up Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa.⁷⁵ *Divya* missiles could effectively counter other missiles, including other *divya* ones. For example, Lakṣmaṇa used an *āgneyāstra* to counter Atikāya's *āgneyāstra*.⁷⁶ Atikāya used a *sūryyāstra* to counter Lakṣmaṇa's *āgneyāstra*.⁷⁷ These two weapons struck each other in mid-air and burnt each other up.⁷⁸ Atikāya then used *tvāṣṭra aiśika* and Lakṣmaṇa countered it with *aindrāstra*.⁷⁹ Atikāya resorted to *yāmya* and Lakṣmaṇa countered it with *vāyavya*.⁸⁰ Elsewhere, Indrajit shot an arrow given to him by Yama and Lakṣmaṇa countered it with one given to him by Kubera.⁸¹ Rāma's *raudra* and *parama* missiles were negated by Rāvaṇa's *āsura* weapons⁸² and Rāma retaliated with a *pāvaka* missile.⁸³ Rāvaṇa next used a glowing weapon made by Maya⁸⁴ and Rāma countered it with a *gāndharva* weapon.⁸⁵ Rāvaṇa then used a *saura* missile.⁸⁶ During a later encounter, Rāma countered Rāvaṇa's *gāndharva* and *daiva* weapons with his own *gāndharva* and *daiva* ones.⁸⁷ Rāvaṇa retaliated with a *rākṣasa* weapon which shot forth arrows that became transformed into snakes and Rāma countered this with a *gārutmata* missile which shot forth arrows that became *garuḍa* birds.⁸⁸

Thus, *divya* weapons had to be generally countered by other *divya* weapons, although a few instances to the contrary do exist. Rāma used four arrows to chop up in the sky the *śūla* that was given to Makarākṣa.⁸⁹ Rāma

⁶⁹ Rāma shot arrows in hundreds and thousands, Rāvaṇa covered up the sky with his arrows, VI. 88. 59. Rāma spread a net of arrows, (*bhānaugha*), VI. 34. 20. Occasionally, other weapons were also hurled in multiplicity, VI. 88. 55.

⁷⁰ VI. 87. 38-41.

⁷¹ VI. 88. 3-4.

⁷² VI. 87. 33-34, VI. 87. 43, VI. 90. 19-21.

⁷³ VI. 88. 6-8.

⁷⁴ V. 46. 38-40.

⁷⁶ VI. 34. 30.

⁷⁶ VI. 59. 82-87.

⁷⁷ VI. 59. 86.

⁷⁸ VI. 59. 88.

⁷⁹ VI. 59. 89.

⁸⁰ VI. 59. 90-91.

⁸¹ VI. 78. 13-15.

⁸² VI. 87. 33-41.

⁸³ VI. 87. 43-46.

⁸⁴ VI. 88. 2.

⁸⁵ VI. 88. 5.

⁸⁶ VI. 88. 6-8.

⁸⁷ VI. 90. 14.

⁸⁸ VI. 90. 18-22.

⁸⁹ VI. 66. 29-31.

cut up the *cakras* issuing out of Rāvaṇa's *saurāstra* with mere arrows.⁹⁰ There are however abundant instances where *divya* weapons are described as being terrible and extremely difficult to withstand.⁹¹ The bonds of the *brahmāstra* were such that they could not be broken away from, nor could other bonds be superimposed on them.⁹² The *śakti* that Rāvaṇa hurled at Lakṣmaṇa was said to be unfailing in killing enemies.⁹³ Though the encounters between warriors began with arrows, the final outcome was usually decided only by the use of *divya* weapons. Makarākṣa, Atikāya, Indrajit and Rāvaṇa were all ultimately killed with the use of *divya* weapons. The *brahmāstra* that finally decided the war, that is the one that killed Rāvaṇa, was remarkable in that it was a guided missile like a boomerang. After piercing Rāvaṇa's heart, it entered the earth, and then quietly returned to Rāma's quiver.

What is one to make of these *divya* weapons? Talboys Wheeler and Sankalia have argued that *divya* missiles were all imaginary.⁹⁴ The alternative view is that the so-called *divya* weapons were not wonderful or mysterious weapons at all and hence need not be disregarded as having been imaginary. They were mundane and therefore, real weapons. Roy considered the *āgneya aiṣika*, *gāruḍa*, *saura* and *brāhma* weapons of the *Rāmāyaṇa* to have been variations of arrows with fire set to the tips.⁹⁵ The evidence of the *Rāmāyaṇa* does bear this out to a very large degree.

Rāma is clearly stated to have burnt Khara up with an incandescent arrow.⁹⁶ Rāma showered flame-like arrows upon the *rākṣasas*.⁹⁷ Indrajit's *nāgamaya* missiles are clearly stated to have been arrows.⁹⁸ In this connection, we would like to emphasise yet again that, in view of the discussion of Section II, this incident seems to be extremely implausible. And even if the bout in question did take place, the reference to snakes must have been metaphorical rather than literal. Alternatively, the heads of the arrows might

⁹⁰ VI. 88. 6-9.⁹¹ I. 26. 3, 20; VI. 78. 26 etc.⁹² V. 46. 39, 46.⁹³ VI. 88. 30.⁹⁴ J. Talboys Wheeler, *India of the Vedic Age, With Reference to the Mahābhārata*, Vol. I, *The History of India*, and Sankalia, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 15-16, 60. Also, C. V. Vaidya, *Epic India Or India As Described in the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa*, pp. 252-253, also subscribes to this view.⁹⁵ J. C. Roy, *op. cit.* Also, see J. C. Roy, "Firearms in Ancient India", *IHQ*, Vol. 8, Vaidya, *op. cit.*, also mentions this point of view.⁹⁶ III. 29. 24.⁹⁷ VI. 34. 20-21.⁹⁸ VI. 34. 29-30. *adrīyo niśitān bāṇān mumooṣānivaracasah |*
sa rāman lakṣmaṇam caiva ghorairnūgamayaiḥ śaraiḥ ||

have been dipped in snake-venom.⁹⁹ The *śarāsana* is explicitly mentioned in the context of Rāma's *pāvakāstra*.¹⁰⁰ Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa's *divya* weapons are stated to have been arrows bright as the sun.¹⁰¹ The weapons that Atikāya and Lakṣmaṇa used on each other were arrows, in some cases they had burning tips and burnt each other into ashes. These *śloka*s deserve to be quoted at some length :¹⁰²

agneyābhisamiyuktam dṛṣṭvā bāṇam niśācaraḥ |
utsasarja tadā bāṇam dīptam sūryyāstrayojitam ||
tāvubhāvambare bāṇānyonyam abhijaghnatuḥ |
tejasā sampradīptāgrau kruddhāviva bhujaṅgamau ||
tāvanyonyam vinirdahya petaturdharanī tale |
nirarciṣau bhasmakṛtau na bhrājete śarottamau ||
tato 'tikāyaḥ saṁkruddhastvāṣṭramaiṣīkamutsṛjat |
tatpraciccheda saumitirastramaindreṇā vīryavān ||
aiṣīkam nihatam dṛṣṭvā kumāro rāvaṇātmajaḥ |
yāmyenāstreṇa saṁkruddho yojayāmāsa sāyakam ||
tatastadastram cikṣepa lakṣmaṇāyā niśācaraḥ |
vāyavyena tadastram tu nijaghāna sa lakṣmaṇaḥ ||

The missiles given to Indrajit and Lakṣmaṇa by Yama and Kubera had a gain been arrows, possibly incandescent because they had lit up the sky and sparked off smoke and fire on hitting each other.¹⁰³ The *aindra* missile with which Lakṣmaṇa killed Indrajit was a straight-coursed arrow, shot with a widely stretched bow and was like fire to the touch.¹⁰⁴ Rāvaṇa's *tāmasa* weapon, though not stated to be an arrow, is said to have performed a burning action.¹⁰⁵ Rāma's *raudra* weapon was an arrow.¹⁰⁶ Rāvaṇa's *āsura* missiles were arrows with blades of various shapes.¹⁰⁷ Rāma's *pāvaka* weapon consisted of arrows with flaming tips.¹⁰⁸ Rāma's *saurāstra*, which is not stated to have been an arrow and instead issued flaming *cakras*, was despatched with a bow.¹⁰⁹ Rāvaṇa's *rākṣasa* missile seems to have been a set of fire-tipped arrows shot with a bow.¹¹⁰ The evidence is thus overwhelming that fire-tipped arrows were in profuse use in the war and that most of the

⁹⁹ Mukherjee, *op. cit.*

¹⁰¹ VI. 67. 23.

¹⁰³ VI. 78. 16-18.

¹⁰⁵ VI. 87. 7.

¹⁰⁷ VI. 87. 39-41.

¹⁰⁹ VI. 88. 6-8.

¹⁰⁰ VI. 66. 35.

¹⁰² VI. 59. 86-91.

¹⁰¹ VI. 78. 24-30.

¹⁰⁶ VI. 87. 33-34.

¹⁰⁸ VI. 87. 44.

¹¹⁰ VI. 90. 15-17.

so-called *divya*, *gāndharva*, *rākṣasa* or *āsura* weapons were nothing but fire-tipped arrows.

But there are two arguments that work against the dismissing of all *divya* weapons as fire-tipped arrows. In the first place, nowhere is the actual action of attaching something combustible to the tip of an arrow and setting it on fire actually mentioned. This seems curious since weapons are often described in great detail. We learn what tassels or trails (*pakṣa*, *patra*, *pumkha*) arrows had and how they were decorated. When such details are given, why is there not a mention of fire actually being set to the arrowheads? This is especially striking because, in contrast to ordinary weapons, *divya* weapons are often presented in the text with literary flourishes and elaborate introductions.

What we find instead are occasional references to the arrows being charged with incantations or *mantras*. Lakṣmaṇa and Atikāya charged two arrows as *āgneya* missiles.¹¹¹ Atikāya charged an arrow as the *sūryya* weapon.¹¹² When applying the *raudra* missile, Rāma had chanted *mantras* over several arrows and then shot them.¹¹³ Such examples can be multiplied. This was an intrinsic part of the action of using *divya* weapons. In fact, the giving of such weapons by one person to another meant parting with the knowledge of such incantations, as well as the power to control and activate such weapons, rather than parting with the physical possession of the weapons. For example, when Viśvāmitra was pleased to grant *divya* weapons to Rāma, he performed ablutions, faced the east and taught Rāma some incantations that would summon up the *divya* weapons and control them.¹¹⁴ It was on uttering these incantations and repeatedly calling out the names of the *divya* weapons that they came up before Rāma.¹¹⁵ In this incident, the weapons are not described as inanimate objects of wood or iron, but as humanoid forms of pleasant appearance who folded their palms and told Rāma that they would with pleasure perform whatever tasks he asked them to do.¹¹⁶ It is significant that Rāma asked them to remain in his memory when the need arose.¹¹⁷ This implies that the acquisition as well as the retention of the knowledge of *divya* weapons was the most important thing about them.

¹¹¹ VI. 59. 82-86.

¹¹² VI. 59. 86.

¹¹³ VI. 87. 33-34.

¹¹⁴ I. 26. 21-24, I. 27. 1-3.

¹¹⁵ I. 26. 22-24.

¹¹⁶ I. 26.22-24, I. 27.10-13. The weapons were conceived in the wombs of Jayā and Suprabhā, two daughters of Dakṣa, by Kṛśāśva Prajāpati, I. 20. 13-17. They did not have any one specific form, I. 20: 14-17. They could assume any desired form, I. 26. 20, I. 27. 8.

¹¹⁷ I. 26. 24, I. 27. 12. It is precisely in this that *divya* weapons had failed Kaṇa in the Kurukṣetra War.

This is in harmony with the proposition that *divya* weapons were not profusely available in general. The *Rāmāyaṇa* makes this quite clear. For example, Viśvāmitra is said to have been the only one to know of such weapons in all the three worlds ; such weapons were unknown on earth and not known even to the gods, *rākṣasas*, *gandharvas*, *yakṣas*, *kinmaras* and *mahoragas*.¹¹⁸ Daśaratha had been scared of letting Rāma go with Viśvāmitra to the latter's hermitage to fight the *rākṣasas*, since young Rāma was still not sufficiently well-versed in the use of weapons.¹¹⁹ Vaśiṣṭha however argued that this did not matter, since Viśvāmitra knew of weapons unknown to all and would protect Rāma.¹²⁰ The implication is that even if one did not have complete mastery over the usual weapons, he was invincible if he had mastery over the unusual and *divya* ones. This is borne out by Indrajit's being described as superior to all the other warriors and the cause of grief to the *suras* as well as the *asuras* by reason of his acquiring weapons from Pitāmaha Brahmā.¹²¹

These *divya* weapons could not be acquired without some effort. Rāma acquired them only after he pleased Viśvāmitra by killing Tātakā.¹²² Viśvāmitra himself had acquired them after pleasing Mahādeva through meditation and penance.¹²³ Indrajit had acquired them by pleasing Brahmā.¹²⁴ Atikāya had pleased Brahmā through penance and meditation and obtained *divya* weapons from him.¹²⁵ *Divya* weapons are said to have been extremely difficult to acquire. This suggests that *divya* weapons were distinct from run of the mill weapons, men could not make *divya* weapons on their own. Their supply was limited among men because the know-how of their manufacture was restricted to gods, *gandharvas*, *asuras* and the like. The *Rāmāyaṇa* clearly states that such weapons could only be obtained from the *devas*, *dānavas*, *gandharvas*, *yakṣas*, *rākṣasas* and some great sages.¹²⁶ The following table brings out this process of transfer quite clearly. The table indicates that *divya* weapons were certainly not available to all and sundry. Only stalwarts like Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, Rāvaṇa, Indrajit and Atikāya possessed them. Even they had obtained these weapons from extra-human sources, sometimes through powerful sages who were associated with the gods. This suggests that such weapons were not mere fire-tipped arrows. This observation can be supplemented with the statement that these weapons were used only sparingly, only when the occasion justified their use. Lakṣmaṇa did not unnecessarily use his *divya* weapons on Śūrpaṇakhā.¹²⁷ Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa initially used

¹¹⁸ I. 20. 9-12.

¹²⁰ I. 20. 9.

¹²² I. 26. 1-25.

¹²⁴ V. 46. 2, VI. 72. 12.

¹²⁶ I. 54. 17.

¹¹⁹ I. 19. 7

¹²¹ V. 46. 2.

¹²³ I. 54. 12-19.

¹²⁵ VI. 59. 30.

¹²⁷ III. 17. 21.

only bows and arrows when fighting with Khara and his cohorts, they used the *vaiṣṇava* bow and the *brahmadanḍa*-like arrow only later.¹²⁸ Rāvaṇa did not use any *divya* weapons on Jaṭāyu.¹²⁹ Nor did Rāma use any on Vālī.¹³⁰ Indrajit shot his *nāgamaya* arrows only when he had become fatigued and angered by the fight.¹³¹ Makarākṣa and Rāma, although they both possessed *divya* weapons, only exchanged arrows at first, using the *śūla* and *pāvakāstra* only later.¹³² Similarly, Atikāya and Lakṣmaṇa, although they both possessed *divya* weapons, did not start the fight with *divya* weapons.¹³³ Indrajit and

TABLE OF TRANSFER

Name of the weapon	Possessor or user in the <i>Rāmāyaṇa</i>	Original owner or maker	Through whom acquired and how	Reference
Numerous	Rāma	Kṛṣṇāśva Prajāpati	Viśvāmitra, pleased at the killing of Tāṭakā,	I. 20. 13-18 I. 26. 5-20 I. 27. 4-10
Brahmāstra	Indrajit	Brahmā ?	Brahmā, pleased.	V. 46. 2
Unspecified <i>divya</i> weapons	Atikāya	Brahmā ?	Brahmā, pleased by <i>tapas</i> .	VI. 59. 30
<i>Bāṇa</i>	Indrajit	—	Yama	VI. 78. 13
<i>Bāṇa</i>	Lakṣmaṇa	—	Kubera, in a dream.	VI. 78. 15
Unspecified	Rāvaṇa	Maya	—	VI. 88. 2
<i>Śakti</i>	Rāvaṇa	Maya	—	VI. 88. 30
<i>Śūla</i>	Rāma	Śiva	Viśvāmitra	I. 26. 5-20

Lakṣmaṇa initially shot only arrows at each other, Indrajit switching to the arrow given by Yama only when angered by Bibhīṣaṇa, and Lakṣmaṇa bringing out Kubera's arrow only in retaliation.¹³⁴ Lakṣmaṇa used the *brahmāstra* upon Atikāya only when Vāyu advised him that this was the only way in which Atikāya could be killed.¹³⁵ Rāma and Rāvaṇa, although they both possessed several powerful and unusual weapons, had many exchanges with

¹²⁸ III. 27. 19, III. 29. 24.¹³⁰ IV. 16. various ślokas.¹³² VI. 66. various ślokas.¹³⁴ VI. 75. various ślokas, VI. 76. various
various ślokas.¹³⁵ VI. 59. 96-98.¹²⁹ III. 49. various ślokas.¹³¹ VI. 34. 29-30.¹³³ VI. 59. various ślokas.

ślokas, VI. 77. various ślokas, VI. 78.

mere arrows.¹³⁶ Rāma finally clinched the issue by using the *brahmāstra*, but only when Mātali, sent to Rāma by Indra, pointedly asked him to do so. Indeed, Rāma never used most of the numerous *divyāstras* given to him by Viśvāmitra.¹³⁷

The above casts doubt on the hypothesis that these wonderful weapons were merely fire-tipped arrows, although a large number of weapons can indeed be explained as having been fire-tipped arrows. *Divyāstras* were extra-human in origin. Humans could use, but could not construct, such weapons. What these extra-humans were, or what the weapons that cannot be explained as fire-tipped arrows really were, cannot be explained on the textual evidence of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. On the other hand, a belief in firearms would also do violence to the evidence and would be a suspension of disbelief far beyond what the facts warrant.

Part of the problem is that the role of *mantras* or incantations is not very clear, although it is possible to accept the hypothesis that this was probably a superstitious practice of Brāhmanical or priestly origin. In similar vein, it is impossible to say much about the role of *māyā* in battle, as used, for example, by Rāvaṇa and Indrajit.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ VI. 87. various ślokas, VI. 88. various ślokas, VI. 90. various ślokas.
¹³⁷ I. 26. 5-20, I. 27. 4-10.

¹³⁸ VI. 67. 40. *Māyā* may have been an exaggeration designed to explain how the omnipotent Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa could have been worsted in battle by the *rākṣasas*. The word may also have been linked with the name of Maya.

YAKṢA-WORSHIP IN KURUKṢETRA

BY

O. P. BHARADWAJ

The history of Yakṣa-worship goes back to hoary antiquity. It was widely prevalent in India and its neighbouring countries since immemorial times.¹ However, while it may well be called pre-Vedic² there is hardly any justification for describing it as non-Aryan or pre-Aryan.³

In later literature the Yakṣas are usually bracketted with the Asuras, Rākṣasas and Piśācas⁴ and placed by lexicons⁵ in the category of demi-gods like Vidyādhara, Gandharvas, Kinnaras, Guhyakas, Siddhas and Bhūtas. These demi-gods share some peculiar characteristics so that distinction in their worship is often blurred even where the presiding deity is specifically named, as we find in case of Muñjavarṇa. At this tīrtha the same deity has been described as a Piśāci⁶ and Rākṣasi⁷ in the *Mahābhārata* and as a Yakṣiṇī in the *Vāmana Purāṇa*.⁸

The word Yakṣa has been derived from the root *yakṣ* (*yakṣ* + *a*) "to speed on, to manifest", in the sense of "a mysterious being", "a supernatural being revealing himself suddenly" (as did the Yakṣa to Yudhiṣṭhira in the Vana Parvan of the *Mbh.*) as well as in the sense of (*yakṣ-in*) "pursuing, avenging" which reminds us of his later characteristic of "seizing, possessing" expressed in the term 'Yakṣa-graha.' Piśāca (= Piśitāśa) is "one

¹ N. G. Tavarar, *The Essays throwing new light on the Gandharvas, the Apsaras, the Yakshas and the Kinnaras*, Bombay, 1971, p. 57.

² Ibid., p. 58.

³ Anand K. Coomaraswamy, *Yakṣas*, New Delhi, 1971, Intro., p. 3.

⁴ See the account of creation in *Manu Smṛti*, 1. 37 (i):

यक्षरक्षःपिशाचाश्च गन्धर्वाप्सरसोऽसुरान् ।

⁵ E. g. *Amarakośa*, Svarga, 11.

⁶ Cr. ed., Vana, 129. 8; अत्रानुवंशं पठतः शृणु मे कुरुनन्दन ।

उलूखलैराभरणैः पिशाची यदभाषत ॥

⁷ Ibid., Karṇa, 30. 46 : इति तीर्थानुसर्तारं राक्षसी काचिदब्रवीत् ।

एकरात्रशयी गेहे महोलूखलमेखला ॥

⁸ Cr. ed S. M. 13. 39 : उपोष्य रजनीमेकां गाणपत्यमवाप्नुयात् ।

तत्रैव च महाप्राही यक्षिणी लोकविभ्रता ॥

⁹ Suryakanta, *A Practical Vedic Dictionary*, Delhi, 1981, p. 536.

who eats raw flesh" (*piṣitam māmśam aśnāti* = *piṣita* + $\sqrt{aś-a}$).¹⁰ Yakṣa has thus a split personality, as it were, both pleasant and unpleasant, while Piśāca has little pleasant about him. This etymological dichotomy between the pleasant and unpleasant — or benevolent and malevolent — aspects of the personality of Yakṣa persists all along through the ages.

The word Yakṣa occurs several times in the *R̥gveda* (*RV.*),¹¹ the oldest literary testament of mankind and, although the meaning assigned to it is not always free from doubt, it has often been made to yield a sense which is not entirely unhelpful for our purpose. In VII. 56. 16,¹² Yakṣas are mentioned as models of beauty while in X. 88. 13,¹³ Agni is presented as more powerful than even the Yakṣa who, by implication, was counted among the powerful. By contrast in IV. 3. 13,¹⁴ Agni is requested not to visit even secretly the house of one who frequents the abode of the Yakṣa : in VII. 61. 5,¹⁵ the purport appears to be that only immature and unintelligent people believe in strange gods like Yakṣas and in V. 70. 4,¹⁶ the poet prays to the gods to save him from an encounter with a Yakṣa. The word Piśāca, in the only instance of its appearance (I. 133. 5), has undoubtedly a demoniac sense.¹⁷ In the *Atharvaveda* (*AV.*) Yakṣa is called "a soulful prodigy"¹⁸ and "holy folk"¹⁹ on the one hand and "a soul-possessing monster"²⁰ on the other. Piśāca stands for a class of demons who are 'eaters of raw flesh' (*kravyād*).²¹ According to the *Kauśika Sūtra*²² in a rite for curing a person caught by the Piśācas, the medicine-man-priest makes powder of *Pr̥ṣṇiparnī* (*Hemionitis Cordifolia*), performs an offering with *AV.* 1. 35, pours the remnants of that offering on the powder, utters the same hymn on it and besmears the patient with it from top to bottom. The Piśācas were thus

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 430.

¹¹ *Vedic Index*, ii. 182.

¹² ... यक्षदृशो न शुभयन्त मर्याः ।

¹³ ... अग्निं ... यक्षस्यायक्षं तविषं बृहन्तम् ॥

¹⁴ मा कस्य यक्षं सदमिद्धो गा ...

¹⁵ अमूरा विश्वा वृषणाविमा वां न यासु चित्रं ददृशे न यक्षम् ।

बृहः सचन्ते अनृता जनानां न वा निष्यान्यचिते अभूवन् ॥

For interpretation cf. V. S. Agrawal, प्राचीन भारतीय लोकधर्म, Varanasi, 1964, p. 120.

¹⁶ मा कस्याद्भुतकृत् यक्षं भुजेसा तनूभिः । मा शेषसा मा तनसा ॥

¹⁷ A. B. Keith, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads*, Reprint, 1970. Pt. I, p. 74.

¹⁸ X. 8. 43. For English translation and notes see W. D. Whitney, *Atharva-Veda Samhitā*, Two Volumes, Delhi, 1962.

¹⁹ Margaret and James Stutley, *A Dictionary of Hinduism*, New Delhi, 1986, p. 345.

²⁰ X. 2. 32.

²¹ V. 25. 9., Cf. *Vedic Index*, i. 533.

²² 26. 36.

probably already recognised as *grahas* or seizers of human beings in the age of the *AV*.

The position does not change in later Vedic literature. In the *Brāhmaṇas* *Yakṣa* appears only a few times and applies to a 'wondrous thing'.²³ However, they could not have been uniformly held in great esteem as *Kubera*, their king and lord in later literature, is a *Rākṣasa* and lord of robbers and evil doers in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*²⁴ and his hosts appear as plaguing children in the *Sūtras*.²⁵ Thus even while being an ideal for beauty²⁶ the *Yakṣa* is considered an "Evil being".²⁷ This also finds support in the *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads*. The *Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka* couples *Yakṣas* with *Rākṣasas* and *Piśācas* as killers,²⁸ So does the *Śivopaniṣad* (5,3) which justifies their destruction.²⁹ According to the *Sāmarahasyopaniṣad* (v. 7) worshippers of *Yakṣa* are always to be abandoned.³⁰

The ambivalence in the attitude towards *Yakṣa* has left *Piśāca* unaffected. In the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*³¹ and the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*³² (*JB*.) we find him standing in the company of *Asuras* and *Rākṣasas* in opposition to the gods, fathers and men. According to *JB*.³¹ the wife of *Triyaruṇa*, king of the *Ikṣvākus*, was a *Piśāci* and she suppressed the power of their fire. She is destroyed by *Vṛṣa*, son of *Jana*, the domestic priest of *Triyaruṇa*, by reciting some verses of the *Rgveda*. The *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad*³⁴

²³ See e. g. *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, ed. Raghuvara and Lokesh Chandra, 2nd revised ed., Delhi, 1986, iii. 203; and *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, ed. Dieuke Gaastera, Leiden, 1919, 1. 1, 1.

²⁴ XIII. 4. 3. 10.

²⁵ Keith, Op. cit., i. 242.

²⁶ Cf. *Gobhila Gṛhya Sūtra* III. 4. 28, and *Drāhyāyana Gṛhya Sūtra* III. 1. 25 ;
यक्षमिव चक्षुषः प्रियो भूयासम् ।

²⁷ e. g. *AV*. X. 2. 32, Whitney's tr.

²⁸ XII. 5 : नैनं यक्षो न पिशाचो हिनस्ति ।

न जम्भको नाप्यधुरो न यक्षः ॥

²⁹ *Upaniṣad Saṅgraha*, ed. J. L. Shastri, Delhi, 1980, Pt. II, p. 337 :

यक्षरक्षःपिशाचानां ध्वंसनं मन्त्रसत्कृतम् ।

रक्षार्थं बालरूपाणां सूक्तिकानां गृहेषु च ॥

³⁰ Ibid., p. 235 : यक्षोपासकाः सदा त्याज्याः ।

³¹ II. 4. 1. 1 : देवा मनुष्याः पितरस्तेऽन्यत आसन्नधुरा रक्षांसि पिशाचास्तेऽन्यतः ...

³² I. 154.

³³ III. 96 : पिशाची वा इयं त्रियरुणस्य जाया सैनत् कशिपुना छात्रित्वा अभ्यास्त इति । तद् अभिव्या-
हरत् ... इत्येवैनाम् इदम् अमेर् हर ऊर्चम् उद्भवत् सर्वा प्रादहत् । ...

³⁴ *Upaniṣad Saṅgraha*, Delhi, 1980 p. 176.

26 [Annals BORI]

describes the Yakṣas, Rākṣasas, Bhūtas, Gaṇas, Piśācas, Urugas as *grāhas* who seize beings. According to the *Atharva-Pariśiṣṭa*³⁵ a town infiltrated by Piśācas, Rākṣasas and their likes soon suffers destruction of human life by epidemics.

The dual character of Yakṣa survives in Jain and Buddhist works also. Yakṣas and Yakṣiṇīs appear as protectors of Jain Tīrthaṅkaras, each tīrthaṅkara having a Yakṣa and a Yakṣiṇī as attendants.³⁶ They are called Vyan-tara or gods of intermediate status³⁷ and said to be dwelling in unoccupied houses, trees, forests or woods, ponds etc. which are then said to be possessed (*adhiṣṭhita*) by them.³⁸ Their temples known as Yakṣāyatanaś, Yakṣakulas, Yakṣagrahas or Yakṣabhavanas, Yakṣaprāsādas and Yakṣacaityas were located outside the city³⁹ and visited by dubious characters like the robber Vijaya who was in the habit of wandering through gambling dens, drink-saloons, courtesans' houses and cross-roads.⁴⁰ Some Yakṣas are devoted to the Buddha⁴¹ while others molest his followers in their woodland haunts.⁴² In the *Ayakūtajātaka*, Yakṣas, annoyed with the Buddha, on being denied *bali*, plan his assassination.⁴³ There are direct references to sacrificial offerings to the Yakṣa demons in the *Jātakas*.⁴⁴ Malalasekera⁴⁵ classifies different kinds of Yakṣas, known in Buddhism, as spirits, ogres, dryads, ghosts, spooks — generally speaking decadent divinities — beings half deified, having a *deva*'s supernatural powers, particularly as regards influencing people, partly helpful, partly harmful. At many places *Devatā* and Yakṣa are synonymous.⁴⁶ Nonetheless there is a tendency in Buddhism to restrict the designation 'Yakṣa' to demons.⁴⁷ A passage in the *Dīghanikāya* sums up

³⁰ 70. 15. 4. : संप्रविष्टैः पिशाचैर्वा रक्षोभिर्वापि तन्निमैः ।

अचिरान्नगरं तत्र जनमारेण मार्यते ॥

³⁶ Tavakar, op. cit. p. 67. ³⁷ A. Venkatasubbiah, *Vedic Studies*, Mysore, 1932, p. 152.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 152 f.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 153, 156.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 153.

⁴¹ J. R. Haldar in *Religious Life In Ancient India*, ed. D. C. Sircar, Calcutta, 1972, p. 156.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ V. Fausboll, *The Jātaka*, 7 Vols., London, 1962. Vol., III. p. 146 : यन्खा बलि-
कर्म अलभमाना बोधिसत्तस्स कुञ्जित्वा हिमवन्ते यन्खसमागमं क्त्वा बोधिसत्तस्स मारणत्थाय
एकक्खलं यन्खं पेसेसुं ।

⁴⁴ J. R. Haldar, Ibid., p. 155.

⁴⁵ G. P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*, 2 Vols. London, 1960 : Vol. II, p. 675.

⁴⁶ Venkatasubbiah, op. cit. p. 195.

⁴⁷ Coomaraswamy, op. cit. Pt ii, Addenda p. 7.

all the demoniac attributes of a Yakṣa.⁴⁸ In later Buddhist literature they have been degraded to the state of red-eyed cannibal ogres.⁴⁹ The female Yakṣas (Yakṣiṇīs) are in these cases more fearful and evil-minded than the male. They eat flesh and blood and devour even men and corpses. They eat babies and are full of spite and vengeance. Jātaka stories abound in instances of this nature.⁵⁰

In the Epics and Purāṇas the degeneration of Yakṣa to his malevolent self is largely accomplished and he gradually becomes almost a regular member of the Asura-Gandharva-Bhūta-Piśāca-Guhyaka-Vetāla group.⁵¹ It is in keeping with this development that the *Rāmāyaṇa*⁵² derives *yakṣa* from the root $\sqrt{yakṣ}$ "to gobble." Tāḍakā, originally a Yakṣiṇī, becomes a Rākṣasī⁵³ while Ulūkhalemekhalā is at the same time a Yakṣī, Piśācī as well as a Rākṣasī.⁵⁴ Although at one place the *Rāmāyaṇa*⁵⁵ compares them to blooming lotuses in the sky, at another⁵⁶ they are described with the Rākṣasas and horrifying Piśācas as creatures who wander at night. Manu⁵⁷ mentions meat and intoxicating drinks as the food of Yakṣas, Piśācas and Gandharvas. In the *Mahābhārata*⁵⁸ Rākṣasas, Piśācas and others of their group are known as "eaters of raw flesh." They eat human flesh and drink

⁴⁸ Ed. Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, 3 Vols., Nalanda, 1958, Vol. III, p. 157, IX. 3. 9 : अयं यक्खो गह्हाति, अयं यक्खो आविसति, अयं यक्खो हेठेति, अयं यक्खो विहेठेति, अयं यक्खो हिंसति, अयं यक्खो विहिंसति, अयं यक्खो न मुञ्चतीति ।

⁴⁹ Malalasekera, op. cit., p. 676.

⁵⁰ *The Jātaka* (Eng. Tr. of Jātaka Stories), Ed. E. B. Cowel, 3 Vols., London, 1957, *Jātaka Stories* No. 1, 96, 155, 196, 398, 510, 537, 546 etc.

⁵¹ *Abh. Ādi*, 1. 35. & 111. 10-11 : *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* V. 1. 19. Also, *Amarakośa*, *Sva-rūdi Kāṇḍa*, 11.

⁵² VII 4, 13 : रक्षाम इति यैरुक्तं राक्षसास्ते भवन्तु वः ।

यक्षाम इति यैरुक्तं यक्षा एव भवन्तु वः ॥

Cf. *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* 45. 20 (ii) :

खादाम इति ये चोचुस्ते यक्षा यक्षणाद्विज ॥

⁵³ Coomaraswamy, op. cit., Pt. II, p. 5.

⁵⁴ See supra, notes 6, 7. In the *Kathāsaritsāgara* also a Yakṣa named Supratika is turned into a Piśāca by the curse of Kubera. See note 73 infra.

⁵⁵ V. 57. 3 (ii) : भुजङ्गयक्षगन्धर्वप्रबुद्धकमलोत्पलम् ॥

⁵⁶ I. 34. 18 : नैशानि सर्वभूतानि विचरन्ति यतस्ततः ।

यक्षराक्षससंघाश्च रौद्राश्च पिशिताशनाः ॥

⁵⁷ XI.96 : यक्षराक्षःपिशाचान्नं मयं मांसं सुराऽऽसवम् ।

तदन्नाद्येण नान्नव्यं देवानामश्नता हविः ॥

⁵⁸ *Bhīṣma* 82. 44 (i) : राक्षसाश्च पिशाचाश्च तथान्ये पिशिताशनाः ।

blood.⁵⁹ The Yātudhānas and Piśācas steal oblations.⁶⁰ The Yakṣī named Jarā of Rājagṛha is described as *māmsaṣṇitabhojanā*.⁶¹ There are Piśācagrahas and Yakṣagrahas.⁶² One possessed by a Yakṣa soon turns mad and is known as Yakṣagraha.⁶³ The Purāṇas give a detailed account of the nature, food, and habitat of the Piśācas. They are said to dwell or congregate in cremation grounds together with Bhūtas, Vetālas, Yakṣas etc. and move about at twilight frequenting deserted houses, royal roads and doorways.⁶⁴ One who sees them or other demons meets death within nine months. They can be propitiated with small and mean offerings such as food that has been sneezed or stepped on, food mixed with hair, insects or tears, or licked by a dog, or unconsecrated food. They are given offerings of liquor, flesh, rice, curd, sesamum, incense, black cloth etc. They have the power of invisibility and can easily enter the mouth of anyone and penetrate to the intestines and they feed on faeces.⁶⁵ Yakṣas, just by a glance, Rākṣasas, by entering,

⁵⁹ Sautika, 8. 127 & 131-133 ; तथादृश्यन्त रक्षांसि पिशाचाश्च पृथग्विधाः ।
 खादन्तो नरमांसानि पिवन्तः शोणितानि च ॥
 पीत्वा च शोषितं दृष्टाः प्रानृत्यन् गणशोऽपरे ।
 इदं वरमिदं मेच्यमिदं स्वाद्विति चाब्रुवन् ॥
 मेदोमज्जास्थिरक्तानां वसानां च भृशाशिताः ।
 परमांसानि खादन्तः क्रव्यादा मांसजीविनः ॥
 वसां चाप्यपरे पीत्वा पर्यधावन् विकुक्षिलाः ।
 नानावक्रास्तथा रौद्राः क्रव्यादाः पिशिताशनाः ॥

Also Droṇa, 48. 47-48, 51; and Vāmana P., 9. 41-42.

⁶⁰ Anuśāsana, 90. 16 : तिलदाने च क्रव्यादा ये च कोधवशा गणाः ।
 यातुधानाः पिशाचाश्च विप्रलुम्पन्ति तद्विः ॥

⁶¹ Sabhā, 16. 38 : ते चतुष्पथनिक्षिप्ते जरानामाथ राक्षसी ।
 जग्राह मनुजव्याघ्रं मांसशोणितभोजना ॥

⁶² Vana, 219. 51-52.

⁶³ Vana, 219. 51 : आविशन्ति च यं यक्षाः पुरुषं कालपर्यये ।

उन्माद्यति स तु क्षिप्रं ज्ञेयो यक्षग्रहस्तु सः ॥

⁶⁴ Mārkaṇḍeya P., 8. 108. (i) : पिशाचभूतवैतालडाकिनीयक्षसंकुलम् ।

⁶⁵ Ibid., 43. 5 : दृष्ट्वा प्रेतापिशाचादीन् गन्धर्वनगराणि च ।

सुवर्णवर्णान् वृक्षाश्च नवमासान् स जीवति ॥

Vāyu P., Uttara, 8. 281-282 : मधुमांसौदनैर्दध्ना तिलचूर्णं सुरासवैः ।

धूपैर्हार्द्रिकृशरैस्तैलभद्रशुद्धौदनैः ॥

कृष्णानि चैव वासांसि धूपाः समनसस्तथा ।

एवं युक्ताः सुवलयस्तेषां वै पर्वसन्धिषु ॥

Also Brahmāṇḍa P., II. 3. 7, 359-411.

and Piśācas, by afflicting or pressing, drink the blood and eat the flesh and marrow of human beings.⁶⁵

According to the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*,⁶⁷ Rākṣasas, deranged by hunger, attacked, together with Yakṣas, Brahman who had assumed a nightlike body. The Creator cried out to them not to eat, but to protect him. Their king is Kubera, the lord of Alakā.⁶⁸ Ulūkhalā-Ulūkhall are counted among Piśāca couples.⁶⁹ We shall revert to them later.

Still later about the second half of the 11th century A. D., we come across a Yakṣa as gigantic as a mountain in the *Kathāsaritsāgara*.⁷⁰ In the same work⁷¹ Bhūtivarṇa Rākṣasa tells Kāṇabhūti that Yakṣas, Rākṣasas and Piśācas rejoice in the night since, eclipsed by the brilliance of the sun, they wield no power during the day. A Vidyādhari named Madanamañcukā makes an offering of wine, flesh and other dainties with her own hand to Yakṣas.⁷² We hear of a Yakṣiṇī of heavenly beauty, surrounded by many Yakṣas with feet turned the wrong way and squinting eyes, enjoying all kinds of meat and drink.⁷³ Four Pāśupata ascetics stay overnight in a deserted temple of Śiva in a wood where each one of them falls prey to Yakṣiṇī Śṛṅgotpādinī who, playing on a lute of bones, recites a charm which produces

⁶⁶ *Vāyu P.*, Uttara, 8. 191 : यक्षा दृष्ट्वा पिबन्तीह नृणां मांसमसृग्वसाम् ।

रक्षांस्यनुप्रवेशेन पिशाचाः परपीडनैः ॥

⁶⁷ iii. 20. 19-21 : विससर्जार्त्तमनः सायं नाभिनन्दंस्तमोमयम् ।

जगृहुर्यक्षरक्षांसि रात्रिं क्षुत्तृदसमुदभ्रवाम् ॥

क्षुत्तृङ्भ्यामुपसृष्टास्ते तं जग्धुमभिदुद्रुवुः ।

मा रक्षतैनं जक्षध्वमित्यूचुः क्षुत्तृडर्दिताः ॥

देवस्तानाह संविमो मा मां जक्षत रक्षत ।

अहो मे यक्षरक्षांसि प्रजा यूयं बभूविथ ॥

⁶⁸ *Vāyu P.*, Uttara, 8. 190 : यक्षाणां राक्षसानां च पौलस्त्यागस्त्ययश्च ये ।

तेषां राजा महाराजः कुबेरो ह्यलकाधिपः ॥

and *Mbh.* Udyoga, 16. 33.

⁶⁹ *Vāyu P.*, Uttara, 8. 251-254 : 254 (ii) : उपचारोपचारश्च उलूखलउलूखली ॥

⁷⁰ Eng. Tr. *The Ocean of Story*, Tawney C. H., 10 Vols., London, 1924, Vol. II, p. 52.

Also cf. *Mbh.* Vana, 297. 20 : विरूपाक्षं महाकायं यक्षं तालसमुच्छ्रयम् ।

ज्वलनार्कप्रतीकाशमध्वजं पर्वतोपमम् ॥

⁷¹ Vol. I, pp. 76-77.

Particularly in 1. 7. 35 : दिवा नैषां प्रभावोऽस्ति ध्वस्तानामर्कतो जसा ।

यक्षरक्षः पिशाचानां तेन दृष्यन्त्यमी निशि ॥

⁷² *Ibid.*, Vol. VIII, p. 25.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 118.

horns on him. Bewildered he rises up and dances till he falls into the blazing fire from which he is dragged out half-burnt by the Yakṣiṇī and devoured with delight. She is ultimately subdued by their companion Niścayadatta.⁷⁴ A Yakṣa named Supratika is turned into a Piśāca by the curse of Kubera.⁷⁵

The *Nīlamata Purāṇa*⁷⁶ relates a story according to which Kashmir was occupied, as a result of Kaśyap's curse, for six months of each year by Piśācas, who forced the human settlers to retire from the country from the full moon day of Aśvayuja to that of Caitra. The *Grāmadevatā-pratiṣṭhā*⁷⁷ includes Yakṣas among *grāmadevatās* in the company of Pūtanā and others who kill children, Bhūtas, Pretas and Piśācas, Kūṣmāṇḍas, Śākinīs, Ḍākinīs, Vetālas and others. As V. S. Agrawal⁷⁸ has shown the Yākṣa-cult is still widely prevalent in the form of worship of various local male and female deities like Bīrs or Pīrs, Mātās and Yoginīs. However, now it rests more on fear than on genuine respect.

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Having formed an idea of the character of Yakṣas and their kin and of the nature of Yakṣa-worship, we can take up a brief survey of the Yakṣa cult in Kurukṣetra. The observations arising from the evidence of our earliest literary works are, of course, largely relevant in the case of Kurukṣetra which is regarded as the cradle of Indian civilisation. We shall therefore take note of more specific traditions only. In the remote past when the austerities of king Kuru were successful, god Viṣṇu, granting him the desired boons, assigned for the protection of Kurujāṅgala the Yakṣa named Candra, the serpent Vāsuki, the Vidyādhara Śaṅkukaṇṇa, the Rākṣasa chief Sukeśī, the king Ajāvana and the great god Agni.⁷⁹ A Yakṣa was thus associated with the region from the very day it acquired the name Kurukṣetra. A verse

⁷⁴ Ibid., Vol. III, p. 187 f.

⁷⁵ Ibid., vol. I. p. 7.

⁷⁶ Ed. K. De Vreese, Leiden, 1936, vv. 208. 326; cf. M. A. Stein : *Kaḥaṇa's Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, Delhi, 1961, Vol. I, p. 184, n. to v. 710.

⁷⁷ Gustav Oppert, *On the Original Inhabitants of Bhāratavarṣa or India*, Reprint, Delhi, 1972, p. 455.

⁷⁸ Op. cit., pp. 132 ff.

⁷⁹ *Vāmana P.*, Cr. ed. A. S. Gupta, Varanasi, 1967, 23. 39-41 :

तस्य क्षेत्रस्य रक्षार्थं ददौ स पुरुषोत्तमः ।

यक्षं च चन्द्रनामानं वासुकिं चापि पन्नगम् ॥

विद्याधरं शंकुकर्णं सुकेशिं राक्षसेश्वरम् ।

अजावनं च नृपतिं महादेवं च पावकम् ।

एतानि सर्वतोऽभ्येत्य रक्षन्ति कुरुजाङ्गलम् ।

अमीषां बलिनोऽन्ये च भृत्याश्चैवानुयायिनः ॥

common to the *Mahābhārata*⁸⁰ and the *Vāmana Purāṇa*⁸¹ describes the heartland of Kurukṣetra, with a radius of five *yojanas* on all sides and therefore known as Samantapañcaka, as bounded on its four corners by four Yakṣas called Dvārapālas or guardian deities. This core of the country was also named Uttaravedī of god Brahmā.⁸² The four Yakṣas were Tarantuka, Arantuka, Kapila and Macakruka.⁸³ Cunningham⁸⁴ has identified Taran-tuka with Ratan Yakṣa in the N. E. corner, close to the town of Pipli on the G. T. Road near the Sarasvatī, Arantuka with village Ber or Baher to the N. W. of Kaithal where a Yakṣa-kuṇḍa exists, Macakruka with the village Sinkh in the S. E. corner, and Kapila Mahā Yakṣa of Rāmahrada with the present town of Ram Rai in the S. W. corner where we have a *tīrtha* named after Kapila. In place of Rāmahrada the *Vāmana Purāṇa*⁸⁵ names the *tīrtha* Muñjavaṭa which the local tradition connects with a neighbouring village called Barahban. The *Mahābhārata*⁸⁶ describes one Śaṅkhatīrtha, three other *tīrthas*, away from Vinaśana, upstream on the Sarasvatī, where Yakṣas, Vidyādhara, Rākṣasas, Piśācas and Siddhas in thousands subsisted on the fruit of the tree while moving about unseen by human beings.

As the statement appended at the end shows, the identification of the towns associated with the four guardian Yakṣas of Kurukṣetra is by no means free from confusion. Some of the suggestions, even though rather unorthodox, are more in keeping with the traditional geographical definition of Kurukṣetra, as a sacrificial altar given in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* with Khāṇḍava as the southern half, Srughna the northern half, Pariṇat the lower or western half, and Maru or the Rajasthan desert as its Utkara or rubbish heap. V. S. Agrawal⁸⁷ places Macakruka Yakṣa at Jakhala in the N. W. of Kurukṣetra across the Sarasvatī-ghaggar. The name is probably a corrupt form of Yakṣasthala and its location makes it an ideal site for the Yakṣa Dvārapāla in the N. W. corner. There are other centres of Yakṣa-worship

⁸⁰ Vana, 81. 178 : तन्तुकारन्तुकयोर्दन्तरं रामहृदानी च मचक्रुकस्य च ।

एतत्कुक्षेत्रसमन्तपञ्चकं पितामहस्येतरवेदिरुच्यते ॥

⁸¹ S. M. 1. 14.

⁸² The verse is repeated in *Mbh* Śalya, 53. 24 too with प्रजापतेः as a variant of पितामहस्य.

⁸³ The *Vāmana P.* gives Caturmuṣha in place of Macakruka in S. M. 1. 14 (ib.) :
... दन्तरं रामहृदानीचतुर्मुखम् ।

⁸⁴ *Archaeological Survey of India Reports*, Vol. XIV, Reprint, Varanasi, 1970, pp. 89-90, 97-106.

⁸⁵ S. M. 13. 38-39. See note 170 infra. ⁸⁶ Śalya, 27. 19-24.

⁸⁷ *Vāmana Purāṇa - A Study*, Varanasi, 1964, p. 49.

like Jakhepal identified with village Yakṣapālaka⁸ and Patran identified with Pāṭala⁹ in the same region. The *Vāmana Purāṇa*¹⁰ names Mālavaṭa Yakṣa near Pañcanada. Some other Yakṣas are also mentioned in the region.¹¹ The pilgrim is advised to go to Pañcanada after propitiating Rantuka or Arantuka Yakṣa.¹² Since Pañcanada figures as a *tīrtha*, it obviously refers to the place below Multan, now in Pakistan, which went by this name,¹³ and not generally to Panjab as a land of five rivers. If Rantuka or Arantuka was near Pañcanada we have to place one of the Dvārapāla Yakṣas of Kurukṣetra somewhere deep in the Marus which agrees better with its traditional western corner.¹⁴ Placing all the four Dvārapālas to make a much smaller rectangle within the Sarasvatī-Dr̥ṣadvatī *doab* would lead to the conclusion that the geographical definition of Kurukṣetra had shrunk to denote a very small unit by the age of the Great Epic and the Purāṇas.¹⁵

The Ājānāṭiya Sutta¹⁶ contains a vivid description of the Yakkha kingdom of Uttarakuru which, according to Buddhist literature, denoted the hilly region to the north of Kurukṣetra extending from Srughna into the high Himalayas.¹⁷ In the *Dīghanikāya* are mentioned two Yakkhas, Yugandhara¹⁸ and Serīśaka,¹⁹ who were apparently the guardians of the two important towns of Yugandhara or Jagadhari in the N. E. and Śairīśaka or Sirsa in the N. W. The *Mahāmāyūrī*, translated into Chinese in the 4th century A. D.,¹⁰⁰ gives names of numerous localities together with the names of their presiding Yakṣas. Several of these are from Kurukṣetra. The text assigns Kapila

⁶⁸ O. P. Bharadwaj, *Studies in the Historical Geography of Ancient India*, Delhi, 1986, p. 176.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ 18. 44, 53 & 67.

⁹¹ Ibid. 18. 67; & S. M. 13. 24-26. The whole region is called यक्षमण्डल in *Vāmana P.* 18. 59.

⁹² *Vāmana P.*, S. M. 13. 24-26.

⁹³ See E. C. Sachau, *Alberuni's India*, Reprint, Delhi, 1964, Vol. 1, p. 240.

⁹⁴ Marus have been called the Utkara of the Vedī of Kurukṣetra in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* viii. 1. 1. : देवा वै सत्रमासत । ... तेषां कुरुक्षेत्रं वेदिरासीत् । तस्यै खाण्डवो दक्षिणार्ध आसीत् । तूर्जमुत्तरार्धः । परिणजघनार्धः । मरु उत्तरः ॥

⁹⁵ The definition given in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* covers a much bigger area and is co-terminus with the present state of Haryana.

⁹⁶ *Dīghanikāya*, Ed. Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, 3 Vols., Nalanda, 1958 : Vol. III Pāthika Vagga, p. 155 ff. Also, cf. Malalasekera, op. cit., p. 677.

⁹⁷ Cf. O. P. Bharadwaj, op. cit., p. 160. The *Varāha P.*, Cr. Ed. A. S. Gupta, Varanasi, 1981, 81. 33, mentions a hundred towns of Yakṣas on the Śataśṛṅga, a name used for the Shiwalik range.

⁹⁸ IX. 3. 9, v. 3.

⁹⁹ Ibid., v. 4.

¹⁰⁰ See V. S. Agrawal, "The Geographical Contents of the Mahāmāyūrī," *Journal of the U. P. Historical Society*, Vol. XV, Pt. 2, December 1942, pp. 24-52.

Yakṣa to Bahudhānyaka,¹⁰¹ the country about Rohtak,¹⁰² Mālyadhara¹⁰³ and Muñjakeśa¹⁰⁴ to Agrodaka or the present town of Agroha,¹⁰⁵ Kārttikeya to Rohitaka or Rohtaka,¹⁰⁶ Duryodhana¹⁰⁷ and Siddhayātra¹⁰⁸ to Srughna identified with the site of Sugh near Jagadhari,¹⁰⁹ Arjuna to Arjunāvana,¹¹⁰ Purañjaya to Yaudheya,¹¹¹ Sthūṇa to Sthūṇā,¹¹² and the Yakṣa chiefs Tarārka and Kutārārka¹¹³ and the well-known Yakṣi Ulūkhāmekhalā¹¹⁴ generally to Kurukṣetra. The last three immediately remind us of Dvārapālas Tarantuka and Arantuka¹¹⁵ and Yakṣi Ulūkhāmekhalā, wife of Kapila Yakṣa¹¹⁶ of Rāmahrada.¹¹⁷

The *Mahāmāyūrī* is supposed to belong to the class of works called the Dhāraṇīs or “protective spells” which constitute a large and important part of Mahāyānist Buddhist literature. It is one of the five Dhāraṇīs collectively entitled Pañcarakṣā which is extremely popular in Nepal. The other four Dhāraṇīs are Mahāpratisarā for protection against sin, disease and other evils, Mahāsaahasrapramardinī against evil spirits, Mahāśītavatī against hostile planets, wild animals and poisonous insects and Mahā (rakṣā)-mantrānusāriṇī against diseases. The *Mahāmāyūrī*, frequently entitled Vidyārājī, “Queen of secret sciences”, is for protection against snake-poison. It takes its name from the notorious hostility of *mayūra* (peacock) towards the snakes, but was also used as a general remedy for diseases.¹¹⁸

The popularity of the *Mahāmāyūrī* in Kurukṣetra of the 7th century A. D. deserves special notice. In the *Harṣacarita*,¹¹⁹ Bāṇa describes how Harṣavardhana, returning in haste on account of his father's terminal illness, enters the royal palace and finds people performing various kinds of ceremonies and sacrifices and chanting the *Mahāmāyūrī* hymn. This popularity of *Mahāmāyūrī* need not be taken to reflect the spread of Buddhism in the region. In spite of extensive proselytising activity by Gautama Buddha him-

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 27. v. 15.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 27. v. 18.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 27. v. 23.

¹⁰⁵ Cunningham's *Ancient Geography of India*, Calcutta, 1924, p. 395 f.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 27. v. 23.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 28. v. 60.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 28. v. 58.

¹⁰⁹ *Vāmana P.*, S. M. 13. 44-45.

¹¹⁰ Maurice Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, Revised ed., Vol. III, Delhi, 1983, p. 371.

¹¹¹ Ed. P. V. Kane, Reprint, Delhi, 1973, Ch. V. p. 21 ... पञ्चमानसहस्रमायूरी ...
Also, R. K. Mookerji : *Harsha*, 3rd ed., Delhi, 1965, p. 141.

self and zealous royal patronage extended particularly by Aśoka and Kaniṣka, Buddhism failed to make a dent in the religious leanings of the people of Kurukṣetra.¹²⁰ The Nalanda Clay Seal and Sonapat Copper Seal¹²¹ and Madhuban plate¹²² inscriptions of Harṣa describe his father as a *paramādityabhakta* (devout worshipper of Āditya or sun) and *varṇāśramavyavasthāpanapravṛttacakra* (the upholder of Varṇāśramadharma). According to Bāṇa, the conversion of Harṣa and his sister to Buddhism took place only after the completion of his conquests under the influence of the Buddhist ascetic Divākaramitra.¹²³ Even then he did not patronise Buddhism to the exclusion of other religions. His inscriptions refer to him as a Paramamāheśvara (devout Śaiva) and his Sonapat seal as well as the seal presented to him by a village headman, as recorded in the *Harṣacarita*, bore a Nandi device, while his coins carry Śaiva devices.¹²⁴

As observed by Winternitz¹²⁵: "the Dhāraṇīs belong to a period at which Buddhism in India began to be more and more assimilated to Hinduism, while outside India it tended to make compromises and to become contaminated by the popular religions of the countries in question. In the course of time the difference between the Dhāraṇīs and the Mantras belonging to the Tantras became more and more obliterated and finally the Dhāraṇīs were completely supplanted by the Mantras." There is for instance "a Gaṇapati Dhāraṇī, addressed to the Śivaite god Gaṇapati in spite of the fact that it is proclaimed by Buddha." This observation finds full support in the prevalence of Śaivism and Tāntric worship in Kurukṣetra side by side with the popularity of the *Mahāmāyūrī* as testified by Bāṇa. The *Harṣacarita*¹²⁶ narrates the performance of the exordium of the potent rite Mahākālāhṛdaya in the great cemetery by Bhairavācārya with the active assistance of none else than king Puṣpabhūti, the progenitor of the dynasty. The rite was performed in the night and its successful completion involved the subduing of a Vetāla or goblin, a ghost occupying a dead body. The people in the capital city of Sthāṇvīśvara are said to have included worshippers of Caṇḍī and Mahākāla.¹²⁷ The Bhairavācārya too was a Śakta who had offered human flesh to Śakti and Piśācas and thereby secured superhuman powers.¹²⁸

¹²⁰ See O. P. Bharadwaj, *Op. cit.*, pp. 149-165.

¹²¹ See Kiran Kumar Thaplyal, *Inscriptions of the Maukharis. Later Guptas, Puṣpabhutis and Yaśovarman of Kanauj*, Delhi, 1985, p. 186, lines 5-6. The first twelve lines of the two seals are identical, p. 188.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 182, lines 3-4.

¹²³ Thaplyal, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

¹²⁶ Ch. III, p. 49 f.

¹²⁸ Cf. Kane, *op. cit.*, Notes on chapters i-iii, p. 200.

¹²¹ Mookerji, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

¹²⁵ *op. cit.*, p. 373.

¹²⁷ Mookerji, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

Evidently, therefore, the reason for the popularity of the *Mahāmāyūrī* in Sthāṇvīśvara was not the popularity of Buddhism but the fact that it was not considered an exclusively Buddhist text any more.

To some of the Yakṣas the *Mahāmāyūrī* assigns whole Janapadas or districts / regions instead of single towns. Thus Kapila is the presiding Yakṣa of Bahudhānyaka or the region around Rohtak, which was conquered by Nakula after vanquishing the Mattamayūraka Yaudheya warriors in a fierce fight.¹²⁹ Arjuna Yakṣa presides over Arjunāvana which is probably a scribal error for Ārjunāyana, the country where the Ārjunāyanas held sway.¹³⁰ Purañjaya Yakṣa is assigned to Yaudheya which is described as a Janapada in the *Yasastilakacampū*¹³¹ with its capital at Rajapur, identified with the present town of Rajpura situated on the G. T. Road about 25 kms. from Ambala on the way to Ludhiana.¹³² The town would be an appropriate choice for a capital if the Yaudheyas, at any time, controlled the whole of Haryana and Punjab upto the Sutlej as the wide provenance of their coins suggests.¹³³ Yakṣa chiefs Tarārka and Kutārka and the Mahāyakṣī Ulūkhāmekhālā also command a very wide area of influence as they have been assigned to Kurukṣetra generally which was in early ages almost coterminous with the present state of Haryana.

Archaeological evidence also confirms the prevalence of Yakṣa cult almost all over the region. Yakṣa images provide the earliest specimens of lithic art in India.¹³⁴ They can be distinguished by their colossal size, massive build, emphasis on muscular strength, a bulging belly, a turban on head, scarf thrown on shoulders and arms with a knot around the chest, dhoti as a lower garment fastened with a girdle, heavy ear-rings, heavy torque, flat triangular necklace and armlets with feathered projections.¹³⁵ Yakṣa sculptures have been recovered from places scattered all over Kurukṣetra and even across its boundaries :

¹²⁹ *Mbh. Sabhā*, 29. 4-5.

¹³⁰ Cf. V. S. Agrawal, *Geographical Contents of Mahāmāyūrī*, p. 35 n. 8; K. K. Dasgupta, *A Tribal History of Ancient India*, Calcutta, 1974, p. 18.

¹³¹ *Purvakhanda*, ed. Sunder Lal Shastri, Varanasi, 1960, p. 8.

... यौधेयो नाम धाम संपदो जनपदः ।

¹³² See K. K. Handiqui, *Yasastilaka and Indian Culture*, Sholapur, 1949, p. 395.

¹³³ Cf. Jagannath Agrawal, "An Ancient Republic of the Punjab - The Yaudheyagana," in *Dr. M. S. Randhawa Fel. Vol.*, Chandigarh, 1970, pp. 49-55, p. 54; Birbal Sahni, *The Technique of Casting Coins in Ancient India*, Bombay, 1955, p. 7 ff; John Allan, *A Catalogue of the Indian Coins in the British Museum*, Reprint, Oxford, 1967, pp. cxlvii ff., 265 ff. etc.

¹³⁴ V. S. Agrawal, *भारतीय कला*, Reprint, Varanasi, 1987, p. 125.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

i) A head and bust of a colossal Yakṣa image of red sandstone was found at Palwal in Gurgaon district in 1914 and is now deposited in the Provincial Museum, Lucknow (o. 107). The style of the turban and the torque, the necklace and the armlets with feathered projections seen in the side view, all point to the images being an early Yakṣa type that may be assigned to the early Śuṅga period about the second century B. C.¹³¹

ii) Two Yakṣa sculptures have been reported by D. S. Punia,¹³⁷ one from village Bhadas, 63 kms. south of Gurgaon on the Delhi-Alwar road, and the other from village Hathin, 77 kms. south-east of Gurgaon on the Palwal-Hathin road. The Bhadas figure (190×26.67cm.) carved on a railing pillar in red sandstone, with mutilated face and headgear, wearing a dhoti, a seven-stringed bracelet reaching above the navel, seven-stringed armlets and five-stringed wristlets, stands in a Samabhaṅga pose on a fish-tailed Makara. The Hathin sculpture, similarly carved on a railing pillar (142.50 × 25.40 cm.) of red sandstone in Samabhaṅga pose on a Bhāravāhaka dwarf who appears to support the pillar. In this case too the face and headgear are partly mutilated. The figure wears a dhoti tied with a Kāyabandha, a saṅghāti as upper garment and four-stringed bangles. Both sculptures appear to belong to the Śuṅga period.

iii) One beautiful image of a Yakṣī was recovered from Mehrauli near Delhi which was traditionally a part of ancient Kurukṣetra. It is preserved in the National Museum, New Delhi (No. A-29). Made in buff sandstone, the Yakṣī is shown standing under a tree, embracing its trunk with her left hand in an attitude suggesting a Śālabhañjikā figure and has been assigned to the second century B. C.¹³⁸

iv) The ancient mound of Khokrakot at Rohtak yielded a carved lion-capital fragment, 3 ft. in width and 18 inches in height which is now preserved at the National Museum in New Delhi. On one side of this fragment two winged lions (*sapakṣa sinhas*) are seated facing in opposite directions while its backside carries lions without wings with a couple holding reins in a traditional manner. The figure to the left is a Yakṣī and to the right a male Yakṣa offering her a cup of wine with his extended right hand in a pleasant mood.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ R. C. Agrawala, "Early History and Archaeology of Haryana" in *Haryana Studies in History and Culture*, Kurukshetra, 1968, p. 20.

¹³⁷ Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Deptt. of Ancient Indian History and Culture, Kurukshetra University, pp. 182-183, Plates xx, xxii.

¹³⁸ *Journal of U. P. Historical Society*, Vol. XXIV-XXV, p. 191f. (cited by Punia).

¹³⁹ R. C. Agrawal, in *Haryana Studies*, p. 26f.

v) About 8 kms. to the S. S. E. of Thanesar, in village Amin, the traditional site of the Cakravyūha in the Mahābhārata war,¹⁴⁰ were discovered two inscribed red stone rectangular pillars from the Thakurji shrine on the west bank of the tank called Suraj Kunda. R. C. Agrawal¹⁴¹ and A. K. Coomaraswami¹⁴² place these pillars somewhere in the Śuṅga period. The pillar to the left side depicts a male person in the Sthānakamudrā wearing a typical Śuṅga turban, a dhoti tightened with the help of a Kāyabandha (waist-cloth), long ear-rings and two full-bloomed lotuses carved above his head. The figure has been identified with a Padma-Pāṇi Yakṣa who appears to be pondering over some problem out of great anxiety. — The pillar to the right side depicts a couple in an amorous scene. The lady with very large breasts wears a typical Śuṅga turban, three necklaces, heavy kuṇḍalas in her ears and a dhoti tightened with a Kāyabandha. She is looking with a smile at the male who holds a wine cup in his left hand. The couple is taken to represent a Yakṣa mithuna. — Moving further in the north, the well known site of Sanghol, about 40 kms. from Chandigarh on the road to Ludhiana, has yielded a number of interesting sculptures carved on railing pillars. Following four of these represent Yakṣas and Yakṣīs.

vi) Paribhoga-darśiṇī (Yakṣī with a mirror) 100 cm. (H) 19 cm. (W); 15 cm. (D)—Yakṣī standing gracefully over a dwarf Yakṣa and admiring herself in a mirror. Her bent left hand is holding a mirror; the index finger of her bent right hand is pointing towards nail marks (*nakha-kṣata*) in the shape of a crescent on her right cheek.¹⁴³

vii) Yakṣārohi (Yakṣī riding Vāma Yakṣa) : Yakṣī seen being borne by a Yakṣa under a Śāla tree (*shorea robusta*). She is astride his back, her hands on his shoulders and her thighs pressing his sides, her eyes and lips curved in a joyous smile.¹⁴⁴

viii) Darpaṇa-dhāriṇī (Yakṣī with a mirror) : Yakṣī seen standing over a crouching Yakṣa under a Kadamba tree (*stephegyne parviflora*) in full bloom : wearing a nūpura, mekhalā and a necklace which she is looking in the mirror to see how it sets off her beauty.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ A. S. R., Vol. XIV, p. 97ff.

¹⁴¹ *Haryana Studies*, pp. 20-21.

¹⁴² A. K. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, London, 1927, p. 32.

¹⁴³ *Kuṣṭhāna Sculptures from Sanghol* (1st-2nd century A. D.) Vol. I, ed. S. P. Gupta, New Delhi, 1985, p. 116, fig. 1.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 118, fig. 7. ¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 119, fig. 8.

ix) Yakṣī holding lotus flowers : seen holding a bouquet of lotus flowers by their stalks in her right hand beside her face standing over the back of a kneeling Vāma Yakṣa grasping her mekhalā or girdle and wearing bangles on her forearms, kuṇḍalas in her ears and nūpurās on her ankles.¹⁴⁷

x) From Sirsa in the N. W. has been recovered a headless terracotta figurine depicting a pot-bellied male, wearing a Yajñopavīta and shawl over his shoulders, who apparently represents a Yakṣa.¹⁴⁷

Two of these sculptures described at numbers iii and v have been counted by V. S. Agrawal¹⁴⁸ among 18 notable Indian Yakṣa-Yakṣī images.

But for the depredations of invading hordes from the north-west, much more sculptural wealth would undoubtedly have been available today because the region was in no way wanting in artistic activity. Bāṇa¹⁴⁹ describes Śrīkaṇṭha Janapada, another name for Kurukṣetra, as the country where stone-cutters were busy chiselling and carving stones for use in temples.

A peculiar aspect of the traditional attitude towards the Yakṣa-tīrthas of Kurukṣetra deserves special notice. The pilgrims are allowed only a hurried visit to these places and night stay or more than one night's stay is not permitted. We are referring particularly to Rāmahrada¹⁵⁰ or Muñjavaṭa, Yugandhara, Acyutasthala and Bhūtālaya.¹⁵¹ Of Rāmahrada and Yugandhara, the former, as already noted, is the seat of Mahāyakṣa Kapila and his wife Mahāyakṣī Ulūkhāmekhalā. This is a rather strange couple. While the husband is described as the guardian of one of the gates of Kurukṣetra and is said to destroy sins and grant good position after death,¹⁵² his consort is depicted as quite the opposite of it. The *Mahābhārata*¹⁵³ calls her a Piśaṇi and the *Vāmana Purāṇa*¹⁵⁴ adds the adjective *mahāgrāhī* pointing to her demoniac characteristic of seizing body and mind of people and causing

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 123, fig. 20.

¹⁴⁷ V. S. Shukla, "Some terracotta Figurines from Sirsa (Haryana)," *Indological Studies (Essays in Memory of Shri S. P. Singhal)*, Delhi, 1987, (pp. 79-86 :) p. 81, fig. 4.

¹⁴⁸ भारतीय कला, p. 123.

¹⁴⁹ *Harṣacarita*, Ch. iii. p. 43 :

... सुरालयशिलाघटनटङ्कनिकरनिकृता इव व्यदीर्यन्त विपदः ...

Also cf. D. Devahuti, *Harsha—A Political Study*, Oxford, 1970, p. 57.

¹⁵⁰ *Mbh.* Vana, 129. 8-10.

¹⁵¹ *Vāmana P.*, S. M. 13. 38 (ii)-48.

¹⁵² Ibid., v. 44.

¹⁵³ Vana, 129. 8 quoted supra.

¹⁵⁴ S. M. 13. 39. (ii) : तथैव च महाम्राही यक्षिणी लोकविधुता ॥

¹⁵⁵ *Vāyu P.* (Venkateshwar Press ed.) Uttara, 8. 268 (i) :

विष्टन्वासा महाजिह्वा लेलिहाना ह्यदूखलाः ।

insanity etc. She comes of the family of the Piśāca couple Ulūkhalā and Ulūkhālī whose horrifying looks are characterised by rigid, unwinking eyes and a long darting tongue.¹⁵⁵ The adjective *piśitāśana* — eater of raw flesh — given to a Piśāca, becomes really meaningful in her case in view of her threat to eat up the female pilgrim during the night¹⁵⁶ which is the time for Yakṣas and Piśacas to operate. Night stay is therefore forbidden. The eating of curd, one of the items to be offered to Piśācas and Yakṣas, is disallowed at Yugandhara¹⁵⁷ (Jagadhari) which is the seat of the Yakṣa bearing identical name. Hardly four kms. away lies Srughna or Sugh which is assigned to two Yakṣas, Duryodhana and Siddhayātra. Acyutasthala has not been identified so far. Bhūtālaya, probably signifying 'abode of Bhūtas (fellow creatures of the Yakṣas)', has been placed at Jind. At Acyutasthala sleeping or nightstay, and at Bhūtālaya taking of bath, is forbidden, which confirms their Yakṣa connection. This is contrary to the normal requirement of a purifying bath at other tīrthas. In the land of Kurukṣetra particularly, every tīrtha has its pond or tank, often with *pucca* bathing *ghats*. At bigger sacred complexes like Thanesar there are many tanks and a dip in each one of these has its own special merit. Although the centres of Yakṣa cult present in the night an atmosphere entirely opposite of that during the day, there is no doubt whatsoever of the merit of visiting them during the day. In fact the pilgrim is required to begin his *tīrthayātrā* in Kurukṣetra with a visit to the Rantuka Yakṣa.¹⁵⁸ Also, the ban on nightstay is limited only to these Yakṣa-tīrthas and does not apply to the region of Kurukṣetra generally, as V. S. Agrawal thinks.¹⁵⁹ Kurukṣetra is the holiest of the holy tīrthas accor-

¹⁵⁶ *Vāmana P.*, S. M. 13. 48 (i) : दिवा मया ते कथितं रात्रौ भक्षयामि निश्चितम् ।

¹⁵⁷ *Mbh.* Vana, 129 9 : युगन्धरे दाधि प्राश्य उषित्वा चाच्युतस्थले ।

तद्वद् भूतालये स्नात्वा सपुत्रा वस्तुमर्हसि ॥

Vāmana P., S. M., 13. 47. is identical but for इच्छसि in place of अर्हसि, S. S. Parui (*Kurukṣetra in the Vāmana Purāṇa*, Calcutta, 1976, p. 77) agrees with this interpretation. V. S. Agrawal (*Vāmana Purāṇa-A Study*, Varanasi, 1964, p. 67) thinks curd or milk was eaten as a Prasāda in Yugandhara. According to him this Gāthā verse is open to many inferences. The interpretation accepted by us appears to suit the context better and finds support from *Mbh.* Karṇa, 30. 42 also :

युगन्धरे पयः पीत्वा प्रोष्य चाप्यच्युतस्थले ।

तद्वद् भूतिलये स्नात्वा कथं स्वर्गं गमिष्यति ॥

¹⁵⁸ *Vāmana P.*, S. M. 12. 19-21 & 13. 11 :

13. 11 : रन्तुकं च नरो दृष्ट्वा द्वापलं महाबलम् ।

यक्षं समवाद्यैव तीर्थयात्रां समाचरेत् ॥

¹⁵⁹ *Bhārata Sāvitrī*, three volumes, Delhi, 1977 : Vol. I, p. 259f.; Vol. II, p. 264.

ding to the *Mahābhārata*¹⁶⁰ and the *Purāṇas*¹⁶¹ and there is not even a trace of any idea of Kurukṣetra-Kutsana in the great Epic.¹⁶²

It has been observed that in early centuries of the Christian Era assimilation and synthesis of the Yakṣa cult within the fold of Śaivism was in progress.¹⁶³ The *Mahāmāyūrī*¹⁶⁴ counts Śiva Mahākāla in its list of Yakṣas as the presiding deity of Śivapurāhāra and Varanasi. According to the *Matsya Purāṇa*,¹⁶⁵ many Yakṣas enrolled themselves as gaṇas of Śiva and several others got converted to Śaivism. Even Mahā-Yakṣa Kubera was raised to the position of Gaṇeśa and Mudgarapāṇi enrolling himself in the service of Śiva began acting as a doorkeeper of the citizens of Varanasi.¹⁶⁶ The phenomenon is however best illustrated by the story of Harikeśa, son of the Yakṣa king Pūrṇabhadra, who disregarding his father's opposition, worships Śiva and wins a boon to become the guardian deity (Kṣetrapāla) of Varanasi and chief of all his gaṇas there.¹⁶⁷ All this, however, does not justify the sweeping assertion that only Yakṣa-worship existed earlier and Śiva-worship developed entirely out of the Yakṣa-cult.¹⁶⁸

Fusion of the Yakṣa-cult with Tāntric worship was another contemporary and correlated phenomenon. We find the Mahāyakṣa-Senapati figuring in a Tāntric mantra in the *Garuḍa Purāṇa*¹⁶ : *Oṃ namaḥ khaḍgavajrapāṇaye mahāyakṣasenāpataye svāhā*. This process of assimilation, synthesis or fusion, whatever we might call it, was wide-spread and covered Kurukṣetra too. Muñjavaṭa, the seat of Mahāyakṣī Ulūkhalemekhalā, is called a tīrthā of Mahādeva, and a pilgrim passing a night there is promised the status of

¹⁶⁰ E. g. Vana, 81. 184 : पांसवोऽपि कुरुक्षेत्रे वायुना समुदीरिताः ।

अपि दुष्कृतकर्मणि नयन्ति परमां गतिम् ॥

¹⁶¹ E. g. *Matsya P.*, 109. 3 (ii) :

पृथिव्यां नैमिषं पुण्यम् अन्तरिक्षे च पुष्करम् ।

त्रयाणामपि लोकानां कुरुक्षेत्रं विशिष्यते ॥

For religious importance of Kurukṣetra, also see Lakṣmīdhara's *Kṛtyakalpataru*, Baroda, Vol. III. pp. 175-79.

¹⁶² Cf. O. P. Bharadwaj, "Is There Kurukṣetra-Kutsana in the Mahābhārata?" in *Indo-logical Studies (Essays in Memory of Shri S. P. Singhal)*, New Delhi, 1987, pp. 295-301.

¹⁶³ S. G. Kantawala, *Cultural History from the Matsya Purāṇa*, Baroda, 1964, p. 191f.

¹⁶⁴ P. 27, v. 28; v. 12. ¹⁶⁵ 183. 63-66.

¹⁶⁶ Kantawala, op. cit., p. 172.

¹⁶⁷ V. S. Agrawala, *Matsya Purāṇa-A Study*, Varanasi, 1963, p. 279.

¹⁶⁸ Agrawal, भारतीय कला, p. 127.

¹⁶⁹ I. 78. 10 (i). Also cf. A. B. L. Avasthy, *गरुडपुराण — एक अध्ययन*। Lucknow, 1968, p. 256.

Śiva's Gaṇapati.¹⁷⁰ The mention of the Yakṣiṇī there gets only the second place. Saptacaru, below Vinaśana, is a Śaiva tīrtha, also connected with Yakṣas, Guhyakas and Rākṣasas etc.¹⁷¹ In case of two other tīrthas of Śiva, namely, Pañcanada and Koṭitīrtha, the pilgrim is advised to undertake a visit after first paying homage to the Yakṣa Arantuka who is one of the four Yakṣa gate-keepers of Kurukṣetra.¹⁷²

We have also seen above how Yakṣiṇī Śṛṅgotpādinī devours four Pāśupata ascetics staying in a deserted Śiva temple during the night before she is subdued there.

The nexus between Śāktism and Tantrism and Yakṣa-worship suggested by the *Garuḍa Purāṇa* above can also be similarly supported. The region dotted with centres of Yakṣa-worship has an equally generous share of Śākta-Pīṭhas. The names include Sarasvatī,¹⁷³ Jyotiḥsara,¹⁷⁴ Brahmāvarta,¹⁷⁵ Prthūdaka,¹⁷⁶ Rṇamocana,¹⁷⁷ Kapālamocana,¹⁷⁸ Oghavatī,¹⁷⁹ Kurukṣetra,¹⁸⁰ Karavīrapura¹⁸¹ and Kṛtaśauca.¹⁸² Like some of the Yakṣa-centres quite a few of the Śāktapīṭhas are located across and adjoining the boundaries of Kurukṣetra, as for instance Pāṭalā,¹⁸³ Śatadru,¹⁸⁴ Pañcanada,¹⁸⁵ Mathurā¹⁸⁶ and Hastināpura.¹⁸⁷

All this evidence leads to the conclusion that the Yakṣa-cult was, at one time, fairly wide-spread in the land of Kurukṣetra and its adjoining areas and constitutes an important chapter in the history of development of religious beliefs in this region.

¹⁷⁰ *Vāmana P.*, S. M. 13. 38 (ii)-39 (i) :

ततो मुञ्जवटं नाम महादेवस्य धीमतः ॥

उपोष्य रजनीमेकां गाणपत्यमवाप्नुयात् ।

¹⁷¹ *Mbh.* Vana, 80. 106-107 and variant readings under these verses.

¹⁷² *Vāmana P.*, S. M. 13. 24-26 & 28.

ततो गच्छेत विप्रेन्द्रा द्वारपालं त्वरन्तुकम् ।

तत्रोष्य रजनीमेकां स्नात्वा तीर्थवरे शुभे ॥

द्वितीयं पूजयेद्यत्र द्वारपालं प्रयत्नतः ।

ब्राह्मणान् योजयित्वा च प्रणिपत्य क्षमापयेत् ॥

तव प्रसादाद्यक्षेत्रं मुक्तो भवति किल्बिषैः ।

सिद्धिर्मया ऽभिलषिता तथा सार्धं भवाम्यहम् ॥

एवं प्रसाद्य यक्षेत्रं ततः पञ्चनदं व्रजेत् ॥

कोटितीर्थानि रुद्रेण समाहृत्य यतः स्थितम् ।

तेन त्रैलोक्यविरह्यतं कोटितीर्थं प्रचक्षते ॥

¹⁷³ D. C. Sircar, *Śākta Pīṭhas*, 2nd revised ed., Delhi, 1973, p. 26.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.* ¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 30.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.* ¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 29, 31, 36, 41, 51, 60, 63.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 89. ¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29. ¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 30.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

STATEMENT SHOWING YAKŞAS

with villages/towns to which they are assigned by different authorities

Authority	Arantuka	Tarantuka	Macakraka	Kapila
Cunningham	Ber/Baher, W. N. W. of Kaithal	(=Ratan Yakşa) Near Pipli on the Sarasvati, 6 Kms. N. E. of Thanesar	Sinkh (a Yakşa-Kuṇḍa exists)	Ram Rai, 17 Kms. W. of Jind
R. S. Sharma	—do— (p. 33)	Sinkh (p. 29)	(= Ratnuk Yakşa) Ratgal near Pipli (p. 28)	—do—
Dayali Ram (Hindi)	—	(= Ratan Yakşa) Samak near Panipat (p. 63)	—	—
Dayali Ram (Urdu)	Sinkh (p. 74)	(= Ratan Yakşa) Ratgal near Pipli (p. 66)	—	—
Silak Ram	Barta, 18 Kms. N. W. of Kaithal	—do— (p. 16) Also (= Tarkhu tirtha) Sinkh, 16 Kms. N. of Gohana (p. 17)	Kirmach, 16 Kms. S. of Thanesar (p. 16)	Ram Rai

Authority	Vāsuki	Uṛukhala	Bhūteśvara Bhūtālāya	Hara Yakṣa	Yakṣa (no name given)
Cunningham	—	—	—	—	Ber/Baher/Sinkh
R. S. Sharma	—	—	Jind (p. 30)	—	—
Dayali Ram	—	—	Jind (p. 71)	Baher, W. N. W. of Kaithal (p. 83)	Kaithal (p. 85) & Samak (p. 63)
Silak Ram	Barta, 18 Kms. N. W. of Kaithal (p. 18)	—	Jind (p. 71) Ram Rai (p. 18) (Also locates Yugandhara at Ram Rai)	—	Dakhni Khera, 8 Kms. S. of Jind (p. 18)

Works cited : i) Alexander Cunningham, *Archaeological Survey of India Reports*, Vol. XIV [(1878-79), Reprint, Varanasi, 1970.

ii) R. S. Sharma, *Kurukṣetra-Rahasya* Pt. i (Hindi), Jind, 1926

iii) Dayali Ram Lala, *Kurukṣetra-Darpana* (Hindi), Ambala Cantt., 1941.

iv) —do— (Urdu), —do—

v) Phogat Silak Ram, "Tirthas of Kurukṣetra as Enumerated in the Mahābhārata and Vāmana Purāṇa," *Journal of Haryana Studies*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 1-2, 1976, pp. 14-32.

1. The first of these is the fact that the

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GEOGRAPHICAL BASIS OF KĀLIDĀSA'S WORKS

BY

S. V. SOHONI

I

1. The problem of locating Rāmagiri can be resolved very easily and quickly, and, that too, in terms of the text of *Meghadūtam* itself, as was explained by me before a gathering of scholars earlier.¹ Very briefly, two details of the relevant stanza 16 in *Meghadūtam* have to be taken into account :

(a) The variants of the all-important line in it : Mallinātha's reading being, "*kiñcit paścād vraja laghugatiḥbhūya evottareṇa* /" The words, '*vraja laghugatiḥ*', are not mentioned by some of the earlier Ṭikākāras, e. g. Vallabhadeva and Sthiradeva, who, instead, record this part of the line as '*pracalaya*', '*pravalaya*' or '*pravartaya gatim*'.² It is easy to see how the *pāṭhabhedas* or variants came into existence, even without examining how the confusion was easily explicable if the letters of the old Brāhmī script had been used. For the scope for confusion can be appreciated even on using letters from Devanāgarī alphabet. It is submitted that since the Cloud had been advised earlier to move northwards from Rāmagiri, the Yakṣa found it necessary to mention a slight change in that direction, a change that was to have become operative, *after* the Cloud had passed over the Mālakṣetra, "*kṣetramārhuṇya mālam*" (verse 14). It may be specifically noted that *no* change of direction thereafter was stated by the Yakṣa upto the flight for reaching Vidiśā. In other words, after Mālakṣetra was crossed over, the cloud was expected to reach Vidiśā, by coursing in the sky, along *one straight line* i. e. in *one* direction only. It is this single direction for its flight which is mentioned by furnishing two specific but fully complementary details : (i) it was a flight expected to be not fully northwards, but as could be said to be slightly westwards, and therefore, not exactly north : '*kiñcit paścāt*', and (2) by and large, northwards : '*bhūya eva uttareṇa*'. Further, giving the reading, '*kiñcit paścād vraja laghugatiḥ kiñcid evottareṇa*' a very able Ṭikākāra, Bharata Mallika, has interpreted the line to mean going north-west-

¹ At the International Seminar on Kālidāsa at Ujjain in 1984.

² Vide S. K. De, Sāhitya Akademy Edition, 1970, p. 7, foot-note on verse 16.

³ After giving this reading Bharata Mallika interprets it as indicating the north-west direction, in his commentary, *Subodhā*.

wards, not at first westwards and then to the north. Modern aeronautica parlance⁴ follows the same usage.

(b) This analysis of variants can be supplemented by one other consideration: the Yakṣa could hardly have thought of suggesting a route to the cloud as was expected definitely to be more time taking in having first to go westwards, and that too till an unspecified distance was covered; and thereafter, to move dead northwards again, instead of moving along the hypotenuse which is always shorter than the two other lines of a right-angle triangle.

2. This examination of the relevant line in *Meghadūtam* is fully open to accurate verification by examining a modern map of the physical geography of India. The tests for this verification can be (i) that a straight line in the *reverse* direction which could be described as mostly southwards and slightly eastwards, (ii) that it should enable transiting over the geographical features of the top of the Āmrakūṭa range, and (iii) that it should also enable viewing the picturesque appearance of the Narmadā meandering snugly among the slopes of the Vindhyan range, and ultimately, (iv) it should pass over a point, quite close to, but not exactly over Rāmagiri.

It would be sufficient if the top of the Āmrakūṭa could be located on an entirely independent basis. In view of the description, '*stana iva bhuvah*', the classical concept of '*bhū*' or '*prthvī*' comes in handy, in this context, particularly because Kālidāsa has vividly described the different limbs etc. of *Prthvī*, at different places.⁵ The highest point of the bust of *Prthvī* would be found to be Pachmadhi in Madhya Pradesh. Accordingly, joining Vidiśā with Pachmadhi should be sufficient for this verification. The distance between Rāmagiri and Mālakṣetra would have to be taken into account, since the line would have to pass *near* the northern boundary of Mālakṣetra. This distance, obviously, is quite small. If this line would pass close to Mālakṣetra and be found to be fairly near Ramtek, it would be the most complete proof of Rāmagiri being the present day Ramtek.

3. This self-contained analysis is direct and definite evidence of Kālidāsa's accurate knowledge of the relative positions of these localities in Central India, situated on the two sides of the Vindhyan range. For, if the foregoing considerations are at all valid, the conclusion is obvious that Kālidāsa was fully aware that a *straight line* connecting Vidiśā with Mālakṣetra would pass

⁴ According to this parlance, based on mariners' compass indication, minor directions are determined in terms like, north by east, south-west by south etc.

⁵ Vide S. V. Sohoni, *JBRS*, Vol. LI, pp. 79-87.

over the top of the Āmrakūṭa range and also over that portion of the Narmadā river which could give rise to a comparison between 'bhakti' style painting on an elephant's decorated body and the stencilled appearance of the Narmadā alongside the slopes of the Vindhya range.

II

4. If this were correct, the immediate curiosity arises as to how Kālidāsa could be so faultless or accurate in his geographical information of this kind. For, as shown elsewhere,⁶ he is also similarly accurate in stating that Alakā was, more or less, north of Rāmagiri, notwithstanding that the Himālayas and other mountain ranges to their south and the large region of flat land, traversed by many river systems, had intervened between these two terminal points viz. Rāmagiri and Alakā. This being the position of geographical knowledge in Kālidāsa's time, the query must be framed and answered as to how such accuracy could at all be acquired. Some may like to jump to a conclusion that the answer lies in Kālidāsa's exercising his extraordinary 'pratibhā' or combination of intuition and learning. But it is submitted that it is hardly necessary to make such assumption and that the correct explanation is quite different.

5. One may begin by referring to yet another exercise of accurate geographical knowledge viz. that found occasionally in Huen Tsang's reports of distances and directions of some places in India visited by him. One example may suffice. This great Chinese pilgrim has described⁷ Kiu-che-lo (the Chinese pronunciation of 'Gurjara') a second kingdom in Western India, as situated 300 miles to the north of Valabhī and 2800 *li* or 467 miles to the north-west of Ujjayinī, with its capital at Pi-lo-mi-lo (the Chinese pronunciation of Bhinmal). The three distinct localities mentioned by Huen Tsang in this connexion can be seen on any modern map of India: Valabhī, Ujjayinī and Bhinmal. It would be seen that the distances in *li* terms and the directions mentioned by Huen Tsang are quite correct. Huen Tsang was removed from Kālidāsa by about 150 years. He has repeatedly mentioned specific distances and directions etc. in his descriptions of the different regions of India. How could he also give such details with confidence?

6. It is submitted that the stage of Indian astronomy had reached a phase whereby, readings concerning the positions of stars and planets in the sky and

⁶ Vide S. V. Sohoni, "Kālidāsa's Geography of Central Tibet" in *ABORI* Vol. LXIII, 1982, p. 130.

⁷ Beal, Vol. II, pp. 269 ff.

the time of the rising and setting of the sun and the moon at different localities, had enabled astronomers to get an idea of the relative locations and distances of these places or geographical features. It is noted that the 5th and the 6th centuries in India had witnessed the careers of an astronomer of extraordinary calibre like Āryabhaṭṭa of Kusamapura and an encyclopaedia like Varāhamihira of Avanti.

7. Āryabhaṭṭa was separated from Kālidāsa by some decades only. Bāṇabhaṭṭa was, admittedly, a contemporary of Huen Tsang, there being a reasonable possibility that the two might even have met each other or known and heard about each other. By the time of Bāṇabhaṭṭa and Huen Tsang, it was common knowledge that the Earth was not flat but like a huge round ball of earth and a member of the solar system of planets. Bāṇabhaṭṭa has specifically written about "*Sakalalokalanajalapātāpavitram mṛdgalakam vasudhābhidhānam*" in his *Haraśacaritam* (U. VI). Āryabhaṭṭa, six generations earlier, was even more explicit about the shape of the Earth etc.

8. While this was the state of astronomical ideas and practical observation in the 5th and 6th centuries A. D. in India, it is possible to make a surmise about the development of this branch of knowledge as had gone on during some preceding centuries. It is wellknown that Ptolemy of Alexandria, the great Roman geographer, had fitted his knowledge of the geography of the civilized world into a framework of latitudes and longitudes. As stated in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14th ed., Vol. XIV, pp. 840-84: "The charts in use by the medieval navigators of the Indian Ocean—Arabs, Persians or Dravidas—were equal in value, if not superior, to the charts of the Mediterraneans. Marco Polo (thirteenth century) mentions such charts; Vasco da Gama (1498) found them in the hands of his Indian pilot, and their nature is fully explained in the *Mohit* or 'the Encyclopaedia of the Sea', compiled from ancient sources by the Turkish admiral, Sidi Ali Ben Hosein, in 1584. These charts are covered with a close network of lines intersecting each other at right angles. The horizontal lines are parallels depending upon the altitude of the Pole Star, the Calves of the Little Bear and the Barrow of the Great Bear above the horizon. This altitude was expressed in *isbas* or inches, each equivalent to $1^{\circ} 42' 50''$. Each *isba* was divided into *zams* or eighths. The intervals between two parallels thus only amounted to $12' 51''$. These intervals were mistaken by the Portuguese occasionally for degrees, which accounts for Malacca, which is in latitude $2^{\circ} 13' N.$, being placed in Cantino's charts (1502) in latitude $14^{\circ} 5'$. It may have been a map of this kind which accounts for Ptolemy's moderate exaggerations (in the second century A. D.) of the size of Taprobane (Ceylon). The first meridian, separating a leeward

from a windward region, passed through Ras Kumhari (Comorin) and was thus nearly identical with the first meridian of the Indian astronomer, which passed through the sacred city of Ujjain (Ozene of Ptolemy) or the meridian of Azin of the Arabs. Additional meridians were drawn at intervals of *zams* supposed to be equal to three hours' sail."

9. While quoting this extract from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Dr. D. C. Sircar had observed : " The suggestion seems to be that the Indians had the knowledge of making maps as early as the beginning of the Christian era and that the Arabs and Græks were indebted to them for the charts of the Indian Ocean together with the islands in and lands bordering on it. "

10. Moreover, there is definite evidence that maps were used in India in the 7th century A. D. For example, Bhāskaravarman, ruler of Kāmarūpa, a contemporary of Harṣavardhana, had to make over a map of India to an aggressor on north India, who had conducted his raids after Harṣavardhana's demise, in the middle of the 7th century A. D.⁹ Earlier, as shown by me elsewhere,¹⁰ the earliest map of India on stone was sculptured inside a rock cave at Udayagiri near Vidiṣā during the reign of Candragupta Vikramāditya, Kālidāsa's great patron.

III

11. Thus, astronomical observations and resultant maps were known to India, in ancient times. There is yet another relevant circumstance which deserves consideration in this context which consists of two parts : (1) one relating to an administrative functionary viz. the Akṣapaṭalika, and (2) the other relating to an administrative department which obtained and stored in a record room annual reports on economic conditions.

12. That the former was a continuing administrative post can be inferred easily from references to it in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*¹¹ as well as in the later literature, including inscriptions. The title of the post is noteworthy. Basically, an Akṣapaṭala had a drawing on a surface,¹⁰ either on the ground or on a piece of cloth, consisting of squares in parallel rows like those on a chess board etc. This helped the functionary to record revenue receipts from different adjoining parts of the administrative area and to prepare figures for audit and accounts of the year's public income and expenditure. The arrange-

⁸ D. C. Sircar, *Geography of Ancient And Mediaeval India*, p. 350.

⁹ D. Devahuti, *Harsha, A Political Study*, p. 221.

¹⁰ Vide S. V. Sohoni, *Bhāratiya Itihāsa And Sanskṛti* 1986, no. 1, pp. 37-40.

¹¹ Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* : 2. 7; V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, *Hindu Administrative Institutions*, 1929, p. 204.

ment helped making comparisons or contrasts and in totalling figures or subtracting them. As regards the administrative arrangement of the Department of Land Records etc. styled as Nibandha-Pustaka-Sthāna in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* and which found its Chinese equivalent in Huen Tsang's 'Ni-lo-petchā'. Reference is invited to my detailed analysis concerning archives in¹² ancient India.

13. It would be reasonable to assume that public administrations in India were then in possession of exact locations of geographical features, including individual localities, of distances between them and of relative directions for journeying among them. There is little doubt that both Kālidāsa and Huen Tsang utilised such sources of information as was easily available to them in view of its continuing utility on a very mundane and practical matter like revenue collection and reporting on economic conditions. It is well known that the Departments of Audit and Accounts, and Treasury are closely associated with the Finance Department, even in a modern public administration. Their work must necessarily be conducted on the basis of territorial divisions and subdivisions. Proper organization of records is an essential and indispensable aid for accurate accounts and efficient audit. It is not at all surprising that Kauṭilya laid stress on all these points in observations about "*Akṣapaṭala-Gaṇanikyādhikāraḥ*" (K. A. 2-7). He has specifically stated the territorywise basis of work in this organization, when he mentions its '*Deśagrāmajātikulasaṅghānāṃ dharmavyavahāracaritrasansthānam*' aspect (K. A. 2. 7. 2). The stone panel from Bharhut¹³ stūpa, depicting the land transaction at Rajgir by showing coins spread on the floor, was most probably a scene related to an Akṣapaṭalika's office, as perhaps was the one, described in Kālidāsa's *Raghuvamśam* V. 29, of gold pieces heaped up, '*hiraṇyamaiḥ vr̥ṣṭim*', inside the Kośagrha found one morning by a set of treasury officials (*kośagrhe niyuktāḥ*). Further down the centuries, Bāṇabhaṭṭa has referred to the head of this organization making over, in the presence of his whole staff, a new gold royal seal to Harṣavardhana who was setting out on his campaign : *Tatratsthasya cāsya grāmākṣapaṭalikaḥ sakalakaraṇiparikarāḥ* etc (H. C. U. VII).

14. In these circumstances, it would be quite safe to conclude : (i) that accurate geographical information was available (indispensable in itself) to a public administration in ancient India in its civil departments (and, doubtless,

¹² S. V. Sohoni, " Archives In Ancient India " in *Indological Studies*, (Prof. D. C. Sircar Commemorative Volume), 1987, pp. 121-124.

¹³ Barua & Sinha, *Barhut Inscriptions*, 1959.

in its military offices as well); (b) that the progress of Indian astronomical science at centres like Pāṭaliputra, Ujjayinī and Valabhī was remarkably palpable: and (c) that this is the simple and rational background to the accuracy in Kālidāsa's descriptions and Huen Tsang's accounts as regards distances and directions.

IV

15. Although astronomical calculations and necessity of revenue and fiscal administrations had led to accurate calculation and mapping of locations and relative directions, it does not follow that thereby anybody could *imagine* how a certain locality would look like from the air. It could be urged that in this respect the exercise of Kālidāsa's '*pratibhā*' was unique.

16. While not contesting this view regarding Kālidāsa's genius, due regard should be paid to yet another active factor viz. the art of painting in India which had made very prominent progress even before Kālidāsa and Huen-Tsang, e. g. at Ajanṭhā and Bāgh. It is correct that there is no word in Sanskrit for what stands for a modern map. But, as pertinently noted¹⁴ by Dr. D. C. Sircar, "There is no special word in Sanskrit for a map. The word *nakṣā* (from Arabic '*naqshah*') has been adopted in most modern Indian languages in this sense, although it also signifies 'a picture, a plan, a general description, an official report.' In Eastern India, the word, "*mānacitra*" has been coined to indicate the English word 'map'. The absence of any special Sanskrit word raises the question whether map-drawing was at all known to the Indians of old. There is, however, reason to believe that in ancient India a map or chart was regarded as '*citra*' or '*ālekhiya*' i. e. 'a painting,' a picture, a delineation. It will be seen that the Sanskrit word, '*citra*', and its synonyms have practically the same meaning as the Arabic word, *naqshah*." Further, there were painters belonging to the category known as '*viddha*', who were capable of drawing and painting faithfully what they could actually see in nature, thereby disproving that all Indian art was distortion of that which was natural. Painters in ancient India respected the profile and the frontal as well as sideways appearances, and were thus quite capable of formulating a reasonable view of what ground level objects would look like, if a viewer were to look at them from a considerable height. As is well known, with the assistance of astronomy, mathematics and the arts of drawing and engraving, it was possible to convey fairly exact and graphic descriptive information. To use the hill shading, the

¹⁴ D. C. Sircar, *Geography of Ancient And Mediaeval India*, 2nd ed. revised & enlarged, 1971, p. 326.

hachures and contour lines methods for the delineation of hills and places, was not beyond the ability of Indian painters in that period. Moreover, any body moving on a *ghat* road along side a steep valley, can form a fair idea of how hills, rivers and trees look like when they are seen from a height.

17. Further, there is every reason to hold that Kālidāsa was fully familiar with the theory and practice of the art of painting prevalent in his times.¹⁵ It is this position which is very relevant to understanding what amounts to his satellite-like vision of geographical features on the earth's surface, as is proved by a number of descriptions of such features, specifically recorded as seen during a fight, e. g. of the *Pañcāpsara* lake (identified with Lonar lake in Buldhana District of Maharashtra) and of Daśapura or Mandasaur (headquarters of Mandasaur District in Madhya Pradesh).

V

18. In this context, Kālidāsa's handling of the dramatic aspects of the geography involved in the aerial journey in Act VII of *Abhijñāna Śakuntala* forms an interesting testimony to his genius— not only on account of what is stated there but also on account of what has been deliberately omitted. In respect of what has been stated, two details call for specific comment, viz. (1) Duśyanta's observations in verses 7, 8 and 9, and (2) Mātali's remarks thereon. The relevant passage is reproduced below—

राजा— मातले असुरसंप्रहारोत्सुकेन पूर्वेषु दिवमधिरोहता मया न लक्षितः स्वर्गमार्गः ।
तत् कतरस्मिन् मस्तां पथि वर्तमाने ? ।

मातलिः— क्षिप्तोत्सं वहति यो गगनप्रतिष्ठां
ज्योतींषि वर्तयति च प्रविभक्तश्चिः ।
तस्य द्वितीयहरिविक्रमनिस्तमस्कं
वायोरिमं परिवहस्य वदन्ति मार्गम् । ६ ॥

राजाः— मातले अतः खलु सबाह्यकरणो ममान्तरात्मा प्रसीदति (रथाङ्गमवलोक्य) मेघ-
पदवीमवतीर्णो स्वः ।

मातलिः— कथमवगम्यते ? ।

राजा— अयमर विचरेभ्यश्चातकैर्निष्पतद्भिर्
हरिभिरचिरमासां तेजसा चानुलिप्तैः ।
गतमुपरि घनानां वारिगर्भोदराणां
पिञ्चुनयति रथस्ते सीकरक्लिन्ननेमिः ॥ ७ ॥

मातलिः— क्षणादायुष्मान् स्वाधिकारभूमौ वर्तिष्यते ।

¹⁵ V. V. Mirashi, *Kālidāsa* (Marāṭhi) 3rd edition, pp. 88-90.

राजा— (अधोऽवलोक्य) त्रेगावतरणादाश्चर्यदर्शनः संलक्ष्यते मनुष्यलोकः । तथा हि—
शैलानामवरोहतीव शिखरादुन्मज्जतां मेदिनी
पर्णाभ्यन्तरलीनतां विजहति स्कन्धोदयात् पादपाः ।
संधानं तनुभागनष्टसलिलव्यक्त्या व्रजन्यापगाः
केनाप्युत्क्षिपनेव पश्य भुवनं मत्पार्श्वमानीयते ॥ ८ ॥

मातलिः— साधु दृष्टम् । (सबहुमानमवलोक्य) अहो उदाररमणीया पृथिवी ।

राजा— मातले कतमोऽयं पूर्वापरसमुद्रावगाढः कनकरसनिप्यन्दः सान्ध्य इव मेघः सानु-
मानालोक्यते ? ।

मातलिः— आयुष्मन् एष खलु हेमकूटो नाम किंपुरुषपर्वतः तपः संसिद्धिक्षेत्रम् ।

19. Had he so desired, Kālidāsa could have described the scenic beauty of the Himālayan and Hemakūṭa ranges either with reference to Duṣyanta's proceeding to battle with Kālanemi's son Durjaya or while returning victorious from that encounter. Why the first opportunity was not utilised has been explained in Duṣyanta's statement, "असुरसंप्रहारोत्सुकेन पूर्वैर्बुद्धिबन्धमधिरोहता मया न लक्षितः स्वर्गमार्गः ।" The second opportunity was available during the return trip. It was not availed of because, firstly, there were limitations on the stage craft, whereby only a verbal reference could have informed the spectators of what was being seen and that would have taken time. The Kavikulaguru wanted to reach the climax of the plot, so vividly described by Mārīca in verse 29, as quickly as possible, after Duṣyanta had gone through the seven steps of the *abhiñjāna* sequence. Moreover, Kālidāsa definitely wanted to drive home his cherished concept of the supreme value of scrupulous observance of one's duties and the opposite of it inviting punishment. Duṣyanta had speedily complied with Indra's behest; and this was instantaneously followed by its reward in the shape of Duṣyanta's reunion with Śakuntalā along with Sarvadāmana, their son. Thus, there was neither time nor justification to indulge in any specific geographical description of interesting ground level features and the last lap of the return journey, i.e. from Mārīca's *āśrama* upto Hastināpura, was purpose fully left out.

20. But in verse 7, a definite height indicating the process of descent has been indicated : the chariot had then come below the cloud belt. This leads to Mātali's observation, "क्षणादायुष्मान् स्वाधिकारभूमौ वर्तिष्यते ।" Thereafter, Duṣyanta, seeing below (*adho* 'valokya'), describes (verse 8) how 'manuṣyaloka' (as distinguished from 'svargaloka') presented itself to the eye : the peaks of different *śailas*, the trees on their slopes, the descending rivers — all appeared like the Earth's surface being projected upwards, as it were, being brought up to be along his sides, 'मत्पार्श्वम् आनीयते.' One may note how broad and general is this observation about the picturesque scenery.

It is as swift as the motion of Mātali's chariot itself. Then follows Mātali's remark ; and Mātali was Indra's charioteer accustomed to observing heavenly sights. He stated, "साधुदृष्टम् । (सबहुमानम् अवलोक्य ।) अहो, उदग्र- (alternatively, उदार-) रमणीया पृथिवी ।" This reference to *pṛthivī* being completely *ramaṇīyā* was made not by a mortal but by a semi-divine personality like the *sārathi* of the king of gods. It is such a tribute to '*manuṣyaloka*', which only a great poet like Kālidāsa could have paid. By *pṛthivī*, is meant not just the ground level of the earth but the *pṛthivī* of which the Himālayan range was the *mānadaṇḍa*. There could have been no better praise of India's physical geography as a whole, howsoever briefly worded it was put in the mouth, not of a mortal, but of a semi-divine personality. Let it also not be overlooked that Act VII follows Act VI in which there are many references to the prevailing spring season, so vividly described in *Ṛtusamihāra* possessing features all of which are materials utilised by Kusumāyudha : "सर्वं रसायनमिदं कुसुमायुधस्य (RTS VI. 35).

21. The only definite geographical feature referred to in the conversation between Duṣyanta and Mātali, is the Hemakūṭa mountain range. Duṣyanta asked Mātali : "मातले, कतमो अयम् पूर्वापरसमुद्रावगाहः कनकरसनिप्यन्दः सान्ध्य इव मेघः सानुमानालोक्यते ?" To this query, Mātali replied, "आयुष्मन् ! एष खलु हेमकूटो नाम किपुख्यपर्वतः तपःसंसिद्धिशेखरम् ।" The Hemakūṭa range is the Ladakh-Kailāsa-Trans-Himālayan chain lying parallel to the north of the Great Himālayan range. It can be stated with confidence that its appearance as described by Duṣyanta is absolutely correct, as any modern aerial observation, during a late spring season, of a line of snow-covered mountains, would indicate.

22. The other detail mentioned by Duṣyanta, viz. that the Hemakūṭa range, stretched from the Eastern to the Western sea, deserves a comment from a modern geographer. This has been stated in S. M. Ali's work, *The Geography of the Purāṇas*, as follows¹⁴: "The Purāṇas say that all these ranges extend from sea to sea. This is literally true in the case of the Himavān only. Why and where did the Purāṇics make this obvious mistake in the case of other ranges? If we look at the map of Asia closely we find that the Śṛṅgavān, Śveta and Nila end on the west in the Kizil Kum and Kara Kum deserts, and on the east, in the Gobi desert. The Niṣadha extends from the Caspian to the China sea (taking Tsinling Mountain as its eastern extension). The Hemakūṭa extends from the sea on the east to the Iranian desert on the west. Thus, in each case, the range extends from sea to sea, if we define 'sea' as a large expanse of sand or water. Did the Purāṇas hold

¹⁴ S. M. Ali, *The Geography of The Purāṇas*, 1973, pp. 53, 57.

the view that as barriers to human settlement and movement, the sea of sand and that of water, were synonymous when considering the geography of the inhabited world ! ”

23. Mātali adds the detail of Hemakūṭa being a *Kim̐puruṣaparvata*. The region of Kim̐puruṣa community is supposed to be near about the Kailāsa range.¹⁷ In other words, since Mātali was taking Duṣyanta, with their ultimate destination at Hastināpura, from Indra's capital city in Svargaloka, and an aerial journey permitted movement along the line of the shortest distance, Marīca's āśrama could be assumed to have been located somewhere to the south-west of the Kailāsa range and approximately north of Hastināpura in the fold between the Himālaya range and the Ladakh-Kailāsa-Trans-Himalayan range of snowy mountains which constituted the Hemakūṭa range according to the Purāṇas. The Kim̐puruṣas served Kubera whose capital city was Alakā. To this may be added one more detail viz. that the political jurisdiction of Duṣyanta commenced where that of the *Svargaloka* ended. The boundary of Kubera's authority ran side by side with that of a Cakravartin of India. In *Raghuvamśa*, Raghu claimed that Kubera was a neighbour and could be attacked as a Sāmanta!¹⁸ Duṣyanta too was a Cakravatin, and his 'adhikāra-kṣetra' or jurisdiction ran along side that of Kubera, a feudatory of Indra.

24. Mārīca's āśrama was thus located somewhere in the Hemakūṭa range among its southern slopes, though not far away from the northern foot-hills of the Himālayan range to its south, where the political jurisdiction of Duṣyanta had commenced. It was expressly described by Mātali as, 'Tapaśsa-misiddhi-kṣetram.' It was there that the last scenes of *Abhijñāna-Śākuntala* were located — and not in Duṣyanta's capital at Hastināpura!¹⁹

25. Kālidāsa was, doubtless, very accurate in respect of what could strictly be described as Indian geography. But being a stickler for accuracy, he described Purāṇic celestial geography in very discreet and broad terms.

¹⁷ M. R. Kale (Ed.), *Abhijñāna-Śākuntalam* (3rd ed.), p. 172 of Notes.

¹⁸ RV. V. 28.

¹⁹ That the Hemakūṭa's śikhara was not far away from Kubera's Alakā is absolutely evident from references to these localities in Act I of *Vikramorvaśīyam* : Urvaśī was abducted while coming out of Kubera's palace; and her companions eagerly awaited her rescue by Purūravas and for that purpose were waiting on Hemakūṭa śikhara for such good news. They had also mentioned earlier to Purūravas that the miscreant had gone northeastwards of Alakā taking Urvaśī with him. All these indications fit into a perfect geographical scheme. Please see the enclosed sketchmap, where a straight line has been drawn to connect the Kailāsa region with Hastināpura. Mārīca's āśrama must be located in the fold between the southern slopes of the Hema-

(Continued on the next page)

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The elevated portion of India's physical geography map, showed in light shading, was called *Medinī* or *Prthivī*, which words' another meaning was a ruler's kingdom. *Kālidāsa* identified the elevated highlands of Central and Peninsular India with the figure of *Prthivī*, resembling a lady, whose right thigh and leg were stretched out (representing as the Sahya range), her torso was that indicated by the *Vindhya* range in Central India, a plait of her hair being symbolised by the *Yamunā* river, whose water was, proverbially dark. The white water of the *Carmanvatī* supplied the imagery of a necklace of pearls on the person of *Prthivī*. One breast of her bust was the *Mahādeva* range of hills, sloping upwards on all sides into its highest point at the *Pachmarhi* group of hills. The *Himālayan* range was specifically compared to a *mānadaṇḍa* for the figure of *Prthivī*.

Even on a modern map of India, it would be found that connecting a point near *Rāmāgiri* (or *Ramtek*) with *Vidiśā* or the *Sanchi-Udayagiri* group of hills, would mean drawing a straight line between these terminals; and this straight line passes very close to the *Pachmarhi* group of hills. This straight line has been shown on the map.


Similarly, it would be noticed that the *Mānasa* lakes' area is, approximately, north of *Ramtek*, on the other side of the *Himālayan* range.

The geography of the return (aerial) flight of *Duṣyanta* is shown by another straight line from a point between *Hemakūṭa* and *Alakā* to a point at *Hastināpura*, 22 miles northeast of *Mecrat*. Any modern physical map of India would show that several peaks in the *Himālayan* range are situated not far away from this route on the right, viz. *Nandādevī*, *Triśūla*, *Kamet*, *Dhavalagiri*, *Badrinātha* etc. To the south, would be the plains of the *Punjab* group of rivers as well as those of the *Sarasvatī*, *Yamunā*, the *Gaṅgā*, and the *Chukā* and the *Śarayū* rivers. It was this geography which was described as that associated with the picturesque scenery of *udagra / udāra - ramaṇīyā prthivī*, by *Indra's sārathi*, *Mātali*.

(Continued from p. 231)

kūṭa and the northern slope of the adjoining *Himālaya* range. Why *Urvaśī* was taken north-eastwards by the miscreant demon (*Vikramorvaśīyam*, Act I) need not be discussed here, though there is a satisfactory explanation for it.

The geographical background of Acts I to VII of *Abhiññāna-Śākuntalam* deals with a limited area in the *Punjab* and *Haryana* and *U. P.* States, in which the *Gaṅgā*, the *Yamunā* and the *Sarasvatī* rivers debouch on the plains from the southern slope of the *Himālayas*; and, on the northern slope of the range, is located the main scene of Act VII. The geography matches with the atmosphere and the sentiment, perfectly, in both these regions.



References

- (1) मन्दाकिनी भाति नगोपकण्ठे
मुक्तावर्ल कण्ठगतेव भूमेः ॥ *RV* 13. 48
- (2) कचिद् खगानां प्रियमानसानां
कादम्बसंसर्गवतीव पङ्क्तिः ।
अन्यत्र कालागरुदत्तपत्रा
भक्तिर्भुवश्चन्दनकल्पितेव ॥ *RV* 13. 55
- (3) मध्ये श्यामः स्तन इव भुवः शेषविस्तारपाण्डु ।
Meghadūta 18
- (4) एकं मुक्तागुणमिव भुवः स्थूलमध्येन्द्रनीलम् ।
Meghadūta 46
- (5) तत्र सौधगतः पश्यन् यमुनां चक्रवाकिनीम् ।
हेमभक्तिमतीं भूमेः प्रवेणीमिव पिप्रिये ॥
RV 15. 30
- (6) असह्यविक्रमः सखं दूरान् मुक्तमुदन्वता ।
नितम्ब इव मेदिन्याः स्रस्तांशुकमलङ्घयत् ॥
RV 4. 52
- (7) शैलो गर्भे शिशुरिव भुवः शासनाद्यस्य शेते ।
Bālabhārata III. 95

Geographical Features

About Bundelkhanda's
Ken river

About Saṅgama
at Prayag

About Pachmadhi and the
Mahādeva range of hills

The Yamunā as a dark braid
viewed at Mathurā.

The Western Ghats
Sahya belts.

The Vindhya

MISCELLANEA

MY STUDIES ON THE *MAHĀBHĀRATA* : A CLARIFICATION

BY

M. R. YARDI

I am thankful to Dr. Mehendale for reviewing my work¹ and initiating a discussion on it. I am giving clarification on the points raised by him² for the consideration of the *Mahābhārata* (*Mbh*) scholars.

I do not think any linguistic scholar would agree with him that an Epic poet could write in five different styles. A lot of linguistic research on the determination of authorship has been carried out all over the world since a long time, although statistical methods with the use of tests of significance have been used only in recent times. This research has proceeded on the basis that every author has a style peculiar to himself, and, if the style of a work of doubtful authorship can be shown to be different from that style, it is held that that work has come from the pen of a different author. It is difficult to agree that an author can pick up the style of another author. He may be able to pick up the apparent peculiarities of another author's style such as the choice of words, phrases, figures of speech or even imagery, but how can he pick up the style represented by the unconscious use of long or short syllables in varying proportions? My views in this regard have been recorded at page 7 of my work. I have chosen the Anuṣṭubh śloka for this purpose, as the author has the freedom to use long and short syllables in ten positions in the *śloka* of the Anuṣṭubh. No such study can be undertaken for the Triṣṭubh and Jagatī metres, as they are not flexible in their metrical pattern and the author is not free to use long and short syllables in any position.

The statistical method used can be explained simply by the toss of a coin or coins. If a normal coin is tossed it will fall either heads or tails. If it is tossed 100 times, it should give, according to the theory of probability, 50 heads and 50 tails. But in actual practice it is found to give sometimes more

¹ *The Mahābhārata : Its Genesis and Growth — A Statistical Study* (MGG), pub. BORI, Pune, 1986.

² *ABORI*, vol. LXIX, pp. 349-355.

heads and sometimes more tails. The statistical theory tells us whether this variation is within permissible limits of its probable value. If we increase the number of tosses, the variation from the probable value goes on decreasing and the heads and tails will approximate to half the number of tosses. The problem will be different if the coin is loaded on the side of the tail. It will then give more heads than tails. If we have ten such coins differently loaded on the side of tails, they will give more heads but in different proportions. The use of long and short syllables in the ten positions of the Anuṣṭubh line corresponds to the heads and tails of the ten loaded coins. In the *Bhagavad-gītā*, for instance, it will be seen (*MGG*, p. 175) that the first adhyāya has 94 lines in the first position, but the author has used more long syllables, namely 56 lines. For all the ten positions, the author has used 610 long syllables as against 470. For all the 18 adhyāyas of the *Gītā*, the number of lines is 1290, but the number of long syllables used by the author in each of the ten positions is consistently higher than 645. For the ten positions as a whole, the number of long syllables used is 8634 instead of 6450. I have found that the *Mbh.* authors have shown a propensity for using more long syllables than short syllables.

It may also be mentioned here that the long and short syllables are not independent of each other, because they must add to the number of lines. Thus if the author of the *Gītā* has used 56 long syllables in the first position of the first adhyāya containing 94 lines, he has also used 38 short syllables. In the ten positions of the eighteen adhyāyas of the *Gītā*, he has used 8654 long syllables and 4246 short syllables. It is thus obvious that when the author uses more long syllables, he uses less short syllables, and when he uses less long syllables, he uses more short syllables. In my statement, therefore, that the 'stylistic variations in the Anuṣṭubh ślokas could arise from the natural propensity to make use, unconsciously of course, more or less long syllables, where they are free to do so', the phrase 'more or less long syllables' is equivalent to 'more long syllables or more short syllables' or 'more or less short syllables'. The analysis will remain the same if we take the count of long syllables, even when the author shows a propensity to use more short syllables.

By the successive application of the statistical tests, it has been found that the *Mbh* exhibits five distinct styles. The statistic chosen for this purpose is the variance due to variation within a group of adhyāyas relating to a definite topic or subject. This does not mean that this index is a fixed number. It is different for different number of lines or more correctly for different degrees of freedom. From the Tables attached to the *MGG* it will

be seen that this index for the A style has the values 297.4 (*Ādi*), 209.2 (*Udyoga*), 258.78 (*Bhīṣma*), 250.9 (*Droṇa*), 278.6 (*Karna*), 220.8 (*Śalya*), 247.4 (*Śānti*) and 277.7 (*Anuśāsana*). The statistical tests show that these are permissible variations of the index for their different degrees of freedom. For all the adhyāyas which exhibit this style, this index is found to be 255.4 (degrees of freedom 3123). It will be seen that the index for *Bhīṣma* and *Droṇa* parvans approaches this value, as their degrees of freedom are sufficiently large, namely 576 and 954 respectively. The indices for these four styles are α -style : 55.5, B-style : 87.1, C-style : 171.5 for large degrees of freedom, and β : 1071.9 for 99 degrees of freedom. It is difficult to agree that these widely varying styles could belong to the same author.

The reviewer states that it is admitted on all hands that Vaiśampāyana and Sūta Ugrasravas (Sauti) are among the original authors. He further states that according to the line of transmission, Sūta Lomaharṣaṇa, whom the epic does not recognise as the reciter, occupies the second place and the statistical analysis has accorded only a minor role to Sauti. This statement is, however, not factually correct. It will be seen from Table B at *MGG*, page 228, that while Sūta's contribution has been 17284 verses to the *Mbh* Sauti has added 26728 verses, which are more than the 24,000 verses in the original *Bhārata*. But their contributions have to be judged not merely by the size but by the nature of their contributions. Sūta has elaborated the incidents of *Mbh* briefly mentioned by Vaiśampāyana and has also added anecdotes which do not find even a cursory mention in Vaiśampāyana's *Bhārata*. Sauti has added most of the Upākhyānas and the passages on Nīti and Dharma and transformed the war chronicle into a Purāṇa and Dharma-śāstra. On the other hand, the reviewer says that, if the epic statement is to be believed, Vyāsa's text contained not only the *upākhyānas* but also *khilas* like the *Harivaṃśa* and the *Bhaviṣyat*. He relies upon the verses 69, 233 and 71 of the second adhyāya of the *Ādiparvan*. According to the statistical analysis, this adhyāya belongs to the B group of adhyāyas added by the last redactor, namely the Parvasaṅgrahakāra. But if this is true, then what is the contribution of Sūta Ugrasravas to the *Mbh*? In saying this the reviewer himself has accorded a marginal role to Sauti, who, according to him, is one of the original authors of the *Mbh*.

I should like to point out here that this statistical study has confirmed most of the important results obtained by Dr. V. S. Sukthankar in his research on *Mbh*. This itself should prove that the statistical analysis has proceeded on the right lines. In his Critical Studies in the *Mahābhārata*, later included in the Sukthankar Memorial Edition Vol. I, Dr. Sukthankar conclu-

des as follows : “ The infiltration detailing the Bhārgava legends, the manner of its treatment and even that strange admixture of the Epic with the Dharma and Nīti elements, which later has puzzled many enquirers into the genesis of the *Mahābhārata*, thus appears to find a simple and straightforward explanation in the assumption of an important diascuasis of the epic under strong and direct Bhārgava influence (*MGG*, p. xii). According to the statistical analysis, the Bhārgava legends and the Nīti and Dharma passages exhibit α and B styles, ascribed by me to Sūta and Sauti.

That most of the Bhārgava legends were composed by father and son is clear from the internal evidence itself. When Śaunaka asks Sauti to narrate the Bhārgava stories, the latter tells him that he will relate to him the Bhārgava stories as told by Vaiśampāyana and by his father and himself (I. 5. 4, 5). When Śaunaka asks Sauti to narrate the story of Āstika, Sauti tells him that he would recite it as he had heard it from his father (I. 14.40). It will be found that although the 50 adhyāyas 4–54 (excluding 50) have been narrated by Sauti, they exhibit the α style (Variance 51. 13, degrees of freedom 450). Thus, as clearly stated by Sauti, this style belongs to his father. It, therefore, stands to reason that the other *upākhyānas* and Nīti and Dharma passages, which exhibit the α and B styles, were also contributed by father and son. This is borne out by other evidence also. In the *Śakunatalopākhyāna* (I. 65. 34) Sauti mentions that the nakṣatra cycle began with Śravaṇa asterism. According to S. B. Dikshit, an eminent astronomer, this could not have occurred before 450 B. C. This is also accepted by C. V. Vaidya, another great *Mahābhārata* scholar, who says that this reference to the Śravaṇa being the beginning of the nakṣatra cycle could not be earlier than 450 B. C. (*MGG*, p. 129). If this *upākhyāna* were in Vyāsa’s text, it would make him a contemporary of Lord Buddha or even later. Further, in the *Anugītā* (14. 44. 2), the reading accepted by the Critical Edition is *śraviṣṭhādīni ṛkṣāṇi*, where Śraviṣṭhā is only another name for Dhaniṣṭhā, which would go to show that at the time of author of the *Anugītā*, which is in the α -style, the winter solstice used to commence with Dhaniṣṭhā and not with Śravaṇa as in the days of Sauti. This would show that the α and B styles belong to two different authors.

This statistical study also confirms the view of Lokamanya Tilak and Dr. Radhakrishnan on the date of the *Gītā*. According to the statistical study the date of the *Gītā* is placed in the fifth century B. C. (*MGG*, p. 130). After citing Pāli texts and other evidence Lokamanya Tilak came to the conclusion that the *Gītā* existed before and exercised considerable influence on the growth of Mahāyāna Buddhism and assigned the fifth century to the *Gītā*

(Appendices to the *Gītārahasya*). Dr. Radhakrishnan summarises the evidence on this point thus : "We shall not, I believe, be far wrong if we assign *Gītā* to the fifth century." (*Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 524).

The C-style has an index of 175.5 for large degrees of freedom and is significantly different from the other styles mentioned above. There is internal evidence to show that these additions were made at a still later date. In *Āraṇyaka* 188.64 this author complains that the Buddhist shrines (*eḍukas*) have ousted the Hindu temples, and in verse 66 he further says that the earth is littered with *eḍukas*. It must have taken at least two to three centuries after Buddha's Mahānirvāṇa for the *eḍukas* to have been constructed in large numbers (*MGG*, p. 128). In the *Sārasvatopākhyāna* of *Śalyaparvan*, there is a mention of Vṛddhagarga as having obtained, by dint of his austerities, the knowledge of the planetary motions. Now an astronomer Garga Parāśara is reportedly³ mentioned by Pāṇini, and probably this Garga is referred to as Vṛddhagarga to distinguish him from another young Garga, who had come into prominence during that time. The date of this younger Garga is fixed at 145 B. C. from a reference in his work to the invasion of Sāketa by the Greeks. The author with the C-style therefore seems to have belonged to the second century B. C.

The *Harivaṃśa* with the exception of the *Uśāsvapna* is also written in the C-style. If, as the reviewer states, it was composed by Vyāsa or Vaiśampāyana, then it is not known why they did not incorporate it within the corpus of *Mbh*. It is also surprising that neither Śaunaka nor the audience persuaded Sauti to narrate it at the sacrificial session. It is also pertinent to note that the references to *Harivaṃśa* occur only in the second adhyāya of the *Mbh* and nowhere else. The *Mbh* also does not refer to Kṛṣṇa's stay at Gokula, his exploits there as a child, his foster parents Nanda and Yaśodā and his instructor Sāṇḍipani. Significantly the reference to Kṛṣṇa as a cowherd is found for the first in Sauti's additions. Śiṣupāla, in his tirade against Kṛṣṇa in the Rājastūya sacrifice, calls Kṛṣṇa a cowherd (*Mbh*. II. 38) but is silent about his relations with the Gopīs. The latter also do not figure in the Bauddha *jātakas*. It is pertinent to note that Kṛṣṇa's mention as a cowherd occurs in the epic only after the nomadic tribe of the Ābhīras came on the scene. Sūta mentions them for the first time in *Mbh* XVI. 6, when they are said to have waylaid Arjuna's party, who were returning to Hastināpura after Kṛṣṇa's death. As pointed out by Dr. R. N. Dandekar, there seems little doubt that the cowherd child-god Kṛṣṇa origi-

³ Vide C. V. Vaidya, *The Mahābhārata : A Criticism* (Bombay, 1905), p. 20.

nated among the nomadic community of the Ābhīras, who followed the profession of cowherds. It, therefore, seems evident that the legends which had grown round this child-god of the Ābhīras were incorporated into the early life of Kṛṣṇa in the *Harivaṃśa* by its author. This finds further support in terracotta find from Sugh assigned to the second century B. C. which contains an art depiction of Kṛṣṇa learning the Brahmi alphabets at the *āśrama* of Sāndīpani. As this fact is mentioned only in the *Harivaṃśa* (*HV*), it fixes the date of *HV* as second century B. C. This date also finds support from the internal evidence in *HV* which describes the Brahmin General who is supposed to restore the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice in the *Kali* age as *Audbhijja* or plant-born. Jayasval identifies him with Puṣyamitra, who ruled from 187 to 151 B. C. (*MGG*, p. 128). Thus the internal evidence both in *Mbh* and *HV* shows that the author of the C-style passages lived in the second century B.C.

It was found that the β-style with its index of 1071.9 was significantly different from the above three styles. Had Sauti written the first three adhyāyas of *Ādiparvan*, he would not have repeated the story of his visit to the hermitage of Śaunaka in the fourth adhyāya. The author of the first three adhyāyas came later than Sauti and also *Harivaṃśakāra*, as he mentions *Harivaṃśa* and has added the *Uṣāsvapna* to the *HV*. Evidently until his time the *HV* was not regarded as an integral part of the *Mbh*, as he does not give the count of *HV* along with the counts of the eighteen parvans. Later when *HV* came to be regarded as an integral part of the *Mbh*, some one must have noticed that the vulgates of *Mbh* and *HV* contained about 84 thousand verses and 16 thousand verses respectively, which added to one lakh verses. Then it came to be known as *Śatasāhasrī*, and so Dio Chrysostomos, who came to India in the first century A. D., recorded that people talk about a work containing one lakh verses (*MGG*, p. 232).

Now in a similar study of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, I have come across three styles α, C and β. The first paper on *Rāmāyaṇa* appears in this very issue of the *Annals* (pp. 18-35). In addition to two styles, the R-style (index 113.06) and the U-style (index 33.51) which are entirely different from the five styles in *Mbh*, the Sargas 2-21 of the *Sundarakāṇḍa* and Sargas 32-65 of the *Yuddhakāṇḍa* exhibit the C-style, while ślokas 41-190 of the first Sarga and 113 lines of Sarga 56 of *Sundarakāṇḍa* exhibit the α style. It is further found that the Viśvāmitra episode in the *Bālakāṇḍa* excluding the *Tāṭakāvadha* is in the α-style. Now it is not possible that Vālmiki and Vyāsa could write in three identical styles. The simple and straightforward inference is obvious, namely, that the redactors who made additions to *Mbh* also made additions to the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

It should now be abundantly clear that the four styles, α, B, C and β, belonged to four different authors, who lived in different periods. Out of the total number of verses 75595.5, which constitute the Critical Edition, the above styles account for 17285, 26728.5, 9053 and 1368.5 verses respectively. In counting the number of verses, a three-line śloka and a six-line stanza have been counted as $1\frac{1}{2}$ verses. The remainder, which comes to 21161.5 is the size of Vaiśampāyana's *Bhārata*. The *Mbh* itself mentions that the *Bhārata* did not contain episodes and consisted of 24000 ślokas (*MGG*, Intro. vi). The difference between the two counts is explained by the fact that the Parva-saṅgrahakāra must have counted them from a Vulgate edition (Dn) (*MGG*, Intro. vii). The reviewer finds fault with this on the ground that the *Bhārata* retrieved by the statistical study does not contain any adhyāyas from the *Sabhā* and *Āraṇyaka parvans*. But the *Ādi* and the *Udyoga parvan* adhyāyas in Vaiśampāyana's *Bhārata* describe how the dissension began, namely the attempts made by the Kauravas to get rid of the Pāṇḍavas, the dice game, the exile of Pāṇḍavas, and the efforts made by Kṛṣṇa on their return to bring about a reconciliation between the cousins. When these attempts failed war was inevitable. These events form the beginning of the story. The events of war are described at great length, which form the middle. Then comes the end with the victory of the Pāṇḍavas, the retirement of Dhṛtarāṣṭra along with Gāndhārī and Kuntī to the forest and their tragic death there, the coronation of Yudhiṣṭhira, the instruction received by him on Rājadharmā from Bhīṣma and the death of Bhīṣma. Thus the 'A'-group of adhyāyas gives a self-contained story, and so one may justifiably claim that it constitutes by and large the *Bhārata* of Vaiśampāyana. It came to be called *Mahā-bhārata* only after its redaction by Sūta and Sauti.

THREE INTRODUCTORY COMPOSITIONS

BY

J. A. F. ROODBERGEN

1. Introductory verses have been put at the beginning of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (*KV*), the *Pañcikā*, otherwise known as *Nyāsa* (*N*), and the *Padamañjarī* (*P*). They are rather different in length and character. This becomes especially noticeable when comparing the introductory verses of *KV* and *N* with those of *P*.

2.1 Text of the introductory verses of *KV*¹ :

1. *vṛttau bhāṣye tathā dhātunāmapārāryaṇādiṣu
viprakīrṇasya tantrasya kriyate sārasaṃgrahaḥ.*
2. *iṣṭyupasaṃkhyānavatī śuddhagaṇā vivṛtaguḍhasūtrārthā
vyutpanmarūpasiddhir vṛttir iyaṃ kāśikā nāma.*
3. *vyākaraṇasya śarīraṃ pariniṣṭhitaśāstrakāryam etāvat
śiṣṭaḥ parikarabandhaḥ kriyate 'syu granthakāreṇa.*

2.2 Translation :

1. A compendium is composed of the quintessence² of grammar³ dispersed in *vṛttis*⁴, in the (*Mahā-*) *bhāṣya*⁵ and also in lists⁶ of verbal bases and nominal stems, etc.⁷

¹ Text according to *Kāśikā*, Part 1. Editors A. Sharma, Kh. Deshpande, D. G. Padhye. Sanskrit Academy, Osmania University, Hyderabad 1969, p. 1.

² The text of *N* and *P* is quoted according to *Kāśikāvṛttiḥ*, Vol. I. Edited by Swami Dwarikadasa Shastri and Pt. K. Shukla, Varanasi 1965.

N (*KV*, p. 5 and 6) proposes two *vigrahas* of the cp. *sārasaṃgraha*, (1) *sāraṃ cāsaṃ saṃgrahaś ca*, and (2) *sārasya saṃgrahaḥ*. Here (1) is a *kdh* cp. in the sense of 'both the essence and (correct and complete) epitome (of rules and examples)'. *P* (*KV*, p. 5) adopts the analysis *sāra ... tasya saṃgrahaḥ*, a simple *tp*. cp.

³ *N* (*KV*, p. 5) mentions three possible meanings of *tantra*, (1) *tantram iva tantram* 'so to speak, a loom', (2) *tantryante vyutpādyante ... anena* 'by it (words) are etymologically derived', and (3) *siddhānta* 'authoritative textbook'. *P* (*KV*, p. 5) says that *tantra* here means *siddhānta*.

⁴ *Jūṭyēkavacana* by P. 1. 2. 58. *P* (*KV*, p. 4) explains *vṛtti* as *vivaraṇaṃ cullibhaṭṭinallūrādiviracitam* 'an exposition (of Pāṇini's *sūtras*) composed by Culli, Bhaṭṭi or Nallūra, etc.'. *P* (*KV*, p. 4) defines *vṛtti* as *sūtrārthapradhūno granthaḥ* 'a book mainly concerned with the meaning of the *sūtras*' and refers to works composed by Kuṇi, etc.

2. Containing *iṣṭis*⁸ and *upasaṃkhyānas*,⁹ providing the *gaṇas* in their accurate form,¹⁰ explaining the hidden meaning of the *sūtras*,¹¹ establishing standard (word-) forms,¹² this *vṛtti* is called *Kāśikā*.¹³
3. The body of grammar, (that is) the complete achievement of the science of grammar, is so big.¹⁴ The remaining protective girdle¹⁵ of this (body) is made by the author of (this) work.¹⁶

3. Analysis of contents :

Verse 1 describes the nature of the work. It is a compendium of what is essential in grammar, collected from three sources : (1) *vṛttis* on Pāṇini, (2)

⁵ P (KV, p. 4) explains *bhāṣya* as the exposition (*vivaraṇa*) by Patañjali of the statements of Kātyāyana. N (KV, p. 4) repeats this and adds a definition of the *bhāṣya*-genre as *ākṣepasamūdhūnāparo grāthakḥ* ' a work mainly consisting of objection and answer. '

⁶ N (KV, p. 4) explains the term *pūrāyana* as *pūram paryantaṃ niṣṭhām ayanta gacchanti* ' they go to the end '. That is to say, a complete list. See also PASPA, fn. 280.

⁷ P (KV, p. 4) explains the word *ūdi* as referring to the *śikṣās*, etc.

⁸ *iṣṭi* literally means a desired form, an established wordform used in the speech of the *śiṣṭas* (compare *iṣṭiṇā*, PASPA, Note (143)). Then *iṣṭi* is taken to mean the rule desired to establish such a wordform as formulated by Patañjali.

⁹ *Upasaṃkhyāna* literally means ' inclusion '. The term is often used by Kātyāyana in his *vṛttikas* to refer to additional forms which are to be included under a Pāṇini-sūtra. Here the word *upasaṃkhyāna* is used in the sense of *vṛttika*.

P (KV, p. 5) explains the word *iṣṭyupasaṃkhyāna* as *sūtrenūsaṃgrhītaṃ lakṣyaṃ yena saṃgrhyate* ' that (statement) by which examples are included which are left out by the *sūtras* '.

¹⁰ P (KV, p. 5) gives an example of a *śuddhagaṇa*, that is, a completed and ' corrected enumeration of nominal stems to which a particular Pāṇinisūtra applies, and then says *vṛtyantareṣu tu gaṇapūṭha eva nūsti prāg eva śuddhiḥ* ' but in other commentaries there is no *gaṇapūṭha* at all, let alone a corrected and completed list '.

¹¹ P (KV, p. 5) explains that to bring out the hidden meaning of the *sūtras* is the defining feature of a *vṛtti*, and says that ' hidden ' is the defining feature of the meaning of *sūtras*.

¹² P (KV, p. 6) explains *vyutpannarūpasiddhi* as *udāharaṇamaṇḍita* ' adorned with examples '. *Vyutpanna* means ' derived according to the rules of grammar ' in relation to words, and also ' cultured, well-educated ' in relation to persons. So *vyutpanna* words may be taken to mean the words used by a cultured person who has received a grammatical education, in short, standard speech.

¹³ P (KV, p. 6) refers to P. 4. 2. 116 and says that *kāśikā* means *kāśiku bhavā* ' (the commentary) originating in Kāśi '.

¹⁴ Taking into account the size of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* with annexes, the *vṛttikas* and the *bhāṣya*-statements.

¹⁵ P (KV, p. 6) explains *parikarabandha* as *rakṣābandha*.

¹⁶ P (KV, p. 6) points out that *śiṣṭa* (in the sense of *pariśiṣṭo* ' *ṣiṣṭa* ' the part left over ') may be connected with *grāthakāreṇa*. In that case, the word *grāthakāra* is taken to refer to the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* and others. But, naturally, *grāthakāreṇa* may also be connected with *kriyate*.

the *Mahābhāṣya*, and (3) the *dhātupāṭha* and the *gaṇapāṭha*. Apparently, in the days when the *KV* was composed *ṛttis* on Pāṇini were still available, thus providing independent access to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. That is, access independent from Patañjali. *N* mentions three authors of such *ṛttis*, *N* mentions one only by name. Whether these *ṛttis* were merely known by name to *N* and *P*, or whether they were still available to and used by *N* and *P* is not clear. The exception here may be Bhaṭṭi, if by this name the author of the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* is meant. Verse 2 states four qualities of the *KV*. Among them, according to *P*, the quality of *śuddhagaṇā* is especially important in comparison with other commentaries. Verse 2 also states the name of the commentary. Verse 3 is more or less poetical. It compares the science of grammar to a big body, and says that the commentary, like a girdle, serves to protect that body.

4.1 Text of the introductory verses of *N* :

1. *jayanti te sadā santaḥ sarvathā yair upārjitam
guṇānām sumahad vṛndam doṣāṇām ca vimārjanam.*
2. *anyataḥ sāram ādāya kṛtaiṣā kāśikā yathā
ṛttis tasya yathāśakti kriyate pañcikā tathā.*

4.2 Translation

1. Always and in all ways these saintly people are victorious¹⁷ by whom a very great multitude of virtues and an erasing of (moral) defects is procured.¹⁸
2. Just as this *Kāśikā* is composed by taking the essence¹⁹ from elsewhere,²⁰ in the same way this commentary (called) *Pañcikā*²¹ on that (*Kāśikā*) is composed, according to the best of ability.

5. Analysis of contents

Verse 1 is in praise of those Buddhist saints who by practising virtue have ceased to act as prompted by bad desires. Verse 2 says that the commentary

¹⁷ Allusion to the name *jina* for the Buddha.

¹⁸ The phrase goes equally well with Theravāda *arhats* and Mahāyāna *bodhisattvas*. See S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. I. Cambridge 1922. Reprint 1951, p. 100, 103, 126, 127 (*pūramitū*).

¹⁹ Compare introductory stanza 1 of the *KV* (*sūrasaṃgrahaḥ*).

²⁰ Compare introductory stanza 1 of the *KV*, line 1 (*ṛttau bhaṣye dhātunūmapūrū-yaṇūdiṣu*).

²¹ *Pañcikā* literally means a work consisting of five parts. According to MM. K. V. Abhyankar and J. M. Shukla, *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar*, Second revised edition, Baroda 1977 (*Gadkwar's Oriental Series* N. 134), p. 231. s. v., *pañcikā* is a popular name given to critical commentaries by scholars.

is designed along the same lines as the *Kāśikā* in so far that it takes the essence of grammar from other sources. In that sense it is not an original work. Verse 2 also states the name of the commentary.

The verses are in the *śloka*-metre.

6.1 Text of the introductory verses of *P* :

1. *vyaktapradhānapuruṣātmakam asvatantram
etat samastam adhiṭiṣṭhati yaḥ svatantraḥ
tasmai śivāya paramāya daśavyayāya
sāmbhāya sādaram ayaṁ vihitāḥ praṇāmaḥ.*
2. *svaṁ svaṁ manoratham avāptum apeta vigṛhṇaṁ
yasya prasādam anavāpya na śaknuvanti
padmāsanaprabhṛtayaḥ prathame 'pi devās
tad vastu hastimukham astu mayi prasannam.*
3. *tātaṁ padmakumārākhyam praṇamyāmbāṁ śriyaṁ tathā
jyeṣṭhaṁ cāgnikumārākhyam ācāryam aparājitam.*
4. *yaś cirāya haradattasaṁjñayā viśruto daśasu dikṣu dakṣiṇaḥ
ujjahāra padamañjarīm asau śabdaśāstrasahakārapādapāt.*
5. *tām imām anupadhena cetasā bhāvayantu bhuvi bhavyabuddhayaḥ
kaḥ khalu praṇayini priyaṁvade matsarī bhavati madvidhe jane.*
6. *avicāritaramañīyaṁ kāmam vyākhyāśataṁ vṛtiteḥ
hṛdayaṅgamā bhaviṣyati guṇagṛhyāṇām iyaṁ vyākhyā.*
7. *iṣṭadevanamaskāraḥ kāryaḥ. Sa neha kiṁ kṛtaḥ
vṛttau sūtre tathā bhāṣye vārttike ca tad ucyate.*
8. *manasā vacasā ca karmaṇā kṛta evāyam ihāniveśitaḥ.
na hi darbhapavitrapāṇitādyaparaṁ maṅgalam atra kīrtiyate.*

6.2 Translation :

1. Who, the absolute one, rules over this universe which essentially consists of matter and individual spirits in a manifest form,²² (and

²² It may be assumed that Haradatta, who comes from South India (verse 4), was a Pāśupata Śaiva. Compare S. Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, Cambridge 1955, p. 100, (while dealing with a section of the *Śivamahāpurāṇa*), "The supreme Lord ... manifests Himself as the individual *puruṣas* or souls who enjoy the qualities of the *prakṛti*." *Pradhāna* = *prakṛti*, cf. *ibid.*, p. 107.

which is) dependent, for him, Śiva, the highest, having ten qualities,²³ together with Ambā, this obeisance is respectfully performed.

2. Without having obtained whose favour even the foremost gods beginning with the lotus-enthroned one²⁴ cannot obtain their respective wishes without encountering obstacles, may that elephant-faced being²⁵ be gracious to me.
3. Having bowed down before my father named Padmakumāra and before my mother Śrī, and before my elder brother named Agnikumāra, and before my teacher Aparājita,
4. I, who am wellknown in the ten regions for a long time by the name of Haradatta, coming from the south, have taken a *Padamañjarī* 'word-bouquet' from the mango tree of grammar.
5. May those who possess excellent minds on earth honour this (*Padamañjarī*) with honest minds. Who, indeed, could be jealous of a man like me, affectionate (and) speaking sweetly?
6. Granted that there must be one hundred commentaries, easy to understand and enjoyable, (still) this exposition (of mine) will touch the heart of those who are appreciative of quality.
7. Obeisance is to be made to the favourite deity. Why has this not been done here, in the *vṛttis*, the (*Pāṇini*-) *sūtras*, and in the (*Mahā*-) *bhāṣya* and in the *vārttikas*? That I (shall) state.
8. That (obeisance) was definitely performed by mind, word and deed (but) not introduced here (in the text of the works mentioned). Because here (on earth) there is no *maṅgala* 'invocation to establish future success' greater than the status of a person having a ring of purificatory *darbha* grass on his hand, etc.²⁶

7. Analysis of contents :

The stanzas clearly fall into four groups, differentiated by metre and subject,

²³ The ten qualities are summed up in *Vāyupurāṇa* 1. 10. 60 as *jñānaṃ vairāgyam aiśvaryaṃ tūṣaṇī satyaṃ kṣamā dhṛtiḥ / sraṣṭṛtvaṃ ātmasambodhas tv adhiṣṭhātṛtvaṃ eva ca* 'knowledge, dispassionateness, sovereignty, mortification, truth, forbearance, steadiness, the status of emanator, awareness of the *ātman*, (these make up) the status of ruler itself'. Compare *An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles*, General Editor S. D. Joshi. Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute. Poona 1988, p. 1669, s. v. *adhiṣṭhātṛtva*.

²⁴ Brahma.

²⁵ Gaṇeśa.

²⁶ Reference is to *Mbh.* I, p. 39, lines 10-11, ... *ūcāryo darbhapavitraṇīḥ śucāv avakāśe prāṇmukha upaviśya* 'the Teacher having a ring of purificatory *darbha* grass on his hand, having seated himself on a pure spot of ground; facing the east ...'

namely, 1-2, 3-4, 5-6 and 7-8. In the latter two groups each verse has a different metre.

The subject of the first group is the invocation of deities (in *vasanta-tilaka* metre): Śiva, the *iṣṭadevatā*, and Gaṇeśa, the remover of obstacles. The subject of the second group is personal data and the title of the work (in ordinary *śloka* metre). The personal data include the names of the author's parents, of his elder brother and of his teacher. The subject of the third group is the reception of the work by the fellow-pandits and a praise of the work (verse 5, *rathoddhatā* metre; verse 6 a variety of *udgatā* metre). The subject of the fourth group is the question why there is no *maṅgala* at the beginning of the early great works of grammar. The answer given by Haradatta is that no *maṅgala* was needed here, because these early teachers were the embodiment of *maṅgala* (verse 7, *śloka*-metre; verse 8 a combination of two metres).

8. Comparison

	KV	N	P
length	3 stanzas	2 stanzas	8 stanzas
metre	<i>śloka</i>	<i>śloka</i>	various
deities/saints	—	+	+
personal data	—	—	+
teacher's name	—	—	+
author's name	—	—	+
name of the work	+	+	+
qualities of the work (factual)	+	—	—
hope of good reception	—	—	+
superiority of the work in relation to similar works	—	—	+
self-praise	—	—	+
<i>alaṃkāra</i>	2 (<i>rūpaka</i>)	—	2 (<i>rūpaka</i>)

The only item which the introductory verses have in common is the mention of the name of the work. The only item in which *KV* disagrees with both *N* and *P* is the factual statement of the qualities of the work which could be taken as a brief indication of the contents of the work. The only item in which *KV* agrees with *P* is the use of an *alaṃkāra*. The only item in which all three disagree is length of the composition. In all other cases *KV* agrees with *N*, whereas both disagree with *P*. Clearly, in the course of time between *N* and *P* conventions have changed.

If it is held that a *maṅgala* requires at least the invocation of a deity and the salutation of the preceptor, then only *P* can boast of a proper *maṅgala*. In fact, *P*'s introductory verses have taken the form of literary art.

DATING OF THE ELEPHANTA, MAṆḌAPEŚVARA AND JOGEŚVARĪ CAVES

BY

BRAHMANAND DESHPANDE

1. The Problem

The dating of the rock-hewn caves of Maṇḍapeśvara, Jogeśvarī and Elephanta, as well as Cave Nos. 21 (Rāmeśvara) and 29 (Sītā-ki-Nahāni) at Ellora, has been the subject of much controversy. The absence of any inscriptions in these caves has made the problem difficult of solution. The problem is made more difficult because the political history of Maharashtra of the first six centuries of Christian era is shrouded in obscurity. Of late, Dr. Walter Spink has attempted to unravel this mystery.¹ His conclusions, based on an incorrect interpretation of the available numismatic and epigraphic evidence, have made the confusion worse confounded.

The entire edifice of Dr. Spink's arguments rests on the single fact that the caves of Jogeśvarī, Maṇḍapeśvara and Elephanta and the caves 21 and 29 of Ellora have figures of Lakuliśa carved in them. (The so-called figure of Lakuliśa at Elephanta is badly mutilated and defies identification as both its hands are broken). This has inspired many scholars, including the illustrious epigraphist Dr. Mirashi, to turn to the Kalachuris as the patrons and excavators of the caves, especially those at Elephanta, as the Kalachuris are well-known for their adherence to the Pāśupata cult.² This theory has now found a few adherents. It is, therefore, necessary to examine this theory closely. We maintain that the theory of Kalachuri dominance cannot be accepted as it demands a close scrutiny of the available numismatic and epigraphic evidence.

2. Ābhīras and Traikūṭakas

Koṅkaṇa or Aparānta (Ariake of Periplus) finds mention in ancient Buddhist texts. The Sopara edict of Aśoka suggests Maurya rule over this narrow tract. But it was placed on the political map of India by the valiant

¹ Spink, "Ajanta to Ellora," *Marg*, Vol. XX, March, 1967, pp. 8-10; also his article on Ellora's earliest phase in the *Bulletin of the American Academy*. Vol. I, pp. 11-22.

² Mirashi V. V., *Inscriptions of Kalachuri-Chedi Era*, Part I, Introduction, p. cxvii.

Sātavāhanas. Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi, the great saviour of the Sātavāhana empire, definitely ruled over it. As the Sātavāhanas gradually faded into political insignificance, new dynasties arose to fill in the vacuum. The rule of Ābhira Īśvarasena, who ruled over the Govardhana-Gaṅgāpura region around Nasik, can be cited in this connection.

This Govardhana-Gaṅgāpura tract was also known as Trīkuṭa Parvata from which the Traikūṭaka dynasty derived its name. The earliest record of this line is the Pardi grant of Mahārāja Dahrasena dated in the year 207. This date is referable to the Kalachuri Samvat and so Dahrasena's rule can be placed around 460-65 A. D. The Surat grant of 241 K. S. mentions his son Vyāghrasena and places him around 490-91 A. D.³

An inscription of the Vākāṭaka ruler Hariṣeṇa, in Cave No. 17 at Ajanta, lists a number of countries over which he is said to have triumphed during the course of his *digvijaya*.⁴ Here, the Trikuṭa-deśa is also listed along with Kuntala, Avanti, Kaliṅga, Kośala, Lāṭa, Āndhra and other countries. Dr. Mirashi, being aware that the description of Hariṣeṇa's military prowess is traditional and stereotyped, does not take the account literally to mean that the Vākāṭaka king Hariṣeṇa conquered the Traikūṭaka dominion.⁵ In spite of this, Dr. (Mrs.) Shobhana Gokhale accepts the theory of the Traikūṭaka debacle at the hands of Hariṣeṇa in toto.⁶ As a matter of fact, she goes a step further and suggests that a state of anarchy prevailed in the Traikūṭaka dominions following their discomfiture at the hands of the Vākāṭaka king. To support her assertion, she cites the Kanheri plates of Traikūṭakas, where the name of the ruling Traikūṭaka king is not mentioned. We maintain that the bardic account of the Ajanta cave inscription is a traditional panegyric. The Traikūṭakas might have suffered a reverse in a skirmish. As for the Kanheri plates, it must be kept in mind that it is a strictly personal and religious epigraph concerned with the construction of a *stūpa* over the mortal remains of the Buddhist mendicant Śāradvatīputra, by one Buddharuci, a resident of the far away Sindhu Viśaya. In an epigraph of this kind, an elaborate mention of the ruling Traikūṭaka sovereign with full imperial titles (many of which extol the Vaiṣṇava faith of the Traikūṭakas) would seem irrelevant and unnecessary. Even then the record begins with "*Namaḥ survajñāya / Traikūṭakānāṃ pravardhamānarājye...*" Translated it means, "Hail to the Omniscient! In the augmenting sovereignty of

³ Ibid., pp. 22 ff.

⁴ Hyderabad Archaeological Series No. 14, p. 11.

⁵ Mirashi, *op. cit.*, Introduction, p. xiii.

⁶ Gokhale, *Itihāsa āṇi Samśkriti*, Quarterly, Oct. 1972, p. 9.

the Traikūṭakas.....” The reference to the “augmenting sovereignty” of the Traikūṭakas destroys the theory of anarchy in the Traikūṭaka dominions.

Apparently, then, no serious disturbances followed the so called Vākāṭaka invasion. It is, therefore, absolutely unnecessary to assume that Madhayamasena, the son of Vyāghrasena, had to seek Kalachuri assistance to tide over the crisis. This, for two reasons : One, that there was no crisis in the Traikūṭaka kingdom. Two, we know of no Kalachuri king who could have been contemporary of Madhyamasena (A. D. 505). Such a king could have been the grand-father of Kṛṣṇarāja, of whom we know nothing.

3. The Myth of Kalachuri Empire

Numismatic and epigraphic evidence has brought to light three Kalachuri rulers who ruled from Māhiṣmatī. These are Kṛṣṇarāja, his son Śaṅkaragaṇa and grandson Buddharāja. The first is known to us through his ubiquitous coins called “Kṛṣṇarāja-Rūpaka-s.” These are, so far, found in Malva, Rajasthan, Vidarbha, Nasik, Ellora, Madhyapradesh and Konkan. The legend of these coins is rather strange. The name of Kṛṣṇarāja is devoid of any princely title. He is only called “a devout worshipper of Śiva” and “meditating at the feet of his parents” (*Paramamāheśvara-mātāpitṛpādānudhyāta*). These coins were current even after his death and were minted by his successors and the rulers of other dynasties too. This slender evidence has been used by Dr. Mirashi to build an extensive empire for Kṛṣṇarāja, who according to him, held sway over Gujarat, Vidarbha, the Deccan and Konkan.⁷ However, the mere use of coins in these regions does not prove that he ruled over all these regions. Indo-Sassanian coins were used in Malwa, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Gujarat for some 400 years. Śaka and Kṣatrapa coins were used outside their dominions. The mere use of coins could not, therefore, prove that Kṛṣṇarāja’s rule was spread over this region.

The theory of Kṛṣṇarāja’s rule over Gujarat is similarly based on slender evidence. This theory is based on a copper-plate grant of Saṅgamasimha, ruler of an anonymous dynasty. Edited first by Dr. Sten Konow, it was subsequently included by Dr. Mirashi in his *Inscriptions of the Kalachuri-Chedi Era*.⁸ Saṅgamasimha’s feudatory status under the Kalachuris has been inferred by these scholars on the basis of the reading “(*mahāsāmanta*) *mahārāja*” in the first line of the record. On closer scrutiny of the facsimile of this inscription, one can see that this reading is purely conjectural, since

⁷ Mirashi, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁸ Mirashi, *op. cit.*, No. 11.

this particular portion of the plate is badly mutilated. For this reason, both the scholars have bracketed the word '*mahāsāmanta*.'⁹ Again it is astonishing to find the feudal title '*mahāsāmanta*' coupled with the imperial title "*mahārāja*."¹⁰ The other question one may pose is: who was the Kalachuri overlord of Saṅgamasimha? Dr. Shobhana Gokhale points to Kṛṣṇarāja's unknown father.¹¹ This lands us in a very unenviable situation. Except very dubious numismatic evidence we have nothing to substantiate the so-called empire of Kṛṣṇarāja. His father's name is not known to us. It does not either occur in the legend of Kṛṣṇarāja's coins. Obviously he was a political cipher. If he were powerful enough to have a Mahārāja as his feudatory, he would have been at least a Mahārājādhirāja, and important enough to be mentioned by his son Kṛṣṇarāja. The fact that his son does not ever mention his name is indicative of his insignificance. It is absolutely unjustifiable to hold this insignificant cipher, Kṛṣṇarāja's father, as the overlord of Mahārāja Saṅgamasimha. Again the fact that Kṛṣṇarāja and Śaṅkaragaṇa are not called Mahārāja either in their own records or in those of their successors¹² explodes the entire myth of Kṛṣṇarāja's Kalachuri empire in Gujarat, Konkan or the Deccan. Orthographically also, the Sunev Kalan plates of Saṅgamasimha are more akin to the Traikūṭaka records than those of the Kalachuris.¹³

4. Traikūṭaka-Kalachuri Conflict : a myth

Recently, two new Traikūṭaka grants have been published by Dr. Shobhana Gokhale.¹ Of these, the first mentions a grant to a Brāhmaṇa called Śivasvāmī, a resident of Kallivana (Kaḷvaṇ, district Nasik). The donor is Traikūṭaka ruler Madhyamasena, who ruled around 251 K. S. (about 505 A. D.). His relations with the Kalachuris have already been discussed earlier. The other plate of 284 K. S. (about 533 A. D.) also records the same donee Śivasvāmī receiving some grant at the hands of Vikramasena. But this plate starts with a very puzzling expression, *viḷaya-aniruddha-purā-tkaṭacchurīṇām*. Dr. Shobhana Gokhale has discussed this at length. Drawing upon Dr. Mirashi, she contends that Aniruddhapura was the capital of the Traikūṭakas, who having suffered a complete reverse at the hands of the Kalachuris, had to surrender it to the latter. Hence the scribe had to inscribe "... *Kaṭacchurīṇām*" instead of "... *Traikūṭakāṇām*". Dr. Mirashi, on the other hand, makes specific mention of the Kalachuris. To solve this

⁹ Mirashi, *op. cit.*, pp. 34 ff.

¹⁰ Mirashi, *op. cit.*, p. 40 fn. 2.

¹¹ Gokhale, *op. cit.*, Jan. 72, p. 5 and Oct. 72, p. 5.

¹² Mirashi, *Itihās āṇi Sanskriti*, Quarterly, July, 73, p. 5.

¹³ Mirashi, *Inscriptions of Kalachuri-Chedi Era*, pp. 38 ff.

¹⁴ Gokhale, *op. cit.*, Jan. 72, pp. 5-11; Oct. 72, pp. 5-11.

riddle he proposes another theory. According to him, the mighty Kalachuris overran many kingdoms, including that of the Traikūṭakas. In the disturbed conditions following in the wake of the Kalachuri inroads, the donee Śivasvāmī could not get his charter inscribed on a copper-plate. He did so only when the Kalachuris were firmly planted in the Konkana. Hence the scribe had to write “*viṣayāni-ruddhapurā-īkaṭacchurī ṇām*”.

This theory, though seemingly convincing, does not appear to be fool-proof. Firstly, as there was no Kalachuri ruler worth the name ruling in 533 A. D., it would be wrong to infer a Kalachuri invasion in that year. At the best, we can say that Kṛṣṇarāja's father was alive at the time. But, about him, we know absolutely nothing. Secondly, the donee Śivasvāmī was a resident of Kallivana in Nasik District and not of the Dapoli tahsil in the Konkana as Dr. Mirashi assumes. Thirdly, the charter was transcribed on the copper-plate, not in 533 A. D., as Dr. Mirashi believes, but much later, probably in the period of Śaṅkaragaṇa whose presence in the Nasik Kaḷvaṇ tract is known from his Abhone grant of 347 K. S. (587 A. D.).

The fact that the orthography of the Matwan plates of Vikramasena is strikingly similar to that of the said Abhone plates of Śaṅkaragaṇa proves our contention beyond doubt.

It is thus impossible to establish Kalachuri rule in Konkana prior to A. D. 600. In the light of the foregoing discussion, Dr. Spink's arguments regarding the dating of Jogeśvarī caves and that the excavation was started by Kṛṣṇarāja's father around 520 A. D. do not stand. We have conclusively shown that the father of Kṛṣṇarāja was so insignificant that even his own son does not mention him in his coins. Then again, the discovery of the Matwan plates of Vikramasena clearly indicates that the Traikūṭakas were firmly planted in the Konkana in 533 A. D. This defeats the whole argument of Dr. Spink. It is strange to credit so insignificant a person with the patronage of an excavation as extensive as that of Jogeśvarī. It is even more strange to assume that Kṛṣṇarāja excavated Elephanta. We have already shown that the empire of Kṛṣṇarāja is only a myth. There is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the Kalachuris crossed the Narmadā and entered Maharashtra till the last decade of the 6th century A. D. The first ruler who crossed the Narmadā towards south was Śaṅkaragaṇa and not his father Kṛṣṇarāja. In these circumstances, neither the Jogeśvarī-Manḍapeśvara-Elephanta complex nor cave Nos. 21 and 29 at Ellora can be attributed to the Kalachuris.

5. The Maurya and Nala interlude

The most crucial question which must be answered is who ruled the

Konkan tract after the Traikūṭakas ? This question is not difficult to answer. After the downfall of the Traikūṭakas, who were a power of considerable renown, Konkan was occupied by the Mauryas. An inscription of Maurya Suketuvarman was found at Wāḍā in Kolaba district and was till recently placed in the office of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.¹⁵ The politics does not withstand a vacuum. A new star was gradually rising on the southern horizon. It was the star of the Chālukyas of Vātāpikoṇḍa.

6. The Chālukyas of Badāmī

These Chālukyas – who are better known as the Chālukyas of Badāmī – were gradually coming up in the Vātāpī–Aihole–Paṭṭaḍkal region of modern Karnatak. Though we know very little about Jayasimha and Raṇarāga, the first two monarchs of this line, we can say that they secured a strong bed-rock for their dynasty on which the grand edifice of Chālukya power was to be built in the future.¹⁶ Pulakeśin I, the third ruler of the dynasty, occupied Vātāpī and performed the Hiraṇyagarbha-dāna and Aśvamedha sacrifices. His *biruda* was Satyāśraya. His queen Durlabhadevī (of Bappura family) bore him a son called Kīrtivarman who succeeded him as Kīrtivarman I.¹⁷

This ruler is known to us through his Badāmī cave inscription and also from the inscriptions of his successors. The former is dated in Śaka year 500 which is also said to be the 12th year of his reign. It follows that he came to throne sometimes around 566–67 A. D. He was a warrior of great renown and earned the title “*Pururaṇavikrānta*”. He adorned Vātāpī with grand monuments and shrines, performed the Agniṣṭoma and Bahusuvarṇa sacrifices and extended Chālukya power in all the four directions. He defeated the Kadambas and is said to be night of death to the Mauryas and Nalas of Konkan.¹⁸ The provenance of a Maurya record in Konkan confirms their existence in that region prior to Chālukya inroads. The Nalas, however, were the rulers of Bastar-Orissa region. Their records are found at Pāḍāgaḍh (near Bastar) and Rājim (Raipur district) in Madhyapradesh.¹⁹ So it is difficult to say as to who were the Nalas defeated by Chālukya Kīrtivarman. The folk-lore of Konkan has kept alive the memory of the Nala rulers in Konkan. A Nala ruler of Malaṅgagad is said to have married his daughter to a Malaṅga (Muslim devotee).²⁰

¹⁵ *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. XIV, pp. 372–73. King Chandravarman of the Goa Copper plate (D. C. Sircar, *AEOR* Vol. XXIII, pp. 510–13), was in all probability a Maurya ruler. Thus, Konkan was never under the rule of the Kalachuris of Mahishmati.

¹⁶ Yazdani, *Early History of Deccan*, pp. 205–07.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 207 f.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 208 f.

¹⁹ *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XXVIII, p. 12, Vol. XXVI, p. 49.

²⁰ *Bombay Gazetteer*, XIV. See under Malaṅgagadā.

The foregoing account clearly shows that the Konkan was subjugated by Pururaṇavikrānta Kīrtivarman I. We find his viceroy – one Dhruvarāja Indravarman – ruling in Konkan and Revatīdvīpa (modern Reḍī near Goa) around 590 A. D. He was a governor of four Viśayas and Maṇḍalas and hailed from “*ādi-mahā-Bappura-vanīśa*” to which Durlabhādevī also belonged. This suggests his close relationship with the Chālukya rulers.²¹

All this would suggest that Kīrtivarman I must have turned towards the Konkan around 567–568 and conquered the territory in a couple of years. So we can safely assume that by 570 A. D. the Chālukyas were dominant in Konkan.

Kīrtivarman I was followed by Maṅgaleśa who attacked the Kalachuris of Māhiṣmatī and before 602 A. D. routed Buddharāja, the Kalachuri king, and deposited the Kalachuri wealth in the treasure of the God of Mahākūṭa.²² Though a devout Vaiṣṇava, he was catholic enough to make gifts for Mahākūṭeśvara, a form of Śiva. This victorious march of the Chālukyas was continued by Pulakeśin II who finally annexed Vidarbha, Southern Maharashtra and Kuntala to his domain. The Nasik copper plate grant of his viceroy Jayasīṃha – Dharāśraya and the coins of the successors of this Jayasīṃhavarman speak of a strong Chālukya rule in Konkan upto 685 A. D.

7. Conclusions

Thus starting from 570 A. D. to 685 A. D. the history of Konkan speaks of an uninterrupted and peaceful Chālukya rule. This situation was conducive for arts to flourish. We maintain that the early excavating activities in Konkana were initiated by Kīrtivarman I. He was an enthusiastic builder. The grand Vaiṣṇava Cave at Badāmī (Mahā-Viṣṇugṛha) was started by him and completed by Maṅgaleśa.²³ The Chālukyas offered worship both to Viṣṇu and Śiva as seen earlier. Maṅgaleśa made gifts to Mahākūṭeśvara, a form of Śiva. The Nerur grant refers to Maṅgaleśa as “*Svāmī-Mahāsena-Pādānudhyāta*”, “one who meditates on the feet of Svāmī Mahāsena, i. e. Kārtikeya”. The copper plate grant of Pulakeśin I refers to the Chālukyas being nourished by the Saptamātṛkās and protected by Kārtikeya. It is, therefore, not surprising that in their newly conquered land they started excavating Śaiva caves at Jogesvarī and Maṇḍepeśavra. The guilds of artisans, already working on the caves at Badāmī might have migrated to Konkan, the newly conquered region and started working there under the generous patronship of the mighty Chālukyas, allured probably by challenge of the hard bassalt rocks of Maharashtra.

²¹ Yazdani, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 211.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 209 f.

IDAM IN THE COSMOGONICAL STATEMENTS IN EARLY UPANIṢADS

BY

SAROJ DESHPANDE

(This discussion of *idam* is restricted to its occurrences in the early eleven Upaniṣads. The scope can be profitably extended to the Samhitā and Brāhmaṇa occurrences of *idam* as well as to other pronouns.)

Idam, a regular demonstrative pronoun, in the cosmogonical passages in the early Upaniṣads, has been loaded with special significance by commentators. It has been rendered mostly as 'this universe'. Identifying *idam* with the universe is a definite philosophical commitment. It is proposed to consider here the meaning of *idam* without any commitments or presuppositions. There are ten statements in the cosmological passages in the early Upaniṣads.¹ Throughout the following discussion we would take the following sentence as a representative of all these : *sadeva somyedamagra āsīdekamevā-dvitīyam*. The aim would be to explore all possible meanings that can attach to *idam*. Unfortunately, however, the texts are not accented except for the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Maitrāyaṇi* and there too *idam* has no accent. Determining the meaning with the help of accent is, therefore, not possible.

¹ *Vis.* नैवेह किञ्चनाग्र आसीत् । *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* 1. 2. 1

आत्मैवेदमग्र आसीत् पुरुषविधः । *Ibid.* 1. 4. 1

ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत् । *Ibid.* 1. 4. 10

ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीदेकमेव । *Ibid.* 1. 4. 11

आत्मैवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेव । *Ibid.* 1. 4. 17

आप एव इदमग्र आसुः । *Ibid.* 5. 5. 1

आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः । तस्योपव्याख्यानम् ।

असदेवेदमग्र आसीत् । *Chāndogya Up.* 3. 19. 1

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । *Ibid.* 6. 2. 1

आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् । *Aitareya Up.* 1. 1.

तमो वा इदमग्र आसीदेकम् । *Maitrāyaṇi Up.* 5. 2

ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीदेकोऽनन्तः प्रागनन्तो

दक्षिणतोऽनन्तः सर्वतोऽनन्तः । *Maitrāyaṇi Up.* 6. 17

There are four meanings which can attach to *idam* :

- (a) it can refer to an antecedent entity ;
- (b) it can refer to a hypothetical entity ;
- (c) it can, as a demonstrative pronoun, indicate a relevant substantive ; and finally,
- (d) it can only express an adverbial meaning, being used as a non-referential particle stylistically, and may even be redundant.

The last of these meanings is the least specific and would help us out of all difficulty. The problem really concerns with the second and third ones.^f Let us examine all the four individually, in relation to the sentence in hand.

(a) The fact that all the cosmogonical statements appear at the beginning of a new chapter or paragraph is very relevant. They are the opening sentences of a new topic. A fresh context starts with them. It cannot be gainsaid that, as far as the Upaniṣads are concerned, textual context would mean the Upaniṣadic thought or philosophy as a whole. The Upaniṣads do not offer a systematic synthesised philosophical thought ; they offer miscellaneous metaphysical speculations in a rather unsystematic manner. A new paragraph means a fresh context. *Idam*, therefore, cannot be traced back to farther contexts. If dropping of the noun denoting an antecedent entity be taken as a case of ellipsis, for that too, contextual support is necessary. That is lacking in the passage under consideration. It cannot, therefore, refer to an antecedent entity.

Parallel to the remaining three meanings *idam* can have, we can construe the sentence in three ways.

(b) *Idam (jagat) agre sadāsīt ekamevādviṭīyam.*

This (universe) was, prior to creation, being alone, without a second.² Here *idam* refers to the hypothetical entity *jagat*, which is supplied from outside the sentence. As a pronoun *idam* can hypothesise any noun, not necessarily a particular noun like universe. It would do so only through some secondary sense. The statements are complete and meaningful even without taking recourse to secondary sense. It is true that the lexicons record 'universe' as one of the meanings of *idam*. How it came to acquire this meaning is, for one thing, outside the scope of the present discussion, and for another, lexi-

² Śaṅkara's commentary :

असत् अव्याकृतनामरूपमिदं जगत्शेषमग्रे प्रागवस्थायामुत्पत्तेः आसीत् । *Chāndogya Uṇ.* 3. 19. 1

cons do record secondary senses. Had 'universe' been either the primary sense or the uniformly accepted secondary sense of *idam*, different commentators would not have interpreted it variously as body, caste, etc.³

(c) *Idam sadeva somya arga āsīdekamevādvitīyam.*

This *sat* was there in the beginning, alone, without a second. *Idam*, as a demonstrative pronoun, indicates *sat*, the substantive appearing in the sentence. The meaning is complete in itself. *Idam* stands for a thing close to it either actually or contextually. The contextually nearest noun in this sentence is *sat*, which denotes the substratum of the universe. Syntactically, therefore, *idam* refers to *sat*. (Strictly philosophically speaking, the substratum cannot be connected to anything as it is believed to transcend all relative terminology. Its connection is purely formal, though that is accepted for the sake of further discussion.) In cosmological statements referring to other entities as substratum also, *idam* should, by the same logic, be taken to refer to those respective entities. For example, *ātmaivedamagra āsīd ekameva* (*Bṛhad. Up.* 1. 4. 17) or *brahma vā idamagra āsīd eko'nantaḥ ...* (*Maitrā. Up.* 6.17).

(d) *Sadeva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam.*

Indeed *sat* was there in the beginning, alone, without a second. Here *idam* is an emphatic particle, adverbially used in a stylistic manner. The meaning of the sentence is complete in itself. *Idam* thus used in a formal expression means 'indeed, now there',⁴ and similar things. The Vedic usage of *it* as well as *idam* as redundant particles goes to support this.

In most of these sentences there is an *eva* after the substantive. *Eva* has a restrictive sense. This emphasises the singular character of the substratum as: alone or without a second. Further, *ekamevādvitīya* too underlines this nature of the substratum.

Agre, which appears in most of these sentences, means (a) before or (b) initially, in the beginning. Śaṅkarācārya renders it as 'before creation'.

³ Śaṅkara's commentary :

आत्मैवास्मेति प्रजापतिः प्रथमोऽण्डजः शरीर्यभिधीयते । ... इदं शरीरमेदजातं तेन प्रजापतिशरीरेणा-
विभक्तं आत्मैवासीदग्रे प्रावशरीरान्तरोत्पत्तेः । (*Bṛhad. Up.* 1. 4. 1); and ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र
आसीद्यदस्मि सृष्ट्वा अभिरूपापन्नं ब्रह्म । ब्राह्मणजात्यभिमानात् ब्रह्मेत्यभिधीयते । (*Bṛhad. Up.*
1. 4. 11)

⁴ Vide *PW*, Vol. I, p. 795 :

"it tends to be attached as a relative pronoun like *adas* in a stylistic or formal expression."

This involves an internal logical contradiction. 'Initially' is a more viable meaning in topics starting discussions on the creation of the universe.

As already observed, of the four meanings, the non-referential one is grammatically the most acceptable. This meaning goes beyond all problems of connecting it to a relevant noun. However, the advantage is purely formal. From the philosophical point of view, *idam* deserves more analysis.

It is worth noting how the emphasis of the statements shifts totally with the different meanings one gives to it. When it is a non-referential particle or a demonstrative pronoun standing for the substratum, the substratum is focussed on as one, single, without a second. This seems to be exactly the position the Upaniṣads want to take. The Upaniṣadic metaphysics aims at a singular principle, unmodified, pure and subtle. That alone was there in the beginning. Nothing besides it existed. The *eva* and *ekamevādviīya* derive their fullest significance in these two meanings. Moreover, the purport of these passages is a pointer to the meaning. The Upaniṣadic philosophy, per se, is not necessarily idealistic. The Upaniṣads accept the reality of the created universe. They do not, especially in the early phases, look upon the creation as false, as an illusion. There is a gradual development of such thought. Yet that does not warrant us to assign the same meaning to all statements alike. The real controversy is between the two positions; that of relating *idam* to the substratum and that of relating it to the manifest universe.

If we take *idam* to signify the universe, it would mean that the universe existed in the substratum prior to the creation of the universe. There might have been something then, but that could not be the universe since it was not created then. Before creation the world was not existent. To say that the substratum has the potential of creation is widely different from saying that the creation always potentially existed in it. This is assuming pre-existence of effect in the cause. The presumed pure nature of the substratum becomes shadowed by such a superimposition. There is an explanation of it from an idealistic point of view. The effects are ephemeral whereas the cause, as opposed to them, is eternal. Also, ultimately cause and effect are non-different (*ananya*). The effects are unreal since they are ephemeral and the cause is real as it is eternal.⁵ Ephemeral things too, however, have a very valid existence as long as they exist. Name, form, appearance etc. are distinctive characteristics which, as philosophical categories, need not be underestimated. The process leading to modification or transformation being

⁵ Vide Śaṅkarācārya on *Brahmasūtra* 2. 1

valid, cause-effect relation as well as distinction between the two should be regarded as equally valid. Virtual non-distinction need not mean negation of all distinction. The purport of the Upaniṣads is, more often than not, absolutely realistic.

The problem becomes more complex with *asat* (non-Being) as the substratum. In the absence of a comprehensible primal principle, non-Being is conceived of as a privative logical conception. Perhaps it means nothingness, void. Assuming the pre-existence of the manifest, material universe in nothingness would pose problems.

While putting forth cosmogonical theories there can be two starting points, and accordingly there would be two different formats :

- I. a. Postulating one principle as the substratum of the universe.
b. Analysing the process of creation step by step, i. e. making hypothetical statement about a series of principles or steps in the process.
c. Arriving at the manifold universe.
- II. a. Knowledge of the manifold universe.
b. Tracing the creation backwards to some source and presuming a source, thus reducing multiplicity to simplicity.
c. Postulating one principle as the substratum.

The first format is the thought process from simplicity to complexity, from subtlety to grossness. The second one is its converse. It is but very logical that the exposition should begin at the starting point, the primal principle. This format poses no problems, linguistic, semantic, logical or philosophical. The second format poses some problems. In the process of thought backwards, one goes from the complex to the simple. While thus tracing the source of the material manifest universe one reaches a point when no further material source can be hypothesised. Yet something even beyond that has to be presumed. That something is essentially of the nature of a universal psyche like *Ātman* or *Brahman*, or an abstract principle like *sat* or *ap*. The pure, transcendental, absolute, all-pervading, omniscient nature of that principle is emphatically established by not relating it to the manifest universe in that stage. *Idam* cannot, therefore, be interpreted as the universe. The substratum postulated in different Upaniṣads may differ in name, not in its essential nature. By taking *idam* to mean the universe we would be superimposing the final stage of creation on the primal, a temporal, sequential, and logical fallacy.

All cosmogonical passages, except one,⁶ clearly follow the first format. In the *Maitrāyaṇī* the starting point is *tamas*, a quality of the *Prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhyas, (not darkness as in the *Nāsadiya-sūkta*). The starting point is the manifest universe, the grossest. In this passage *idam* refers to the universe. The difference in the starting point has led to the difference in the connotation of *idam*. As a corollary it may be strongly argued that where the starting point is the substratum, *idam* would indicate that. A valid objection can be raised at this point on the basis of the cyclic notion of time. Indian philosophy assumes that the nature of creation and existence is cyclic. Evolution and involution is a continuous process. It would not be possible to fix a starting point. Nevertheless one has to fix a starting point so as to facilitate understanding. The circle has to be represented as a line in order to unfold the process. The starting point would naturally be the primal principle from which the universe originates according to all Upaniṣadic accounts of creation. All systems of Indian philosophy maintain that existence is beginningless and at the same time try to give a theory of creation. This itself explains the necessity of a linear view.

The gross manifestation must have emanated from something more subtle. Śaṅkara too says that *sat* is nothing but pure, subtle existence (*astitāmātram vastu sūkṣmam*). Śaṅkara here tacitly supports the foregoing arguments. All complexity is posterior whereas simplicity is and should be prior.

The Upaniṣads make an extensive use of symbols, metaphors, analogies etc. The manifest universe, existing potentially in the substratum, is the extreme monistic position. The most suitable analogy bringing out this position is that of the spider.⁷ That the threads always existed inside the spider and that the spider always had the potential of weaving the web from within himself is the most perfect monistic symbol conceivable. Can it be assumed though that as the spider weaves the web, no process whatever, whether biological, organic or chemical is involved at all? If any process is admitted, the monistic argument collapses. Moreover, some of the cos-

⁶ *Viz. Maitrāyaṇī Up. 5. 2 :*

*tamo vā idamagra āsīdekam | Tat pare syāt | Tat pareṇeritam viśamatvaṁ
prayāti | ... sa (Prajāpatiḥ) vā eṣa ekastridhū bhūto'ṣṭadhū ekādaśadhū
dvādaśadhū'parimitadhū vadbhūtaḥ |*

⁷ (i) अथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्यते च ... तथाऽक्षरात् संभवतीह विश्वम् । (*Muṇḍaka Up. 1. 1. 7*)

(ii) यस्तन्तुनाम इव तन्तुभिः प्रधानजैः स्वभावतः ।

देव एक स्वभावोति ... ॥ (*Śvetāśvatara Up. 6. 10*)

mogonical statements speak of a desire for a second in order to create. This suggests the biological process of creation.

Different commentaries⁸ on these passages differ in detail but they all agree on the point that the primal principle was one, single, without a second. It either sought a second⁹ and created or it modified itself¹⁰ and went on modifying until the manifold universe was created. All cosmogonical passages can be analysed by putting them in the two formats mentioned above. Thus, e. g. *Chāndogya* 3. 19. 1, *Asadevedamagra āsīt. Tatsadāsīt. Tatsa-mabhavat. Tadūṇḍam niravartata. Tatsaṁvatsarasya mātṛāmaśayata. Tannirabhidyata. Te āṇḍakapāle rajatam ca suvarṇam ca bhavatām.....*

- I. a. Non-Being is hypothetically postulated as the substratum.
b and c. Non-Being modified itself into Being. It lay a cosmic egg. It hatched for the period of one year. It broke into two halves, silvery and golden.....
- II. a. We see the manifold universe. How can these varied things have come into existence?
b. There must have been a source. It might have laid an egg. It might have hatched and from it all this might have come out stage by stage. What could have laid such an egg? Could we call it Being? Could Being have existed since eternity? Could there have been a state when nothing existed? Could it be non-Being?
c. Non-Being must have been there in the beginning.

It is evident that the thought-process involved in working out steps is essentially the same. Either way the substratum is pure, subtle, single. Relating the substratum to the manifest universe in that stage would be a speculative superimposition unwarranted by the topic under discussion.

⁸ Śaṅkara, Vāsudeva, Raṅgarāmānuja etc. on Upaniṣads.

⁹ स (आत्मा) नैव रेमे । ... स द्वितीयमैच्छत् । स हैतावानास यथा स्त्रीपुमासौ संपरिष्वक्तौ । स इममेव आत्मानं द्वेधाऽपातयत् । (*Bṛhad. Up.* 1. 4. 3);

and सोऽकमयत् जाया मे स्यादथ प्रजायेय । (*Bṛhad. Up.* 1. 4. 17)

¹⁰ ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत् । तदेकं सन्न व्यभवत् । (*Bṛhad. Up.* 1. 4. 11);

and आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् । नान्यत् किञ्चन भिषत् । स ईक्षत—लोकान्नु त्पृजा इति । ... (*Aitareya Up.* 1. 1)

CREATION AS A SCHEMATIZED PHENOMENON EXPLAINING THE POSITION OF MATTER IN LOKĀYATA COSMOGONY AND OF CHHI IN CHINESE


BY

S. MAHDIHASSAN

When man became intelligent enough to realize the multiplicity that surrounds him, he divided the universe as earth upon which he lived, and sky as Heaven that was above him. Later he divided the contents of the universe as constituted of forms of energy and of forms of matter. Thus as energy there was light, heat, sound and even ultrasonic energy. Multiplicity, with forms of matter and of energy, was accepted as originating from one source, by the process of creation. What then was that source? Since what exists is the result of creation, it was reasonable to assume that originally there was creative energy or creative matter. The human mind finds it difficult to assume that either of the above two entities can exist by themselves. It was possible to personify creative energy which then gave the idea of a creator.

In Hindiusm the creator is called Brahmā and he pronounced the word *OM* which is a humming sound allied to that of bees, when they approach their hive in some numbers. Accordingly trying to depict graphically the creator, He was conceived as Puruṣa or super-man and His pronouncement as *OM* was depicted as a number of bees. Fig. 1 depicts bees as representing the humming sound, if not even the ultrasonic sound of *OM*. It is taken from Myer (1888). Briefly the creator is the absolute source and *OM*, creative energy, which is the practical source of creation.

There is an independent explanation similar to it. In the Holy Quran the Almighty pronounced the word *Kim*, Be or Become, which functions as the practical source of all existence. Thus $OM = Kim$. I believe this is the first time that such an equation is being presented. We then proceed further with creative energy. Energy is nothing if it does not expand, As expansion results also in condensation of some energy, forms of energy, less powerful than the original, arise thereby. Thus originated light, sound, ultrasonic energy and possibly others not yet recognized in science. Now one of these later forms of energy when further condensed gave rise to matter. Matter then is frozen energy. Now the spot or site where matter arose vacuum or hole was created with respect to energy. Then some of the surrounding energy entered matter to acquire a form and with it definite



Symbol of Existence. Puruṣa as creator, Cosmic egg as creation, and the Word of command as the syllable *Om*, depicted as Bees, which produce a humming sound nearest to that of *Om*. (From Myer).

power of growth. It functioned like its soul. In as much as impact energy is a fixed quantum, the recipient matter could grow only as far as the impact energy allowed it. That is how a crystal of alum could always have a definite form and size and would not grow into a giant crystal.

Thus there would be creative energy and with it creation of other forms of energy as different forms of condensation energy or forms of matter, incorporating various degrees of impact energy. To be precise, a form of matter is condensed energy plus some impact energy. This would be the real nature of matter when properly recognized.

Chinese cosmogony admits Chhi as the source of material forms of existence. Here we learn from Edkins (1884 : 110) that " a Taoist priest denied that creation was God's act and maintained that it was the act of a material agent which he called Chhi, a word meaning a very pure form of matter and was the creator of things. Its upper part arose and formed Heaven and the grosser portion became earth ". But Chhi means Breath and Breath was recognized as soul. Now soul would be impact energy incorporated in matter. We can compare forms of matter as particles of iron which have been magnetised and thereby acquired power to enter into different combinations as larger molecules. *Chhi then is energized matter* as also creative energy. To start with Chhi is to ignore what Chinese cosmogony itself recognizes as Thai-Chi, the absolute source. The Taoist priest ignored Thai-Chi. This would be the earliest source of creation, which is usually depicted as an empty circle. This has been discussed by me in a previous article (1985).

Trying to understand material entities, as apart from any reasoning, the followers of the Indian materialistic doctrine of Lokāyata, as Joshi (1987) writes, " declared that (there is) *motion in matter*, i. e. atom is due to the inherent potentiality of matter itself and thus denied the necessity of accepting super-natural agency, such as God, to account for creation ". Now what is considered " *motion in matter* " corresponds with " *impact energy*, " explained above and it is traceable to creative energy. Once we personify creative energy we have the idea of God, but the presence of creative energy, as antecedent to the formation of matter, has to be admitted even though this may not be further conceived as the Divine Word, *OM*, or *Kum*, mentioned before. The doctrine of Lokāyata takes creation definitely only to a tangible stage and not earlier. It goes as far as Chhi, in Chinese cosmogony, but not as far as Thai-Chi, though this is duly recognized there as the absolute source. Now if we start with matter, we have to explain the source of its power of growth, as a crystal which can grow. Energy expanding can

freeze as matter while matter receiving energy would explode and give formless entities. This can be elaborated but can give no useful conclusion. We have to *start with creative energy* even if we do not personify it and then as emanating from a creator.

Summary

The universe consists of different forms of matter and different forms of energy. In one case we can start with creative energy. This expanding brings about condensation when forms of energy of lesser powers than the original will arise. From them further condensation will bring about matter as frozen energy. Being born in the midst of energy the latter would produce an impact upon matter. Matter then is frozen energy born in the midst of energy and incorporating a quantum of impact energy. On the contrary, if we start with matter as such, any energy reaching it would explode it and give rise to cases of formless matter.

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ŚAṆKARĀCĀRYA, LAKULĪŚA-PĀŚUPATAS AND UTTARĀKHAṆḌA

By

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Introduction :

Uttarākhaṇḍa comprising the hill districts of U. P., is noted for its rich wealth of ancient temples and sculptures, majority of which is associated with Śaivism (Joshi 1986a : 197-99). According to the popular religious beliefs of Hindus, Śiva is the resident of Kailāsa and there are innumerable mythological episodes showing the Himalaya as the scene of Śiva's multifarious activities, many of which have been transformed into sculptural art from very early times.

In Uttarākhaṇḍa the earliest material remains associated with Śiva are the Kuṇinda coins datable from *ca.* close of the second century B. C. to early third century A. D. (Joshi 1984 : ch. III). Elsewhere the author has suggested that these were the Kuṇindas who popularised Śaivism in Uttarākhaṇḍa (Joshi 1986a : 197) and that the Katyūris were the lineal descendants of the Kuṇindas (Joshi : in press - a). According to a local tradition, before establishing themselves at Kārttikeyapura (modern Baijnath, Kumaon), the Katyūris had their seat at Joshimath (Garhwal) whence they were obliged to migrate to Katyur owing to some serious conflict (Atkinson 1884 : 467-68). Although we do not know the time of this conflict yet we have reason to believe that it may have taken place sometime in the seventh century A. D., for, by about eighth century A. D., the Katyūris were ruling from Kārttikeyapura (Sircar 1955 : 122-24) which place must have formed the head-quarters of one of the several Kuṇinda epicentric principalities (Joshi : in press - a).

It would then follow that during the time of Śaṅkarācārya (*ca.* 788-820 A. D.) the Katyūris were ruling in Uttarākhaṇḍa from Kārttikeyapura. The Katyūris ruled over a vast area in the hills which included the whole of Uttarākhaṇḍa and parts of Western Nepal (Joshi : in press - b). The most remarkable feature of the Katyūri age is the culmination of an art idiom, now being recognised as Katyūri art which found its expression in considerably large number of temples and sculptures (Joshi 1986b : 211-220). On stylistic ground these may be placed between *ca.* seventh and thirteenth century A. D. These art objects help us considerably in tracing the religious history of Uttarākhaṇḍa (Joshi 1986 a : 196).

Ādi Śaṅkarācārya and Uttarākhaṇḍa :

According to the traditional biographies on Śaṅkarācārya, it is said that he visited Badarikāśrama (Kulkarni 1987 : 120-21, 134-40). Thence he went to Kailāsa to pay a " physical visit " to Lord Śiva. Lord Śiva gave him five crystal *lingas*, one of which - *Mukti-linga* - Śaṅkarācārya consecrated at Kedāranātha (Kulkarni 1987 : 212-18). Śaṅkarācārya's visit to Uttarākhaṇḍa may be placed around the same time as he visited Nepal which being about twenty-two years after his birth (Kulkarni 1987 : 212), i. e., ca. 810 A. D.

In Uttarākhaṇḍa Śaṅkarācārya figures as the uprooter of Buddhism and as one who restored the Brahmanical religion by sanctifying all those temples which were earlier desanctified by the Buddhists (Atkinson 1884 : 466). He is also said to have appointed some of his disciples from South as the temple priests in Uttarākhaṇḍa among whom the Namboodri Brahmins at Badrinatha are worth mentioning (Atkinson 1884 : 775 ; Kulkarni 1987 : 140). The Bhaṭṭ priests of Jageshwar (Kumaon) also claim to be the descendants of a Dakṣiṇī Bhaṭṭ who was a companion of Jangam Kumārasvāmī. The latter was entrusted with the ministrations of Jageshwar temple establishment by Śaṅkarācārya (Atkinson 1884 : 780 ; 1886 : 428). Be it as it may, Śaṅkarācārya's visit to Uttarākhaṇḍa gave fillip to Brahmanical religious activities. It is against this background that we have to study the spread of Lakulīśa Pāśupatism in Uttarākhaṇḍa.

Lakulīśa Pāśupatism and Uttarākhaṇḍa :

Lakulīśa Pāśupatism is distinguished from the rest of the Śaiva schools in that it believes in the incarnation theory of Śiva (Majumdar 1950 : 115). Accordingly, Lakulīśa or Nakulīśa is said to be the twenty-eighth and the last incarnation of Śiva who flourished in the second century B.C. according to Sir R. G. Bhandarkar (1965 : 116-17), and in the second century A. D. according to D. R. Bhandarkar (1931 : 7-8). In recent years Pathak has reopened the issue and after reviewing the existing sources, has supported Sir R. G. Bhandarkar (Pathak 1980 : 9). Lakulīśa was a historical person and his sculptural representations are found from about fourth century A. D. (Bhandarkar 1931 : 1-9 ; Banerjea 1956 : 480 ; Joshi 1977 : 39-40). However, during the early mediaeval period his sect gained wide popularity in India (Majumdar 1950 : 115-120). Sculptures representing Lakulīśa belonging to early mediaeval period have been reported from both Eastern and Western India (Banerjea 1956 : 465, 480-81). In these sculptures he is invariably shown seated in *baddhapadmāsana* pose with two or four arms. His characteristic attributes are prominent *ūrdhva-linga* (*penis erectus*), and *lakuṣa* (club) in one of the hands (cf. Banerjea 1956 : 53). In many sculptures he

is shown with two or four attendants who are identified with his four ascetic disciples, namely, Kuśika, Sārgya, Maitreya and Kauruśa (Banerjia 1956 : 481). Recent discovery of a good number of Lakulīśa sculptures in Uttarākhaṇḍa suggests that the breath of Lakulīśa Pāśupatism was also felt here (Joshi 1981 : 141-142). On stylistic ground these sculptures may be placed between *ca.* late seventh and thirteenth century A. D.

In Uttarākhaṇḍa, Lakulīśa is shown seated in *baddhapadmāsana* pose with *ūrdhvaliṅga*, and two (rarely four) arms, one of which holds a *lakuṭa*. In these sculptures Lakulīśa is depicted either as a lone figure or with two or four attendants. It is interesting to note that flanking Lakulīśa, two of the attendants, one on either side, are invariably shown as seated in *lalitāsana* pose on a raised stool whereas Lakulīśa sits on a lotus-seat spread on the ground. These attendants have been identified with two of the four disciples of Lakulīśa by some scholars (Nautiyal 1969 : 142; Singh 1974 : 216-17). However, we do not agree with this identification, for in Indian tradition no disciple would be shown as sitting on a raised seat by the side of his Guru (preceptor), much less before a preceptor like Lakulīśa who is taken as an incarnation of Śiva. Besides, these attendants are sculptured like dignitaries and not ascetics or ordinary devotees as is apparent from their raised seats and elaborate ornamentation. We presume that these attendants represent royal personages who may have patronised Lakulīśa Pāśupatism.

The Lakulīśa sculptures in Uttarākhaṇḍa are found either independently or as architectural members of temples, usually adorning the trefoil pediment above the doorway (*śukanāśa*) or one of the niches in the exterior walls of the temple (*rathikā*) and rarely the upper part of the *śikhara*. These sculptures are found at Jageshwar, Baman-Sual, Naudeval, Someshwar, Kapileshwar, Narayan Kali, Chitai and Patal Bhuvaneshwar (Kumaon) and Adi Badri, Devari and Bajinga (Garhwal). By and large the majority of these sculptures is found at Jageshwar which appears to be the main centre of Lakulīśa Pāśupatism in Uttarākhaṇḍa. The earliest sculptures depicting Lakulīśa are found at Kapileshwar (Joshi 1986c : 159-162) and Mṛtyuñjaya temple, Jageshwar. These may be dated to close of the seventh and early eighth century A. D.

According to the *Cintra-praśasti* (Bühler 1892 : 271-287), originally belonging to a temple at Somnath (Gujrat), a Lakulīśa Pāśupata named Tripurāntaka after having undertaken an extensive pilgrimage, set up a temple establishment at Somanātha in V. S. 1343 (A. D. 1287). The relevant portion of this inscription describing the itinerary of the pilgrim is sadly obli-

terated and as such scholars have not paid any attention to one of its very interesting passages. It reads :

समाधिपूतेन हृदंबुजेन यः - - यि - - - - - ।

ततः शुचि ब्रह्मसरः सरोजैरानर्च केदारपदारविंदे ॥ 24 ॥

जगद्गुरुं चेतसि यः प्रपद्य यागेऽवरं मूर्त्तमि - - - ।

उ - - - - -

प्रसादसंपत्तिलभ्यानि तपःफलानि ॥ 25 ॥

मिथो मिलजहुकलिन्दकन्या तरंगहस्तोपहृतैः पयोभिः ।

ससर्ज यस्याजि - - - - -

पः पाद्यमिव प्रयागः ॥ 26 ॥ (Bühler 1892 : 282)


From the above text we deduce that Tripurāntaka first went to Kedāra (in Garhwal), thence he came to Jageshwar (in Kumaon), and thereafter he went to Prayāga. Here the passage following verse 24 seems to allude to Śaṅkara as it refers to meditation on " Jagadguru " (Universal Teacher, an epithet of Śaṅkara) in association with " Yāgeśvara ". Since Śaṅkarācārya is said to have remodelled the entire temple establishment at Jageshwar (Atkinson 1884 : 779), our suggestion becomes meaningful. In this connection it is to be noted that Jageshwar had already become an important place of pilgrimage from eighth century A. D. onwards as may be attested from several votive inscriptions there datable from *ca.* eighth century A. D. (Sircar 1962 : 243-54). Significantly several of the early inscriptions (datable between eighth and tenth century A. D.) reveal the names of pilgrims hailing from *Pūrve Deśe* (Eastern Country) identified with Bengal and adjoining region. No wonder if, on his pilgrimage to Kedāranātha, Tripurāntaka learned about the religious importance of Jageshwar which was situated more or less on the way to Prayāga. In this connection it is worthwhile to note that Tripurāntaka was a Lakulīśa Pāśupata, as such Jageshwar, being a celebrated establishment of Lakulīśa Pāśupatism, had added attraction for the pilgrim.

Conclusion :

Śaṅkarācārya was a Vedāntin and an exponent of *Advaitavāda*. There is nothing to show in his biography that he was a Lakulīśa Pāśupata. Why then should he be associated with Lakulīśa Pāśupatism in Uttarākhaṇḍa ? The explanation is not far to seek.

We have noted that Śaivism in Uttarākhaṇḍa had already gained ground under the patronage of the Kuṇindas long before the advent of Śaṅkarācārya. Their descendants - the Katyūris - were also devout worshippers of Śiva. That they were particularly devoted to Lakulīśa Pāśupatism follows from the fact that the construction of principal temples at Jageshwar is attribu-

ted to them. Among these the Mṛtyuñjaya temple is most important. Its trefoil pediment (*śukanāsa*) is adorned with a relief depicting Lakulīśa flanked by two royal figures seated on a raised seat. The figure on the right appears to be that of a female as it shows prominent breast and stylistically its sitting posture is also akin to that of a female figure. We have elsewhere identified these figures with one of the Katyūrī king and his queen (Joshi 1970 : 175). On stylistic and palaeographic grounds this temple may be placed in early eighth century A. D.



Śukanāsa of Mṛtyuñjaya temple, Jageshwar, showing Lakulīśa with royal couple (?) as attendants.

It seems that because of their zealousness towards Śaivism one of the Katyūrī kings antagonised the Vaiṣṇavas which fact is camouflaged in the traditional account that Narasiṃha incarnation of Viṣṇu was injured by the Katyūrī king due to some misunderstanding (Atkinson 1884 : 466). Consequently, he was obliged to leave Joshimath for Katyur. In course of time the Katyūrīs established a centre of Lakulīśa Pāśupatism at Jageshwar.

Śaṅkarācārya's mission was re-establishment of Brahmanical faith. His religious leadership appears to be "incorporative" as he promoted on all such branches of the Brahmanical religion as were influential in some way or the other. Thus, in Jageshwar region Lakulīśa Pāśupatism had its stronghold as he encouraged Lakulīśa Pāśuptism in Jageshwar by introducing one of his disciples, Jaṅgam Kumārasvāmī, in the ministration of that temple establishment. In Joshimath area Vaiṣṇavism had a stronghold; therefore, Śaṅkarācārya established Badarīnāthamāṭha there which is an acknowledged seat of the Vaiṣṇavas. In addition, due to his leanings towards Śaivism he consecrated a Śaiva temple establishment at Kedāranātha.

Śaṅkarācārya is taken as an incarnation of Śiva (Kulkarni 1987 : 76, 90-93). His visit to Jageshwar and his participation in the religious affairs of this temple establishment lent a towering stature to Lakulīśa Pāśupatism in Kumaon. It may probably account for the presence of comparatively very large number of Lakulīśa sculptures in Kumaon as contrasted to a few ones in Garhwal. Significantly, most of these sculptures date back from about ninth century A. D., i. e., post-Śaṅkara period.

Lakulīśa Pāśupatism survived in Uttarākhaṇḍa till about the close of the thirteenth century A. D. Its decline synchronises with the disintegration of the central Katyūri kingdom. Possibly, the Lakulīśa Pāśupatas could not hold their own without royal patronage, and consequently lost ground in Uttarākhaṇḍa. It is rather strange that today Lakulīśa is an unknown deity in Uttarākhaṇḍa and some zealous researchers identify Lakulīśa image with that of the Buddha. While concluding, it is worthwhile to add that Śaṅkarācārya's visit in Uttarākhaṇḍa contributed to the religious harmony among different religious sects. The Katyūris who were once opposed to the Vaiṣṇavas started patronising them as is evident from their copper plate grants, the earliest of which, if Kielhorn's calculations are correct, is dated on 22nd December, 853 A. D. (Kielhorn 1896 : 178).

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A UNIQUE SŪRYA FIGURE FROM HATODI

BY

PRADIP SHALIGRAM MESHARAM

Hatodi, a small village, is situated at a distance of about 6 to 7 km. east of Ramtek in the Nagpur District. During the repairs of the Chinchala-Hatodi road, a figure was dug out by Shri Ganbaji Chavan in 1979. This image was first noticed by Shri Chandrabhan Narnaware, in his treatise¹ entitled *Bodhisattva*. I am very thankful to Shri Chavan who showed me the image which is in his possession now.

The image is made up of red stone in round and is one foot in height. The God Sūrya is standing, facing forward, holds a small bunch of lotus flowers with short stalks in both hands, raised to the level of his shoulders. The upper part of his body is covered with full-sleeve clothes and a scarf is draped over the arms. The jewellery is very simple. He wears an *ekāvalī*, with a big *nāyaka-maṇi* (big bead) in the centre and *kuṇḍalas* in ears. He seems wearing a big wristlet and a bunch of bangles. A small section of the halo is seen behind the head. His face is covered by plate. He wears a short cylindrical crown which is higher than the halo. The halo is decorated with horizontal lines in the centre and criss-cross patterns on both the sides. The right side of the halo is damaged and portion below the waist is missing. The carving is done with great care. The image bears a smiling countenance which looks childish. The figure is very unique in the sense of carving.



Images of such type are never seen not only in this area but all over India. Probably the image of the said Sūrya god is a product of the Mathura School

of Art, because such a type of stone is not available in this region. So it can definitely be said that the image is brought here from North India.

Sūrya, the visible celestial luminary, was being worshipped in India from early times. Sūrya was an important solar deity in the early Vedic period. One of the earliest descriptions of the Sūrya image carved is found in chapter 57 of the *Bṛhatsamhitā* as quoted by J. N. Banerjee.³ The god is dressed in the fashion of a Northerner, his body from the feet upto the chest being covered, and wears a crown and holds two lotus flowers by their stalks. His face is adorned with ear rings, he wears a long necklace and *Vijaṅga*, and his face is covered by a cheek plate. The above-mentioned image is similar with this description.

The cult of sun-worship first began in the north and then gradually spread all over India. Iconographical changes of the Sūrya image became very evident. In the Bodhi Gaya³ and Bhaja⁴, as seen in the figures around 2nd century B. C., the depictions of the Sūrya figure are very simple; Sūrya wears a turban and rides on a four-horse chariot. In the mediaeval period, he is shown wearing a *kīrti-mukuta*, and the Kushan dress has no doubt disappeared.

The above image is of the late Gupta period, around 7th-8th century A. D. Similar type of images can be noticed from Bhita⁵ and Chillah⁶ in Allahabad District.

The earliest depiction of the Sūrya god is found at Bhaja in the Buddhist caves of Western Maharashtra.⁷ Sūrya is depicted among the major gods in the Ellora.⁸ The earliest epigraphical reference to the Sun comes from a temple of the 7th century A. D. at Manapur, modern Manor in Palghar Taluka of Thana District in Western Maharashtra.⁹

Except a large number of Sun images, references and temples, one can see that these are specially connected with the Western and Southern

¹ Nagpurkar Nagancha Prachin Itihas Āṇi Bauddha Bhikhu Sanghachi Sanghagiri (Ramtek) Bauddha Parisar, pp. 57-58.

² Jitendranath Banerjee, *The Development of the Hindu Iconography* (Calcutta, 1956), p. 437.

³ B. Barua : *Gaya and Buddha-Gaya*, Vol. II (Calcutta, 1934), fig. 42.

⁴ H. Zimmer, *The Art of India*, Asia, Vol. 2, 1955, pl. 41.

⁵ Promod Chandra, *Stone Sculpture in the Allahabad Museum* (Bombay, 1970), p. XCIII, No. 253.

⁶ Ibid., pl. XCVI, No. 266.

⁷ Zimmer, op. cit., pl. 41.

⁸ James Fergusson and James Burgess, *The cave temples of India*, Delhi, 1969, pl. XXXIII, No. 2.

⁹ V. V. Mirashi, *Corpus I*, Vol. IV, pl. I, p. 63.

Maharashtra.¹⁰ The Sūrya temples were also constructed in Vidarbha in ancient period. A temple of Āditya (Sun-god) was constructed at Amara-vati (ancient Udumbermati, now a district place). The patron of this temple was the Rāṣṭrakūṭa King Kṛṣṇarāja I. This shows that there was a famous temple of Sun-god in the 8th century A. D. in the vicinity of Amaravati.¹¹

Two standing Sūrya figures of 8-9th century A. D. collected from Bhandak (Distt. Chandrapur) are deposited in the Central Museum, Nagpur. Another Sūrya figure with a horse-chariot, collected from Ramtek and dated around 17th century A. D., can be seen in the same museum. It is interesting to note that Hatodi is situated near Ramtek. A very interesting syncretistic icon of Hari-Hara-Pitāmaha-Arka (combination of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva and Sūrya) occurs in the Register No. 1 on the West face of the Mārkaṇḍa Ṛṣi temple (Distt. Chandrapur) which is dated around 10-11th century A. D. The icon is standing with eight arms. Aruṇa, the charioteer, is seen below driving the horses. At his back is shown Bhūdevī in *abhaya mudrā* with Daṇḍa and Piṅgala.¹² This icon has a parallel from Khajuraho¹³ in the Pratāpeśvara and Citragupta temples, but the Mārkaṇḍī representation is more majestic, proportionate and graceful.

It seems that in this region the worship of Sūrya was very popular, besides existence of the temples of many other gods. Vidarbha is a centre of India, where all the sects flourished together like sun temples in 9th century A. D. and onwards.

¹⁰ L. P. Pandey, *Sun Worship in Ancient India* (Delhi, 1971), pp 236 ff.

¹¹ *BDCRI*, Vol. 9, Inscription No. 98.

¹² S. B. Deo, *Mārkaṇḍī Temples* (Nagpur, 1973), p. 32, pl. XXIII, No. 2.

¹³ Rameshraya Avastī, *Khajuraho kī Deo Pratimāyān*, Vol. I (Agra, 1967), Fig. No.82.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A WORD AND ITS MEANING

By

V. M. BHATT

The relationship of the word and the meaning is one of the most crucial issues for the students of language. Of the three significant approaches, the grammarians¹ and the Mīmāṃsakas² tend to treat the relationship as *anādi*, eternal, one without beginning, that is that which has some beginning which cannot be known, or that which has no beginning.³ The logicians (Naiyāyikas) think the relationship to be divine.⁴ In either case, the relationship is treated to be *a priori*. Of these ancient and modern thinkers who think the relationship to be resolvable and comprehensible through discussion, Yāska comes first. Even Pāṇini takes the relationship for granted, and bases his analysis on some permanent, non-analysable relationship between the word and the meaning.⁵ For him, thus, the meaning is the in-put for analysis.⁶ For Yāska, the relationship itself becomes a problem for investigation, and the result of the investigation, that is, the derived as against the assumed relationship of the word and the meaning, becomes the out-put.

The popular belief is that Yāska's processing is derivative and directed

¹ (a) Kātyāyana says : सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे ॥ (आ० १, वा. १) *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya* (Ed. Kielhorn, I. 6. 16),

(b) Bhartṛhari says :

नित्याः शब्दार्थसम्बन्धाः समाप्ता महाभिः ।

सूत्राणां सानुतन्त्राणां भाष्याणाञ्च प्रणेतृभिः ॥ *Vākya-padīyam* (I. 23)

² Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (600 A. D.) says :

स्थिते कूटस्थनित्यत्वे व्यवहारस्य नित्यता ।

कूटस्थेन विनैतेन न तस्यालम्बनं भवेत् ॥

प्रसिद्धत्वाद्दे सर्वो व्यवहारो हि नेष्यते ।

तस्माद् वेदप्रमाणार्थं नित्यत्वमिह साध्यते ॥

— *Śloka-vṛttika, Śabdanityatādhikaraṇam* (6. 6, 7)

³ अनादिः means न ज्ञायते आदिः यस्य सः । and / or न विद्यते आदिः यस्य सः ।

⁴ Viśvanātha Pañcanana Bhaṭṭācārya says :

शक्तिश्च पदेन सह पदार्थस्य सम्बन्धः, सा चास्मात् पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरेच्छारूपा ।

Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, Śabdakhaṇḍa (4), p. 293.

⁵ See footnote 1.

⁶ See : "The Role of Meaning in Pāṇini's Grammar" by Johannes Bronkhorst, *Indian Linguistics* (40. 3), Sept. 1979, pp. 146-157.

to the determining of the meanings of the Vedic words. Yāska himself has shown this to be the aim of the study of the *Nirukta* :

“Moreover, without it (viz. the study of the *Nirukta*) the precise meaning of Vedic stanzas cannot be understood. For one who does not understand the meaning, a thorough investigation of accent and grammatical form is not possible.”⁷

This however does not really seem to be the case. This is how Yāska derives the meaning of the word “*puruṣaḥ*” : *puruṣa* is *puri-ṣāda* : (one who sits in a city) ; or *puruṣa* is *puri-śayaḥ* (one who sleeps in a city) ; or it has come from the action, which is denoted by the root *pr* (to fill), i. e. he fills the interior, with reference to the inner soul.⁸ Here, the last meaning of the word is known from the *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad* (iii. 9). Yāska himself quotes the Upaniṣad as under :

“This entire (Universe) is filled by that inner soul, to them there is nothing anterior, nothing subsequent, than whom there is nothing more minute, nor more great, and immovable like a tree, who alone lives in heaven.”⁹

This shows that at least one meaning, the last one of the word *puruṣaḥ* was present before Yāska, before the analysis, and that the analysis, at least in that case, is a mere exercise in rationalising.

Not only this, Yāska takes especial pains to create an effect that the meaning he derives is also to be found in the Vedas. Very often, after such exercises in rationalisation, he finds additional support from the Vedas : *ityapi nigamo bhavati* (to support a *nirvacana*, there is a statement too in the Vedas);¹⁰ *iti vijñāyate* (this *nirvacana* is known from a *Brāhmaṇa*

⁷ अथापीदमन्तरेण मन्त्रेष्वर्थप्रत्ययो न विद्यते । अर्थमप्रतिष्ठतो नात्यन्तं स्वरसंस्कारोद्देशः ॥

— *Nirukta* (I. 15)

⁸ पुरुषः पुरि वादः । पुरि शयः । पूरयतेर्वा । पूरयत्यन्तरित्यन्तरपुरुषमभिप्रेत्य ।

— *Nirukta* (II. 3)

⁹ यस्मात्परं नापरमस्ति किञ्चिद् यस्मान्नाशीयो न ज्यायोऽस्ति कश्चित् ।

बृक्ष इव स्तब्धो दिवि तिष्ठत्येकस्तेनैदं पूर्णं पुरुषेण सर्वम् ॥ इत्यपि निगमो भवति ।

— *Nirukta* II. 3

¹⁰ See footnote 9.

book),¹¹ or *iti ca Brāhmaṇam* (there is a *nirvacana* like this in the *Brāhmaṇa*-book)¹² and so on.

What Yāska seems to be doing is following a sort of systematic theory of derivation for determining the meaning of a word, and that he tests with reference to an already known meaning of the word.

This can be further confirmed by a reference to his enunciation of the principles of derivation in *Nirukta* (II. 1). He has categorically said that a student must always have before him the meaning of a particular word before instituting the process of derivation :—

- (i) One should always examine them (words) with regard to their meaning...¹³
- (ii) One should interpret inflected cases according to the meaning...¹⁴
- (iii) One should not explain isolated words...¹⁵
- (iv) (The rule is that) they (= words) should be explained according to their meaning : if their meanings are uniform, their *nirvacanas* are uniform ; if their meanings are multiform, their *nirvacanas* are multiform.¹⁶

It can now be safely observed that, contrary to popular belief, Yāska was not really interested in determining through derivations the meanings of words. I believe that Yāska's efforts were directed towards explaining the relationship between a word and its meaning.

Yāska has, before him, a new theory to support. Śākaṭāyana had propounded a theory viz. *sarvāṇi nāmāni ākhyātajāni* (all words stem from action). Śākaṭāyana wants to suggest that the relationship or the bridge

¹¹ ऋषिर्दर्शनात् । स्तोमान्दर्शेल्यौपमन्यवः ।

‘तद्यदेतास्तपसमानान् ब्रह्म स्वयंभ्वभ्यानर्षत् । तद्रूपयोऽभवत् । तद्वशीणामृषित्वम्’ इति विज्ञायते ।

— *Nirukta* (II. 11)

¹² अथात आप्रियः । आप्रियः कस्मात् । आप्रोतेः । प्रीणातेर्वा । ‘आप्रीमिराप्रीणाति’ । इति च ब्राह्मणम् ।

— *Nirukta* (VIII. 4)

¹³ ... अर्थनित्यः परीक्षेत । — *Nirukta* (II. 1)

¹⁴ यथार्थं विभक्तीः सज्जमयेत् । — *Nirukta* (II. 1)

¹⁵ नैकपदानि निर्भूयात् । — *Nirukta* (II. 3)

¹⁶ तानि चेत् समानकर्माणि समाननिर्वचनानि । नानाकर्माणि चेन्नानानिर्वचनानि । यथार्थं निर्वक्तव्यानि ।

— *Nirukta* (II. 7)

between the words and their meanings is based on some action. In other words, the bridge is *kriyāniṣṭha*. We do not know the point of beginning of a speech-act, but we can guess that there was some action in the beginning. This action, on the one hand, is connected with the word, and, on the other hand, with the meaning. To clarify this, we should consider the nature of action as a whole.

An action is called *bhāva* in Sanskrit. Any action has two dimensions to it : One is *Sāddhyāvasthāpanna-bhāva* (action in process), and the other, *Siddhāvasthāpanna-bhāva* (processed action). The action in process (*Sāddhyāvasthāpanna-bhāva*), it seems, is to be denoted by some sound arbitrarily, and, the processed action (*Siddhāvasthāpanna-bhāva*), let us say, is the meaning. Before Yāska, the relationship between the two was left unexplored, under the plea of something unexplorable. (See : *Anādi* and *Īśvarecchā* theories of grammarians and logicians respectively.) I feel however, that, Yāska's processing of the meaning from a word and tallying the derived meaning with the known meaning seeks to underline this unexplored / unexplorable relationship, that Yāska wants us not to forget that between the beginning of a process and the end of the process lies the action, that the relationship between the word and its meaning is to be understood in terms of action.

For Yāska, it must be concluded, the be-all and end-all of the entire process of derivation and testing and tallying of the words and the meaning is his conviction. *Sarvāṇi nāmāni ākhyātajāni*, that all words stem from action. It is natural therefore that he should strive to establish the significance of action while relating a word to its meaning.

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WHO IS THE AUTHOR OF THE *ŚĀṆKARADIGVIJAYA*?

BY

VEÑEEMADHAVASHASTRI JOSHI

Here is a writer in whose work we have an interesting feature of combining philosophy and poetry; and he is the author of the great epic *Śāṅkara-digvijaya* (*SDV*). However, he is successful in bringing the cold philosophical tenets in a flowery language throughout the work. In view of this his adeptness is revealed right from the selection of the theme for his literary piece i. e. the life history of the great philosopher 'Śrī Śāṅkarācārya' than whom India has not produced a more versatile intellect¹ since his date.

The term '*Mādhaviyam*' found several times in this work² has given rise to some shoots of confusion. Tradition ascribes the authorship of this work to the celebrated personage of the 14th century i. e. Mādhava Vidyāraṇya of Bhāradvāja Gotra. This ascription may be for two reasons :

At first, it may be due to the salutation of the author to Vidyātīrtha³ found in the initial verse, which has usually a place at the outset of some of the works by Vidyāraṇya. Secondly, the last stanza of every canto in the epic contains the so-called problematic term '*Mādhaviyam*', for which it is popularly known as *Mādhaviya Śāṅkaradigvijaya*. This term '*Mādhaviyam*' may mean that it is presented to Mādhava, or related to Mādhava or written by Mādhava. We find two more Mādhavas as the contemporaries with Mādhava Vidyāraṇya of the 14th century. In such cases generally tradition is in the habit of assigning almost all the important works that contain the term '*Mādhava*' or '*Mādhaviya*' to the one who is more popular. Consequently, some of the works written by other Mādhavas were ascribed to this illustrious Mādhava Vidyāraṇya only. The famous philosophical work

¹ Cf. Gaṇadāsa's remark, अद्रव्यपरिग्रहोऽपि बुद्धिलाघवं प्रदर्शयति ।

(*Mālavikāgimitram*, Act. I, śt. 16, line 10)

² इति श्रीमाधवीये तदुपोद्घातकथापरः ।

संक्षेपशङ्करजये सर्गोऽयं प्रथमोऽभवत् ॥ *SDV* I : last stanza. This is the style of the stanza found at the end of all the cantos of this work.

³ प्रणम्य परमात्मानं श्रीविद्यातीर्थरूपिणम् ।

प्राचीनशङ्करजये सारः संगृह्यते स्फुटम् ॥ *SDV* : First stanza.

⁴ Cf. fn. 2 above.

Sarvadarśanasamgraha is the work by one Mādhava, son of Sāyaṇa, the brother of Mādhava Vidyāraṇya, but is wrongly ascribed to Mādhava Vidyāraṇya only. Similarly, the commentary on *Sūtasamhitā* is by another Mādhava belonging to 'Aṅgīrasa Gotra' (popularly known as 'Mādhavāmātya of Gomāntaka Pradeśa') and the pupil of Kriyāśakti Guru, but that too ascribed to Mādhava Vidyāraṇya of 'Bhāradvāja Gotra' only. Likewise, even this great work *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* is ascribed to Mādhava Vidyāraṇya.

We have, however, the following reasons to disconnect his name from this work though we cannot fix up the exact author of this work.

1. The epithet 'Navakālidāsa' found in the stanzas in the beginning as well as at the end of the epic,⁵ in regard to self-introduction of the author is not at all supported by any other evidence. Because, nowhere the title 'Navakālidāsa' is seen prefixed to the name Mādhava alias Vidyāraṇya.

2. One internal piece of evidence to the above conclusion is adduced by Prof. M. Hiriyanna.⁶ In the *Vārtikasāra* of Vidyāraṇya we find the opinion of the author of the *Brahmasiddhi* cited as that of "a knower of the true teaching of the Veda."⁷ We know that the *Brahmasiddhi* was written by Maṇḍana Miśra. Now, the *Vārtikasāra*, as its name implies, purports to be an abstract of the views of Sureśvara, and if Sureśvara were identical with Maṇḍana Miśra there would be no point at all in citation of the view in question. Hence, Vidyāraṇya was conscious that Maṇḍana and Sureśvara were two different personages. Besides, in the *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* Vidyāraṇya quotes Sureśvara many a time with the words : "thus says the great Ācārya Viśvarūpa/Sureśvara."⁸ But in the seventh *varṇaka* once, while quoting the view of the author of *Brahmasiddhi*, he says : "Thus says the author of *Brahmasiddhi*."⁹ This reference in the *Vārtikasāra* throws light on the authorship of the *SDV*, which identifies him with Sureśvara.¹⁰ As has

⁵ (i) प्रौढोऽयं नवकालिदासकवितासन्तानसन्तानको । *SDV* I. 9.

(ii) बाणेषा नवकालिदासविदुषः । *SDV* I. 10.

⁶ *Indian Philosophical Studies*, Vol. II. (Mysore, 1972), p. 4

⁷ इति प्राहुर्ब्रह्मसिद्धिकारो वेदरहस्यवित् ।

— Vidyāraṇya's *Bṛhadūraṇyaka-Bhāṣyavārtikasāra* (BBVS) 2. 3. 84.

⁸ (i) तदुक्तमाक्षेपपूर्वकं विश्वरूपाचार्यै ... ।

— Vidyāraṇya's *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha*
(Andhra University, 1941), p. 49

(ii) तदुक्तं सुरेश्वरवार्तिके ... । *ibid.*, p. 72

⁹ ब्रह्मसिद्धिकारास्त्ववमाहुः ... । *ibid.*, p. 283

¹⁰ स विश्वरूपो बत सत्यवादी ... । *SDV* X. 64

long been suspected it cannot be ascribed to Vidyāraṇya for, if what we have stated above is correct, Vidyāraṇya, who is the author of the *Vārtikasāra*, knew that the two were distinct and could not have identified them in another work of his.¹¹

3. S. N. Dasgupta adds one more point in support of the above conclusion :

Amalānanda and Vidyāraṇya had Ānandātman (of whom Śaṅkarānanda, the teacher of Vidyāraṇya, was disciple) as their grand teacher. Amalānanda had Citsukha as another grand teacher. "If this was the case, he could not have written in his *SDV* (XIII. 5) that Citsukha, who lived several centuries after Padmapāda, was a disciple of Padmapāda. It may, therefore, be safely asserted that the author of the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* was not the author of *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha*."¹²

4. In support of the above conclusion one more point can be adduced :

According to Vidyāraṇya mind is the eleventh organ (*ekādaśa indriya*).¹³ That mind is an organ is the view held by the Bhāmati school. Vidyāraṇya's synthetic approach agrees with this theoretical point of the Bhāmati School. On the other hand the Vivaraṇa School denies this view.¹⁴ But a stanza (in the VIII canto) of this *SDV* clearly justifies that mind is not an organ is the stand of Vedāntins.¹⁵ This difference in opinion, though not strong support, does help us to think the author of this work as other than Vidyāraṇya.

5. It is interesting to note that the description in *SDV* of Śṛṅgerī is very short, hardly six verses.¹⁶ Why? If at all he were Vidyāraṇya alias Mādhava, he might have described it in great deal, because after all it was the holy place where he was well educated under the great personages like Vidyātīrtha and Bhāratīrtha. That the peaceful and beautiful Śṛṅgerī has a captivating natural beauty is a well-known fact, and as such it is naturally an object of descriptions to poets. But our poet is not so much interested. Therefore, he might be other than Mādhava Vidyāraṇya.

¹¹ See fn. 6 above. Also see S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p 86.

¹² See fn. 11.

¹³ (i) एकादशेन्द्रियैर्युक्तया शब्देणाप्यवगम्यते । — *Vedānta-Pañcadaśī* II. 28

(ii) एकादशेन्द्रियोत्तरां चैष्टानामुपलक्षणम् । — *BBVS* II. 4. 42

(iii) एकादशेन्द्रियाण्येषां विषयस्य जगत् खलु । *Anubhūti-prakāśa* VIII. 62

¹⁴ Cp. *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* I

¹⁵ यनोक्षमित्यभ्युपगम्य भेदासङ्गित्वमुक्तं परमार्थतस्तु ।

साहाय्यकृद्भोचनपूर्वकस्य दीपादिवत्तेन्द्रियमेव चित्तम् ॥ — *SDV* III. 98

6. According to *Dharmaśāstra*, a wife whose husband resorts to *sannyāsa* attains *punjanma*¹⁷ (i. e. she will become male) in her next birth.

Thus, it brings a high position to the wife in the *pūrvāśrama* of a *sannyāsin*, and as such according to the *śiṣṭācāra* she is never called *vidhavā* and it is observed even to these days. Vidyāraṇya, who was the author of *Pārāśaramādhavīyam* (*Mādhavīyam* is the name given to the commentary written by him in his *pūrvāśrama* on the *Parāśaradharmasamhitā*), if supposed to be the author of *SDV*, could not have used the word *vidhavā* or *vaidhavya*¹⁸ in connection with Ubhayabhārati whose husband Maṇḍana takes *sannyāsa* when defeated by Śaṅkara. Therefore, this author i. e. Navakālīdāsa might not be identified with Vidyāraṇya alias Mādhava.

However, these two points may not be very strong evidences to disconnect Vidyāraṇya from this work, yet they serve the purpose at least to some extent in this direction.

Placing reliance only on the stanza¹⁹ from *Alaṅkārasudhānidhi* which styles Māyaṇa, the son of Sāyaṇa, to be adept in the composition of prose and poetry (if at all the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* has Mādhava as its author, or if it were presented to Mādhava alias Vidyāraṇya as can be meant by the punning use of the term *Mādhavīyam* found in the work), we may, with hesitation, assign the *SDV* to Māyaṇa, the son of Sāyaṇa, who might have written it at a later date. Still, the matter in dispute remains unsolved as to why he saluted Vidyātīrtha, and where we find the title *Navakālīdāsa* to this Māyaṇa.

We have a repeated reference to this interesting adjective 'Navakālīdāsa' in the closing part of almost all the *stabakas* (except II) in the *Bhāgavata Campū* (BC), the author of which is still known only by this name i. e. Navakālīdāsa or Abhinava Kālīdāsa.²⁰ He also styles himself to be the

¹⁶ *SDV* XII. 64-69

¹⁷ पुंजन्म लभते पत्नी ... । Quoted by Vidyāraṇya in his *Jīvanmuktivivēka* Ch. I.

¹⁸ वैधव्यसंभवशुचा भुवमस्पृशन्त्या । *SDV* X. 73

¹⁹ प्रौढि मायग गद्यपद्यरचनापाण्डित्यमुन्मुद्रय ।

Quoted by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy in the Preface (p. 10) to his edition of Sāyaṇa's *Subhāṣita-Sudhānidhi* (Karnatak University, Dharwad).

²⁰ (i) यस्मिन् शङ्करदारसौरभस्त्रीजृम्भतः कटाक्षच्छटा-

पाताः कल्पलतावितानपुमनोगुम्फप्रियं भावुकाः ।

(Continued on the next page)

‘Kālidāsa’ with the prefix ‘*Abhinava*’²¹ in the introductory part of the *BC*.

However, again with much hesitation we may think of the author of *BC* to be the author of *SDV*.

In fact, one of the features of the author of this *Campū* is that he gained the capacity to write his work only by the grace of Pārvatī.²² But we do not find any reference to this point in the work *SDV*. Anyway it is very difficult to decide the author of the *Campū* to be identical with the author of *SDV*, in view of its style.

However, one point seems to be clear that the author of *SDV*, since he refers to Vidyātīrtha and Mādhava (i. e. *Mādhavīyam* in the sense of dedication to Mādhava), might have lived in Karnataka during the latter part of the 14th century.

(Continued from p. 283)

तस्याऽसौ नवकालिदासविदुषः षष्ठोऽपि काव्यामृते

चम्पूनामनि धीमतां कृतसमुल्लासो विलासोऽगमत् ॥ *BC* VI. 24

(ii) cp. वागेषा नवकालिदासविदुषो ... *SDV* I. 10

(iii) A stanza by the Commentator of the *Campū* also refers to the name :

नवकालिदासकविताम्बुधेः रसादुपरिप्लवाय विहिता मया तरी ।

This stanza is inserted in the text of the *Campū* itself as the 22nd stanza of *stabaka* VI.

²¹ अभिनवपदपूर्वः कालिदासः प्रगल्भस्त्रिनयनदयितायाः प्रेमाडिम्भस्तृतीयः ।

विरचयति तयैव प्रेरितः प्रेमपूर्वं हरिगुणपरिशुद्धं चारुचम्पूप्रबन्धम् ॥ *BC* I. 7

²² *Ibid.* Also, see. fn. 17 above.

ĀLAṆKĀRIKAS ON THE MUKTAKA OF AMARUŚATAKA

By

A. JANAKI

The Mukta under consideration is the one which was frequently quoted and discussed by theorists in the establishment of the theory of Dhvani besides the famous example of Dhvani ' *Bhama dhammā* ' etc. Apart from the keen observative criticism made by the well known Ālaṅkārikas, Appayya-dīkṣita and Jagannātha, there are many significant remarks which were bestowed upon the Mukta by standard poetics. An attempt is made here to bring out a critical account of the views expressed by Ālaṅkārikas as well as the commentators of *Kāvyaprakāśa* on the Mukta which is as follows :

*niśṣeṣacyutacandanamī stanataṣaṇi nirmṛṣṭarāgo'dharo
netre dūramanāñjane pulakitā tanvī taveyaṃ tanuḥ |
mithyāvādinī dūti bāndhavajanasyājñātapīḍāgame
vāpīm snātumito gatāsi na punastasyādhamasyāntikam //*

Here the heroine had sent her maid to call her lover. But the maid herself enjoyed the company of the heroine's lover and came back to the heroine, with a lie that inspite of her requests the lover did not come. The heroine understood the real cause of various signs which are seen in the limbs of the maid. She spoke of them under the guise of describing the maid going to the well for bath and not to invite the lover. Here the idea that ' the maid approached the wretched lover for enjoyment ', though not at all expressed, comes as a flash to the mind of the reader. The process of meaning was explained by different Ālaṅkārikas in various ways.

Bhoja is the first Ālaṅkārika to quote the verse. He mentions it twice in both of his works, to illustrate the figure Bhāvika. He quotes this verse to illustrate one of the varieties of the said figure. He includes ' Udbheda ' under Bhāvika. This figure is sub-divided by him into Avyakta, Vyakta and Vyaktāvyakta. ' Udbheda ' means an idea which though concealed comes to be manifested. This verse is given as an example of ' Udbheda ' which is Avyakta. It can be applied thus : The idea of the wicked act of the messenger breaks through the sentence. This is called ' Udbhinna '. Since it is not quite distinct or apparent, this verse is an instance of Avyakta Bhāvika. To explain : the treason committed by the messenger was pointed out by the speaker in a hidden way. This hinting at the wicked act of the maid in a

hidden way is considered by Bhoja as the beautifying element of this composition.

In the view of Mammaṭa, this verse is a specimen of Uttamakāvya, as the beauty of the poetic piece arises entirely from the suggested sense. Thus the peculiarity of this verse, which excelled in the presentation of an intriguing situation, got its due recognition in the hands of Mammaṭa who has paid a nice compliment by way of illustrating it for the best type of Kāvya. Mammaṭa once again takes this verse in the fifth chapter of *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, where he answers all views that stood against the function of Vyañjanā. Just as Abhinavagupta exposed the verse 'Bhama' etc. for a critical examination while answering all allegations raised against the function of Vyañjanā in his *Locana*, Mammaṭa fixes the verse 'Niśṣeṣacyutacandanam' etc. as the ground for the clearance of all doubts regarding the theory of Suggestion.

Māṇikyaandra, the earliest commentator on *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, exposes various elements of this verse. The significance of the usage of words, the process and nature of the suggestion and the Alaṅkāra that is suggested are pointed out by him. He observes, the usage of the word 'cyuta' which denotes the fall of 'candana' itself is significant. Any synonym like 'kṣāṇita' can never be as powerful as the word 'cyuta' in giving the suggested in the present context. He points out that the usage of the words 'dūramanañjane' is significant, for it denotes the meaning that corners alone are devoid of collyrium whereas all other close parts of eyes retain it. Māṇikyaandra observes the suggestion of this verse from the stand-point of both the suggester and the suggested. He mentions that the words 'candanam' etc. through their help to the word 'adhama' became suggesters and the word 'adhama' itself is a chief suggester. He states that the suggested here is based upon the power of the sense conveyed by the sentence. This suggestion is of the form of assertion whereas the expressed is of the form of negation. In the view of Māṇikyaandra, the quality of meanness can also be attributed to the word 'dūlī' (maid) though it is directed to hint at the nature of the hero. He is a proven *adhama*. By suggestion the maid is also shown to be mean resulting in the figure Upameyopamā. He states that the figure Upameyopamā which is of the form of the idea, i. e. 'The maid is mean like the hero and the hero is wretched like the maid', is suggested. Thus Māṇikyaandra exposes various factors in his brief commentary. It seems that Appayyadīkṣita's explanation of each and every epithet in this verse is an elaborated version of simple analysis given by Māṇikyaandra.

Upto this time, no controversy has been raised regarding the process of meaning of this verse. Māṇikyaandra, the earliest commentator, has not

bothered about the view which holds that the function of Lakṣṇā has to be resorted to, in the case of this verse, to get the intended meaning. Caṇḍīdāsa is the one commentator who states that the function of Lakṣṇā has to be resorted to in explaining the process of the meaning of the verses. He opines that the suggested sense in this verse proceeds from Lakṣyārtha. Caṇḍīdāsa explains that the words 'Niśṣeṣacyutacandanam' etc. denote the signs of enjoyment only and hence the apparent meaning 'taking bath in the well' is incompatible. He affirms that the idea of going to the hero is indicated here, and by this indicated sense the idea of enjoyment is suggested. This view put forward by Caṇḍīdāsa found strong support from Viśvanātha. Viśvanātha finds that the primary meaning of the verse is incompatible since the signs of enjoyment here are denoted by the epithets. Therefore, the apparent meaning 'taking bath in the well' is incompatible. For this reason the function of Viparītalakṣṇā finds scope here, by virtue of which, the idea of the maid's going to the hero, gets apprehended. In the view of Viśvanātha the above given 'Lakṣyārtha' will become suggester of the intended idea of the speaker. Thus Viśvanātha completely differs from Mammaṭa in explaining the process of the meaning of the verse. Mammaṭa states clearly that the 'Vyaṅgyārtha' can be had from the word *adhama*. The words 'Niśṣeṣacyutacandanam' etc. are common to both *vāpīśnāna* and *sambhoga*. They are not to be interpreted as being inapplicable to 'vāpīśnāna' and exclusively appropriate to 'tadantikagamana'. What Viśvanātha says is the exact opposite of this. Here he follows his great-grand-father Caṇḍīdāsa, differing from Mammaṭa.

The view, which holds that the function of Indication has to be resorted to to get the intended idea of the speaker, got strong opposition from all commentators of *Kāvyaaprakāśa*. Explanation of the lack of incompatibility in the primary meaning became the main task for them. The counter-arguments put forward by some of the commentators are of much interest. Paramānanda-cakravartin opines that the acceptance of the function of Indication spoils the beauty of the poem. He explains that the speaker here is a heroine who is 'Vidagdā'. She wants to conceal the signs of dalliance from the view of a third person (Udāsīna) but at the same time suggests to the maid that she has understood the real cause of various signs that are seen. If the function of Indication comes in, Cakravartin opines, the very beauty of the poem, the 'Vidagdhatva' of the heroine, would be spoiled. He further argues that the apparent meaning here is quite applicable. He explains that the changes appearing in the limbs of the messenger are capable of being caused by the bath at the well. After all she has gone to the well, not to her home. Due to the presence of so many people at the well she has

finished her bath hastily. Because of this hastiness she was not able to clean her body perfectly. In the light of this, all epithets give the meaning which is suitable to the bath at the well. Thus Cakravartin refutes the view which holds that the function of Indication has to be resorted to to get the intended idea of the verse.

Śrīkṛṣṇaśarman is another commentator who puts forward two more points in order to refute the view of Caṇḍīdāsa. He comments sarcastically: if one proceeds in this manner to analyse the process of meaning, one can go a step further and say that there will be no necessity of resorting to the function of Lakṣaṇā even. If the negative particle 'nañ' is combined with the verb 'gatāsi' and is read as 'gatāsi na,' then the function of denotation will be sufficient to convey the intended idea of the speaker. Śrīkṛṣṇaśarman further observes that Caṇḍīdāsa points out the act of enjoyment as the suggested one. It is not the one which is mentioned by Mammaṭa. For, Mammaṭa says clearly in the fifth chapter that the suggested in the verse is of the form of positive assertion. The same is mentioned as indicated sense by Caṇḍīdāsa. From this it is evident that Caṇḍīdāsa goes against the view of Mammaṭa. Both Paramānanda-cakravartin and Śrīvatsa!āñchana refer to the view of Subuddhi-miśra which advocates the acceptance of intonation for the purpose of refuting the scope of Indication. According to S. Miśra, the peculiarity of intonation of 'na' in this verse gives rise to the meaning that she has gone to the hero only. Since the intended idea is obtained by virtue of Kāku, there will be no scope for 'Lakṣaṇā'. Paramānanda-cakravartin throws away the view, as, since in the first place Lakṣaṇā has no connection here, the 'Kākuvāda' is simply out of context. Further, he says, this 'Kākuvāda' is untenable since it is based upon the objectionable interpretation of the *Vṛtti* of Mammaṭa. Paramānanda-cakravartin totally dismisses both the supporters of indication and intonation, saying that some people are accepting the function of Indication blindly following others like a flock of sheep and some others are adopting bad reasoning to avoid the function of Lakṣaṇā. Thus many commentators voted against the acceptance of the function of Indication only.

It is amusing to find this verse as an example of the figure Lava in the *Alaṅkārasaṅgraha* of Amṛtānandayogin. This Lavālaṅkāra is defined by him as an expression of something in which the desired idea is hidden.

In this connection it is proper to mention that the significance of the word 'adhama' as was observed by prominent commentators of *Kāvya-prakāśa*, is of much interest. Gokulanāthopādhyāya observes that the word 'adhama' cannot be said as the one caused by either class or action, for, in

such case, the heroine does not send the messenger to him. According to this commentator, the word *adhama* suggests the idea that the hero is always fond of other ladies. However, this interpretation does not seem to be proper, for a clever heroine does not voluntarily send a young girl near the man who has a fancy for other ladies. Paramānanda-cakravartin's explanation of the word *adhama* is proper and acceptable. He explains that the hero is called *adhama* by the heroine, for the reason that he expects so many requests from her. Śrīkṛṣṇaśarman clarifies the subtle difference between the words *adhama* etc. on one hand and *taṭa*, *adhara* etc. on the other. All the words other than *adhama* can only hint at the idea of enjoyment of the maid but cannot suggest that she has enjoyed with the particular person only. The man may be anyone else. Whereas the word *adhama* fixes the idea that the maid dallied not with anyone else but with the lover of the heroine only. Thus Śrīkṛṣṇaśarman says that without the presence of the word *adhama* one cannot get the idea that the lady has dallied with the lover of the heroine. For this reason the word *adhama* gets prominence. Thus the significance of the word *adhama* was pointed out by commentators.

There are different explanations regarding the Rasa depicted in this verse. Some hold that the semblance of Sambhoga is suggested here. The ensuants i. e., embracing, kissing which are indicated by the dropping of sandal paste etc., and Sāttvikabhāva horripilation, enhances the effect of enjoyment. This Sambhoga is an Ābhāsa, since this Rasa is described as appearing at improper place. This view is refused by Gokulanāthopādhyāya on the basis that this semblance of Sambhoga results in causing the jealousy and humiliation in the heroine which ultimately result in enhancing the effect of the sentiment 'Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra'. Most of the commentators observed that the Rasa delineated in the verse is 'Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra'. When Sambhoga of hero is known by the heroine it enhances the bitterness of her state of isolation. Thus this Sambhoga of hero enhances the effect of 'Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra'. There is another view which is put forward by commentators like Śrīvatsalāñchana that the Bhāva Nirveda which is an Aṅga of the sentiment of Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra is suggested here. This view seems to be proper. The Nirveda born of Nāyikā is prominent here. Here the heroine gets Nirveda for believing blindly the maid and the lover. She gets utter disgust due to the insult and mischief rendered by the persons who are close to her. If the hero is Ālambhanavibhāva then the Nirveda is an Aṅga of the sentiment of Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra. If the maid is Ālambhanavibhāva then the Nirveda born of Nāyikā is Svatantra and Rasānāṅga. This Nirveda appears to be prominent in the poem. Whatever Rasa may be prominent here, the heart of Sahṛdaya is fully associated with the Vidagdhatva of the heroine.

This Vidagdhatva only greatly appeals to the mind of the Sahṛdaya. Bhoja is also of the same view regarding these kinds of compositions. For, Bhoja considers in Gāthās like 'Bhama' etc. the Vaidagdhyā of Nāyikā or her maid as the mainly suggested one. Hemacandra also rightly observes that in the verses of Vastudhvani, Rasa may be found but it is never prominent like a king who attends the marriage ceremony of his minister in which the latter occupies the prominent place. Here the cleverness of the lady appeals greatly. Gokulanāthopādhyāya and Jagannātha rightly stress upon the Vaidagdhyā of the heroine. Gokulanāthopādhyāya affirms that the cleverness of the speaker only finally appeals to the mind of the Sāmājika.

This verse represents a dignified lady who does not leave her politeness and composed nature even when she is facing the most miserable situation. The abuse made by her is purged of its crudeness due to her wonderful command over the language and thought. This speech is an appropriate instance of 'euphemism' which is regarded as 'a command of life and a conquest of culture'. The variety of Vastudhvani is concerned mostly with the kind of skilful expressions of clever persons. The cleverness of speaker here is an offspring of the beauty of suggestion only. The absolute suggestion of the intended idea inspired the Dhvanivādins to put it on a high pedestal. The Alaṅkāras Bhāvika and Lava for which this verse was illustrated, however, point out the disguised rebuke of the speaker. So understood, this verse can be a perfect example of these Vācyālaṅkāras also. But only the Dhvani theorist Mammaṭa has made full justice to this beautiful verse by recognising it as a specimen of Uttamakāvya.

AESTHETICS, ITS SCOPE, AND THE WORD SAUNDARYA-YOGA AS ITS SYNONYM

By

PADMA SUDHI


Everything has its inheritance in the problems. Artist is a person who projects problems and then dissolves them through his own art-forms. The problems of an artist are different qualitatively and quantitatively than the normal people in a pragmatic sense have. These problems can be defined as desires of their own kind around which the mind of the artist oscillates feverishly and restlessly (*tapasā cīyate*). The bigger the problem the larger and the deeper is the vista of creativity. In a sense, we can say that the artist is a kind of prisoner who is conditioned in his introspective life due to the bondages of artistic desires. These desires have their worldly ancestors in the form of poverty, diseases, anxieties and discomforts of life.¹ Sometimes, his craving is caused owing to his own defeated ideals and incomplete rationality.

So many disciplines have sprung from the disturbing functions of the mind. Mind behaves like a poly-gifted person and functions in a fashion of all the times and all the places. For this fittest existence, mind has apparatuses to function in the form of literature, music, painting, religion, philosophy, history, metaphysics, sciences, psychology, linguistics and so on.² Previously, a man could have been satisfied temporarily through his petty creations. In the 20th cent. when the space is conquered, the microscopic creativity could not get him the recognition in the microscopic style like a light of the sun which spreads its thousand-fold gold-gilded brushes to manifest the great art of the creator with all its hue and colours. The individual branch of knowledge or its specialization has been producing a craving in man for completeness. *The single-tracked mind is feeling uneasy in its own distortion in the present century and now the tendency of combining one branch of knowledge with the other or combining several branches into one discipline, is growing with the reason of ontological need.* The Aesthetics is the outcome of the several incorporated disciplines which have inherited affi-

¹ Ed. Muni Brahmalina, *Yoga-Sūtra*, Comm. of Vyāsa, Chowkhamba, KSS 201, Varanasi, 1970, I. 5.

² *Ibid.* II. 5.

nity with each other. To justify my statement, compare the excerpts from three editions of the *Encyclopedia of Britannica* (1929, Vol. I, pp. 263-72; 1949 Vol. I, pp. 221-223; 1964, Vol. I, pp. 221-225). The extensive scope and vast study of the word 'Aesthetics' which has been explained in three of the editions of *Britannica* is summed up by Feibleman in his book with the table below :



When I was writing my dissertation on 'Indian aesthetic-theories in Sanskrit literature', it was enigmatic for me to understand the word 'Aesthetics' in its right perspective. However, I was confused by the Sanskrit titles given to the different books on Aesthetics. Mostly, I found the headings by the vocabulary *Saundarya-tattva*, *Sauundarya-śāstra*, *Saundarya-mīmāṃsā*, *Saundarya-śodha*, *Sāhitya-śāstra*, *Kāvya-śāstra*, *Sanskrit-ālocanā* and *Rasa-siddhānta*. In English, the Indian writers gave the titles to their books, such as 'Indian concept of beautiful', 'Philosophy of poetry', 'Philosophy of aesthetic pleasure', and 'aesthetic rapture'. To me, it appeared that everybody tried to explain one or the other aspect of the study of Aesthetics. All these titles were inadequate in the import of their total meaning of Aesthetics as defined by the authority of *Britannica*. Even Dr. K. C. Pandey, who has written two volumes on the *Comparative Aesthetics* and *History of Indian Aesthetics* (1950-53), showed only fullfledged development and culmination of *rasa* theory as a whole of the Indian Aesthetics. Moreover, books on sculpture, music, painting, architecture, iconography and other useful arts, again and again emphasised the word 'Aesthetics' with their own view-points.

Study from Raghavan's school of thought to *Bengal Renaissance School*, could not clarify the concept of Aesthetics and its scope. Consequently, I had to take shelter in the writers of the West as the word 'Aesthetics' has its source in the West. Bosanquet, E. E. Carritte, Mr. Read and the other American and Russian writers on aesthetics charged me with the dazzling enlightenment for the study of aesthetics with its wide scope. Reading them, I found that till now Sanskrit literature from Vedas to Classical period, which is rich and has deep-rooted heritage, could not get the total expression in the realm of aesthetics with all its trends, patterns, and concepts apprehended through the process of its cultural history. It was then the pleasure of the writer to apply all the 'isms' to the Indian aesthetic theories, which were innumerable rather than having one outstanding theory of *rasa*.

In my restless quest as such, I have derived one compound word 'Saundarya-Yoga' in Sanskrit as the synonym of the English word 'Aesthetics'. The meaning of *Yoga* which I add to the word 'Saundarya' has been implied for ontological, epistemological, psychological and logical aspects of Indian aesthetics. Ontology stands for our soul energy which is the essence of life, psychology treats the subject of the apprehension of art, epistemology deals with the physical object that becomes the mental idea, a psychic state of the subject (*modus operandi*), and treats the object of apprehension of art. Logic shows the harmony of the parts to its whole, between the psychic state of the subject, and in the apprehension of the object which are subordinate to the soul in existence as *jīva*. Four of these are elaborately interpreted in the philosophy of *Yoga*.

In the ontological aesthetics, *Yoga* is used for the trends of mysticism, occultism, symbolism, essentialism of metaphysics; in epistemological aesthetics, *Yoga* is used in all the religious 'isms', their cults and sects which have sprung from different philosophical systems of India. Worth mentioning theories are polytheistic, monotheistic and pantheistic aesthetical experiences, *bhakti-yoga*,³ *jñāna-yoga*,⁴ *karma-yoga*,⁵ *kriyā-yoga*,⁶ (*yoga* theory of pragmatism) *sāmya-yoga*,⁷ *ātma-yoga*,⁸ *sannyāsa-yoga*,⁹ phenomenalism of Buddhism, existentialism of *Vedānta*, *Vaiṣṇavism* and *Śaivism* and their theory of cosmic play, concept of *ardhanārīśvara* (*Tantra-Yoga*), *Sahajīyas* theory of aesthetics, linguistic theory of aesthetics based on the science of meaning

³ *Bhagavadgītā*, XII, X. 8-11; *Bhaktirasūyana*, Banares, 1923, I. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.* II, VII. 17.

⁵ *Ibid.* III. 5.

⁶ *Ibid.* VI. 17; J. R. Ballantyne, *Yoga-Sūtra*, Calcutta, 1952, II. 1.

⁷ *BG* II. 48-50.

⁸ *Ibid.* IV. 36.

⁹ *Ibid.* VI. 3-4.

or *sphoṭa-vāda*; in aesthetical psychology, *yoga*, is used in the trends of idealism, imagery, realism, surrealism, romanticism, hedonistic aesthetics, sensualism, intellectualism, emotionalism, theory of transformation, socialistic-socialism, communism, theory of sublime and so on. In logical sense, *yoga* is applied to ideal-physiognomy, sense of propriety, theory of *rasa*, theory of quality, ornamentation, style and other modes of aesthetical experience in literature and poetry, sculpture and painting which have their source in the logical harmony of *yoga* where *mudrās* (gestures) and *āsanas* (postures) of *haṭha-yoga* and *rāja-yoga* together with *tantra-yoga* and its *Kuṇḍalinī*-power are prominent features. Postures and gestures of images derived from the traditional Indian symbolism connected with the attitudes of the dance and the *Yoga* techniques.

Problem, process and practice are the three spheres of Indian aesthetics. We can say *p*¹ is necessary in testing and creating the aesthetic attitudes. The *problem* is our *Citta* which like melting copper takes different shapes in different moulds.¹⁰ In its deform vision it has a misconception to devalue the valuable gems.¹¹ The objects of contact are like moulds. To eradicate the distortions, moulds should be kept upright by moving them through reverse gear. The process of turning all the states of *citta* to the backward movement gives the concepts of artistic canons.¹² Great *practice* of concentration and meditation¹³ gives rise to three super knowledges¹⁴ for the subtle perceptions.

Yoga, step by step, unfolds the nature of empirical consciousness to reach the goal of pure-consciousness. Aesthetics is also a gradual process but not the result or goal, it leads to successive stages of judgements. Aesthetics views at the total situations, mental, intellectual and phenomenal and their relationship with culture in passing a judgement on the work of art. For aesthetics, only five *Vṛttis* of *Yoga* are not sufficient. *Vṛttis* of present life, thinking, feelings and emotions of various past lives help an artist to add something from them after being aroused by the different objects of contacts and subtracting something dissimilar from the present-state of mind. This activity of selection chisels the mental-image and then, through meditation, he draws an impeccable picture with the help of brush, word, notes or stone. He closes his eyes and then opens to give form to his mental image. For that, he needs a strong mind free from all the prejudices and possession of the

¹⁰ *Yoga-Sūtra*, II. 5.

¹¹ Ed. M. R. Kale, *Nīti-śataka* (Bhartṛhari), Delhi, 1959, Vidvat-paddhati 13.

¹² *Yoga-sūtra*, II. 29.

¹³ *Ibid.* III. 11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* III, 18, 19, 21, 41, 42.

past that is the mounted one 'Yogarūḍha',¹⁵ In the process of creation of art-form, artist, taking out everything from the past or remote past, absolutely one-pointedly stays in the present moment. The word *citta* is most important in the philosophy of *Yoga* for the aesthetic-experience of relativity. The state of *citta* as a problem, process and its practice, these are the basic principles upon which Indian aesthetics is formulated. Selective picture of thought-forms from pre-conscious to consciousness, play a great role in creating and tasting beauty. These, in other words, can be known as *Vṛttis*, *Smṛti*, *saṁskāras*, *vāsanā*, *dhāraṇā*, *saṁādhi* and *siddhi*. As all the systems of Indian Philosophy follow *Yoga*, it won't be irrelevant if the writer would elucidate something from *Vedānta*, *Sāṁkhya*, *Buddhism* and the others in getting the aesthetic-ecstasy of *Yoga*.

The word *Yoga* with reference to Indian aesthetics is taken with various meanings besides those given by Patañjali in his *Yoga-Sūtra*. The meaning 'union',¹⁶ 'contact',¹⁷ 'means',¹⁸ 'assiduity',¹⁹ 'practice',²⁰ 'ability',²¹ 'preserving the old and acquiring the new',²² 'a state between sleep and wakefulness',²³ 'engaged in meditation',²⁴ 'abstract meditation',²⁵ and 'arts'²⁶ are the meanings which are understood by the word *Yoga* in the compound word coined as '*Saundarya-Yoga*'. But the concept of *citta* should be present in all its meanings. The commentator Vyāsa on *Yoga-Sūtra* (I. 1.) said that '*Yogaḥ saṁādhiḥ sa ca sārva-bhauma-ścittasya dharmah*'. He equated *yoga* with *saṁādhi* which is the quality of *citta* common to all the states (*vṛttis*). These comprehend all the manifold states of consciousness of our phenomenal existence and we cannot distinguish the states of consciousness from consciousness itself, for consciousness is not something separate from its states. It exists in its states as a psychical factor. There are two types of *citta* : *kārya-citta* (artificial mind or personal mind of ego) and *kāraṇa-citta*

¹⁵ *Ibid.* I. 12 : BG VI. 4.

¹⁶ Ed. R. P. Dvivedi, *Kālidāsa-granthāvali : Abhijñāna-Śakuntalam* VII. 22, BHU, 1976.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* *Raghuvamśa*, III. 26.

¹⁸ *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*, Kalyan Press, Gorakhpur, 1959, III. 24. 17.

¹⁹ Ed. V. S. Sukthankar, *Mahābhārata*, BORI, Poona, VII. 188. 45.

²⁰ *Ibid.* V. 34. 39. *Satyena rakṣyate dharmo, vidyā yogenā rakṣyate.*

²¹ BG X. Ch.

²² Ed. T. Ganapati Sastri, *Yājñyavalkya-Smṛti*, TSS, Trivandrum, 1922, Part I. I. 100. *Alabhyatūbho yogaḥ syūt kṣemo labdhasya pūlanam.*

²³ *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*, X. 2. 15.

²⁴ Ed. Shrirama Sharma, *Brahma-vaivartta-Purāṇa*, Samskriti Samsthana, Bareilly, 1970, *Brahma-Kāṇḍa*, I. 3.

²⁵ *Kālidāsa-granthāvali : Kumārasambhava*, I. 21, *Raghu*, I. 8. 29.

²⁶ Yaśodhara (Ed.), *Kāma-Sūtra*, Banares, 1929, I. 3. 14.

(real mind or impersonal mind of reason).²⁷ For the purpose of aesthetics, both are essential. As *kāraṇa-citta* deals with our successive rebirths and is always connected with *Puruṣa*, the theory of *karmāśaya* and *saṁskāras* together with *Vāsanā* of Yoga-Philosophy is the mysterious solution to the aesthetic taste of relishing beauty (*rasa*). *Kārya-citta*, which is the summed up unity of the 11 senses and the ego together with five *prāṇas*, plays a great role in focussing toward aesthetic-object to produce the work of art. Patañjali frankly explained the nature of the world within and without, with reference to *Kārya-citta*. According to him, thing remains the same, though the ideas and feelings (—It is the part of *yoga* psychology to say that all our ideas are accompanied by feelings and emotions, however slight: *Yoga-Sūtra*, I.5—) of different men may change differently about it.²⁸ In our practical life, we see that the same common thing generates different feelings and ideas in different persons. External reality cannot be said to owe its origin to the ideas or imaginations of any person but exists independently of any man's imagination in and for itself. So it must be said that external reality is what we perceive outside, and our knowledge about it is mere percepts.²⁹ The two can never be mixed together. This objective reality, though depending upon ideas, does not cease as it springs up again when the attention of the individual is directed toward it. Therefore, it must be said that there is an independent external reality which is the common field of observation for all souls in general. That very attention which is known as fixing of the mind by abstracting it from all other objects is called *dhāraṇā*.³⁰ During this process an artist tries to focuss at an object completely. As said by Patañjali that one cannot concentrate upon two things simultaneously,³¹ we can explain it in the language of Vijñānabhikṣu from his *Yoga-sāra-saṁgraha* that all parts of an object cannot be seen simultaneously. Just as we cannot see the back of a person if we are seeing his front. In ordinary sense, we perceive the thing with the methods of *gaṇḍha-nyāya*. Therefore, *dhāraṇā* is a method where an artist is supposed to glimpse the whole view of the object, its front as well as its back; only then he would be ready for meditation.³² *Kāraṇa-citta* is purified by three super-knowledges while *Kārya-citta* is purified with benevolence, compassion, complacency and indifference.³³ Artist is a conscious *Yogī* who undergoes two of the four stages. The *prathama-kalpika* which is argumentative with reference to words, their objects and ideas, can be well connected to the state of *dhāraṇā* where one-pointed concentration upon an

²⁷ *Chūyā-Vyākhyā* (Nagēśa-bhaṭṭa), V. 10.

²⁸ *Yoga-Sūtra*, IV. 15

²⁹ *Ibid.* III. 1.

³⁰ *Ibid.* III. 2.

³¹ *Ibid.* IV. 23; IV. 16.

³² *Ibid.* IV. 19.

³³ *Ibid.* I. 33; *Supra* Note 13.

object is taking place. After realising fully well an object, the non-argumentative condition arises which is given the name as *Ātambharā prajñā* (*Yoga-Sū. I. 48* : a knowledge of truth-supporting). This state is called *Madhumatī* : also, because here there is firm meditation (*Dhyāna*) which is connected with the knowledge that gives satisfaction as honey does. A writer has to go through these two stages only to create the art forms. An artist, in a way, is *samprajñāta-yogī* who concentrates upon the object, idea, colour, note, word and stone as a Yogī concentrates upon God.³⁵ The God of the artist is *śabda-brahma*³⁶ and *nāda-brahma* with reference to the art of literature and music.³⁷ Ānandavardhana later talked about the identity of literature with music.³⁷ The three *śrutis* of music, which are *mṛdu*, *madhya* and *āyatā* (*Bharata-Nāṭya-Śāstra* 29/38-40), the same are known in literature or poetics as three excellences of poetry, which are *mādhurya*, *prasāda*, and *ojas* (Mammaṭa's *Kāvya-prakāśa* IV. 49 : *mādhuryaujaḥprasādākyās trayas te*) are enumerated with reference to three groups of *rasas* in poetry. *Rasa-brahma*, which is the focal-point in dramaturgy, that is the object of concentration in poetry too.³⁸ The pictures that express emotions through colours are known as *rasa-citras*. Śrī Kumāra has compared and analysed in his *Śilpa-Ratna* these *rasa-citras* based on realism.³⁹ In *Viṣṇudharmottara-Purāṇa*, seer Mārkaṇḍeya told king Vajra that, without knowing the rules of dance, he cannot understand the rules for painting.⁴⁰ Not only that, even the nine *rasas* of literature and seven colours of painting correspond with the seven notes of music.⁴¹ Bhoja in his *Samarāṅgaṇa-sūtradhāra* and Śārṅgadeva in his *Saṅgītaratnākara* expressed that *nāda-brahman* and *Vastu-brahman* are the objects of meditation in the art of music and architecture respectively.⁴² Art of architecture includes painting and sculpture. All the fine arts have common theoretical canons and common goal of meditation upon *brahman*

31 G. N. Jha, Ed. *Yoga-sūtra saṁgraha*, Adyar, Madras, 1933, p. 8 : 1st Aṁśa.

35 *Yoga-Sūtra*, I. 24.

36 C. Kunhan Raja, Ed. *Saṅgīta-ratnākara*, Madras, 1959, III. 1.

37 *Dhvanyāloka*, Kāvya-mālā 25, Bombay, 1928, III., *Na hi śabdasya vūcya-pratīti-parāmarśa eva vyañjakatve nibandhanam. tathā hi gītūdi śabdebhyo'pi rasā-bhivyaktir asti, na ca teṣāmantarā vūcya-parāmarśah.*

38 S. K. De, *History of Indian Poetics*, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1960, p. 18.

39 T. Ganapati Sastri, (Ed.), *Śilpa-ratna*, Trivandrum, 1929, 145. 7.

40 Priyabala Shah, Ed. *Viṣṇudharmottara-Purāṇa*, Baroda, 1958, Section III, Chs. 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 : Ramachandra, *Kumāravihāra-Śataka* (Ms.), Bhavanagar, 1888, Leaflet, 63, Sl. 61. (In it it is said that the temple was the home of all the arts. It was the embodiment of architecture decorated with sculpture and painting, having halls for dancing and music and for reciting the *Kathā-Kāvya* and the acting or dramas where songs were sung from Literature.)

41 Ramakrishna Kavi, *Bharata-Nāṭya-Śāstra*, GOS, Baroda, 1964, Vol. I. Vi. 42-43.

42 *Saṅgīta-ratnākara* (*Ibid.*) III. 1.

38 [Annals, BORI]

to apprehend this world as beautiful and perfect which is a flawless *Sukṛti*⁴³ of the Creator grasped by the super-sensitivity of the artist. What is in the universe, corresponding to it, that exists in the individual also. This whole creation is known as *Brahmāṇḍa* as well as *Pinḍāṇḍa*.⁴⁴ Three powers which function in the four *Kośas* are known as *Kriyā*, *Ichhā* and *Jñāna*. *Kriyā-śakti* works in the gross-body and *prāṇamaya-kośa*, which is responsible to expose the physical beauty, while feeling-faculty or *saṁveda-śakti* works in *Manomaya-kośa* and expresses the mental beauty of the subject, as it is the kingdom of the mind. *Manomaya-kośa* is composed of the senses and their subtle impressions which function in the subtle-body and corresponds to the plane of dream-consciousness. It is the state where lies the experience of aesthetic delight in the highest degree in the form of impressions. All the actions taking place in *annamaya-kośa* depend upon *prāṇamaya-kośa*, as through the heat of vital forces body activates.⁴⁵ The psychic-process of retention and association and their impression take place in the *prāṇamaya-kośa*. *Manomaya-kośa* is chained in *prāṇamaya-kośa*. The controlling of vital airs, gives the concentrated Yogic-energy to architect perfect beauty which is revealed in the state of dream. Here, an apprenticeship of an artist works where he draws first in his mind what he wants to create in the piece of art. *Karma-bīja-saṁskāras* reside in it.

The harmonious state of the subject with the object through complete contemplation results in relishment or *ānanda*. The cosmic-creator felt unhappy being alone; so He created a plurality in abundance (*bhūmā*)⁴⁶ and then was delighted with it. With the same analogy, an artist concentrates his all-distracting and scattering energy through meditation and in his meditation he collects something beautiful from his other births after enlightening his latent *saṁskāras* and utilizing them in his art as a generalising property so that it may be appealing to many (*bhūmā*). *Vāsanā* as *sthāyibhāva* of *rasas* and *saṁskāras* as the property of generalisation (*Empathy* or *Einfühlung*), *memory* and *forgetfulness* of *karmāśaya* – all these elements are the foundation of the museum of aesthetics in the different Indian aesthetic-theories down to the most developed theory of *rasa*. *Yoga* transforms not only the inherent ignorance into a knowledge-form of nature but its practice beautifies the physical form also. Through complete *yoga* Kṛṣṇa attains *Viśva-mohinīrūpa*.⁴⁷

⁴³ Swami Sarvananda, (Ed.) *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad*, R. K. Mission, Madras, 1977, II. 7.

⁴⁴ Cp. Ānandagiri on *Mūṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, 2. AAP, Pune, 1937.

⁴⁵ Bhagavadatta (Ed.), *Jaiminiya-Upaniṣad*, Lahore, 1921, IV. 22. 11.

⁴⁶ *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*, Gorakhpur, 1966, VII. 23. 1.

⁴⁷ *Yoga-Sūtra*, III. 46-47.

In the use of Yoga in aesthetics, we can say that when two antitheses lose their entities and transform themselves into a newer and absolutely different entity (synthesis) that is called *Yoga*. The enjoyment of this synthesis is described as a process of delectation similar to enlightend, self-sufficient and blissful knowledge which consists of the qualities of melting, pervading and expanding the mind — it is compared to the indescribable bliss of divine-contemplation (*Brahmāsvāda-saciva*). This synthesis is seen in complete submission of devotion, knowledge and action to the supreme-being that is also *Yoga* as expressed by the *Bhagavad-gītā*.⁴⁸ The harmony among all these brings the creativity in literature, music, art and culture. If we look at the world existence in its relation to the self-delight, Kṛṣṇa describes and realizes it as *Līlā*, the play of soul, eternally young, new and is born again and again for *Līlā*. The *theory of play* in aesthetics is derived from the *divine theory of play of Kṛṣṇa, Śiva and Lord Buddha*. The divine dance of bliss of Kṛṣṇa (*Rāsa*) and the divine dance of horror of Śiva (*Tāṇḍava*) are the two qualified forms of non-qualified *Brahman*.⁴⁹ The idea of pain or *karuṇā* which an artist bears has been taken from the Buddha's primal compassion (*karuṇā*). *Līlā* bears the eternal dissatisfaction of the artist with the existing limited forms of his art-forms. He seeks to express the eternal, all-abiding forms of beauty. His failure leads him again and again in his mental-agony to draw a perfect image. This mental-agony (*karuṇā*) characterises all great art, artist's great thirst for beauty aches and inspires his creation.⁵⁰ Not only this, for creating the super-sensitivity, *karuṇā* plays a great role. It helps in cultivating the feeling of friendship, sympathy and equanimity. (*Yoga-Sū. I. 33*). Kṣemendra in his *Bodhisattva-avadāna-kalpalatā* (II. 955ff.) says that *karuṇā* is innate in all creatures, even in such a ferocious beasts as lion. *Jātaka-Mālā* explains more the meaning of *karuṇā* by saying that the earth, with its forests, great mountains and oceans, has been destroyed a hundred times by water, fire and the wind at the close of aeons, but the great compassion of *Bodhisattva* abides for ever. This is the *theory of play* in aesthetics where an object does not do anything but artist does everything in his meditation awaken and enhances himself. It is like a play of doll where a girl has been growings into a woman. A doll's play is only pleasure for a girl, but it prepares the ground for the awakening of motherly love in her. An artist plays in his meditation with some idea, image, colour, stone, note and the word, which prepares a ground for himself to become free from the complexes of

⁴⁸ BG II. 48.

⁴⁹ *Devībhāgavata-Purāṇa*, Kalyan Press, Gorakhpur Durgā-Saptasatī.

⁵⁰ A. N. Tagore, *Bageshwari Lectures*, Sahitya Akademi, Tr. Lila Majumdar, 1958, New Delhi, p. 259.

dharmārtha. The ideas are five-fold (*Yoga-Sū.* I. 6), so the *avidyās* are also five-fold (*Ibid.* II. 5). Through production of art, an artist feels free from his complexes aroused by five *avidyās* and attains solitude where only a state of joy exists (*Ibid.* II. 25, *kaivalyam*). It is a positive feeling of freedom where again greater *karuṇā* arises. An artist feels inferior because of the greatness of the creator, God, but his shortcomings are born even after seeing a superior artist and produces pain (*karuṇā*) in him for perfecting his art through gaining more sensitivity after practising meditation.⁵¹ The theory of transformation and cosmic-play of Indian aesthetics are the outcome of three basic kinds of transformation (*pariṇāma*) as mentioned by Patañjali in *Yoga-Sū.* III. 9-12 as *Nirodha-pariṇāmo*, *Ekāgratā-pariṇāma* and *Samādhi-pariṇāma*. All these three transformations are described as consisting in a progressive narrowing down of the mind until finally it remains steady for a while. This backward progress gives rise to the attainment of identity or similarity, the basic factor of aesthetic-creation,⁵² where an artist realises his own mind and the mind of others.⁵³ The doctrine of *Sphoṭa* or *Dhvani* which was technically the discovery of the Grammarians, was later on employed by the Sanskrit poeticians for the purpose of yielding a spiritual meaning of such suggested sense. Poeticians generally followed the concept of *dhvani* with arguments given by *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Naiyāyikas*. Though *Dhvanyāloka* and *Locana* are two authoritative treatises on the subject, later poeticians also discussed about it taking the *saṃskāra* doctrine of Yoga philosophy as a potency (*apūrvā*) through which a listener hears the phonemes of the word in the same sequence as uttered by a speaker in their fixed order.⁵⁴ It is difficult to indulge in the heavy discussion on the doctrine of *Sphoṭa* in a paper like this where the main objective is to justify my statement about the word *Saundarya-Yoga*. But I too admit the influence of *saṃskāras* upon suggested sense enjoyed in *rasa* of the fine arts of India. Like *Dhvani*, a great discussion on the word *Pratibhā* also took place among many a poetician and there also *saṃskāras* have played a great role together with the Yogic definition of the word *Prajñā*. For comparative outlook about the theory of *Pratibhā*, I have quoted several views of different poeticians in my foot-notes.⁵⁵

⁵¹ *Ibid.* *Mālavikāgnimitra*, II. 2; *Abhiñāna-Śākuntalam*, VI. 61.

⁵² *Yoga-Sūtra*, I. 41.

⁵³ *Ibid.* III. 19, 42.

⁵⁴ S. D. Joshi, *Sphoṭa-Nirṇaya*, Poona, 1967, p. 64.

⁵⁵ M. Rangacarya, (Ed.), *Kāvya-darśa*, Cennapuraya, 1952, I. 103-194.; Bhāmaha, *Kāvya-lamkāra*, Tanjore, 1935, I. 5; Rājasekhara, *Rasagaṅgādhara*, NSS. Bombay, 1930, p. 11; *Kāvya-kautuka*, p. 349; *Locana*, p. 34; *Kāvya-lamkāra-sūtra-ṛtti* by Vāmana, I. 3. 16; *Abhinava-Bhūratī*, Vol. I, p. 346. (All quoted from *Rasagaṅgādhara*); MM. Gopinatha Kaviraj, "The Doctrine of Pratibhā," *ABORI*, Vol. V. (Here, MM. Gopinatha-Ji took shelter to Indian philosophy while dealing with *Pratibhā* and mentioned Yoga-philosophy in particular.)

It would be interesting to note that many *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* are taken from Yoga philosophy by the theoreticians, such as, *Jugupsā*, *bībhatsa*, *vairāgya* etc.⁵⁶ Not only that; in accepting *Śānta* as an individual *rasa* which is somehow omitted in the *Rasādhāyaya* of Bharata, a great discussion of the cluster of poeticians is followed with the spiritual concepts of Yoga, *Bhagavad-Gītā* and *Sāṃkhya* which is ultimately culminated in the philosophy of Yoga. The writer would like to give a brief account of the discussion. About 8 to 10 *sthāyibhāvas* are mentioned by different authors for the sentiment of *Śānta*. These are *Śama*, *Samyagjñāna*, *Tr̥ṣṇākṣayasukha*, *Sarvacittavṛtti-prasama* (*Nirviśeṣa-cittavṛtti*), *Dhṛti*, *Nirveda*, *Jugupsā*, *Utsāha*, *Rati* and *Śoka*. Abhinavagupta consulted the manuscript of Bharata which starts with *Śānta-rasa*; therefore, he rightfully expressed above all the position of *Śānta-rasa* after saying that it is because the *sthāyin* of *Śānta* is *Sthāyin par excellence*, being the *ātman* itself on which arises the comparatively less basic *Sthāyin*-s, *Rati* etc. and, because the relish in all the *rasas* (*rasāsvāda*) is of the form of *Śānta*. Being *alaukika*, free from worldly links, *Śānta* is the greatest *rasa* and hence it is dealt with at the very beginning. (GOS. I. p. 340). Rudraṭa accepts *śama* as a *sthāyin* of *śānta*, while Udbhaṭa anticipated *Samyagjñāna* as a *Sthāyin* of *Śānta*. Ānandavardhana has accounted the word *tr̥ṣṇākṣaya* as its *Sthāyin*. (*Dhvanyāloka* III. 176). Hemacandra, a follower of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, equates *tr̥ṣṇākṣaya* with *śama* (*Kāvyaṇuśāna*, p. 80 : *tr̥ṣṇākṣayarūpaḥ Rāmaḥ sthāyibhāvaḥ carvaṇāṃ prāptaḥ Śānto rasaḥ*). According to Abhinavagupta, it means the cessation of all the *vṛttis* which is a negative state, so without *bhāva* there would be no *rasa*, therefore, he interpreted *tr̥ṣṇākṣaya* as the absence of all the *Vṛttis*. It comes to the same thing as that state of bliss which is marked by the annihilation of all desires (*Locana*, p. 177). Bhoja gives *Dhṛti* as the *Sthāyin* of *Śānta* in his *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharana*, pp. 514–15. By many, as mentioned in the *Abhinava-Bhāratī*, *Nirveda* is stated as a *Sthāyin* of *Śānta* (GOS. I, pp. 269–70). Mammaṭa accepts it whole-heartedly (*Kāvya-prakāśa*, TSS. p. 138). Other views on the *Sthāyin* of *Śānta* enumerated in *Abhinava-Bhāratī* are *Utsāha* (p. 269) and *Jugupsā* (I. 262), then *Rati* which is later on accepted as *Ātma-rati* with reference to *Bhakti-Yoga*.⁵⁷

Furthermore, Tantra-yoga has played a great role along with the Yoga of Buddhism in the temple-architecture (*garbha-grha* and *śikhara* etc.) and in the canons for the iconography of India which can be witnessed in different

⁵⁶ *Yoga-Sūtra*, II. 33, 40; I. 6; BG III. 17.

⁵⁷ *Īsopaniṣad*. 6; *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*, VII. 25. 2; *Mundakopaniṣad*, III. 1–4; V. Raghavan (Ed.), *Śṛṅgāra-Prakāśa*, Madras, pp. 456–87, 503–4.

museums in India where postures and gestures of *Yoga* are displayed in the images of all the Godly Personalities such as Viṣṇu, Śiva, Buddha, Yoginīs and so on.⁵³ Buddhaghosa in the *Art of India* (ed. C. Sivaramamurthy, New York, p. 28) has explained like this; any means apt to stir an intuition or inner-image, including mysticism, including *Yoga*, was a valid and permissible source of artistic inspiration.

*Śukranīti*⁵⁰ for the contemplation says that the depiction of divinity is valuable in proportion to the completeness and perfection of the contemplation that inspires it. Only after intuition has envisaged the image in every detail it is possible to reproduce it. At the preliminary stage, an artist and the image to be sculptured are one from the mystical point of view, but the real manifestation of art occurs only after the form perceived has materialised in a concrete and perfect image. Thus to Śukrācārya, the original mental-viewing becomes secondary to the actual realization, and he regards the work itself as different from and superior to the inspiration or intuition behind it. The *Śilpa-ratna* and the *Pañca-ranta* elaborate the same concept.

While trying to clarify the mystery of beauty through the investigation of proportions, weights and measures, Śaṅkarācārya, having a vision of beauty personified, saw the truth and said, 'O Goddess, these rules and schemes are not meant for you. My pending observations serve only for the cult-images. For infinite are shapes you take, O Beautiful one, no rule can define them (S. N. Dasgupta, *L'Intimo Asetto Dell, Antica Arte Indiana*, Rome, 1936). This shows that artists and philosophers were perfectly aware of the artifice of certain rules and, therefore, were able to break them.

Traditional and modern aesthetics both have agreed to accept *samādhi* as a power of creation of art-forms. From *R̥gveda* upto *Bharata-Nāṭya-Śāstra*, through *Rasagaṅgādhara*, all the *Lakṣaṇa-gran̥thas*, *Śilpa-ratna*, *Viṣṇu*, *dharmottara-Purāṇa*, *Śukranīti-sāra*, *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and the others, stress the process of *Yoga*, in the creation of fine-arts.⁵⁰

⁵³ *Yoga-Sūtra*, I. 46; *Śiva-Purāṇa* (Special Issue of Kalyan Press, Gorakhpur): *Rudrayāmala-Tantra*, Paṭala 23. 27.

⁵⁰ B. K. Sircar (Ed.), *Śukranīti-sūtra*, IV. 4. 71-73.

⁶¹ Weber, *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, Banares, 1964, VI. 2. 2. 16; *Mahābhārata* (BORI) Śānti, 161. 4; *Bhag. P.* III. 25. 26, and X. 1. 33. 3; *Āitareyaopaniṣad*, R. K. Mission, Madras, 1964, I. 3. 2.; Lala, Ramanarayana (Ed.), *Rāmāyaṇa*, Allahabad, 1951: *Sundara-Kāṇḍa*, 97. 15; *Bharata-Nāṭya-Śāstra*, XX. 122; *Abhinava-bhūratī*, I. 113-14, Vol. I, p. 286; *Śukranīti-sūtra*, IV. 4. 167; *Samarāṅgaṇa-Sūtradhāra* (T. Ganapati Sastri, GOS, Baroda, 1924), II. 1. 2. 4-8; *Viṣṇudharmottara-Purāṇa*, GOS 1958, III. 2, II and III. 2, 26, 93.

At the beginning of the *Encyclopaedia of Britannica* (1929), Poetry is defined as a contemplative feeling. However, whatever was applicable to poetry was accepted as the theory of other arts too. So contemplative feeling belongs to all the arts commonly enumerated as fine-arts. The writer of the word 'Aesthetics' in the *Encyclopaedia of Britannica* must have been familiar with this activity in the art of the West also, therefore, in defining the word 'Aesthetics' he studied the data of Western artists and then anticipated the art as a contemplative-feeling. Consequently, it is seen that Yoga has played a great role in the aesthetics of the West also. In his *The World as Will and Idea*, in its third and the fourth book, Schopenhauer has explored the concept of contemplation with reference to art-activity. As he says the artist is distinguished from the other man by his peculiar ability to forget the practical bearings of the phenomenal world upon himself and others, and penetrates and contemplates the ideas, and expresses them and his joy in contemplating them to his fellow-men through his work. Thus, in revealing beauty and arousing aesthetic-satisfaction, he gives peace and cessation from desire. The sense of beauty is associated with the contemplation of phenomena agreeable and friendly to ourselves. In their presence, we can lose ourselves spontaneously and without effort in the object of our contemplation.

Western scholars, in establishing their theory of sublime and intuition, gave importance to pure consciousness which is attained through contemplation. This would be seen in the examples given below: Socrates, 'Pray thee God, that I may be beautiful within'. Dante, 'One who draws picture becomes that'. Hegel, 'The realm of absolute spirit manifests Itself in art, It is the highest level of expression of Idea.' (*History of Aesthetics* by Bosanquet). Ruskin: To teach the meaning of the word thoroughly is to teach the nature of the spirit that coined it. Pope, Virgil, Hume, Hartmann, Kant and Croce, all, in their concept of Aesthetics, talked about meditation, contemplation and situations which give corresponding thoughts of Yoga-practice in the mysticism. It would suffice to say that Yoga philosophy is a fountain-head of Indian Aesthetics in theory as well as in practice.

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A CASE OF SELF-CONTRADICTION IN *NIRUKTA* 7. 8, 10¹

BY

P. D. NAVATHE

1. After giving the threefold classification of the Vedic divinities in an earlier section of the seventh chapter of his *Nirukta* (*Nir.*) Yāska starts the discussion of their allotments (*bhakti*) and associations (*sāhacarya*) with other divinities.

He begins with Agni, the foremost among the terrestrial divinities. His associations with Indra, Soma etc. are recorded as normal cases. Agni is said to enjoy a common share with these associates in the praises in the Vedic hymns, and accordingly Durga in his commentary cites verses illustrating his share with them in the oblations offered at the sacrifices. Then Yāska mentions two exceptional cases in this connection by referring to the association or partnership of Agni with Viṣṇu and Pūṣan.

2. In connection with the latter we come across the following observation : *athāpi āgnāpauṣṇam havir na tu samstavaḥ* (*Nir.* 7.8) 'However, an oblation to be offered to the dual deity Agni-Pūṣan (is enjoined in the ritual texts); but there is no combined praise addressed to these two.' In order to illustrate this point Yāska continues :

tatraitāmi vibhaktastutim ṛcam udāharanti :—

*pūṣā tvetūś cyāvayatu prā vidvān
ānaṣṭapaśur bhūvanasya gopāḥ |
sā tvaitēbhyaḥ pāri dadat pitṛbhyo
'gnīr devēbhyaḥ suvidatṛīyebhyaḥ || Rgveda 10.17.3*

'With regard to this the following stanza is cited (in order to show their) separate praise :

May Pūṣan, the wise, the guardian of the universe, whose cattle are never lost, cause thee to move forthwith from this world. May he hand thee over to these Manes, and may Agni (entrust) them to the benevolent gods.'

¹ Paper submitted to the XXXIII Session of A.-I. O. C., The Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1986.

Later on, after discussing the characteristics of Indra, the foremost among the deities of the atmosphere, Yāska incidentally remarks : *athāpi mitro varuṇena samistūyate. pūṣṇā rudreṇa ca somaḥ, agninā ca pūṣā, vātena ca parjanyaḥ.* (Nir. 7. 10) ' Moreover, Mitra is praised together with Varuṇa, Soma with Pūṣan and Rudra, Pūṣan with Agni and Parjanya with Vāta.'

It will be noticed that the clause *agninā ca pūṣā (samistūyate)* obviously contradicts the latter part of the earlier statement, viz. *na tu (tayoh) samistavaḥ*. Thus this is evidently a case of self-contradiction and hence it requires careful investigation.

3. Yāska's remark *na tu samistavaḥ* is to be taken as equivalent to the one made by him, just earlier, regarding the association of Agni-Viṣṇu. He states : *āgnāvaiṣṇavam havir' na tv ṛk samistavikī daśatayīṣu vidyate* / ' An oblation to be offered to the dual deity Agni-Viṣṇu (is enjoined in the ritual texts); however, a verse which contains their common praise does not occur in the (extant) recensions of the *Ṛgveda*. Yāska's remark under consideration is to be explained as follows : Just as in the case of Agni-Viṣṇu so also in the case of Agni-Pūṣan, a verse containing the common or combined praise of the dual deity as required by the rules of the ritual, to accompany the oblation to be offered to them, is not available in the recensions of the *Ṛgveda*. The remark implies that such a verse, though not available in the *Ṛgveda*, may be found in some other Veda. However, Yāska does not bother about citing a suitable verse to illustrate his point as expected but cites the above-mentioned verse from the *Ṛgveda* which contains separate praise of the two deities.

Yāska records two views regarding the interpretation of the verse which are based on the vague nature of its third quarter. According to one view Pūṣan is described in the first three quarters and Agni in the last one ; according to the other the first half refers to Pūṣan and the second to Agni.

The commentators offer divergent explanations as regards the ritual employment of the verse as follows : (i) Skanda-Maheśvara explain : *śunas-karṇastome pramīyamāṇo' nayābhimantryate | pramītasya cāśīḥ* / (ii) The following is Durga's gloss : *śavasya karṇe pramītānumantrāṇe viniyogaḥ* / (iii) Śāyana cites the authority of *Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra* 6. 10. 19 : *dīkṣita-marāṇe ' pūṣā tveṭaḥ ... ' ityādyās catasraḥ śamsanīyāḥ | sūtritām ca ' pūṣā tveṭaḥ cyāvayatu pra vidvān ' iti catasraḥ* /

² Vide P. D. Navathe, *ABORI LXV* (1984), pp. 141-154.

The source from which Skanda-Maheśvara obtain their information is not traceable. The Śunaskarṇastoma to which they refer is, as prescribed in Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra 22. 7. 20, 21, an optional one-day Soma-sacrifice to be performed by one who wants to die a voluntary death. Durga's explanation is vague. However, the point common to all these explanations is that the said verse is to be recited to consecrate the dying or deceased sacrificer. It has nothing to do with the oblation offered jointly to the dual deity Agni-Pūṣan which Yāska is speaking of.

4. Neither Skanda-Maheśvara nor Durga enlighten us as to the particular sacrifice at which the oblation to Agni-Pūṣan is to be offered. However, on a careful scrutiny of the extant ritual literature we come across one such instance. In the context of the Rājasūya sacrifice the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa prescribes that among other oblations to be offered before the Abhiṣecanīya rite, a puroḍāśa prepared on eleven potsherds is to be offered to Agni-Pūṣan. Thus we come across the following passage : *āthāpareṇa triṣamīyuktēna yajate sá āgnāpauṣṇām ekādaśakapālām puroḍāśām nṛ vapati | aindrāpauṣṇām carām pauṣṇām carām | tēna triṣamīyuktēna yajate* / 5. 2. 5. 5 'He then performs another Triṣamīyukta offering. He prepares a cake on eleven potsherds for Agni and Pūṣan, a pap for Indra and Pūṣan, and a pap for Pūṣan : this Triṣamīyukta he offers'.

Triṣamīyukta-havis denotes a group of three Iṣṭis. At the first of these three the said puroḍāśa is offered. This offering is to be accompanied by a pair of Puronuvākya- Yājñā verses which are expected to be found in the Ṛgveda. But Yāska firmly states that they are not available there. However, as the Brāhmaṇakāra has prescribed this oblation we have to take it for granted that he definitely knew such verses, which, unfortunately, are now lost to us.

5. It was pointed out that Yāska's remark, *agninā ca pūṣā (samistūyate)* (Nir. 7. 10), contradicts his earlier statement, *na tu (tayoh) samistavaḥ* (Nir. 7. 8). It is interesting to notice how the commentators account for this contradiction.

Skanda-Maheśvara summarily dismiss the former passage as a faulty reading stating that it comes into conflict with the earlier statement which disallows the association. They say : '*agninā ca pūṣā* ' ity *apapāṣaḥ* ' *na tu samistava* ' iti *pratiśedhavirodhāt*.

Durga's observation on this passage is : '*agninā ca pūṣā* ' | *madhyamena dyusthānena ca samistava iti pāṛthivena pratiśedhāt* | *ṛcam nodāharati* |

mrgyam udāharaṇam yena samistavaḥ / The substance of Durga's explanation is : Yāska's statement *na tu samistavaḥ* (*Nir.* 7.8) pertained to the terrestrial fire ; so the non-availability of a Ṛg-verse containing Samistava of Agni-Pūṣan was quite plausible in that case. However, the statement *agninā ca pūṣā* (*Nir.* 7. 10) occurs in the context of atmospheric deities. So the possibility of terrestrial fire is to be ruled out and the expression *agninā* should be taken as referring to the atmospheric fire or the celestial fire. Durga thus suggests the possibility of finding a Ṛg-verse containing Samistava of Pūṣan with the atmospheric fire or the celestial fire. Now as the discussion in question pertains to the deities of the atmosphere, strictly speaking, Durga should have restricted his statement to the atmospheric fire only. So his extension of the Samistava to the celestial fire is to be taken as incidental. Durga notices that Yāska has not cited a suitable verse and so he says that an attempt should be made to find out one. However, it is obvious that Durga himself has not come across such verse, otherwise he would have cited it as he has done in other cases, viz., Mitra-Varuṇa, Soma-Pūṣan etc.

6. The fact that both Durga and Skanda-Maheśvara have commented on the passage *agninā ca pūṣā* points to the conclusion that the text of the *Nir.* which was before them contained it and hence there is no doubt about its authenticity. The elucidation of the passage offered by Durga, though ingenious, does not appear to be convincing owing to his inability to support it by a suitable example. So ultimately we have to depend on Skanda-Maheśvara who consider the passage as '*apapāṭha*'. However, it is not clear whether they have some better reading in mind or whether they want to drop the passage altogether from the text of the *Nir.* Yāska's statement *na tu samistavaḥ* appears to be more genuine as it occurs in the very context of the discussion of Agni and is supported by way of citing a counterexample in the form of the verse *puṣā tvetāś*. ... On the other hand, as the observation *agninā ca pūṣā* occurs incidentally in the context of the atmospheric deities re-presented by Indra it may safely be ignored.

WHAT IS *ASIDDHA* ?

By

JOHANNES BRONKHORST

In a recent issue of this journal (vol. 68, 1987) Paul Kiparsky, whose valuable contributions to Pāṇinian studies are well known, did me the honour of publishing an article meant to clarify an issue about which I had been critical (1984), and to persuade me that his position is correct after all. The issue at stake is the correct interpretation of the word *asiddha* as it is used (three times) in Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī. Much as I appreciate Kiparsky's clarifications, they have not made me change my mind ; they have rather convinced me that some clarifications from my side seem necessary – or should I say that I may need even more clarifications ?

I do not accept Kiparsky's interpretation, primarily for two reasons :

- (i) Kiparsky's interpretation is far removed from the literal sense of *asiddha*. This by itself does not prove that Pāṇini did not accept Kiparsky's interpretation, but it raises doubts.
- (ii) Kiparsky's interpretation is not able to account for a set of straightforward derivations, which pose no problem in my simpler interpretation.

Ad (i) :

Kiparsky defines *asiddha* on p. 297 :

- (1) A is *asiddha* w. r. t. B = where A is relevant to B, A does not take effect before B.

The literal translation of *asiddha* is ' not having taken effect ', and this is the interpretation which I have proposed (1980) and still maintain. The second part of Kiparsky's definition — ' A does not take effect before B ' — corresponds to this literal translation. But the additional phrase ' where A is relevant to B ' is disturbing. We shall consider below how Kiparsky defines *relevant*. At present it suffices to note that this phrase changes the sense of *asiddha* (and correspondingly of *siddha*) to such an extent that Kiparsky can formulate his ' single generalized ordering principle ' as follows (p. 296) :

- (2) A rule is *siddha* w. r. t. all rules.

Here *siddha* does not have the sense ' having taken effect ', as indeed it couldn't. In other words, Kiparsky does not use the words *siddha* and

asiddha in anything like their proper sense. This casts doubts on his interpretation, precisely because the literal sense of *asiddha* leads to completely satisfactory results, more satisfactory than Kiparsky's alternative, as I will explain presently.

Ad (ii) :

Kiparsky defines *siddha* as follows :

(3) A is *siddha* w. r. t. B = where A is relevant to B, A takes effect before B.

The term *relevant* is defined on p. 296 :

(4) Rule A is *relevant* to rule B w. r. t. a form F = the result of applying A and B to F in that order is different from the result of applying A and B to F simultaneously.

Consider now the derivation of *vakti*. At the stage

vac + ti

two rules apply : 8. 2. 30 (*coh kuḥ*) and 8. 4. 40 (*stoḥ ścunā ścuḥ*). We can distinguish three cases :

- a. Both rules take effect simultaneously : the result is *vak + ci*.
- b. 8. 2. 30 takes effect first, after which the conditions for applying 8. 4. 40 are no longer present ; the result is *vak + ti*.
- c. 8. 4. 40 takes effect first, then 8. 2. 30; result : *vak + ci*.

According to definition (4) above, 8. 2. 30 is *relevant* to 8. 4. 40 w. r. t. the form *vac + ti*. The reverse is not true : 8. 4. 40 is **not** relevant to 8. 2. 30 w. r. t. the form *vac + ti*.

According to Kiparsky, the right order in this derivation would have been given by the *siddha*-principle, i. e., (2) above. It would have been, but it isn't, for 8. 2. 30 and 8. 4. 40 are part of the Tripādī, where the *siddha*-principle is not valid. In the Tripādī a subsequent rule is *asiddha* w. r. t. an earlier rule ; therefore, 8.4.40 is *asiddha* w. r. t. 8. 2. 30. What does this yield ? We apply definition (1) :

(1') 8. 4. 40 is *asiddha* w. r. t. 8. 2. 30 = where 8. 4. 40 is relevant to 8. 2. 30, 8. 4. 40 does not take effect before 8. 2. 30.

But 8. 4. 40 is **not** relevant to 8. 2. 30 w. r. t. the form *vac + ti*. This means, in accordance with Kiparsky's definitions, that the *asiddhatva* of 8. 4. 40 w. r. t. 8. 2. 30 implies no order of taking effect in *vac + ti*. In other words, we are here abandoned both by the '*siddha*-principle' and by the '*asiddha*-principle'.

It will be clear that the little phrase 'where A is relevant to B' in the definition of *asiddha* (1) spoils the derivation of *vakti*. If we drop it, we come closer to the dictionary sense of *asiddha* (and to the interpretation offered by me), and the derivation of *vakti* will be saved.

Kiparsky might argue that Pāṇini somehow overlooked the derivation of *vakti* and similar cases. Or he may try to refine his definitions even further so as to account for *vakti* too. As a philologist I cannot but be wary. Why bother with an artificial interpretation which doesn't fit all the facts, where there is a natural and straightforward one which does?

Kiparsky's reasons for pursuing the alternative course are clear enough: he wishes to wring out of the term *siddha* a sense which the dictionaries are unable to provide. There is nothing against this in principle. It is only unfortunate that in the case of *asiddha* – the term actually used by Pāṇini – this effort leads to no better explanation of the facts; indeed, it is not able to account for as simple and straightforward a derivation as that of *vakti*.

If Kiparsky wishes to continue his efforts to convince me, he should explain (i) how his theory accounts for the derivation of *vakti*, (ii) why I should accept an interpretation of *asiddha* that deviates from the literal sense of this term, when the literal sense yields a better result.

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AN INTERPOLATION IN KĀTYĀYANA'S VĀRTTIKAPĀṬHA

By

S. D. LADDU

0. 1. *Background*

In the large section on Primary Suffixes¹ which appear after a verbal stem,² within its sub-section of the *KṚT* group of suffixes,³ Pāṇini (P) has recorded in one Sūtra⁴ his observation of the suffix *ṆVUL* (= *aka*) found irregularly applied after a root, to refer to the name of a disease. Kātyāyana (Kty) in his Vārttikas is quick to note⁵ that the same suffix is also found used to make a reference (*nirdeśa*) to the action contained in a root. However, he further points out,⁶ in case a reference to the mere root was intended, the suffixes *iK* and *ŚtiP* are (i. e. one of the two is) to be added.

Then follows a further group of Rules in the first three of which (Vts 3-5), to be discussed below, he notes the addition of three suffixes *not* to verbal stems *but* to the three respective nominal stems : *varṇa*, *ra* and *mat-vartha*. Again, in the following four Rules (Vts 6-9), he reverts to note the use of some suffixes appearing respectively after four groups of verbal stems.

Thus there is seen an obvious break in the flow of recording suffixes appearing after a verbal stem, an illogical break, with the intervening three suffixes (from Vts 3-5) meant to be added to nominal stems, which thrust themselves within P's large section on Primary Suffixes. And this calls for a discussion here.

0. 2. *Vārttikas under Question*

Briefly, the three relevant Vārttikas and the forms that they derive can be stated thus :

Vt. 3 : *varṇāt kāraḥ* / This derives the referential forms : *akāra*, *kakāra* etc., with the addition of the suffix *-kāra* to the stem which is a (i. e. any) *varṇa* ('member of the alphabet'). The Rule can thus derive a large number of forms.

¹ PS. 3. 1. 91-3. 4. 76.

² PS. 3. 1. 91 : *dhātōḥ*.

³ Governed by the *adhikāra*, *kṛd atīti* (PS. 3. 1. 93).

⁴ PS. 3. 3. 108 : *rogākhyāyān ṇvul bahulam*.

⁵ Vt. 1 : *dhātvartha-nirdeśe ṇvul*.

⁶ Vt. 2 : *ik-śtiṭṭau dhātu-nirdeśe*.

Vt. 4 : *rād iphaḥ* / This derives a single referential form, *repha*, with the addition of the suffix *-ipha* to the sound (*varṇa*)-stem *ra-*.

Vt. 5 : *matvarthāc CHAḥ* / This too derives only one form, *matvarthīya*, with the addition of *-CHA* (replaced by *-īya*⁷ to the) (nominal) stem *matvartha-*.

1. 1. Usage Warranting These Rules

No doubt there is some basis for these suggestions, which may be analysed.

(i) *Kāra*-ending Forms :

- a) P rarely uses *kāra* to denote a sound, as once in *vaṣaṭkāra*⁸ which is in fact a group of sounds (*varṇa-samudāya*, *saṅghāta*); otherwise he uses the bare sound⁹ while referring to it.¹⁰
- b) Kty freely uses this suffix after many sounds of the alphabet (cf. *a*, *ā*, *i*, *ī*, *u*, *ū*, *ṛ*, *ṝ*, *o*, *ca*, *ṇa*, *ta*, *dha*, *na*, *ma*, *ya*, *la*, *va*, *śa*, *ṣa*, *sa*, *ha*) and even after some groups of sounds (viz. *an*, *eva*).

(ii) *repha* :

- a) P has not used this form to refer to the sound *r* ; on the contrary, he uses the bare *rA* for the purpose.¹¹
- b) Kty does use this, thrice,¹² and never *rakāra*.
- c) However, a later grammarian, a *Kārikākāra* quoted¹³ by Patañjali, is found using only *ra*, not *rakāra*.
- d) Vālmiki, in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (*Aranya-Kāṇḍa*),¹⁴ is found to have once used *rakāra*.

⁷ By PS. 7. 1. 2 : *āyaneyīniyiyah phadhakkhachaghūni pratyayādīnām* and PS. 1. 3. 10 : *yathāśaṅkhyam anudēśah samānām*.

⁸ PS. 1. 2. 35 : *uccaistarām vā vaṣaṭkārah*.

⁹ Cf. PS. 7. 4. 32 : *asya evau*.

¹⁰ One must avoid confusion here with the *kāra* (preceded by *mum-āgama*) noted by P as appearing in *satyaṅkāra* and *agadāṅkāra* (PS. 6. 3. 70 : *kāre satyāgadasya*) and later by Kty in *astuṅkāra* and *bhakṣaṅkāra* (Vts 1, 2). Therein *kāra* is either a primary form in the sense of action (*karana*), derived from *kr-* with *GHAN* (PS. 3. 3. 18 : *bhūve*), or a bound primary form derived with *aN* (PS. 3. 2. 1 : *karmany an*).

¹¹ Cf. PS. 1. 1. 51 : *ur an raparah*, 8. 2. 42 : *radābhyām niṣṭhūto nah pūrvasya ca dah*, 8. 4. 1 : *raṣābhyām no nah samānapade*.

¹² Cf. SS. 5. 4, PS. 4. 4. 128. 2, 8. 2. 19. 1.

¹³ *reṇa tulyam sūdhīvanī* (*Mahābhāṣya* I. 200. 1, 23 on PS. 1. 2. 18).

¹⁴ *rakārādīni nūmūni rāmatrastasya rūvaṇa* (Cri. Ed. 3, 37. 18).

(iii) *matvarthīya* :

- a) P does not use this, but only *matvartha*.¹⁵
- b) Strangely enough, Kty too does not use this.

1. 2. *Observations*

Historically, this picture of usage may be interpreted thus :

- (1) *kāra*, as a referential suffix, with at least one use by P, had started its journey, later becoming very popular with Kty.
- (2) Referentially, the form *repha*, though probably not in use in P's times, was favoured by Kty, but its use was shared side by side with others' (*rakāra*, *ra*) and did not win quick currency.¹⁶
- (3) *matvarthīya*, in the referential context, was apparently not accepted in early Sanskrit.

2. *Scholastic Justifications*

(1) All the three suffixes, inspite of the fact that they are not enjoined after any verbal stem, are understood throughout the tradition as the '*Kṛt-s*', and the resulting forms as *Kṛdanta-s* and hence taking *sup-s* (nominal suffixes) after them. This treatment is accorded either on the strength of the *bāhulaka*¹⁷ "diversity" (*bahulam* from P's Rule here being supposed to be running ahead, *anuvṛtta*, in the *vārttikas*), or on the strength of the '*Kṛt*' *adhikāra* starting from PS. 3. 1. 93.

(2) All the three suffixes (rather, all those stated upto the 9th or last *vārttika*¹⁸) are to be understood as carrying the referential significance, the word *nirdeśe* being supposed to be *anuvṛtta* in all these *vārttika-s*.

(3) The *k* of *kāra* (Vt. 3) is not to be understood as an *it* or eliding letter¹⁹; the reason is that such an understanding serves no purpose (*prayojanābhāvāt*).

(4) *ipha* (Vt. 4) is supposed either as an *apavāda* of *kāra*, or, by the *vā'sarūpa-vidhi*,²⁰ as present side by side with *kāra* of the preceding Rule: this accounts for the use of both, *repha* and *rakāra*.

¹⁵ PS. 1. 4. 19: *tasau matvarthe*.

¹⁶ See, however: *sakāra-repha-lakūrāś ca* (— *Rkprātiśūkhya* I. 20a).

¹⁷ Cp. *sarvo 'yam bahula-prapañcah* (— *Bhāṣya-vṛtti* of Puruṣottama-deva here).

¹⁸ It is, however, doubtful if this is true of the last, 9th, Vt. : the forms *sampad* etc. certainly do not just refer to the roots *sam-pad-* etc.

¹⁹ In spite of the Sūtra, *laśakv ataddhite* (1. 3. 8).

²⁰ *Vā'sarūpo 'striyām* (PS. 1. 3. 94).

(5) In the form *matvarthīya* (Vt. 5), it is again the *bahula-graṇa* that is supposed to account for the loss of the final *a* of *matvartha*- while being combined with the following suffix *-īya* : for, *matvartha*-, not being the *bha*-type nominal base,²¹ and *cha* or *īya* of this Vārttika not being supposed here to be a *taddhita* suffix, the *a*-dropping Rule²² cannot apply here.

(6) It is Jñānendra Sarasvatī alone, in his *Tattva-bodhinī* on the *Siddhānta-kaumudī* here (3285), who supplies us with the rebellious view²³ of "Some" (*anye*) who, going against the entire tradition, treat the form *matvarthīya* as Secondary (*taddhitānta*), *cha* being added there from P's Rule on the *gahādi* (taken as an *Ākṛti-gaṇa*) stems.

(7) The *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa*, which bears a thick affinity with the *Kāśikā-vṛtti*, accepts our Vt. 2 (*Ik-śtipau dhātu-nirdeśe*) and transforms it into a full-fledged Rule;²⁴ but it (i. e. the *Vṛtti*) seeks to derive *kāra*-ending forms as compound forms, *repha* as *aunādika*,²⁵ and *matvarthīya* with *cha* by P's Rule on the *gahādi ākṛti-gaṇa*. (See fn. 23.).

3. Doubt Cast on the Need and Placement of the Rules

(1) As observed earlier (under 1. 2), usage justifies the need of Vts 3 and 4, but not of Vt. 5 as even Kty does not use *matvarthīya* and as that form can be derived otherwise (see fn. 23).

(2) The referential (*nirdeśa*) force in Vt. 5 (as in Vt. 9) of all the Vārttika-s is not clear.

(3) The number of somersaults almost uniformly made by the scholiasts to grant '*kṛt*-ness' to these suffixes — either through *kṛd-adhikāra* or through *bāhulaka* — and thereby (i) to establish absence of *it-tva* of *k* in *kāra*, and (ii) to secure *a-lopa* in *matvarthīya* through *bāhulaka*, is nothing short of being ridiculous, chiefly as they turn a blind eye to the supremely governing Rule for the section (PS. 3. 1. 91) enjoining all the suffixes under it to appear 'after a verbal stem.'

(4) All this on the part of the commentators became necessary as the three Vārttikas were found placed within the nine on the present Sūtra forming part of 'the *Kṛt* section.'

²¹ *yaci bham* (PS. 1. 4. 18).

²² PS. 6. 4. 148 : *yasyeti oa* [129 *bhasya*, 144 *taddhita*].

²³ *Anye tu*, " *Naitat kṛdantam, matvartho bhava* iti vigṛhya gahādītuvōcchaprasyaye,** taddhitāntam eva,* " *ity āhuḥ*. (* By PS. 4. 3. 53 : *tatra bhavaḥ,** PS. 4. 2. 138 : gahādibhyaś ca* [*chaḥ* 137]).

²⁴ CS. 1. 3. 96 : *i-ki-śtipaḥ svarūpe*. ²⁵ No. 743 : *riphates taudādikūdeḥ*.

4. Conclusion

The foregoing discussion leads us to the following inferences :

(1) The set of three Vārttikas most probably did not come from the pen of Kty, at least Vt. 5 deriving the form *matvarthīya*.

(2) If, by any chance, Vts 3 and 4 were written by Kty, somehow they slipped from their rightful place in the Taddhita section, perhaps even before Patañjali, and were wrongly placed then by some hand within this group of nine vārttikas seeing the referentiality (*nirdeśa*) context common among all. Thus, here is a clear case of interpolation. Their disregard by the *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa* as full-fledged Rules is also significant.

REVIEWS

JOY FOR THE WORLD (*LOKĀNANDA*), A Buddhist Play by Candragomin, Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Michael Hahn. Yeshe De Project, Dharma Publishing, 2425 Hillside Avenue, Berkeley, CA 94704, USA, 1987. Pp. xxiv+158.

This is an English translation of the Tibetan version of Candragomin's original five-act Sanskrit play named *Lokānanda*. The Tibetan version, along with its German translation (by Hahn himself), and an extensive critical introduction dealing with all the problems connected with this original work and its Tibetan translation, was published by Michael Hahn in 1974 under the title *Candragomin's Lokānandanūṭaka*.^{*} Whereas that publication was of a scholarly and research-oriented nature, the present work – "Joy for the World" – is obviously meant for artistic and literary enjoyment.

The play is based on the Mañicūḍa legend which speaks of extreme self-sacrifice on the part of Mañicūḍa inspired by the Buddhist ideal of piety. But there is also a love story which forms the subject of the first three Acts and which, by the contrast it affords, furnishes a background which heightens the effect of the supreme sacrifice of the hero in the last Act. The play at once reminds one of Harṣa's *Nāgānanda* by reason of the combination of the love story and the Buddhistic idea of self-sacrifice and also by the common element -*ānanda* appearing at the end of the titles of both the plays. It was believed (on the basis of the ill-informed statements made by I-tsing) by older Indologists like Sylvain Lévi that Candragomin lived in the 7th century A. D. and that he had slavishly imitated the *Nāgānanda*. In the light of researches carried on since then and the information now available we can safely say with Hahn that Candragomin belongs to (the first half of) the fifth century and give him the credit of conceiving the idea of utilising the Mañicūḍa legend for drama and executing it superbly. True, there has been some adverse criticism on the literary and dramatic merits of the play. To Lévi it was just an insipid copy of the *Nāgānanda*, while Belvalkar and S. K. De thought that this play was not 'of much consequence'. But tastes differ, and such judgments often express subjective views. Any way, with such a reliable English translation as Hahn's now at hand, the reader is better equipped for himself

* *Candragomin's Lokānandanūṭaka*, Asiatische Forschungen, Band 39, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden. For a review of this work by the present writer, see *ABORI* LVII, 1976, pp. 293-296.

judging the original more dispassionately. Besides a special interest attaches to this play, occupying as it does a central position in the Buddhistic Sanskrit plays with fragments of Aśvaghōṣa's plays at one end and Nāgānanda at the other.

One thing one must say about the English of the translation. Hahn's English here is not only readable but elegant. One is glad to note that there is nothing of the old-style 'The bull-shouldered one said to the plantain-thighed one' stuff, a style which was intended for students and was meant to translate the language rather than the thought. Hahn has been successful not only in translating the thought, but in creating the atmosphere of the original also. A refreshing feature of Hahn's policy is, as he says, that he has tried to make this translation nearer to the Sanskrit original (now lost irrevocably) than to the Tibetan translation. (Incidentally, the translation into Tibetan was done jointly by a Kashmirian Pandit Kīrticandra and the Tibetan monk Tragpa Gyeltsen (Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan), a little before 1322 A. D. in Kathmandu. By a happy coincidence, the English translation of this Tibetan original by Hahn was also done in Kathmandu !)

Those who are interested in problems like the identity or otherwise of the three Candragomin, the sources of the *Lokānanda* and the changes introduced by Candragomin, and similar other problems, are referred to Hahn's older work.

It must be said that the present de luxe edition is really a joy for the eyes ; as to whether the 'Joy for the World' will prove a joy for the world, I can only say : *atra sacetasām anubhava eva pramāṇam*.

G. B. Palsule

DAS KĀṬHAKA-GRHYA-SŪTRA mit Vivaraṇa des Ādityadarśana, Bhāṣya des Devapāla, Gṛhyapañcikā des Brāhmaṇabala, Kritische Edition mit Anmerkungen, Teil I: 1. Kaṇḍikā und Sandhyopāsana-mantrabhāṣya des Devapāla von Caren Dreyer, Stuttgart, 1986, Pp. xxxv + 185.

The *Kāṭhaka-Gṛhya-Sūtra* (KGS) is perhaps the only ritual text of the Kāṭhāsākhā on which commentaries are available. The existence of three commentaries on it is indicative of the currency and popularity of this school at one time.

The KGS is available in two editions. It was edited for the first time with extracts from the three afore-mentioned commentaries by Caland in Lahore in 1925. Then it was edited in two volumes with Devapāla's Bhāṣya by Madhusūdana Kaul Shastri in Bombay in 1928, 1934.

Dreyer states that the critical apparatus of Caland's edition contains only a few readings. As his attention was mainly concentrated on the sūtras, he drew up only such extracts from the commentaries as appeared to him important for establishing the wording of the sūtra. Kaul's edition contains no critical apparatus of the readings of individual MSS. Thus the procedure followed by these editors, observes Dreyer, cannot be regarded to be satisfactory as they have made the commentaries accessible only through extracts. As the importance of the commentaries for determining the original form of a given basic text is beyond question, Dreyer considers that it is absolutely necessary that they also should be critically edited in their full form. Accordingly she has placed before us this Part I which contains a critical edition of the three commentaries on Kaṇḍikā I of the KGS. As the Sandhyopāsana is an obligatory rite for the Brahmacārin, whose duties are prescribed in this Kaṇḍikā, the Bhāṣya of Devapāla on the mantras pertaining to this rite is also included here.

In the Introduction the Editor has given a detailed account of the MSS which are used for constituting the text. The mutual relation of the MSS and other related topics are also discussed here. The critically edited text is followed by five Appendices and exhaustive notes.

We congratulate the Editor for this excellent edition of the commentaries on 1. Kaṇḍikā of the KGS.

P. D. Navatṛe

THE DECIPHERMENT OF THE SĀMAVEDIC NOTATION OF
THE JAİMİNĪYAS : by Wayne Howard (with a Foreword by Asko
Parpola); Studia Orientalia Vol. 63, Helsinki, 1988. Pp. xv+330.

Dr. Howard is a well-trained musicologist who has taken great interest in the studies of Sāman chants. His two books, Sāmavedic Chant (1977) and Veda Recitation in Vārāṇasī (1986), have clearly evinced his sincere efforts to study the Sāmavedic chant in theory and practice. He has made extensive recordings of the Sāman chants of Kauthuma-Rāṇāyaṇīya and Jaiminiya schools of Sāmaveda. The North Kauthuma and the South Kauthuma differ in certain respects, though they have the same text basically. The Rāṇāyaṇīyas have very little difference from the Kauthumas. The Jaiminiyas belong to two traditions, namely, Tāmīṇnāḍu Jaiminiyas and Nampūtīrī Jaiminiyas. The Nampūtīrī Jaiminiya tradition is only oral and the Tāmīṇnāḍu tradition has its text in manuscript form having syllabic notation. This tradition existing at Koḍuntarapulli near Palghat in Kerala has been studied in some detail by scholars as regards the notational system. It was a long-felt need to find out the correspondence between the Jaiminiya chants and the Kauthuma-Rāṇāyaṇīya chants which have syllabic notation employed in the manuscripts of the chanters. In the published texts of the Kauthumas, numeral notation is given. The chanters claim that *Nārādīya-śikṣā* is the authority for their tradition.

In this book Dr. Howard has tried successfully to find out the correspondence between the numeral notation and the syllabic notation of the Sāmavedic chants. After giving the Abbreviations and the Bibliography, he has stated the Jaiminiya syllable notation and the Kauthuma-Rāṇāyaṇīya numeral notation. The Jaiminiya notation consists of 16 signs representing single svaras and 16 showing double or compound svaras. Two signs signify absence of svara. The *Dhāraṇalakṣaṇa* of Sabhāpati and the *Sāmālakṣaṇa* are the authoritative texts for this notational system. The major defect of this system pointed out by the author is the mixing of compound svaras with single svaras. He says that the system adopted by chanters at Koḍuntarapulli is more logical. The numeral notation employs numbers 1 to 6 for tones which are called svaras. Numbers 1 to 5 are placed over the syllables of the text which are understood as denoting the main or primary svaras. Numbers 1 to 6 are placed in the line of the text which indicate subordinate or secondary svaras. Number 7 denotes Abhigīta svara, and Kruṣṭa is denoted by number 11 over the syllable of the text which is the highest svara in the Sāman-Scale. The avāntara svaras like Pratyutkrama, Atikrama etc. have the employment of more than one note. The word *svara* is understood by the author as musical phrase.

The notational signs designate hand postures or movements which provide musical phrases representative of certain chant styles. The Nampūtiri Jaiminiyas of Kerala hold the hand at one of the three vertical levels : high, middle or low. This right hand may appear in any of the three horizontal positions : right, middle or left. Other details are also pointed out.

In Part I, the chant analysis of Nampūtiri Jaiminiya is dealt with. Part II deals with the decipherment. The author points out that the Kauthuma-Rāṇāyaṇīya classification of textual syllables as short, long and augmented is applicable also to the Nampūtiri Jaiminiya syllables. With but few exceptions, Jaiminiya notational symbols are found only on augmented syllables, which bear the musical phrases primarily associated with the signs. To understand the notational correspondence, the following extract is given as illustration.

ṭī ta
agnāyīm sã-mū ...
1 y y 1₂₃ 2

Symbol ṭ prior to t is always represented by the sequence 1₂₃, with the ṭ preliminary syllables shown by the sequence's primary number. The Nampūtiri Jaiminiya chanters treat syllables with short vowels closed by nasals as though these syllables possessed long vowels. In this way the decipherment is given in detail.

In conclusion, Dr. Howard states that there was originally only one school of Sāmaveda i. e. Jaiminiya, the pristine aspects of which have been preserved by the Nampūtiris. Directly or indirectly, all Sāmavedic notations are Jaiminiya notations. Even the numeral notation employed today by Kauthuma-Rāṇāyaṇīya chanters is an altered version of an old Jaiminiya notation. Both Sabhāpati and Bhavarātra prescribe a series of Jaiminiya mudrās strikingly similar to those used by Kauthuma-Rāṇāyaṇīya Sāmavedins of the present day. Possibly the Tamil chant was very similar to Nampūtiri Jaiminiya chant at one time. The Nampūtiri Jaiminiya appears to have changed little over the centuries, or perhaps not at all. The melodies or melody-fragments which constitute this tradition may date back to pre-Vedic India.

We know from the legendary account that the Sāmaveda was handed over to Jaimini by Vyāsa. It is reasonable to say that the Jaiminiya tradition is to be understood as the oldest. The Nampūtiri manner of chanting is characterised prominently by *kampa*. When asked, Pandit Ittiravi, the oldest exponent of this style, told that only five notes are used in this chanting as per the *Nāradiya-Śikṣā*. One more point that needs to be cleared is, when

the chanter raises the basic pitch, whether the relation of the lower and higher pitches to it remains the same or not. Some scholars, particularly the Indian ones, always try to find out which musical notes are employed in the chants of the particular school. From the musical point of view, these notes appear to be approximations. The *Nāradyaśikṣā* is admitted by the chanters as the main authority in this respect. This point of view deserves careful consideration while dealing with the Sāmavedic chant.

Dr. Asko Parpola has compared the notations of a few Sāmans. (*The Literature and Study of the Jaiminīya Sāmaveda*, Helsinki, 1973 p. 21, fn. 2). Dr. Howard has studied the Jaiminīya tradition quite in depth in this book. His continuous efforts have proved to be very valuable for Sāmavedic Studies. Another dimension is added to his *SV* studies by his recent publication, *Mātrālakṣaṇam*. He deserves congratulations.

G. H. Tarlekar

MYTHOLOGICAL AND RITUAL SYMBOLISM, by Dipak Bhattacharya (with Foreword by Professor Govindagopal Mukhopadhyaya), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, 1984; Pp. x + 242. Price : Rs. 80/-.

The present book is a part of the Ph. D. thesis submitted by the author. It is a study undertaken with reference to the birth of Vedic and Tantric Agni. The book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is the Introduction in which the author has discussed his approach and method. Chapters two and three form the main bulk of the book. In chapter two the author has tried in his own way to solve the mythological problem of the birth of Agni by studying in detail particularly *RV*. IV. 1. Birth of Agni in the *Agnyādheya* rite is the subject of chapter three. In chapter four the author has explained in short the birth of Agni in the Tantric *Agñijana* mainly based on the rite prescribed in *Śāradātīlaka*. Chapter five is a retrospection. The book is dedicated to the memory of the late Professor Durgamohan Bhattacharya, a Vedic scholar of eminence and who was the father of the author.

The author holds that Vedic mythology should not be a mere account of Vedic gods; it should discuss myths of the various deities. The main problem about the Vedic gods is their identification. The theory of anthro-

pomorphism was current among the etymologists of ancient India and was first recorded by Yāska in his *Nirukta*. Modern scholars too resorted to it to explain many enigmatic characters. Certain scholars like Coomaraswamy, V. S. Agrawala, Aurobindo, Kapali Shastri, Anirvan and others have put stress on the symbolic nature of elements like water, fire, Soma, sun etc. The author of this book also believes in symbolic nature of many Vedic deities. In his view the forces of nature are often to be viewed as symbolic of something else. Symbolism means the presentation of important ideas of Vedic world-outlook through words denoting real or imagery, animate or inanimate beings or functions of such beings. Anthrozoomorphic figures are also symbols, but the objects of symbolization in such imageries are not the natural phenomena themselves, but aspects of the same basic ideas as are meant to be presented through the natural phenomena (p. 9). In the title of the book the term 'mythological' precedes 'ritual', which indicates that in the opinion of the author mythology gives birth to ritual. The relation between ritual and mythology has been the subject of discussion among modern scholars for quite some time and different opinions prevail. Mythology is rather a wide term. It is related to the character and functioning of a deity; it also concerns the relations among the various deities. But so far as the relation between ritual and mythology is concerned, it seems reasonable to say that ritual is a primary form of religion and that its development gives birth to myths.

The attempt of the author is to trace the philosophy of late Ṛgvedic period to the old period. The setting of sacred fires (*agnyādheya*) is a basic rite which is prescribed in *Yajurveda* texts, Brāhmaṇas and Śrautasūtras. The author has sought to find out the ritual of setting fires in the old Ṛgveda period, and came across *RV* IV. 1 which gives an account of the myth of Agni's birth. This is a rather obscure hymn which has been interpreted differently. The author has devoted a hundred pages towards the elucidation of this hymn. A typical feature of Agni in this hymn is that Agni promotes the stream of *ṛta*. This has been variously explained by scholars. It can be expected that Agni who is associated with Varuṇa in some of the verses of this hymn should be connected with *ṛta*. Just as the sun traversing the whole atmospheric region is a powerful instrument of the cosmic order, similarly Agni who is churned, deposited and worshipped regularly is also an agent of the order by which men on the earth abide. Several other terms like *Aṅgirasas*, *triḥ sapta*, *rajas*, *yoni*, *garbha* have also been discussed. In the elucidation of some of these the author is guided by physiological functions. His attempt to equate *sapta svasāraḥ* with the seven figures on a Harappan seal almost following D. D. Kosambi is hardly convincing. To try to arrive at the

form of ritual of the setting up of fires in old Ṛgvedic period is by no means an easy task. The form of that ritual would indeed depend upon the presumption whether the old Ṛgvedic people were yet in a migratory stage or were already settled in the land of seven rivers.

In chapter three the author has discussed the ritual of *Agnyādheya* as is given mainly in the *Āpastamba Śrautasūtra*. He has selected a *Śrautasūtra* because an exhaustive treatment of the subject is met with therein, not so in a *Brāhmaṇa*. This is true to a certain extent; the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* gives a detailed and orderly description. The author says, "A *Brāhmaṇa*-based interpretation may be even to some extent misleading. For in these visibly concocted items have often been too much eulogised. These may confuse one as to where the emphasis is to be laid. There are numerous examples of these". (p. 137) The author has cited one example: In the Mahāvratā sacrifice there is an offering to Prajāpati. The Rathantara Sāman is chanted at that offering. The verses on which the Sāman is based are addressed to Indra. Same is the case with the Bṛhat Sāman. The author has traced these verses to the *Ṛgveda*. Technically they belong to the *Sāmaveda*, and that Veda has borrowed from the *Ṛgveda* almost all verses in which Soma offered to Indra is eulogised. Soma offerings to various deities are made to the accompaniment of the chanting of these Sāmans. This is the character of the *Sāmaveda*. There is nothing misleading about it. Because *Brāhmaṇas* are older than *Śrautasūtras*, the ritual-picture which one can have from the *Brāhmaṇas* must necessarily be taken to be older than that from the *Śrautasūtras*.

The author has tried to correlate the *Agnyādheya* rite with the myth in *ṚV* IV. 1 and 2. It is difficult to agree to his conclusions. The acquiescent origin of Agni which he seeks in *ṚV* IV. 1 cannot be traced in the *Agnyādheya* rite. The *Anvāhāryapacana* fire which is related to the Pitṛs is not mentioned in the *Ṛgveda*. It is therefore concluded that in the Ṛgvedic times there were only two fires. It is generally agreed that in the Vedic religion the sacrificer gratified the god by making him offerings, and the god in his turn fulfilled the sacrificer's desires—the give-and-take theory in the *Bhagavadgītā*. As against this the author finds in *ṚV* IV. 1.9 a common proprietorship of Agni with the mortal that is the sacrificer. The Hotṛ-formulas contained in the *Yajurveda* texts are employed towards the offerings of clarified butter in various sacrifices on different occasions for the fulfilment of certain desires. Because these represent a cosmogonic theory and are employed also in the *Agnyādheya*, Dipak Bhattacharya finds a sense of unity between the archetypal ritual as contained in *ṚV* IV. 1 and the present ritual (p. 179).

Just as the mantra and ritual were united in the *Agnyādheya*, similarly

they were so in the Tantric *Agnijana*. Therefore the author has described the birth of Agni according to the Tantric ritual.

One or two minor points. *BaudhŚS* II. 16 refers to *abhiprāṇana* by which the author understands "breathing" (p. 172). Really it means "breathing out upon, exhaling." *ĀpŚS* V. 8. 1 mentions a formula which in part reads *daivīm vācam yacchāmi*. This is translated as "the divine word do I promise" (p. 186). The verbal form *yacchāmi* (√ *yam*) should be translated as "I control (my speech) (that is to say, I keep silence)".

Resorting to the theory of mythological symbolism, Dipak Bhattacharya has tried to show that the late Ṛgvedic and also post-Ṛgvedic philosophy can be traced to the old Ṛgvedic period, and has exploited *RV* IV. 1 and 2 for that purpose. It is difficult to say that the evidence put forth is adequate. Scholars interested in Vedic mythology based on symbolism will find the book interesting.

C. G. Kashikar

ACHARYA SHANKARA, by Swami Mukhyananda, published by Sri Ramakrishna Advaita Ashrama, Kalady, Dist. Ernakulam (Kerala), 1987; Pp. vii + 199; Price: Board Rs. 30/–, Cloth Rs. 40/–.

This small but illuminating book, being an elucidatory and reconciliatory interpretation of the teachings of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya written by Swami Mukhyananda of the Belur Math, Calcutta, is published by Swami Ganananda, President of Sri Ramakrishna Advaita Ashrama, Kalady. The monograph consists of thirty-nine topics. It is a developed version of a talk given by the author at the Ramakrishna Mission, Delhi, in 1966. There are three Appendices. The first one is based on the author's talk, entitled "Ācārya Śaṅkara and his contribution to Indian spiritual regeneration," mentioned above. The second one, entitled "Works of Ācārya Śaṅkara", is a revised and enlarged version of the author's article which was read at Sri Śaṅkara Math, Sringeri (Karnataka) in 1950. The third one, entitled "The Status of the Universe," is a revised version of the author's paper published in the *Prabuddha Bharata*, September 1982. There are also notes and references among which there is a complete list of works attributed to Śaṅkara. The book is not intended only for scholars but also to the general intelligent public who wish to know something of Śri Śaṅkara's life and thought without going deeply into its technicalities.

Summing up Śrī Śaṅkara's contributions to religio-philosophical thought, the author concludes, "Śrī Śaṅkara was a great spiritual genius with a comprehensive penetrating intellect, breadth of vision, depth of insight and a daring passion for truth. He was imbued with an intense reforming zeal for the all-round regeneration of society and establishment of Dharma, and this he accomplished on the basis of the highest spiritual philosophy which declares the Oneness of all Existence and the Divinity of man." (p. 74). The book is an authentic representation of the Advaita Vedanta thought and Śrī Śaṅkara's contribution to it. A perusal of the book will amply serve as the means of refreshing one's understanding of the subject. The miscellaneous character of the book will in a way prove helpful because any page opened at random will enlighten one's mind.

C. G. Kashikar

ADI SANKARA : THE SAVIOUR OF MANKIND, Study of Indian History and Culture, General Editor S. D. Kulkarni, published by Shri Bhagavan Vedavyasa Itihasa Samshodhan Mandira (BHISHMA), Thane 400 602, 1987 ; Pp. 362; Price : Rs. 240/-.

Shri S. D. Kulkarni of Thane (Maharashtra) has formulated an ambitious plan of presenting in eighteen volumes the study of Indian history and culture. The present Volume is the eleventh in the list which is given on cover page three. It seems Volumes one to ten pertain to the general history and Volumes eleven to eighteen to the cultural history. The list of Volumes is as follows :

- I Beginnings of Life, History and Culture
- II Epic Age
- III The Early Historic Period (from Parikṣiti to the end of the Nandas)
- IV The Golden Age (from the Mauryas to the end of the Guptas)
- V The Founders of the Current Eras (Sakari Vikramaditya and Salivahana to the end of Prithviraj Chauhan)
- VI Encounter with Islam
- VII The Struggle for Supremacy
- VIII European Interlude
- IX Cultural Revival of Bharata
- X Emergence of Modern India

- XI Adi Sankara : the Saviour of Mankind
- XII Our Cultural Heritage (History of Religion, Culture and Philosophy of Bharata)
- XIII History of Positive Sciences (including Military Science)
- XIV History of Fine Arts (Dance, Drama, Music, Pictorial and Plastic Arts)
- XV Indian Technology
- XVI Indians Abroad
- XVII Economic History of Bharata
- XVIII Reconsiderations and Trends

A similar attempt to present the history and culture of Indian people in eleven volumes was made during 1944 and 1978 by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan of Bombay with the collaboration of reputed Indian scholars. Shri Kulkarni remarks on this Series : " Although this is a laudable effort it has its limitations and certain shortcomings in as much as it has generally accepted the chronology and approach chalked out by the western scholars " (p. 6). Therefore, " an authentic history of the country is the need of the time " (p. 6). " The uniqueness of the Volumes to be published under the project BHISHMA would be :

1. A new chronology in the history of Bharata based on historical evidence.

2. A full discussion of the social and cultural aspects with all their manifold implications to enable teachers in schools and colleges to teach a truly national history. " (p. 7)

Justice P. N. Bhagavat has written a Foreword to this Volume which is the eleventh in the series but is being published first. Professor A. G. Javadekar has written a long Constructive Introduction to Advaita Vedanta which aims at acquainting one with the salient features of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya's thought and trying to remove some of the misunderstandings which have been prevalent about the same. The book proper is divided into three parts. Śaṅkara's life and work are described in Part one. The date of Śaṅkara is discussed in Part two. Part three is the anthology of select hymns of Śaṅkara together with a translation. Numerous stotras have been attributed to Śaṅkara and there is no unanimity of opinion as to which were composed by Śaṅkara himself.

There are several traditional accounts depicting the life of Śaṅkara. These have very often described the miracles in Śaṅkara's life. Shri Kulkarni

has tried to present the Ācārya's life shorn of miracles. Even then the account contains much matter which may be stamped as imaginary. Śaṅkara is generally believed to have established four Maṭhas at Dvaraka, Badarika-shrama, Puri and Sringeri, and to have left the mortal coil at Kedarnath. There is a controversy whether the Ācārya founded a fifth Maṭha at Kanchi where he himself stayed and where he breathed his last. Shri Kulkarni has discussed many details on this point and has concluded that Śaṅkara established the fifth Maṭha at Kanchi where his life came to an end.

In Part two Śaṅkara's birth date is given as 509 B. C. This date is based on the traditional account preserved in the Maṭhas. Out of ten accounts generally called as Śaṅkaravijaya, five have mentioned this date; four have not mentioned any date at all; and one gives the date corresponding to 788 A. D. which is generally accepted. Shri Kulkarni has laid stress on the evidence contained in the traditional accounts. The date 788 A. D. was first fixed by K. B. Pathak on the support of a traditional account. While objecting to the reliability of Pathak's source, Shri Kulkarni has opened the question of literary evidence. He says, "It is needless therefore to state that such literary evidence cannot be regarded as conclusive. Quoting many more of such types and discussing them in detail is therefore futile, and it would be better if we avoid it." (p. 291) A basic question has been raised here concerning the problem of chronology. Literary evidence is in fact one of the decisive proofs for the fixation of chronology. To set it aside in consideration of mere traditional accounts is likely to lead one to a wrong conclusion. The difference between 509 B. C. and 788 A. D. is a big one. When one fixes so early a date for Śaṅkara, one assumes the responsibility of setting right the *entire* historical stage in a logical manner. The earlier Volumes in the Series are yet to be published. The General Editor has however mentioned certain dates in the present Volume. In his view Gautama Buddha's date is 1885 B. C. (p. 349), Candragupta lived in 1534 B. C. (p. 292), and Mahākavi Kālidāsa flourished in 1150 B. C. (p. 292). Which age might have been fixed for the R̥gveda is not known so far. The setting which he has in his mind is not sufficiently clear; nor is it known so far how he traces the religious, cultural, political and social development in India. His chronological assessment is vastly different from the accepted one. A full criticism of his total assessment of India's history and culture would be possible only after most of his contemplated Volumes are out. Printing mistakes are plenty.

C. G. Kashikar

EARLY COINS OF NORTH INDIA — AN ICONOGRAPHIC STUDY : by Dr. Shatrughna Sharan Singh, published by Janaki Prakashan, Ashok Rajpath, Chauhatta, Patna-4, 1984. Pp. xix+216, Price Rs. 225/-.

1. The publication under review was the thesis submitted by the author for his Ph. D. degree in 1980. It is divided into six Chapters which discuss : (1) the religious significance of Symbols and Devices on Punch-marked and Caste Coins (pp. 1-40); (2) Deities and Symbols on tribal and local coins (pp. 41-75); (3) Deities and Symbols on Indo-Greek Coinage (pp. 76-100); (4) dealing with Deities and Symbols on Śaka and Kuṣāna Coins (pp. 101-152); (5) Deities and Symbols on Gupta Coinage (pp. 153-184); and (6) Development of Cult on the Basis of the History of Coinage (pp. 185-195). The Conclusion is stated at pp. 196-198 followed by Bibliography at pp. 199-208. The Index occupies pp. 209-213. Finally, there are plates containing sketches and photos of symbols and coins.

2. (a) Coins are dumb witnesses of contemporary history. Because they are put into public hands for circulation as legal tender, some element of guarantee, that their evidence i. e. inferable information is both relevant and reliable, can be assumed. In very early periods, those who issued coins need not, always, have been political authority exercising an exclusive right of minting money : Coins could be issued by trade guilds or banking corporations and even by agents specially authorised for that purpose. Thus, many influences could be seen at work as regards taking decisions on what should be put on limited space available on obverse and reverse of a coin type. It could be a village assembly or a trade guild operating on a large area or a feudatory, and not always a sovereign ruler. But everybody issuing coins for public use was concerned about safeguarding these metal pieces from being melted down or otherwise put to wrong use. That is why, as trade and commerce grew in volume due to political forces succeeding in securing larger and larger consolidation, the need for using acceptable religious symbols increased correspondingly ; so that coins reflected what was held sacred by those who used them as well as by those who minted them.

(b) The symbols and devices appearing on early Indian coinage at its initial phase seem to have been selected, more or less, on local considerations of village assemblies as adopted by commercial interests operating in that area. To represent a doctrine or a reference to an individual or a specific geographical feature by means of a symbol has been a matter within any developed or even developing social culture's capacity. This particularly holds

good as regards India where philosophical speculations commenced in very early times.

(c) Yet another important aspect which cannot be omitted in this context arises out of the position that the western boundaries of Indian culture lay much more to the west of Punjab, Baluchistan and Sindh territories before 1947 which meant that a successful foreign invader of North India encountered Indian culture at a much earlier stage before reaching Āryāvarta proper. The invader, despite his political victories, not only became familiar with purely Indian religious views, but was, more often than not, even persuaded to adopt some of these views as his own. This happened partly with the Indo-Bactrians, with the Parthians and, in a larger measure, with the Kuśānas, Śakas and Hūṇas. In this manner, some Indian religious symbols even got a larger circulation, especially on coins than they would have otherwise got, whenever a foreign power could manage to consolidate an imperial hold over portions of North India and had espoused an Indian view of life.

(d) Further, it was a precept of Indian *daṇḍanīti* that a conqueror should pay meticulously due respect to a defeated ruler's customs and should aim more at continuance of a status quo in social life, as far as practicable. Thus, many times, it was found expedient to continue the size of the coin prevalent in a subjugated territory, along with its weight as well as the old symbols thereon. The new regime had to consider such limitations on its numismatic initiative.

(e) Yet there was enough scope for new ideas. When a monarchy could assert itself more and more in respect of coinage, the personal name of the ruler presented a problem before the mint master and the group of artists working with him. Since that name was generally of a deity, related mythology was profusely drawn upon. The wealth of materials for an iconographic study of early coinage of North India can be explained in these terms.

3. Dr. Singh has examined the views of most leading numismatists in working out his analysis. His conclusions, generally, are well supported by specific evidence. Accordingly, his research work is a useful guide to the progress of coinage symbolism in North India during the ancient period. Some symbols or markings on the early coinage in India are likely to continue to defy identification. The information they were expected to convey might have been quite clear to the contemporary world but in modern times their signals have remained increasingly obscure. For anything which had then mattered could carry a symbol, and what was important then is being erased away by

the moving finger of time. Every attempt, including this one, to put some order in their puzzles would have to be renewed, from time to time.

4. Certain points call for specific comment.

(i) Dr. Singh's discussion of symbols has taken into account earlier analyses, and is generally well founded. However, he has remarked with reference to the figure of the hare occurring on some types of punch-marked coins that the animal was shown there on account of its association with the moon (p 15). This view is not quite correct. The spots on the moon are sometimes referred to as corresponding to an outline of a hare; and because a crescent moon is supposed to occupy a place on the head of Śiva, Śiva is sometimes styled as Candrasekhara, Śaśidhara, Candramauli etc. But the depiction of the hare on a coin should not necessarily imply a reference to Śiva being thus symbolised. Further, it is easier to draw a crescent than a hare anyway. The other inference, where even a numismatist like J. Allan was cautious in not interpreting finally the two animals shown on a punch-marked coin type, does not appear to have been at all discussed by the author, viz. the so-called, 'dog holding either a hare or rabbit in his mouth' vide J. Allan's *BMC Catalogue*: XXVII. Allan had noted, "The next common animal type is one which might conveniently be described as a dog seizing a young hare or rabbit; in its clearest form it is certainly an animal of the dog type seizing a young animal, but it is perhaps too much to identify them definitely." Allan was



[Vide p. LXIII of J. Allan's British Museum's Coin Catalogue (*Coins of Ancient India*), 1936, discussed at § 69 in its Introduction.

This drawing is about four times bigger than that on the Coin.]

not sure whether what was referred to as dog was really a dog and what was referred to as a hare or rabbit was really a hare or rabbit. Considering that the *proportions* of limbs of animal's figures *shown* on these coins are fairly accurate, it is quite clear that the so called rabbit or hare on this type, is a much bigger creature in real life than would be warranted by the depiction on the coin. While a dog can certainly carry a hare in its mouth, the depiction is more likely to be that of a female cat, either a domestic cat or, more likely, a lioness, (the lower jaw somewhat flattened due to circulation

of the coin) tenderly carrying a kitten or a cub — and their relative proportions on the coin would be found to be far more natural. Why this particular totem was selected is as much a matter of guess as any other on these coins! The symbols discussed by Allan at p. XXVII of his *Catalogue* still remain a challenge to numismatists.

(ii) During the last phase of the Indo-Bactrians, there seems to have been more intimate familiarity with Vaiṣṇaism than can be noticed in earlier times. For example, Hermaeus (c. 50 B. C.) issued silver pieces of money, including two coin types one of which exhibited Haladhara or Balarāma and another showed Cakradhārin or Śrīkṛṣṇa. This meant that Hermaeus had a lot to do with Saurāṣṭra. Any numismatist visiting rural areas in that beautiful region would be impressed by the close similarity between the male costume now worn in its rural areas and that shown on the person of either Balarāma or Śrīkṛṣṇa coin types of Hermaeus. Dr. Singh could have included a reference to this coinage in his work to illustrate the influence of Dvārakā in distant Gāndhāra.

(iii) Greater emphasis was desirable on the results of a cultural renaissance brought about in North India's numismatics during Samudragupta's reign which was developed further by his immediate successors viz. his son Candragupta Vikramāditya II and his grandson. Kumāragupta Mahendrāditya I : c. g. the Cornucopia was replaced by the seed pot of a lotus. In fact, the symbolism of the lotus was at no time more fully exploited either before or later on than during the reign of the imperial Guptas. It was this that gave great prominence to showing Rājalakṣmī or Śrī during this golden age of Indian history. In earlier periods, Athene or Nānā had been featured similarly.

But what is important to note is that Samudragupta's father, Candragupta I, had issued at least 2 copper coin types, on which Śiva's Nandī was prominently shown, closely resembling the bull depicted on the copper coins of the Nāga kings of Central India. This proved beyond any doubt that Candragupta I had minted money showing this very common Śaivite symbol on it. Since the legend on this type referred to the Licchavis as well, it is more than likely that a change over to a Vaiṣṇavite scheme of ideas had taken place *after* Samudragupta's successful annexation of Nāga territories. 'Samudra' is a name of Śiva, and Samudragupta's first-born was named Rāmāgupta, a circumstance which supports a surmise that this revision in religious outlook was due to Samudragupta's initiative. This is also proved by a change-over to a *garuḍa* standard from a crescent moon standard. It may be recalled that *garuḍa* featured prominently on Rāmāgupta's copper

coinage. To what extent and how royalty worshipped mattered most to a mint master is brought out very well by such evidence.

(iv) While this is the position regarding very early symbolism, certain details, even of the much more familiar Gupta period, demand further scrutiny. Dr. Singh has exhaustively dealt with the symbolism associated with Mahākāla Śiva of Ujjayinī. But some points regarding Gupta symbolism still retain their challenge. The Narasimha-avatāra type coin of Kumāragupta I has yet to be related to a definite event in his career. Bāṇa compared Harṣa to a *Narasimha*, but did not mention the related incident. Even more general is the problem which has remained unclear, viz. the lion-slayer coin types of Gupta emperors, the riddle being that caused by the reverse showing a deity seated on a lion mount. What is beyond comprehension is how the ruler could be shown as attacking the *vāhana* of the deity he respected. Dr. Singh's view (pp. 168-69) that the deity was not *simha-vāhinī* Durgā but Lakṣmī, leaves this riddle intact. My suggestion, that the deity was shown seated not on a lion but on a lion throne i. e. on a common piece of furniture for deities and royalties, only blunts the edge of this riddle. Similarly, the meaning of a bull or an elephant or a lion or a horse facing either right or left has yet to be precisely understood.

5. The romance of studying ancient coins carrying hitherto unresolved problems, with reference to the messages emanating from some of their symbols or even portions of symbols, is the permanent attraction of this discipline. The present reviewer feels confident that later editions of this work will throw more and more light on related problems.

S. V. Sohoni

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- (1) HARSHA AND BUDDHISM : by S. R. Goyal, 1986; Pp.xx + 184.
 (2) हर्षे श्रील्लादित्य (एक नवीन राजनीतिक-सांस्कृतिक अध्ययन) : श्रीराम गोयल, 1987; Pp. xiii + 304.

Both published by Kusumanjali Prakashan, Ranjan Building, P. L. Sharma Road, Begum Bridge, Meerut 250001.

These two Kusumanjali Prakashan publications of the research work of Prof. S. R. Goyal are a valuable addition to the growing volume of fresh interpretation and consequent re-statement of the analysis of the events in the life of Harsha, the great ruler of Uttarāpatha, who was born fourteen

centuries ago and had shone brilliantly, like a star of the first magnitude, on the northern skies of India.

I

Harsha and Buddhism is not just an analysis of Harsha's wide religious outlook. Dr. Goyal's contention that Harsha never became a Buddhist can hardly be contested – notwithstanding the impressions carried by Huen Tsang, the famous Chinese pilgrim, who had every opportunity to come to know Harsha intimately. There seems to be little doubt that Harsha's catholicity in respect of the religious faiths of his people – an outlook which was fully in conformity with the basic principles of ancient Indian polity – and the respect and sincere hospitality shown to Huen Tsang in some Indian courts, seemed to have misled him, and he had his own personal convictions and curiosities, which played a very active role in judging contemporary affairs and personalities. These could be and indeed, were, occasionally, sources of error. It was also, clearly, practical wisdom to praise a ruler whose official religion was different, by highlighting favours shown to one's own religious faith e. g. in Dhaneśvara's *Śatruñjaya-māhātmya*, Śilāditya Dharmāditya is praised for his patronage by its Jain author, despite that ruler being a staunch Śaiva. Moreover, a shrewd ruler so handled different individuals that everybody thought he alone counted with him – as noted by Kālidāsa about Daśaratha, “अहमेव मतो महीपतेरिति सर्वः प्रकृतिञ्चिन्तयत्” (*Raghu*. 8. 8). According to *Vālmiki-Rāmāyaṇa* Daśaratha had all kinds of religious professors at his court, including even Lokāyatikas.

Among recently discovered items of positive historical evidence in this connexion, is the single specimen of the gold type¹ *āliṅgana-Śiva-Pārvatī* coin type of Harsha, apparently issued late in his reign, which is testimony that whatever might have been his personal views about religious doctrines, he conformed officially with the continuing Śaivite faith observed by earlier generations in his family. Bāṇa has given a vivid account of Śaiva practices in the *Śrī-kaṇṭha janapada*, which was the hard core of the Vardhana dynasty's kingdom.

Dr. Goyal has analysed, in detail, the import of all available historical evidence on the subject of Harsha's religion – Copperplate records, Huen Tsang's statements, Harsha's literary works etc. Especially valuable are his conclusions regarding politico-economic aspects of Harsha vis-a-vis Buddhism and other religions, as well as the economic implications of his religious activities in general.

¹ S. V. Sohoni, “Unique Gold Coin Type Of Harsavardhana” *JAINS*, Vol. III. 1980

Some new curiosities are bound to crop up on a perusal of this *ensemble* of information, e. g. what precisely was the relationship between Harsha and Śīlāditya Dharmāditya I of the Valabhi dynasty, whose title, 'Śīlāditya', was, quite obviously, taken over by Harsha; or why no details were furnished about the ruling family in which Yaśomatī, Harsha's mother, was born.

Dr. Goyal's work under review is, undoubtedly, an indispensable aid to forming a correct appreciation of this important aspect of a great Indian ruler like Harsha.

II

In his other work on Harsha viz. 'हर्ष शीलादित्य (एक नवीन राजनीतिक-सांस्कृतिक अध्ययन)', Dr. Goyal has raised a very large number of significant queries in respect of the evidence furnished in Bāṇa's *Harṣacaritam* as well as in the accounts relating to Huen Tsang's contemporary travels in India. Bāṇa, doubtless, composed *Harṣacaritam*, long after Harsha commenced his career, but chose to describe only his childhood, i. e. to say his *śaiṣava*, up to his sixteenth year or the first part of an individual's life, according to standard Indian outlook; and to round it off, had deliberately put a statement, as having been made by his favourite cousin, Syāmala, concerning some unique achievements of Harsha in the subsequent years, as an artistic flashback. (See S. V. Sohoni, *ABORI* Vol. 67, 1986, pp. 195-217.) He has thereby illuminated some fresh aspects of alternative interpretation, which are, definitely, thought-provoking. Bāṇa and Huen Tsang seemed to have initially settled the shape of Harsha's biography, and it needs being emphasized that not even Aśoka, the Maurya, or Samudragupta who laid the foundations of Gupta imperialism had the advantage of such extensive contemporary literary testimony as could be cited in respect of Harsha. Historians of ancient India have been drawing upon this testimony and advancing their own views with confidence, for several decades past. Dr. Goyal's survey of earlier views on a number of important topics e. g. Harsha's succeeding his elder brother Rājyavardhana, Harsha vis-a-vis problems concerning the Maukhari dynasty's rule in Uttar Pradesh, Harsha's handling of his sister Rājyaśrī's status and role, Harsha's military conflict with Pulakeśin, the Cālukya, Harsha vis-a-vis Śaśāṅka of Gauḍa, has led to his expressing new doubts and queries regarding old conclusions. They all deserve close scrutiny by every student of Harsha's career, no matter how novel some of them might be. It is not likely that Dr. Goyal's views would meet with total acceptance by everybody, e. g. his assumption that Harsha, then hardly sixteen years old, had joined a conspiracy to get rid of Rājyavardhana, his elder brother. But some of his

other surmises are more convincing, e. g. regarding the import of Bāṇa's famous description of the red glow of the sunset, viewed from Harsha's military camp after Rājyaśrī was rescued in the Vindhyāṭavī, as implying potential warfare, not so much against Śaśāṅka but as limited within the limits of the Maukhari kingdom itself. Dr. Goyal's work is essentially a thought-provoking exercise. Rājyaśrī had no alternative but to escape into Vindhyāṭavī after she was rescued by one high officer called, Gupta, from the 'gupti' or fortified area in Kānyakubja. (For details, see S. V. Sohoni, *loc. cit.*.)

S. V. Sohoni

INDIA AND EUROPE : AN ESSAY IN UNDERSTANDING : by
Wilhelm Halbfass, Pub. by State University of New York Press,
Albany, 1988; Pp. xv + 604.

This work has been divided into three main sections : the first deals with the topic of 'India in the History of European Self-understanding' and includes such subjects like the philosophical view of India in classical antiquity, Islamic encounter with Indian philosophy, the Christian missionary approach to Indian thought, the early history of Indology, Hegel, Schelling and Schopenhauer, etc. The second section contains analyses of traditional Indian Xenology, Rammohan Roy, modern Indian traditionalism, *dharma* and *anvikṣikī* (in their ancient and modern interpretations) etc. The third section contains four appendices, on (i) the concept of 'experience' in the interaction between India and the West, (ii) 'Inclusivism' and 'tolerance' between the two domains, (iii) 'India and the Comparative method, and a Summary and Conclusion. The footnotes have been put separately at pp. 450-579 and exhibit the great pains taken by the learned author while drawing his conclusions.

As specifically stated by the author in the preface to the original German edition of the work, he has attempted an investigation into the role of India in the making of the philosophical thought of Europe since the days of classical antiquity as well as of the reaction of Indian thought to European philosophy. He has emphatically stressed that this approach is based, "upon the conviction that our European philosophizing has by no means surpassed or superseded the Indian tradition" (p. xiii). He has noticed that modern Indian thought finds itself in a historical context created by Europe and it has

difficulties (in) speaking for itself. Even in its self-representation, and self-assertion, it speaks to a large extent, in a European idiom." Despite such a situation and the consequent handicaps from the Indian point of view, in the considered estimate of the author: "This does not mean that the dialogue and the debate between India and Europe has been decided in favour of Europe, or that India has been superseded by Europe. The power of the Indian (philosophical) tradition has not exhausted itself in the self-representation and self-assertion of modern India. The dialogue situation is still open."

The author has, invariably, given priority to the position of India vis-à-vis Europe; and wants, especially, to note that his is but an essay or an attempt, (and that too, a preliminary one), "to describe and clarify some of the historical pre-suppositions of their mutual understanding, specifically in such areas as religion, philosophy and science. It is an attempt to show how Indians and Europeans have received each other in these areas of encounter, how they have asserted and questioned themselves, what they have expected from each other, how they have articulated their own identity and how they have dealt with the otherness of the other" (p. ix). How very different is this outlook from that of, say, Rudyard Kipling, the nineteenth century exponent of the colonial period of Indo-British relations, can be gauged by contrasting his conclusions that East was East, West was West and that never the twain would meet with those recorded with becoming modesty by our German scholar!

'*Sarvaḥ kāntam ātmīyaṁ paśyati*' — and it is not surprising that the author has principally dealt with the German view of India and *vice versa*. The facts demanded it — the Indian self-understanding or philosophical concepts have never been more debated and dissected than in that great country. The German interest in India competed with that entertained in the U. K. and the latter was evidently influenced by the outlook of a colonial ruling power. The extent of the search for the minutia of present Indian thinking as was relevant to the author's inquiry is amazingly comprehensive.

The learned author's conclusion reached after a deep and sustained analysis is: "For Indians as well as Europeans, the 'Europeanization of the earth' continues to be inescapable and irreversible. For this very reason, ancient Indian thought, in its unassimilable, non-actualizable, yet intensely meaningful distance and otherness, is *not* obsolete." (p. 442) The present reviewer would, finally, make just a few minor comments. Noting that a new era about appreciating what was India began with the Indian campaign of Alexander the Great (327-325 B. C.), the author has noted, "It is characteri-

stic, that the story of Alexander which gained extraordinary popularity in other parts of Asia, found no place in the Indian tradition." (p. 19 and p. 457 f. n. 104). This is not quite correct. As during the seventh century A. D., Bāṇabhaṭṭa recalled in his *Harṣacaritam*, 'Alasaścandakoṣo yo na prāvikṣat kṣmāni jivā strī-rājyam' (HC VII), referring to that Macedonian's outlook towards the Amazon land, I also think that the treatment of India's early achievements in the world of science could have been more exhaustive. As regards purely philosophical relevant matter, the Cārvāka or the Lokāyatika school of thought deserved a fuller reference than that occurring at pp. 40, 274, 278, 284, 351 and 360-61. Similarly, the impact of Buddhism on Manism in Iran, could have been more fully discussed. Lastly, the recent European / American interest in Navya-nyāya logic would have justified incorporation of fuller detail than that at pp. 39, 214 and 363.

Having mentioned such instances, I can unhesitatingly conclude this brief review by stating that the author has repeatedly pointed that the topics traversed by this work indicate numerous avenues for further thinking; and there can be no terminal point to it. Yet what has been put together is not a little surprising. This work is a most welcome addition to the library on India's quest for truth.

S. V. Sohoni

BEGINNINGS OF LIFE, CULTURE AND HISTORY : by S. D. Kulkarni (Study of Indian History and Culture : Vol. I), published by Shri Bhagavan Vedavyasa Itihasa Samshodhana Mandira (BHISHMA), Bombay, 1988; Pp. xi+599. Price : Rs. 320/-.

1. While social affairs must necessarily develop forward, history can be recorded only in retrospect. There is thus a scope, always available to a later historian, for taking a view different from the one prevailing earlier, on account of either increments in information or a fresh interpretation of old data. However, as Kalhana noted, while making such a revision, neither pride, nor prejudice nor passion should be permitted to influence it. Truth alone, as rationally estimated, should prevail. The early British contempt towards the sense of history on the part of Indians was nurtured by arrogant colonialism. No wonder that it provoked a chauvinistic reaction in some Indian historians, especially, after 1857. But contributions made meanwhile

by epigraphists, numismatists and analysts of relevant Indian literary sources — by both Indian and European scholars — arriving at their conclusions with patience and perseverance and in a spirit of dedication to accuracy — cannot be undervalued at any time. Long ago, a great intellectual with a superb sense of dealing with life in a correct perspective, like Kālidāsa, had observed ‘(a) पुराणमित्येव न साधु सर्वम्’ (b) ‘न चापि ... न चमित्यवद्यम्’ and (c) ‘परीक्ष्यान्यतरद् भजन्ते’ (*Mālavikāgnimitram* I. 2).

2.0 The main ingredients entertained in the editorial outlook of the work under review, and a survey of the major conclusions of its contributors, have been indicated by the General Editor of this Volume which is the first of the proposed “18-volume series of BHISHMA’s Study of Indian History and Culture.”

It will not be possible to refer to all the novel opinions put together in this work, in a short review. Accordingly, (i) only a brief comment is made here on the topic of ‘Culture,’ along with (ii) a somewhat more detailed analysis of the view regarding the chronology of the Mauryan / Gupta periods as stated in the Volume.

2.1 As regards (i), the General Editor has observed (p. iv) : “The world civilizations of the ancient times were the product of Vedic wisdom. The Indians have not severed their links with their root—the *Vedas* as the others have done. They claim their inheritance from the *Vedas* and continue to do so even today, with such modifications as the times and climes demand.” This seems to be an audacious claim — no wonder that it has not been substantiated in the Volume. As Ritchie has amply demonstrated in his famous *Natural Rights*, some exponents of every ancient culture can be noticed persistently advocating that it had been associated with ultimate or final wisdom, superlative progressive social institutions and highest technological achievements, and that all later developments amounted to a downfall in these respects, and finally, that acquiring knowledge in all its branches was but a process of recovery from oblivion.

The learned General Editor has further remarked (pp. iv-v) : “The Sarasvati-Sindhu Civilization is but a link in the chain of the continuing Vedic civilization.” A glance across any map of the continent of Asia is sufficient to point out the basic position that the Sindhu and the erstwhile Sarasvati rivers watered very vast regions and joined the sea, which was traversed by very brisk communications with Western Asia and some countries of Africa and Europe. It is this constant inter-action which enriched not only one culture but a group of individual cultures. To postulate that there was only one-way traffic in ideas, goods and technology is contrary to experience. However, it is but proper that the Sarasvati is brought into focus

in a book of history. Some of our leading geologists and space scientists, using hyper-altitude photography, have drawn significant conclusions about the changing beds of this river. The literary references to the Sarasvatī have also been separately studied in depth. Both groups of data should be studied together for isolating the role of this river in India's cultural history. This can even be an independent or separate study by itself.

2.2 On (ii) : Accurate chronology is the backbone of history. About this subject, the learned General Editor has noted (pp. v-vi) :—

“ In this Volume, evidence has been collated to show convincingly that the *Bharata War* was fought in the year 3139 B. C. and that Chandragupta Maurya belonged to 1534 B. C. He was not the contemporary of Alexander, the Greek adventurer. It was during the tenure of Chandragupta I of the Gupta dynasty holding the imperial throne of Magadha that this adventurer attempted to advance towards the regions east of the Sindhu river. But the wrong identity of Chandragupta Maurya with the Indian king Sandrocottus of the Greek record first advocated by William Jones and later on declared as the ‘ sheet anchor of Indian Chronology ’ by Max Müller has vitiated the whole problem of Indian chronology. It places Maurya Chandragupta in 326 B. C. when according to all Indian sources, his date is 1534 B. C.

“ Scholars after scholars, both Indian and European, pointed out the falsity of this identification to Max Muller but he refused to budge from his stand. He wanted to fit the Indian chronology in the procrustean bed of the Biblical notion of the age of the creation placing its origin in 4004 B. C. His suppositions and conjectures have later been accepted as proved facts and are being followed by a vast majority of scholars in India and abroad. The voice of truth and reason has been stifled and has been proved to be a cry in the wilderness so far.

“ The main grounds on which these scholars steadfastly adhere to this stance of theirs are : (1) Aśoka the grandson of Chandragupta Maurya has left behind him his legacy of edicts and the five names of the kings mentioned in his rock edict XIII put Aśoka in 272 B. C. to 236 B. C. beyond all reasonable doubts. (2) The Iron Age in India began in 1000 B. C. and so highly developed Magadha cities cannot belong to a period prior to this. (3) We should not disturb the present thinking on chronology for it would upset all the scholarly writings on this subject published during the last about 150 years.

“ That these arguments are superficial and have no legs to stand upon would be clear from the following :

“ The names of the five kings (edicts most probably refer to the names of kingdoms and not to those of kings) noted in the edicts are :

(1) Antioka (2) Turamaya (3) Artikini (4) Maga and (5) Alikshudar.

They have been identified by these scholars as:—

(1) Antiochus II. Theos of Syria [264–246 B. C.] (2) Ptolemy Philadelphos of Egypt [285–247 B. C.] (3) Antigonos Gonatus of Macedonia [276–239 B. C.] (4) Magas of Cyrene [300–250 B. C.] This Cyrene was a Greek colony, west of Lybia and (5) Alexander of Epirus [277–235 B. C.].

“Because these happen to be around 300 B. C. to 235 B. C., the scholars state that Aśoka Maurya must have ruled around 272 B. C. to 236 B. C. And thus Chandragupta Maurya must be the contemporary of Alexander, the Greek prince who had visited Indian borders around 326 B. C.

“These identifications are absurd to the extreme as the kingdoms are far away from Aśoka’s territorial borders and it is impossible for Aśoka’s High Commissioners to supervise and ensure that Aśoka’s commands on morality were enforced by these foreigners in their kingdoms. One has to stretch one’s imagination and credulity to believe that these High Commissioners were crossing all the intervening countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Lybia on their missions of moral teaching to these far off countries. There is no evidence whatsoever in Greek literature to support such a thesis.

“We have identified these with (1) Balkh, (Bactria, bordering Aśoka’s empire which included eastern Afghanistan then) (2) Baluchistan, it was then known as Maga. (3) Turan – also bordering Afghanistan. (4) Nepal-Bhutan (Antikina i. e. Kinnar Kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan.) and (5) Kashmira (Alik Sudara = Alekhya Sunder — the beautiful land of Kashmira). All these kingdoms were then on the borders of Aśoka’s empire.

“Confronted with this absurdity, these scholars advance another argument that they are unconcerned with literary or such other epigraphical evidence. They would like to determine Aśoka’s period on geological ages.”

2.2’ In this connexion, it would be sufficient to examine the argument put forward in the Volume to the effect that the regions to which Aśoka the Maurya sent supplies of medicinal plants, as stated by him in some of his edicts, were not ruled over by the kings named in these references; and that Aśoka had nothing to do with these rulers whose names were held so far as having been mentioned by him.

— Ordinarily, one single reference to another ruler in a record of one ruler indicating that he was a contemporary is treated as sufficient to sustain the assumption of both being contemporary. In the instant case, there are as many as five kings,¹ all of whom were contemporaries of each other in terms

¹ C. D. I. Vol. 1 : *Inscriptions of Asoka* by E. Hultzsch, 1969, pp. xxx – xxxvi.

of independently verifiable evidence and were separately mentioned by Aśoka the Maurya as being his 'pratyanta-nrpatīs.' No more evidence is required for holding that all six of them belonged to one common generation and were contemporaries. It will be sheer perversity to conclude otherwise.

— Yet this conclusion, based on *terra firma*, was set aside in this Volume on the contentions noted below :

(1) 'Alikā Sundara' was not the name of a king but the name of a region viz. Kashmir.

(2) How could Aśoka send supplies of herbs to regions which were outside his political jurisdiction, where his administrative personnel could not operate at all ?

— How very superficial and specious these arguments are is clear from the following independently verifiable details :

(a) Aśoka took care to mention that the names of the individual rulers stated by him were those of his 'pratyanta-nrpatīs'. By definition, a 'pratyanta-nrpati' is a neighbour, i. e. is outside the political boundary.

(b) As stated in ancient Greek and Roman historical sources (all of which agree among themselves on the point), Aśoka's grandfather Candragupta the Maurya had wrested as many as four satrapies formerly held by Seleucus, a leading general of Alexander, the Macedonian invader of NW India. These satrapis, thereafter, became a part of the Mauryan empire. This is the political background of the *pratyanta-nrpatīs*.

(c) (i) 'Alikā-sundara' is a reasonably recognizable phonetic equivalent of 'Alexander'.

(ii) Kashmir has *nowhere* been called 'Alikā-Sundara.'

(iii) There was no reason to refer to Kashmir by calling it 'Alikā Sundara', in any official document.

(d) Many Indo-Bactrian kings had succeeded in retaining a temporary hold over territories in North-Western India. Referring to an earlier *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* recorded by Chhavillakara, Kalhaṇa has stated that Kashmir was held after Aśoka by his son, Jalauka, who was followed by a ruler named, 'Dāmodara,' who was none else than Demetrius, 'Regis Indorum,' as the classical references indicate.

² Vide my article, "The Chhavillakara Fragment in Kalhaṇa's *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*" (*JBRS*, Vol. 36 (1950), pp. 74-75 + i-vi.).

(e) The General Editor should have appreciated the gentle sarcasm in the observations of the doyens of ancient Indian history like the late Dr. R. C. Majumdar and the late Dr. D. C. Sircar. On the contrary, he drew the conclusion that they had no point to make against his scheme of Maurya and Gupta chronology and had even declared a patently valid result as outcome of 'perversity' !

(f) There is failure in not taking into account the significance of Aśoka's own statement, "*Nāsti hi kaṃmataram sarva-loka-hitatpā*" (vide Girnar edict 6.10-11). The term '*Sarva-loka*' is important. Spread of '*dhamma*' did not recognize either a political or national boundary. There was no limit to it, in contrast with a '*cakravartikṣetra*',³ Aśoka was consciously pursuing a non-political '*viṣaya*'; his welfare measures were being administered by his staff, even in foreign countries, exactly like the international red cross operations in modern times.

(g) Indian medical science and practices were in demand even outside India; and their availability was being positively sought for in foreign countries. It was not a matter of arbitrary imposition leading to resentment.

(h) While all this should have been noon clear, it was strange that an altogether erroneous conclusion should have been drawn on one hand and its correct opposite view dubbed as 'absurd'. Further, how very unfair is this baseless attempt, as regards viewing Aśoka the Great's unique personality in its proper perspective !

(i) The massive coincidence, between the information yielded by Prinsep's decipherment of Aśokan edicts and that contained in the ancient Buddhist chronicles and *ṭikās* of Ceylon brought to light by G. Turnour, has been completely ignored.⁴

3. A volume, which has thus made a mess as regards well established historical findings, can at best be like the proverbial curate's egg - mostly bad and good only in parts. The injunction in the *Gītā*, '*na buddhibhedam janayed ajñānām karmasaṅginām*' needs no over-emphasis. Enough has been indicated in this short review that even a better informed reader should be wary and take the precaution of pursuing side by side standard relevant literature. It would then be possible to distinguish clearly between what is amusing and what is instructive— '*santaḥ parīkṣya anyatarad bhajante*.'

S. V. Sohoni

³ D. C. Sircar, *The Geography of Ancient and Medieval India*, 1971, pp. 1-16.

⁴ Vide my Introduction to the edition of *Mahāvamsa Ṭikā* published by Nava Nālandā Vihāra, Nālandā.

SAMSKṚTA-NĀṬYA-SIDDHĀNTA KE ANĀLOCITA PAKṢA
(in Hindi) : by Mohammad. Israil Khan. Published by Crescent
Publishing House, F/D-56, New Kavinagar, Gaziabad, 1986;
Pp. 88. Price : Rs. 60/-.

In this small but valuable book the author, Dr. Khan, has tried to draw the attention of the scholars to some problems of Sanskrit dramaturgy. In thirteen chapters, he has given his views on topics like Influence of Greek Drama, Bharata and Bhāratī Vṛtti, some controversial views of *Daśarūpaka* of Dhanañjaya, *Patākāsthānaka*, Bharata on Dramatical style and language, the date of Bharata, *Pūrvaraṅga*, *Sāttvika Bhāvas* in Samskrta Nāṭya, *vīthi*, *abhinaya*, *āhāryābhinaya*, *Kāvyeṣu Nāṭakam* Rāmyam, *Rasāsvādāna*.

The learned author has traced the origin of Sanskrit Dramas to Vedic sources and has rejected the theory of the influence of the Greek Dramas (pp. 7-8). Actually there are some similarities and dissimilarities in both. The dissimilarities like absence of tragedy, absence of triune unity of time, place and action in Indian dramas are quite well known. The word *yavanikā* raises the unsettled question whether curtain was in vogue in Greek Dramatic performances or not. Moreover, *ya* changing to *ja* in this case, is quite unknown to Sanskrit, *yavanī* is not changed to *javanī*, and the Vārttika of Kātyāyana, यवनालिप्याम् (4. 1. 49. 3) gives the meaning of *yavanānī* as 'Yavana Script' only. As Prof. Satyavrata Sastri has suggested in his Foreword, the word may be derived from √कीञ्जु (जुटिति सौतो धातुः). Thus *javanikā* might have been a piece of tapestry.

Dr. Khan has criticised the view of *Daśarūpaka* on पूर्वरङ्ग, basing his argument on the gloss, तत्स्थप्रथमयोगव्युत्थापनादौ पूर्वरङ्गता । As the पूर्वरङ्ग is meant for the entertainment of the audience, it is different from the Prologue. It is unconnected with the main theme or characters. This definition can incorporate नान्दी also. The stage-manager, then, does not introduce the plot (*vastu*) (p. 15).

The author has also pointed the discrepancy regarding *Patākāsthānaka*. Though *Daśarūpaka* is based on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, it has not followed Bharata's work strictly. Bharata has given four varieties of *Patākāsthānaka*, connected with the main plot, whereas the two-fold division of *Daśarūpaka* is related to subordinate (*prāsaṅgika*) plot

प्रस्तुतागन्तुभावस्य वस्तुनोऽन्योक्तिसूचनम् ।

पताकास्थानकं तुल्यसंविधानविशेषणम् ॥

"An indication by the mention of something extraneous of a matter that is

begun or is about to begin (is called) an Episode — indication (*patākāsthānaka*) which is characterized by similar situations or attributes."

(— Translation by George C. O. Haas, p. 7)

Dr. Khan has emphatically maintained that the four types of *Patākāsthānaka*, given in *Nāṭyaśāstras* (XIX, 30-33), are not similar. These are related to 'Incidental Subject' only, and not with the 'Principal' one, as maintained by Dr. Khan (p. 15). The implication of the terms *anyokti* and *samāsokti*, used by Dhanañjaya, is more or less the same as that given by Bharata or by the author of *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (VI. 46-49). *Patākā*, however, is connected with 'Incidental' one only. *Patākāsthānaka* (of any variety) is distinctly connected with the Principal subject. It has got two subdivisions: *Tulyasam-vidhānaka* and *Tulyaviśeṣaṇaka*. Dhanañjaya's terms indirectly convey the same meaning. Dr. Khan has remarked (p. 28) that it would be proper to subdivide '*Tulyasamvidhānaka*' only in two parts. He has also criticized the views of *Daśarūpaka* on *Prastāvanā* and *Vīthi* (pp. 19-21). The text is :

प्रस्तावना तत्र स्युः कथोद्घातः प्रवर्तकम् ।
प्रयोगातिशयश्चाथ वीध्यङ्गानि त्रयोदश ॥

The last part is, however, somewhat out of place. One would expect the *Vīthyaṅgas* to come directly, before the enumeration of the subdivisions (III. 13). The *Sāhityadarpaṇa* has mentioned *Udghātyaka* and *Avalagita*, being included here as well as among the subdivisions of the *Vīthi* (*Daśarūpaka* III. 9). (Cf. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, XX. 30). Thus all the subdivisions of *Vīthi* need not be taken as subdivisions of *Āmukha*.

Dr. Khan has also complained that the author of *Daśarūpaka* has paid scant attention to the types of *Rūpaka* like *Thāmṛga*, *Aṅka* etc. This is not unexpected in a book like this. Types like *Nāṭaka*, *Nāṭikā* have received relatively more attention because the discussion gives rise to some other important points like *Rasa* or *Nāyaka*. The author of *Daśarūpaka* has not given illustrations. So he cannot be charged with partiality. His views, however, are worth noting for a comparative study of various texts on Dramaturgy.

The chapter on 'Date of Bharata' is a well-knit one. He has pointed out some defects in the arguments of the earlier thinkers. Dr. Khan has successfully tried to prove that the date of *Nāṭyaśāstra* is between 400-200 B. C., giving quotations from *Purāṇas* and *Sūtras*.

Dr. Khan has discussed *Pūrvarāṅga* in detail and has maintained that *Nāṇḍī* should be included in it (pp. 51-58).

Dr. Khan has pointed out some lapses on the part of the author of *Daśarūpaka*. His views deserve due attention of scholars.

P. G. Lalye

SUBODHINĪ : Published by Shrivallabha Vidyapitha, Kolhapur, V. S. 2043. For free distribution.

This is a publication in part (on First too Skandhas only) of a commentary on the *Śrīmadbhāgavata* by Vallabhācārya, along with *Prakāśa* written by Puruṣottama. This excellent edition in 777 pages is a reprint of the earlier editions published by Shri Gokulanathaji Maharaj (in V. S. 1971, 1976). The work is divided into six parts, as follows :

(i) *Subodhinī* on Skandha One (300 pages), (ii) Verse-Index for the *Bhāgavata* Skandha One (7 pages), (iii) *Subodhinī* on Skandha Two (190 pages), (iv) Verse-index for the *Bhāgavata* : Skandha Two (4 pages), (v) *Prakāśa* on *Subodhinī* : Skandha One (112 pages), (vi) *Prakāśa* on *Subodhinī* : Skandha Two (164 pages).

The publisher has done a yeoman's service to Indians in general and to the followers of Śrī Vallabhācārya in particular, by publishing such a voluminous work and that too for free distribution to the devotees. The printing is almost flawless and the get-up is attractive. It is by the munificence of the devotees of Śrī Vallabhācārya that this volume has come out. Many more are expected to be published, some being already published.

All these volumes will undoubtedly give an impetus to the study of Vallabhācārya's works and will also make a valuable contribution to the commentarial literature of Sanskrit. It is hoped that this will harbinger a new era in Bhakti-Vedānta philosophy, inspiring the followers of other Ācāryas also to undertake similar endeavours.

P. G. Lalye

SAMSKṚTA-SĀHITYAMEN SARASVATĪ KĪ KATIPAYA JHĀN-KIĀN (in Hindi) : by Mohammad. Israil Khan. Published by Crescent Publishing House, F/D-56, New Kavinagar, Gaziabad, 1985 ; Pp. 127, with sixteen art plates ; Price : Rs. 100/-.

Among the pantheon of Indian deities, Sarasvatī is a deity of three-dimensional characteristics. She is renowned as a Deity of Speech, as a wife of the Creator Brahman, and as a sacred river. Many scholars have tried to explain the multifarious nature of this deity. Among those, N. N. Godbole, K. C. Chattopadhyaya, Aurel Stein and B. R. Sharma are prominent. Although a good deal has been written on this deity, a comprehensive work, dealing with the origin and development and their mythological parameter, was a desideratum.

Dr. Israil Khan has done a good service to the world of Indologists, by presenting a work in fifteen chapters, giving ample information about the nature of the deity. The first chapter describes the nature of Sarasvatī in the Vedic and Purāṇic literature. The second chapter depicts the inter-relations between Sarasvatī, Idā and Bhārati, who are supposed to be the deities connected with Vāk. In the third chapter, the author has discussed some of the Vedic epithets of Sarasvatī, like *ghṛtācī*, *pāvīravī*. The fourth chapter deals exclusively with Sarasvatī as a river. Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII discuss the eminence of Sarasvatī in the Purāṇas. Ninth chapter discusses the nature of Swan and Peacock as her vehicles. The tenth chapter mentions some Greek and Roman deities resembling Sarasvatī. The eleventh chapter deals with the erotic legends about Brahman and Sarasvatī. The twelfth chapter deals with the trinity of Vedic Goddesses, as described in different texts. The thirteenth chapter once more deals with the theme : Sarasvatī in the Brāhmaṇas, now in a detailed manner. The author has quoted many passages from the Brāhmaṇas, in order to prove the identity of Sarasvatī with Vāk. The fourteenth chapter has exhaustively quoted passages from the Purāṇic texts. In the fifteenth chapter the author has given a brief legend about every art plate given in the appendix.

Thus the work of Dr. Khan offers valuable information about Sarasvatī who has undergone metamorphosis more than any other deity. The author has bestowed meticulous attention on details and on giving references of the corresponding text material. In a small but valuable book, the author has endeavoured to collect the necessary information and arranging it logically. Scholars interested in Indian mythology owe an immense debt of gratitude to the author for providing valuable data regarding an important deity

of India. By discussing the physical and metaphysical aspects of the deity the author has provided an insight into the complex nature of Sarasvatī and has thus become instrumental in giving impetus to future studies.

The art-plates encompass a period from 2nd to 14th century A. D., and also a vast area of the Indian sub-continent. Dr. Khan deserves admiration for making available a large source-material and also for giving a comprehensive account of one of the most prominent deities.

The author, I feel, should have discussed some more Vedic epithets like *vrtraghnī*, *āptapruṣī*, *mayobhūh* and Paurāṇic epithets like *viṣṇorjihvā*, *śrutilakṣaṇā*, *akṣarā*, *svarā* etc., making the work more comprehensive.

P. G. Lalye

SOME GRAPHICAL PURĀṆIC TEXTS ON BRAHMĀ : by Mohammad Israil Khan. Published by Crescent Publishing House, F/D. 56, New Kavinagar, Ghaziabad (U. P.), 1981; Pp. 142, with eight photoplates. Price : Rs. 70/-.

The first twelve pages of the Introduction of the book contain the summary of the book *Brahmā in the Purāṇas* written earlier in the same year by the author; and pages 13 to 16 describe the images of Brahmā at various places. The book also consists of eight photoplates which are identical with the plates, numbering a, b, c, d, e, X, XII, XIV, XIX, XXI of the earlier book. The descriptions of the images differ slightly. Pages 17 to 136, the main part of the book, contain Sanskrit texts from various Purāṇas. No particular classification of the passages is done. Passages are given Purāṇawise. This book serves the purpose of an appendix to the book mentioned earlier. This book seems to be published a little earlier as the former one has given some more plates.

P. G. Lalye

BRAHMĀ IN THE PURĀṆAS : by Mohommad Israil Khan. Published by Crescent Publishing House, F/D-56, New Kavinagar, Ghaziabad (U. P.), 1981; Pages xii+156, with 38 plates. Price : Rs. 90/-.

The present book gives a detailed account of Brahmā, the first deity of the famous trinity. Brahmā is the creator of the universe. Nevertheless he and his consort Sarasvatī, are the deities concerned with knowledge and scholarship. He is a well-developed deity in the Purāṇas. He is mentioned in the Vedic literature also. He is described as a very generous deity in granting boons to the gods as well as to the demons. He is very rarely worshipped by the human beings. In the Purāṇas and in the later Sanskrit literature, Viṣṇu and Śiva are pre-eminent deities who have obscured the Creator God. There are, however, many legends woven around Brahmā in the Purāṇas. Dr. Khan has collected many legends and epithets of the Purāṇas. Though there are many articles on Brahmā, the book written by Dr. Khan may be said to be the first book comprising the mythological and sym-bological details about Brahmā in the Purāṇas.

The first chapter gives a short account of Brahmā in the Purāṇas. The second one narrates certain legends about the birth of Brahmā in various Purāṇas. The third chapter deals with the creations of Brahmā — Maithunī and Mānasi Sṛṣṭi. The fourth chapter deals with a few Purāṇic episodes, the colour and vehicles of Brahmā. The fifth chapter deals with the iconography of Brahmā, giving details about the images, emblems and symbols of Brahmā. The author has given copious references from the *Viṣṇudharmottara* and *Matsya Purāṇas*. He has also discussed the prescription for the image of Sarasvatī's face.

Thus Dr. Khan has given a succinct but lucid account of a somewhat neglected deity like Brahmā. The book contains very useful information about the genealogy of Brahmā (p. 35), the genealogy of the Purāṇic Prajā-patis (pp. 43-59), names and attributes of Brahmā, occurring in various Purāṇas (pp. 111-124). All this information will certainly be useful to a common reader and also to the research scholar.

The most important part of this book is the art-plates (thirty-eight in number) and their explanations. This has set aside the common concept that Brahmā is a neglected deity. The plates are printed on thick art-paper. Their explanations (pp. 130-145) have enhanced the utility of the book.

Thus Dr. Khan has done a valuable service to scholars by presenting almost all the relevant facts about Brahmā in this book. A few expressions like 'which seems to us corporeal' (p. 65), 'naturalistic theory' (p. 61),

‘Brahmā’s mind falling in love with Sarasvatī’ (p. 72), ‘Seven streams (of bliss, existence etc.)’ (p. 86) certainly require detailed explanation. I feel that at certain places original references should have been given, instead of referring to the views of Vettam Mani, which are purely secondary in nature (pp. 69, 72. etc.).

Even then the book is quite useful and Dr. Khan deserves encomiums for throwing so much light on the less popular deity Brahmā. It is however hoped that a comprehensive study on the deity will come from the pen of the author in the near future.

P. G. Lalye

PĀṆINI : HIS WORK AND TRADITIONS, Volume One : BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION : by George Cardona ; Published by Motilal Banarsidass, Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007, 1988; Pages xxiv+671. Price : Rs. 175/-.

I. In the earliest phases of the ‘life’ of the Sanskrit language when it was widely used as a means of social communication, the elasticity of expressions developed so ‘richly’ that it was required to be regulated and even standardised. At the hands of the ancient *vāgyogavid*-s of India, like the great Pāṇini and his worthy followers, Sanskrit Grammar was thus cultivated into a Science. Its study, as was long back pointed out by R. G. Bhandarkar (*vide* p. xi of the Preface to the third edition of his *Second Book of Sanskrit*, 1873), “possesses an educational value of the same kind as that of Euclid and not much inferior to it in degree.” At the same time, because of its peculiar processes of synthesis and its technicalities required to be mastered in the *prakriyā* (formation) of derived expressions, a thorough elucidation of Pāṇini’s Grammar always remained a challenging task to its modern exponents facing a modern batch of students of varied linguistic backgrounds. A count by fingers cannot go much farther than Professor Cardona, in respect of scholars equal to the task, combining an equipment along traditional as well as modern lines, an awareness of the needs of modern students, a power of elucidation without making the subject dry, and, above all, an amount of patience.

“In order to give a relatively full picture of the extensive and insightful thinking about language, centred upon Indo-Aryan languages but of more

general interest to linguists and indologists alike " Cardona concerns himself with a study " not only of Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī with its ancillary texts but also of a great part of the commentatorial literature that surrounds this treatise. " (p. v) — The present book is the first part of this large study (in eight volumes) of Pāṇini and the Pāṇinīyas, — as a preliminary to which the author had already published his *Pāṇini, a Survey of Research* (1976, reprinted 1980). Subsequent volumes that are contemplated take up in detail the issues of interpretation, method, and theory associated with Pāṇini's grammar. along the following lines :

II. Kinds of Rules in the Aṣṭādhyāyī and how they are related, III. Metalanguage, IV. Affixational Rules, V. Formation of derived bases, VI. Rules providing for augments, replacements, and accentuation, VII. Pāṇinian Sūtras concerning dialects, VIII. Syntax and Stylistics of the Aṣṭādhyāyī.

It can be easily seen how ambitious and authoritative the whole project is visualised to be. Of all, the section on Stylistics of the Aṣṭādhyāyī (VIII. 2) would apparently be receiving a first detailed treatment among modern studies.

The present Volume, I, is purported to present a ' general background,' containing brief explanations on the procedures, principles and problems dealt with in the School of Pāṇini, leaving detailed discussions on them to Vols. II-VIII.

II. The entire book is divided into subsections which are numbered, facilitating cross reference. The explanatory note at the beginning tells also that bold face italics are used to indicate markers affixed to Sanskrit elements (— making a decided gain over the current practice of using capitals). The book is composed using computer software.

Following a preliminary Introduction, the book goes on to give a detailed idea of Pāṇini's work : the Sūtrapāṭha (referring, in order, to the Operational Rules and to the Ancillary Rules, this latter discussing the Markers, Metarules, Headings etc.), the Akṣarasamāmnāya (with the Pratyāhāras), the Dhātupāṭha and the Gaṇapāṭha. Next are discussed the Derivational System of Pāṇini, the General Principles observed in his Grammar, and lastly, in the Background of the System, we are told on the general procedures used in analysis and the criteria for positing basic forms in the system.

Then follow important Appendices on 1. the status and purpose of grammar, and 2. the terms *samskr-* and its two derivatives, and other terms like *śabdānuśāsana*, *vyākaraṇa*, *śāstra*, *sūtra*, *yoga* and *lakṣaṇa*.

In a work planned as above and containing a synoptical table of contents as well as extensive cross references, the idea of a full Index is dispensed with, and so too that of providing references to studies by modern scholars (p. vii).

III. A few remarks of a general nature may now be offered.

1. While it could be argued that, in an explanation of Pāṇini's Work (Sec. 1), the ordering of relevant topics might differ with different expounders, it may be pointed out that, for a scientific work like Pāṇini's, it is not so. Especially in the case of the Akṣarasamāmnāya, enjoying a pivotal position for the whole structure of the Sūtrapāṭha, its primacy cannot be a matter of two opinions. Hence, all discussion relating to that (pp. 94-98), including the one on the Markers and Abbreviatory terms (pp. 54-58), requires to be placed immediately after the introductory statements (Sec. 1. 0), i. e. as Sec. 1. 1, not as Sec. 1. 2.

2. A cross-reference to the यथासंख्यत्व maxim was needed on p. 10, while its first mention appears only on p. 62.

3. Cardona very rightly observes, and also substantiates, that "there is nothing at all particular(ly) prescriptive about the Aṣṭādhyāyī" (p. 644), meaning that Pāṇini through his work gave an objective and descriptive picture of the language, although "to Pāṇinīyas grammar served more than a purely descriptive purpose" (p. 643). However, when he finds it "reasonable to consider that Pāṇini himself also considered his work to serve not only an immediate but also an ultimate purpose," explaining this by remarking that he was "a product of his society" (p. 643), one would like to think twice before agreeing with this (self-conflicting) remark. And one would here like to fling, on Pāṇini's behalf, Patañjali's retort (made in another context) : अभ्यन्तरोऽहं लोके, न त्वहं लोकः । " (Mahābhāṣya, I. 9. 4 f.) — Further, when Cardona remarks that the shift in the purpose at the study of grammar began later on "when Sanskrit had ceased to be truly a current language," here too it has to be pointed out that this 'later' period probably started much earlier than that, with Kātyāyana himself who asserted " (शास्त्रेण) धर्मनियमः " in his very first Vārttika (if he is not denied its authorship !).

4. On the term *yoga* being used to refer to an individual rule of grammar, a *sūtra*, Cardona apparently finds only one instance from Kātyāyana's vocabulary (p. 670 f.) ! This is an obvious case of the nodding Homer, as, astonishingly, it escapes him to cite the former's numerous uses of ' *yoga-yibhāga* ' and ' *eka-yoga* , ' in the same meaning for *yoga*.

5. In line with the comprehensiveness of Cardona's writing(s), and also otherwise, it would have been happy to have one more Appendix to the book : on the pre-Pāṇinian contributions to the Science.

6. Amazing care has been taken in the computerisation of the script. A microscopic number of errors were, however, bound to remain, a few of which may be noted :

P. 576. Change 'सिद्' to 'तिद्'.

P. 666, l. 8. 'meanings' to 'means'.

P. 670, centre. Add 'but' before 'it is not necessary'.

IV. By way of a final remark, it must be said that all the co-students (सब्रह्मचारिन्-s) in the field would, with one voice and equally heartily, congratulate Professor Cardona over the tremendous (विद्वज्जन-) परिश्रम spent on the book and over the remarkable success it has attained. Subsequent volumes in the projected series are eagerly awaited.

S. D. Laddu

MAHĀ-SUBHĀṢITA-SAMGRAHA, Vol. VI (किं-कै): by Ludwik Sternbach; ed. by S. Bhaskaran Nair; pub. by Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute, Hoshiarpur, 1987; Pp. xiv+354+ (App.) 222. Price : Rs. 400/-.

This is the sixth volume of a gigantic undertaking on the Sanskrit Subhāṣitas or wise sayings, which presents their comprehensive catalogue, index and edition, all in one. The speedy completion and publication of the work — a “much enlarged and modernised *Indische Sprüche* (of Otto Böhtlingk)” — was recommended with approbation by the International Congress of Orientalists at its 29th Session held in Paris in July 1973. The publication of this priceless project was entrusted by Professor Ludwik Sternbach (12. 12. 1909–25. 3. 1981) to the V. V. R. I. (Hoshiarpur) through Dr. Ludwik Sternbach Foundation; and it is to the credit of the Institute which, since then, has successively brought out six out of the contemplated twenty volumes of it, while maintaining a high standard in editing which is characteristic of the publications of the Institute.

The present volume incorporates 1,512 verses (with their initials from किं upto कै), thus bringing their total so far to 11,491, which is besides 77

inserted verses. The editing proceeds along the pattern set in earlier volumes : with the text given in the Devanāgarī, a record of variant readings and of sources wherever available, and an English translation done at expert hands. This is followed by four very useful Appendices (Indices), recording : Abbreviations-cum-Bibliography (76 pages), Authors and Sources of the verses (56 pp.), Sanskrit Metres used in them (8 pp.), and the Subjects treated in them (78 pp.). Then is appended a small Addenda and Corrigenda.

It is not quite surprising that Professor Sternbach, this veritable *Subhāṣita-Maharṣi* ', combining in himself prodigious learning as well as simplicity and humanism (— the reviewer has treasured nostalgic memories of his brief meetings with the scholar at the Twenty-ninth session of the A. I. O. C. held in Pune in June 1978 and at the Fifth World Sanskrit Conference held in Varanasi in October 1981, —), should have generously entrusted the papers containing his life-time researches for publication to the care of the V. V. R. Institute, and, there too, to Prof. Bhaskaran Nair, the Director-Professor of the V. V. R. I., with "full confidence in him" and "high esteem for his work". As can be evident on any page of the volumes of the work edited by Professor Nair including the present one, he has amply justified the trust reposed in him by the late scholar, and what the editor has remarked, in his Preface to Vol. V, about the painstaking labour put in by the compiler towards the compilation (that it is "better visualised than stated"), applies in equal measure to his own editing of the Volume(s). Attention in this connexion may be drawn to only one, the last, Appendix viz. the Subject Index. What a mine of information, under topics and sub-topics, it provides to the reader on a variety of small and big aspects of Indian culture which are touched in these *Subhāṣitas* !

With excellence in printing also (— just randomly, the name of the author at no. 10640, appearing to be one of a Maharashtrian, is probably better read, and printed, as Viṭhobā Aṇṇā, on pages 2817, 3129), the Volume makes an excellent work of reference for scholars and inquisitive public alike, who would naturally wish god-speed to work on the subsequent Volumes.

S. D. Laddu

THE GLIMPSES OF INDOLOGICAL HERITAGE : by Uma Deshpande ; Pub. by Good Companions, Ushakiran Building, Raopura Road, Baroda 390 001, 1989; pp. vii + 199. Price : Rs. 45/-.

The book under review contains fifteen essays on some facets of Indian culture as reflected in the different branches of Sanskrit literature and in the lives of some modern saints and scholars. They offer "some rudimentary yet prominent glimpses of our vast and unfathomable Indological heritage mainly in literary, philosophical and spiritual fields" (p. iii).

In the Vedic field, there is discussion on the contribution of its female seers, the position and status of women then, and a language study of Yāska. In Classical literature, are discussed writings of Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa and Ananta Paṇḍita for the first time, besides those of two modern writers : Kshama Row and S. B. Velankar. Philosophy, however, seems to occupy the author largely and deeply : we have here an excellent critique of the *B. Gītā* and *Brahma-Sūtra*, scholastic interpretations of the Karma-Yoga, an introduction to the works of Vallabhācārya and to the *Śikṣāpatrī* of Sw. Sahajānanda, and reflections on Aurobindo on the *Gītā*. The same interest leads the author to a study of the philosophical teachings of the modern Saints : Shri Sāi-Bābā, Sw. Vāsudevānada Sārasvatī and Shri Raṅga Avadhūta.

There is a good General Index at the end. Errata is happily given at the beginning.

The work thus presents fine glimpses of the Indian thought (literary and philosophical) to the world of scholars and to the enlightened public alike. This otherwise excellent and handy production, however, suffers from typographical inadequacies, with which one has to bear.

S. D. Laddu

RASIKAVINODA OF KAMALĀKARA BHAṬṬA : by Uma Deshpande ; Pub. by Shalaka Prakashan, 4/32 M. I. G. Colony, J. P. Road, Andheri, Bombay 400 058, 1989 : Pp. vii + 55 + 90. Price : Rs. 75/-.

The publication is an addition to our knowledge of the meagre literature in Sanskrit in the genre of Allegorical Drama. It is a critical edition based on a single manuscript of the drama *Rasikavinoda* in five Acts composed

by Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa who lived in Gujarat between the 17th and early 18th centuries A. D. (p. ii). The handy volume contains the Sanskrit Text (supplying also the editor's own *chāyā* for the Prakrit passages), its English Translation, two useful Indices, and a critical Introduction at the beginning in two Chapters, on : (I) the author and the play and (II) Gukulanāthajī (16th-17th c. A. D.) and his philosophy of *Rasātmaka Puṣṭimārga* which was inspired by Vallabhācārya's *Śuddhādvaita-vedānta*. A note, under I. 7, on Literary peculiarities of the play (pp. 12-14) makes an interesting reading.

The play was written with the object of propogating various philosophical tenets and inculcating moral and spiritual values of life. Similarity of such allegorical literary composition with the 'Cycle plays' or 'Morality plays' of the West has been brought out by the Editor (pp. 17, 44). However, the suggested possibility of the enactment of the present play in temples on festive occasions, like that of similar plays in the West, (pp. 27, 44) needs to be pursued through historical references.

Dr. Uma Deshpande deserves congratulations for this handsome *editio princeps*, accompanied by a scholarly study of the work.

S. D. Laddu

VĀRĀHA ŚRAUTASŪTRA : critically edited by C. G. Kashikar, Shree Balmukund Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya Research Series No. 4, Tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeeth, Pune, 1988; pp. 298. Price : Rs. 100/-.

Kashikar, one of the best specialists in the field of Vedic ritual (especially the Sūtra literature), is undoubtedly the most qualified scholar for re-editing the Vārāha Śrauta Sūtra. This text was first published by Caland and Raghu Vira (Lahore 1933) on the basis of only one MS (or rather a transcript) and the editors themselves already realized the defects of this edition.

In the past Kashikar noticed some mistakes, found two new MSS (unfortunately not much superior) and published several articles on this text. In his *Survey of the Śrautasūtras* (Bombay 1968) he still hesitated about the possibility of a complete new edition " unless more manuscripts of the text become available " (o. c., p. 75). These MSS were not discovered. Still Kashikar ultimately decided to publish a text " which is largely improved " (Introd., p. XV).

Indeed, when comparing the old and the new editions one cannot but agree that improvements are discernible on many pages. Where the new MSS did not help, Kashikar has made emendations and conjectures (mostly based on parallel texts such as the Mānava and the Āpastamba Sūtras). In some cases a reading of a parallel text substitutes a completely corrupt reading of the (scarce) MSS. Gonda, *Ritual Sūtras* (Wiesbaden 1977), p. 649, warns against such substitutions. Kashikar invites Gonda to reconsider his views in the light of his proposed emendations (o. c., p. XX). However, even rather successful emendations of this type do not change the principle. A parallel text need not have read the same as the corrupt text and the corruption should have some explainable connection with the restored text.

Apart from a much improved text this edition also offers something which was strangely missing in the first edition: an introduction. This omission, for which Caland can hardly be held responsible (he died before the edition was published), was unconvincingly defended by Raghu Vira, who referred to the too overwhelming material collected by him (and never discovered anymore).

In his introduction Kashikar i. a. deals with the complete literature of the Vārāha school, the style of the Sūtra, its relation to some other texts and its chronology. As such it is useful and comparable with his introduction to the edition of the Bhāradvāja Śrauta Sūtra. Some topics which are not directly connected with the Sūtra itself might have been treated in a more succinct way. On the other hand the discussion of problems sometimes ends with an apodictic statement without the adducement of arguments, proofs and references to modern literature. See e. g. the speculations on the relative chronology of the Yajurvedic Saṃhitās (p. L) and the assignment of an absolute chronology to the Sūtra itself ("... may be assigned to a period not earlier than the fourth century A. D.", p. LXIX).

As far as the text itself is concerned I share Kashikar's optimism after having checked the Agnihotra section. Still I have to observe that one misses some useful notes found in the old edition. Emendations like (*sāyamāram-bhaṇam agnihotraṃ*) *prātarapavargam* for *prāgapavargam* based on BaudhŚS. 24, 30 convince everybody. In the case of the Agnihotra section Kashikar (who gives no list of consulted literature) should have used Dumont's survey of the treatment of this rite in the Sūtras (*L' Agnihotra*, Baltimore 1939). Then he would have read *na saṃmṛṣati* for *anu* (or 'nu) *saṃmṛṣati* in 1, 5, 2, 13 (see Dumont, o. c., p. 210). In 1, 5, 2, 19 Kashikar rightly inserts *na* and refers to MŚS. 1, 6, 1, 24. In Dumont's publication more parallels are to be found.

In spite of some critical remarks I fully acknowledge the importance of this new edition which is a great improvement as far as the text is concerned and which has clearly established the relative chronology of the Sūtra in its introduction.

H. W. Bodewitz

VIŚVA KE VIVIDHA DHARMA : published by D. E. I. Deemed University, Dayalbag (Agra) ; 1984; 4+2+158.

This book in Hindi is intended as a text-book on Comparative Study of Religions for the senior students of the D. E. I. Deemed University, Dayalbag (Agra). It has grown out of a Symposium organized at the University in May 1983. It contains twenty essays by different authors on such subjects as "Religion – its nature, aim, and necessity", "History and doctrines of religion", "Vedic religion", "Hindu religion — history, Smṛti, and Purāṇa", "Religious thought in the systems of Indian philosophy", "Buddhism", "Jainism", "Christianity", "Islam", "Sufi doctrine", "Sant doctrine", "Sikhism", and "Radhasvami religion". The treatment of the various topics is, however, superficial and uncritical, and lacks proper method. It is doubtful whether the book, in its present form, can at all adequately help a comparative study of religions.

R. N. D.

HINDUISM : A brief outline of its framework, by Swami Mukhyananda; Ramakrishna Math, Trichur; 1986; xii+115+Charts.

Is it possible to specify something which a person must necessarily believe and / or do in order to be designated as a Hindu or something which a person who is not designated as a Hindu does not believe and / or do? The answer to this question which involves *anvaya-vyatireka* is probably 'No'. And herein perhaps lie both the strength and the weakness of Hinduism. Wisely enough, Swami Mukhyananda has prefaced his manual on Hinduism with the observation that Hinduism is "a vast and variegated composite religion with numerous aspects and rich traditions, serving the needs of the

simplest as well as of the wisest, of the laity as well as of acute philosophers." He has made it clear that his book does not aim at a detailed treatment of Hinduism, but "has been conceived to acquaint the general reader in a brief compass with some of the fundamental features of Hinduism in its total perspective, showing their mutual interconnection and coherence in the whole scheme." Swamiji begins by outlining the general nature of Hinduism or Hindu-Dharma (strictly speaking, the terms 'Hinduism' and 'Hindu-Dharma' are not quite synonymous!) and its scriptures. In Chapter III, which may be said to constitute the kernel of the whole book, he discusses the two aspects of Hindu-Dharma, namely, *Satya* (truth) and *Dharma* (applied truth), which he correlates—not very correctly—with *Śruti* and *Smṛti* respectively. Here the terms *Śruti* and *Smṛti* have been used rather loosely. Again, Swamiji has considered in this chapter only what may be regarded as religious (mainly, philosophical and ethical) *thought* and has mostly ignored religious *rites* and *practices*. There too, some of his propositions, such as the one representing the correlation of the four aspects of *Brahman*, the *kośas*, and the *yogas*, seem to be too strained.

The nine Appendices are meant to supplement and expound the argument contained in the main body of the book. But the statement of the fundamental teachings of Hinduism contained in them (as, for instance, in the Ten Sūtras), which incidentally reflects the Neo-Vedānta of the Rama-krishna Mission, is often more idealistic than realistic and critical. The charts included in the book also cannot be said to be particularly illuminating.

Notwithstanding all this, the present manual may be found fairly serviceable as an aid for a slightly advanced study of Hinduism rather than as an introduction to it.

R. N. D.

INDIZES, WIENER ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE KUNDE SÜDASIENS
UND ARCHIV FÜR INDISCHER PHILOSOPHIE, by Ch. H.
Werba; Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien;
1987; 55.

The *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für indischer Philosophie*, published under the auspices of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Commission for the Languages and Cultures of South Asia, Vienna,

and at present edited by Professor G. Oberhammer, has now established itself as a prestigious research journal in the field of South Asian Studies and Indian Philosophy. Indeed, Vienna has now emerged as one of the most active centres in that branch of learning in Europe. It was, therefore, a welcome decision of the authorities of the Academy to publish an elaborate Index to the thirty volumes (1957-1986) of *WZKSA*. Indexes serve a very useful purpose in that they bestow some kind of direction and discipline on the usually miscellaneous contents of a journal. The present *Indizes*, assiduously prepared by Dr. Ch. H. Werba, are divided into three main sections: (1) Articles, (2) Dissertations approved by the University of Vienna; and (3) Reviews. One, however, wishes that, like the author-register, a subject-register also had been included in this book. It would have enhanced its utility.

R. N. D.

DAS WISSEN VON DER LEBENSSPANNE DER BÄUME : SURAPĀLAS VṚKṢĀYURVEDA, kritisch ediert, übersetzt und kommentiert von Rahul Peter Das; Alt-und Neu Indische Studien, Seminar für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens an der Universität Hamburg; 1988; ix+589.

The *Vṛkṣāyurveda* of Surapāla is perhaps the oldest, wholly preserved, treatise which deals in a comprehensive and systematic manner with the cultivation of groves, etc. Its author Surapāla, also known as Sureśvara and Suresh, belonged to a Bengali family of court-physicians and was patronised by a minor chieftain named Bhīmapāla (who, however, was in no way related to the famous royal dynasty of the Pālas of Bengal). Surapāla is believed to have lived some time between the second half of the 11th century and the first half of the 12th century, and is credited with the authorship of two other works, namely, the *Lohasarvasva* (which deals with the medicinal use of iron) and the *Śabdapradīpa* (which is a botanical glossary). Only one manuscript of the *Vṛkṣāyurveda* is known to exist, and it is very corrupt. So, for the present edition, Das has depended, besides this manuscript, on the manuscripts and printed editions of various other texts which have reproduced portions from the *Vṛkṣāyurveda*. He has provided a detailed description of such manuscripts and printed editions. On the other hand, the *Vṛkṣāyurveda* itself is seen to have been heavily dependent on earlier works

on agriculture and horticulture which are now available only in fragments. The *Ṛkṣāyurveda* contains 325 verses. Das has classified these verses into 15 groups, and has treated each of these verses under six heads, namely, transliterated text, variants, metre, translation, explanatory notes, and comments. One of the five Appendices contains G. J. Meulenbeld's Additions to his "Sanskrit Names of Plants and their Botanical Equivalents". The book ends with four very useful Indices. All in all, through this edition of the *Ṛkṣāyurveda*, which reflects abundant scholarship, industry, and care, Das has produced a model of critical editing of a Sanskrit text.

R. N. D.

KANN DIE GUPTA-KUNST KĀLIDĀSAS WERKE ILLUSTRIEREN? by Annette Classen; Marburger Studien zur Afrika-und Asienkunde, Serie B: Asien, Band 11; 1988; 90+10 Fig. + 32 Abb.

It is generally agreed that the poetry and the art of the age of the Guptas have mutually reacted on each other to the best possible advantage of both. In her interesting thesis, approved by the Marburg University, Annette Classen addresses herself specifically to the consideration of the question: Can the Gupta art illustrate the works of Kālidāsa? She begins with the assumptions that Kālidāsa must have lived some time between A. D. 370 and A. D. 470, and that the term "Gupta art" has to be taken to denote the art (for her present purpose, the author takes into account only painting and sculpture, leaving out architecture) which flourished in North India, roughly within the region which had come under the suzerainty of Candragupta II, between A. D. 370 and ca. A. D. 550. Professor C. Sivaramamurti has already dealt with the theme "Kālidāsa's poetry and Gupta art" in his noteworthy contributions *Sculpture inspired by Kālidāsa* and *Numismatic Parallels of Kālidāsa*, but Classen characterizes his approach and treatment as subjective. It may, however, be emphasized that in the matter of poetry and art the judgement of a discerning critic is bound to be subjective. Indeed, therein lies his main strength. Classen also opines that Sivaramamurti's *Sanskrit Literature and Art - Mirrors of Indian Culture* is vitiated by his juxtaposition of the specimens of art and poetry belonging to different chronological periods. Classen seems to accept the view of Joanna Gottfried Williams that the Kuṣāṇa style of Mathura and of areas directly influenced by that great pilgrimage city on the river Yamunā was the sole real source for

the Gupta style. She then perspicuously studies the motifs reflected in Kālidāsa's six works with reference to the earlier treatises like Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* and the *Viṣṇudharmottara-Purāṇa* on the one hand and the examples of the Gupta art on the other. The parallels are amazingly eloquent and are visually confirmed by the 32 illustrations which form the second part of this book. They together represent "the classic phase of Indian civilization in so far as it aspired to create a perfect, unsurpassable style of life". The author aptly concludes her thesis with the observation that the Gupta art is thoroughly competent to illustrate even the abstract concept-categories in Kālidāsa's works.

R. N. D.

THE RELIGION OF THE VEDA, by Hermann Oldenberg; English translation by Shridhar B. Shrotri; published by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi; 1988; pp. xiii + 359.

Die Religion des Veda by Hermann Oldenberg (1854–1920) certainly constitutes one of the most remarkable contributions to the study of Vedic religion and mythology. The book falls into two main parts — the first (Chapters I and II) deals with Vedic mythology and the second (Chapters III and IV) with the Vedic cult. Like Bergaigne, Oldenberg fully realizes the importance of the knowledge of the Vedic ritual for the proper understanding of the Vedic religion as a whole. He, however, points out that, in the history of Vedic philology, Vedic mythology came to the forefront before Vedic cult and religion. As for the scope of *Die Religion des Veda*, while Bergaigne has restricted himself only to the hymns of the *Rgveda*, Oldenberg covers the whole field of the Vedic literature, for, he believes that the literature immediately following the *Rgveda* deals with the same sacrificial ritual for which the hymns of the *Rgveda* are composed. Oldenberg generally adheres to the naturalistic interpretation of the Vedic mythology. He says that the higher gods — that is to say, those gods which are not of a semi-divine or fetishistic nature — of the Vedic, and certainly also of the Indo-European period, are without exception the deified representations of the entities in nature or of the forces which are active in the great phenomena of nature. He, however, hastens to sound a note of warning against the acceptance of the simple formulae to which the earlier schools of naturalistic mythology had reduced their views in this connection. It is necessary to remember, Oldenberg adds,

that, between the prototype of nature (wherever such a one exists) and its mythological counterpart, manifold and complex developments take place. Oldenberg further points out that, besides naturalistic aspect of the Vedic mythology, there exists another equally significant aspect of it, namely, the deification of abstract concepts. As for the methods of comparative mythology, which he generally accepts, Oldenberg says that one must free oneself from the bondage of mere etymology and pass into the free atmosphere of reality.

Die Religion des Veda was first published in 1894 and its second edition was published in December 1916. Oldenberg has not made any substantial changes in the second edition, but, as he has said, he has tried to improve upon and enlarge the first edition in the light of his own further research and the work of other scholars. The third and the fourth monotype reprints of work were issued in 1923.

This first ever English translation of Oldenberg's monumental *opus* is to be heartily welcomed since it makes known to a wider audience the large number of original ideas and theories about Vedic religion and mythology which Oldenberg has put forth. The English translation is quite lucid and true to the original. Dr. Shrotri deserves encomium for having creditably accomplished a job which could not have been that simple.

R. N. D.

PROFESSOR RANGANATH DATTATRAYA VADEKAR



b. 1-12-1900]

[d. 1-4-1989

OBITUARY NOTICES

PROFESSOR RANGANATH DATTATRAYA VADEKAR

b. 1-12-1900]

[d. 1-4-1989

It is with profound sorrow that we report the passing away of Professor Vadekar, the great banyan tree in the garden of Oriental Studies. Like the eagle on the tree of Life and Knowledge described in the *R̥gveda*, Professor Vadekar lived his life here (full of activity) and yet he was just its spectator because of his detachment. He chose for himself poverty and obscurity, leaving the riches, glory and light to those who hankered for them. He gave to all his belongings, his effort, his helping hand and care, without hoping for any return. In this he lived the life of a true lover of knowledge, of a seer, of a Bodhisattva, with full awareness of it, with choice, without regret and with unflinching devotion.

Professor Ranganath Dattatraya Vadekar was born on December 1, 1900, in a middle class Brahmin family at Kuroli Siddheshvara (Satara Dist.). He took his B. A., from Fergusson College, Poona, of the Bombay University in first class in 1921, and M. A. in 1926. He taught himself Pali and then offered it as one of the options at M. A. His teacher, Professor P. D. Gune, advised him to study German and French, if he wanted to do research. He took his teacher at his word and not only learnt German and French, which he mastered to the same extent as English, but also several other European languages beginning with Greek and Latin. Thus when he became Professor of Sanskrit and Allied Languages in Fergusson College in 1935, he started teaching Sanskrit, Pali, Ardhamagadhi, and later, German and French. Except for Sanskrit, he wrote a manual for each of the other four languages (French 1942, German 1946, and Ardhamagadhi and Pali for private circulation). He learnt Dutch for helping his historian friend, Late Shri D. V. Apte, to read the Dutch records on Shivaji, and until the end remained one of the few Indians to know Dutch.

He studied the works of Śaṅkarācārya and his paramaguru Gauḍapāda, and also other works on Vedānta, which maintained their grip on him intellectually, philosophically, and yogically to the last. He held the *Bhagavad-Gītā* in the highest esteem, knew it by heart, and on every occasion of life cited from it to light his path (and of others) on the lonely journey he had chosen to make in his life. He was one of the few teachers who had specialised in the *R̥gveda*. Buddhism was the anchor of his life.

During 1927–1935, associated with it as a Life Member, he taught at Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute as Honorary Lecturer, and simultancously worked with Professor S. K. Belvalkar, assisting him in research. During 1930–36 he lived in the Bhājā caves for the sake of Sādhana, to instil in himself the spirit of Buddhism, to feel the life of a Buddhist monk, and to imbibe emotions of fearlessness, and so on. In 1931, he proposed to the All-India Oriental Conference the preparation of ‘An Indian Edition of the Pali Tripiṭaka in Devanāgarī Characters’ with four specimen pages and approximate cost and price. Needless to add that the scheme remained only on paper for want of financial assistance, and a dream remained unfulfilled. However, he published the editions of *Milindapañha* (1940), *Pātimokkha* (1941), *Telakaṭhagāthā* (1941), *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (1940) and *Aṭṭhasālinī* (in collaboration with Dr. P. V. Bapat, 1942). In 1959, he published an edition of the *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, a Jain work.

During 1935–61 he taught at Fergusson College. He also taught at the Tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeetha, Ahilyadevi High School for Girls, New English School, and several other institutions. During 1948–61 he also taught at the newly created Poona University.

At Fergusson College, he founded the Tutorial Department, a unique institution of its kind, under whose aegis he could reach out to all the students of the college by providing them aids for further study. He always extended assistance to all students irrespective of nationality, sex, caste or religion, when in need, including books, materials, money, and all that the situation required. With a nostalgia his students and colleagues (!) recall the sweets they have eaten out of his hands. He even learnt psychiatry in order to help his students in their psychological problems.

Although Professor Vadekar never took the degree of Ph. D., many scholars sought his guidance which he gave generously. Because of excellent powers of retention and comprehension, he had a vast store of knowledge equal only to an encyclopaedia, not only of Indology and allied subjects like Linguistics, Archaeology, and Philosophy, but also of various crafts, electricity, automobile engineering, telecommunications, and so on. About him a colleague in Fergusson College said to the late Principal Karve : ‘If you allow him to work at his fullest capacity, half of your staff will have to be dismantled.’ He maintained a personal collection of books, ‘a larger part of which’, as he used to say, ‘is safe on the desks of my students’. As a culmination of his research interest, he undertook to edit the principal Upaniṣads, in which endeavour his friend Acharya V. P. Limaye joined him later, and the fruit of this collaboration is seen in the Edition of *Eighteen Principal*

Upaniṣads, imbibing many novel features, published by the Vaidika Samshodhana Mandala.

He was one of the Founder Members of the Vaidika Samshodhana Mandala and also of the Bharatiya Dharma-tattvajnana Samshodhana Mandala. Also, he served, in various capacities the Council for Marathi Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. He worked at the Kaivalyadhama Yoga Centre at Lonavala as the Research Director of the Yoga Encyclopaedia during 1961-66.

As a true *karma-yogī*, living in life the teachings of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, Professor Vadekar never expected any fruits of his devotion and service to all and to the cause of learning, never hankered for reward even in the imperceptible manner of fame. Yet he was conferred upon the 'Sanskrit Pandit' National Award by the President of India in 1981. He accepted it graciously, with humility and detachment. He looked upon the celebration with a detachment amounting to indifference fit to a seer. A Professor of Fergusson College was thus honoured for the first time in the century-old history of the institution. Out of this century Professor Vadekar was associated with it as student and teacher during 1917-61.

Even though he did all this, his real mission in life was something different. At the age of sixteen he was made aware of it in a dream. Since then he pursued this goal set before him by the Divine, single-mindedly and unflinchingly, through knowledge and devotion, in word, thought and deed, alone through decades, through service and love to the needy, and through yogic *sādhana*. Following the examples of the Buddha, Śrīkṛṣṇa, Ādi Śaṅkarācārya, Jñāneśvara and Sri Aurobindo, knowing them through their writings, he set out to achieve the same goal. And I dare say he did it!

His life spanned almost over the century — 'I am running with the century' — witnessing so many great events including the Freedom Struggle and the attainment of political Independence, to which he contributed silently and unobtrusively by sheltering all the underground workers in his house, and by adopting *khādī* for his 'three piece suit': dhoti, shirt, and Gandhi cap. He remained a bachelor and cooked his own food, and regarded the whole humanity as his family.

He loved modernity and tradition equally, was a great lover of individual freedom and liberty, treated everyone with equality and distributed his love and resources generously, equally. He took keen interest in political events, in life around him, and in the changing face of society.


He has left behind him an ideal of life for emulation and difficult to attain in a single life-time. This vast personality merged into the Infinite achieving a true union with It, with great equanimity, poise and dignity, and with an awareness, but without a flutter, on April 1, 1989, leaving us to ponder over him !

Malati J. Shendge

Professor R. D. Vadekar was actively associated with the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute for a long time. He was a Life Member of the Institute (since 1927), and a member of the Institute's Regulating Council (1930-57).

— Editor

PROFESSOR GOVIND KESHAV BHAT



b. 2. 5. 1914]

[d. 18. 7. 1989

PROFESSOR GOVIND KESHAV BHAT

b. 2-5-1914]

[d. 18-7-1989

The news of the passing away of Professor G. K. Bhat on the 18th July 1989 came as a shock to all those who, only less than a fortnight earlier, had the joy to see him participating in the (for him) 'never-to-be-missed' Annual Meeting of the Institute on July 6, its Foundation Day. It was all the more so with the writer of the present note who had a long and hearty talk with him at his residence only two days before this Meeting! Professor Bhat had just completed seventy-five years in May 89, when he was felicitated by a large number of his friends and students. It was easy to detect then the impact he had made, through his writings and his lectures, on the literary élite besides that on generations of his students. He was among the few who possessed a rare combination of critical scholarship, artistic appreciation and charm of expression.

Born in Nasik on 2nd May 1914, Professor Govind Keshav Bhat had his early education in Nasik but later did post-graduate studies in Bombay. With Sanskrit as his dearest subject and never missing a First Class, Bhat maintained a brilliant academic career at all the University examinations. Apart from bagging most of the coveted University prizes and scholarships for Sanskrit, he secured the prestigious V. N. Mandlik Gold Medal and Prize in 1944 for his essay on the *Vidūṣaka*, which was later published in English, Marathi and Gujarati languages. He took Doctorate in 1950 on the *Dramas of Bhāsa*.

Prof. Bhat served at various Government Colleges in Bombay, Ahmedabad, Kolhapur and Aurangabad for over thirty years, and everywhere he left a mark as a very successful teacher, carrying his point home with penetration, eloquence and animated expressions. He was recognised as a Research Guide at various Universities in Maharashtra and Gujarat. On retiring from the Maharashtra State Education Service in 1972, he joined the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute on 1.6.1972, assuming the offices of Director and Curator; and, having adorned these for seven years, he retired on 15.5.1979, but continued to work there as Research Professor for some months more (from 15.5.79 upto 26.10.79). He was a Life Member of the Institute (since 1951), and was elected a Member of the Institute's Regulating Council in 1981, which position he held till the end.

Dr. Bhat was a recognised literary writer in Marathi, and wrote about twenty-five books and several research papers in English, Marathi and

Gujarati. He touched different themes from Sanskrit literature, including the Vedic, but delighted most in Classical literature, and, there too, in Drama : its theory, art and performance.

Among his important works must be mentioned : *Bhāsa Studies* (doctoral thesis, pub. 1968), *Vidūṣaka* (mentioned earlier, 1959), *Appointment with Kālidāsa* (1982), *Tragedy in Sanskrit Drama* (1974), *Sanskrit Drama : A Perspective in Theory and Practice* (1975), *Bharata-Nāṭya-Mañjarī* (1975), *Nāṭya-Mañjarī-Saurabha* (1981, with an extensive Introduction on Sanskrit Dramatic Theory), and *Theatric Aspects of Sanskrit Drama* (1983), — the last three, published by the Bhandarkar Institute. He wielded a facile pen in English and had always to offer some original and penetrating ideas, whether they be on the fate of Śakuntalā, or on the thought and personality of Kālidāsa, or on the absence of tragedy in Sanskrit drama.

Bhat's interest in dramatic theory and performance led to his playing many-sided rôles as dramatist, actor, director and producer as well. Indeed, Bhat was considered an authority in the staging of Sanskrit Drama. He was also in close touch with the Theatre Movement, and was invited by several learned bodies (University, Governmental, Literary and Public) to deliver special lectures. Two of his books, *Gṛhadāha* and *Vidūṣaka*, won the Maharashtra State Award.

It is a great pity that this enthusiastic scholar suffered, in the last few years, from severe arthritic pain as well as acute deafness. This fact cast serious limitations on his activities, which he withstood with rare equanimity. Neat and disciplined almost to a fault, Professor Bhat was very social and affable by nature. His sudden death was mourned widely and even from unexpected quarters. Professor Bhat will ever be remembered as a lover and original interpreter of Sanskrit poetry and drama, and as a man of jovial temperament.

S. D. Laddu

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R. N. Dandekar
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FORM IV

See Page 3

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